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Abstract 
The ongoing process of globalisation has witnessed an increase in cross-border 
corporate insolvencies involving multinational enterprises (MNEs). Yet, national 
insolvency laws have proven themselves ill-equipped to handle such matters in an 
international setting. Responsible policy-makers and academics argue for the creation of a 
viable international insolvency approach. 
This debate has revolved around an "either-or" spectrum of (1) the theory of 
"Universality" that proposes a single court charged with implementing a single 
bankruptcy law to worldwide claimants, and (2) the theory of "Territoriality" that asserts 
each jurisdiction can only adjudicate the debtor's insolvency on a territorial basis and 
distribute local assets to local claimants. But, this debate yet has yielded no practical 
solution. This thesis suggests that these two theories are not mutually exclusive, and both 
may be utilized in developing a pragmatic and "better" international insolvency 
framework. 
To date, there has been one non-binding international instrument based on 
moderate choice of forum/law provisions: the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (the Model Law). Although the Model Law has significant merits, it falls 
short of the broader expectations a minimally acceptable international insolvency system 
should fulfil. In addition, the regional European Union Council Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings (the Regulation) has recently been enacted. This thesis will argue that, while 
recognizing the special sui generic nature of the EU framework, important lessons can be 
learned from this Regulation, and when combined with certain elements from a revamped 
Model Law approach, a "better" international insolvency framework may be found. The 
concluding observations of this thesis will touch upon a range of existing international 
vehicles that may be complementary or alternative vehicles to channel interim reforms. 
Unless otherwise expressly indicated, this thesis speaks as of I January 2006. 
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For background purposes, the following considers certain basic terms and 
definitions relevant to this thesis, including selective examples of recent, major 
international corporate insolvencies; the basic scope, assumptions and objectives 
underpinning this thesis; and, the methodology used in developing this thesis. 
A,. Terms and Definitions 
Insolvency' law is applied when an enterprise is no longer able to meet its 
obligations to creditors 2. The primary aim of the ensuing proceedings is the maximization 
of the economic value of the enterprise's estate by preventing its muddled 
dismemberment and (according to a statutorily prescribed prioritisation scheme) the 
satisfaction of its claimants to the fullest extent possible. In some cases, opportunities for 
the enterprise's reorganization might be provided. To achieve these objectives in a fair 
and orderly fashion, the overall insolvency framework should respect creditors' rights 
and the relative priority of their claims, equally treat similarly situated claimants, and 
generally seek to strike an equitable balance between the conflicting interests of the 
parties that have a financial stake in the matter. 
Insolvency law has long been applied solely in the domestic domain, with the 
legal assumption being that a given corporation would be governed by the insolvency 
laws of the forum in which it was duly registered, located and operating 3; it was taken for 
1 Unless otherwise stated "insolvency" as used throughout this volume refers to the insolvency-liquidation 
of an indebted corporation. In a number of jurisdictions, however, insolvency proceedings may entail the 
reorganization of the indebted entity. When reorganization proceedings are treated in this work, reference 
thereof will be expressly made. 
2 The insolvency of a debtor can be ascertained pursuant to either a "balance-sheet" test, (which assesses 
whether the total of the debtor's outstanding liabilities exceeds the value of his assets) or a "cash-flow" test 
(which determines the inability of a debtor to pay his debts as they fall due). The concept of insolvency as 
used in this work is the "cash-flow" insolvency concept. 3 Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach To Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. IN'L L. 1,1 (1997); 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum, 65 AM. BR. L. J. 457,457 (199 1). See also S. L. Bufford et al., International Insolvency, available 
at www. abiworld. org/intemational/intllnso. pdf (last visited on March 2006). See in general, Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AMBKRLJ 563 (1996). Neil Cooper, International 
Initiatives: INSOL., 6 International Insolvency Review 85 (1997). 
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granted that all three of these connecting factors would be in the same jurisdiction. The 
domestic court before which claims were submitted would apply its own insolvency laws 
to determine the overall amount of the debt, the administration of the indebted 
corporation's estate, the process of its liquidation and the distribution of the proceeds to 
the various stakeholders4. 
Within this domestic setting, this process may have entailed lengthy and complex 
procedures; however, issues pertaining to the default of this domestic corporation were 
dealt with largely in a predictable and transparent manner. Additionally, there was 
usually little or no doubt as to the identification of the competent forum to settle 
creditors' claims and no uncertainty as regards the applicable law to such domestic 
proceedings. 
With the development of international trade and investment and the surge of new 
technologies, corporations and their subsidiaries and affiliates have extended their 
operations beyond domestic boundariess. Such an expansion has not only contributed to 
an even greater increase of trade and investment, but has also led the domestic 
corporation to create one or several other related corporate entities overseas. This 
"conglomeration" of corporations is formally known as a multinational corporation or 
multinational corporate group 6. 
4 The term "stakeholders" refers to those who may have an interest (financial or otherwise) in the insolvent 
corporation. This includes creditors and shareholders and other categories such as workers, communities 
and governments. See Richard Lieb, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent 
Corporations (University of Toronto Press 2003, Book Review), II AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 551,555 
. 556 (2003). 5 See supra note 3. 
6 Henry Lewis Goodman, Mark P. Friedman & William H. Schrag, Use of the United States Bankruptcy 
Law in Multinational Insolvencies: The Axona Litigation-Issues, Tactics, and Implications for the Future, 
9 BANK. DEV. J. 19,19-20 (1992); Evan D. Flaschen & Leo Plank, The Foreign Representative: A New 
Approach to Coordinating the Bankruptcy of a Multinational Enterprise, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
I H, 112-115 (2002); Hector Jose Miguens, Liability of a Parent Corporation for the Obligations of an 
Insolvent Subsidiary Under American Case Law and Argentine Law, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
217,217-220 (2002). 
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Typically, a multinational corporation consists of a network of subsidiaries 
and/or branches present and operating in more than one country. Through their 
sophisticated structures, capitalization and operations in several domestic markets, 
multinational corporation have come to place themselves as primary economic players in 
the international market 7. Nowadays, it is no surprise to see a number of multinationals 
whose financial base and economic strength, impact and influence outgrow the countries 
in which such multinational corporations are operating and/or established 8. Though these 
corporate conglomerates usually respond to high standards of supervision and control as 
regards risk-assessment and financial exposure, they are not immune from experiencing 
financial distress, and possibly insolvency. Recent cross-border insolvency cases, such as 
the Kirch Group, Yukos, Swissair, Landis, Fairchild Lomier, Philipp Holzmann, 
Daisytek, Parmalat, MG Rover and Collins & Aikman testify to that reality. 
When this international corporate insolvency situation arises, it is needless to say 
that the resulting economic, financial market and social impact can be significantly 
detrimental in more than one country. 9. For instance, the recent debacle of the Enron 
group has produced significant global economic aftershocks, especially in the energy 
industry, not to mention the shaken confidence of investors in the stock markets and the 
rather drastic measures the United States government had to undertake, such as the 
issuance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, so as to try to prevent or to limit future 
recurrences. In turn, this legislation has had significant global impact on corporate 
governance and financial market developments in many other countrieslo. Aside from the 
economic and political implications of the Enron downfall, there have also been legal and 
jurisdictional issues that transpired therefrom. For example, Enron Directo Sociedad 
7 See Cynthia Day Wallace, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State Sovereignty in an 
Era of Economic Globalization 1082 (2002). 
8 Id. 
9 See also Brewer, Thomas L. and Stephen Young, The Multilateral Investment System and Multinational 
Enterprises, Oxford University Press 45, (1998). 
10 Felicia H. Kung, The Rationalization of Regulatory Internationalization, 33 L& POLY IN INTL BUS 
443,467 (2002). 
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Limitadal 1, a fully owned Spanish subsidiary of the Enron Group, had most of its assets 
and employees in Spain. A creditor of Enron Directo has, based on the rather regular 
meetings of the Enron Directo's board of directors in England, sought to establish the 
competence of English courts. In fact, the English court issued an order whereby it 
recognized its primary competence to adjudicate the insolvency of the Enron Directo. As 
a result, a French court refused the opening of main insolvency proceedings requested by 
Enron Directo, advancing that although Enron Directo was incorporated and operating in 
Spain, it was effectively headquartered in England. This case illustrates how important it 
is to have an acceptable degree of cooperation between forums so as to ensure a 
coordinated and coherent adjudication of the insolvency at stake. 
Similarly, another significant recent cross-border insolvency case, also in the 
energy industry, entailing both serious economic consequences as well as jurisdictional 
conflict is the recent Yukos case 12 . This oil giant was established in Russia 
in 1993 from 
a collection of small regional oil and gas companies. From its inception to 2002, Yukos 
had become a leading company in the oil and gas industry, and its production in 2002 had 
reached 590 million barrels of oil with a total market capitalization of more than US$40 
billion. Following the fraud and tax evasion charges filed against its directors in 2003 by 
the Russian governmental authorities, Yukos entered into formal insolvency proceedings 
in Russia. With a total estimate of nearly $30 billion in debt, the assets of the Russian 
giant were set to be sold in a public auction as per Russian law. Surprisingly, in 2004, 
Yukos filed a Chapter II petition in Houston, seeking a restraining order against several 
of its creditors, so as to prevent them from proceeding with the public auction and the 
sales of its assets. The federal district court of Houston found that, although Yukos is a 
foreign entity that was not incorporated in the US, the presence of account trust money 
and the Yukos' chief operating officer in the US, were sufficient to confer to the 
" This case was unreported but for a discussion of its rationale and the arguments presented to confer main 
jurisdiction to the UK court, see Skeleton Argument on Behalf of the Petitioner in Re Enron Directo 
Sociedad Limitada, available at http: //www. iiiglobal. org/country/european_union. htmi (last visited 
February 2006). 
12 In Re Yukos Oil Co. 320B. R. 130. 
11 
American courts an international jurisdiction over the debtor's estate. This case denotes 
how the differences as to the criteria of jurisdiction from one forum to other can create 
substantial conflict of jurisdiction to the disadvantage of the indebted entity's 
stakeholders. It is important to note that, although the Yukos case was later dismissed 
when the Houston federal court decided that, from the "totality of the circumstances", it 
should not interfere and adjudicate cases that bear sensitive political implications and that 
fall within the act of sovereign state doctrine, this detour was in fact very costly and time 
consuming. 
The recent Parmalat insolvency for instance presents an actual illustration of the 
legal challenges that arise from the insolvency of large multinationals. Parmalat SpA was 
a parent company incorporated in Italy. Though controlled by a family group, Palmarat 
had - through a rather aggressive 20 year long acquisitions policy using offshore 
financing vehicles - expanded its operations and spread throughout Europe, South 
America, Asia and Australia. One of its most notorious special purpose vehicles was 
IFSC Limited (commonly known as Eurofood), a company incorporated in Ireland. In 
2003, after a hole of some USD 7 billion in the assets of Parmalat SpA was discovered, 
Parmalat entered into formal insolvency proceedings in Italy, entailing the appointment 
of a special commissioner (administrator). In 2004, Bank of America, a creditor of 
Eurofood, filed a winding up petition against the latter company in the High Court of 
Ireland, which appointed a provisional liquidator to Eurofood. Ignoring the decision of 
the High Court of Ireland, the Italian government - perceiving Parmalat and its 
subsidiaries (including Eurofood) as providers of public services and carrying an Italian 
identity - placed Eurofood under extraordinary administration and as in the case of its 
parent company, appointed a special commissioner to dispose of the assets of the Irish 
subsidiary. Such a conflict of jurisdiction is typical in cross-border insolvency cases, 
where more than one forum may present a legitimate claim to support its competence to 
adjudicate the insolvency at stake. The Eurofood case was later referred to the European 
12 
Court of Justice 13 , which has, questionably, conferred main jurisdiction to the Irish court. 
The reasoning of the ECJ was that Eurofood centre of main interests is the place where 
Eurofood was incorporated, i. e. Ireland. As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters 
of this thesis, whether under the EU Regulation or the UNCITRAL Model Law, the 
determination of the debtor's home country poses considerable difficulties and raises 
conflict ofjurisdictions uneasy to resolve. 
Though also decided on the basis of the EU Regulation, a recent decision of the 
Commercial Court of Nanterre (France) applied a broader construction of the debtor's 
centre of main interests, thereby taking more into account the very spirit of the 
Regulation and its primary aim to ease the insolvency process and administration of 
multinationals. The French court adjudicated this case, Emtec Consumer Media 
Benelux 14 , in February 2006, which entails the insolvency of the Emtec group formed 
by 
three large companies, two of which are incorporated in France, and one incorporated in 
Belgium (Emtec Benelux). Upon the latter's filling of a voluntary insolvency petition 
before the Court of Nanterre for the opening of main proceedings in France, the court has 
acknowledged its primary jurisdiction even though Emtec Benelux presumably (as per 
the EU Regulation) has its centre of main interests in Belgium. Among the criteria taken 
into account by the court so as to assert primary jurisdiction over the foreign entity, 
attention was given to the forum of meeting of the board of directors, the applicable law 
to major contracts, the place where the commercial strategy of the subsidiary is decided 
and the emplacement of the banking and financial institutions to which the subsidiary is 
indebted. All of these criteria unequivocally pointed to France, and as a result to the 
primary jurisdiction of the French court. 
The cases mentioned above provide an introductory and brief snapshot of the 
increasing currency of international corporate insolvencies and of the impact and legal 
13 See Court of Justice of the European Communities (E. C. J. ), Judgment of May 2,2006, Case C-342/04 (not yet published in O. J. ). 
14 Tribunale de Commerce [TC] [ordinary court for commercial issues] Nanterre, February 15,2006, No. 
PCL 2006JOO 174. 
13 
issues that may arise from these multinational insolvencies. A thorough look into 
Eurofood and Emtec can further indicate that not only these jurisdictional conflicts arise 
between forums applying different insolvency laws, but also the judicial battle can take 
place between two forums both implementing the same law (in the instant cases the EU 
Regulation) and the outcome will primarily depend on the more or less restrictive 
construction of that law by either domestic courts or by a central judicial authority such 
as the ECJ. This issue, however, will be more fully treated in Chapter Five. 
As the scope of this thesis pertains to the insolvency of these multinational 
corporations, it would be helpful for the reader to have some definitional context for 
certain of the key terms that will be used recurrently throughout this volume, such as 
"bankruptcy", "insolvency" and "multinational". Regrettably, the definitional area, at 
best, is a torturous one fraught with legal controversies, ambiguities and legal fictions. 
Indeed, in the American context, the word "bankruptcy" is the official term used in 
federal case law and statutes, whereas the vast majority of other countries use the term 
"insolvency". For the purpose of this thesis, which refers to the American federal 
bankruptcy system, to the European Union insolvency model, and to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, the terms "insolvency and "bankruptcy" will be interchangeably used so as 
to designate the same process of liquidating the estate of a corporation that is unable to 
meet its financial obligations, and of distributing the proceeds to its creditors. In some, 
jurisdictions however, a reorganization alternative to liquidation might be available. 
When this is the case, this volume will explicitly refer to the process of "reorganization" 
or "restructuring" of the financially distressed entity. 
Due to this linguistic ambiguity, it should also be noted that "multinational's 
insolvency" and "multinational's bankruptcy" both refer to the financial default of a 
multinational corporation. Additional expressions also refer to such a default and these 
are "international insolvency", "cross-border insolvency"', "transnational insolvency", 
"global insolvency", "international bankruptcy" and "transnational bankruptcy". While 
some of these expressions are more frequently used than others, they all refer to the 
14 
default of a multinational corporation and the ensuing proceedings for its liquidation. 
When the words "regime", "system" or "framework" follow any of the aforementioned 
tenns, the overall expression aims at designating an international legal arrangement 15 
arguably effective to deal with cross-border insolvencies. By definition, such a 
framework is not subordinated to the sovereignty of any particular state and is the regime 
to be created by the international community to address the issues that arise from the 
insolvency process of multinationals. Chapter One will touch upon the notion of the 
"multinational", but for working definitional context, the term refers to a corporation 
and its affiliates (whether or not enjoying an independent legal personality) that conduct 
business in many countries. 
B. Scor)e, AssumDtions and Obiectives 
The insolvency of domestic corporations and individuals is not the subject of this 
thesis. Similarly, securities and insurance corporations and banking and credit 
institutions are excluded due to their special status and the specific public policy issues 
their insolvency induces. However, in some areas, reference will be made to certain 
insolvency statutes or provisions that are applicable to all types of corporations (domestic 
and transnational), and in some instances, to individuals. In such cases, only the effects of 
such instruments on multinational corporations will be taken into account. 
A starting assumption for this thesis will be that domestic insolvency laws - 
traditionally applied to the settlement of the financial default of domestic corporations - 
16 have proved ineffective in dealing with the insolvency of large multinationals . Indeed, 
13 Such a structure may either include substantive insolvency laws or can merely provide for conflict of law 
rules. This prospective framework may also entail the creation of an international court or provide for rules 
on the choice of forum. 
16 The issues that arise from cross-border insolvency cases are complex because they often involve not only 
one multinational debtor, but all of the latter's creditors who are located in more than two jurisdictions. 
Dealing with such a fragmented process can increase the number of unknown problems across sovereign 
borders and necessitates the adoption of clear rules. See, e. g., United States v. BCCI Holdings 
(Luxembourg) S. A., 48 F. 3d 551 (D. D. C. 1995); see also Maxwell Communication Corp. v. SOcidtd 
Gdndrale (In re Maxwell Communication Corp. ), 93 F. 3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Olympia & York Dev. 
Ltd., [1993] 12 O. R. 3d 500 (Ont. Gen. Div. ) (Proceedings in Canada and the United States); In re Maruko 
Inc., 160 B. R. 633 (Bankr. S. D. Cal. 1993); In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 B. R. 597 
(Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1988); see more generally Thomas Gaa & Paula E. Garzon, International Creditors' 
15 
the acquisitions of assets, along with the creation of debts and credits on a global level, 
have contributed to the increase of the number of claimants located in several 
jurisdictions. But, as argued by the great weight of bankruptcy experts, domestic 
insolvency laws have, by and large, not kept pace with globalisation and are often 
inadequate to handle the insolvency process of large multinationals and the various 
resulting claims. A corollary initial assumption is that this inadequacy has led 
academics, scholars and the international community in general to acknowledge the 
increasing need for the creation of some form of viable international insolvency approach 
or framework that is capable of facilitating and improving the insolvency processes of 
large multinationals 17 . 
As a further starting point for this thesis, it will also be assumed that such an 
international insolvency regime 18 should be constructed over time, giving due 
Rights and Bankruptcy, 31 International Lawyer no. 2,273,275-277 (1997); Arnold Quittner, Maxwell 
Communications and Cross-border Insolvency Issues, Practicing Law Institute Commercial Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series 752,647 (1997). 
17 In this respect, the use of international treaties that grant local creditors the right to pursue foreign 
debtors in other countries has been long recognized. With the increase of global trade and business 
activities, the various international instruments have proved relatively deficient to overcome the challenges 
brought forth by globalisation. These deficiencies underscore the importance of the creation of an 
international insolvency regime able to resolve today's complex and cross-border insolvency cases. To this 
end, one has to rely on two sets of rules. Firstly, it is important to define the competent forum, which 
should be in charge of adjudicating these cases. Secondly, it is important to agree on legal principles to 
ensure the mutual recognition and enforcement ofjudgments rendered by this competent forum. 
" This work departs from the assumption that an international convention on cross-bordcr insolvency is 
the most appropriate solution to resolve the issues arising from multinationals' default. The success of such 
a convention is arguably conditioned on the willingness of local courts to apply principles of law different 
from those that apply in purely domestic disputes. So far, the reluctance of domestic courts to cooperate in 
cross-border cases underscores the fact that any multilateral agreement on cross-border insolvency must be 
enforceable and must define the rules according to which competing claims can be resolved. Otherwise, 
national practices may render the establishment of an international insolvency regime futile. This 
prospective regime will have to address widespread practices such as "ring fencing" by which local courts 
ensure that assets located in their jurisdictions receive special protection. Essentially, the aim of ring 
fencing is to ensure that local creditors receive preferential treatment over foreign creditors. "Ring-fencing! ' 
is permitted in some jurisdictions. "ring-fencing assets for the exclusive advantage of a restricted sub-group 
of creditors linked to a specific country; the utilization of so-called "bankruptcy havens" for the purpose of 
defeating attempts to gather and administer property on a collective basis". See Ian F. Fletcher, The 
European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview Comment, with U. S. interest in 
Mind, 23 Brook. J. INTL L. 25,25 (1997). Other than the international convention approach, there are 
proposals of a "contractual" approach to limit the negative effects of Cross-Border Insolvencies. Robert K. 
Rasmussen, A New Approach To Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. IN'L L. 1,16-19 (1997) (the 
author compares market oriented solutions - such as a contractual protection of creditors in transnational 
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consideration to the prevailing insolvency law principles of "Universality" or 
"Territoriality" 19. The former principle proposes that, for each multinational or cross- 
border insolvency case, a single court that is in charge of implementing a single 
bankruptcy law to worldwide claims should decide the insolvency of the multinational in 
question2o. In contrast, the Territoriality principle provides that each jurisdiction can only 
adjudicate the debtor's insolvency on a territorial basis and distribute to domestic 
claimants the proceeds resulting from the liquidation of the debtor's local assets. 
Despite lengthy debates on this issue, to date there has been only one non-binding 
international instrument that suggests an approach geared towards the recognition of 
foreign insolvency proceedings and that is based on moderate choice of forum/law 
provisions (and not on substantive law): the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (the Model Law). Although the Model Law has a number of significant 
merits that could serve as a foundation for a more rational international corporate 
insolvency cases - to the current legislative insolvency norms and proceedings). See also Alan Schwartz, 
Contracting about Bankruptcy, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 127,127 - 131 (1997). "Contractualisnf' as an 
alternative to universalism is not workable domestically or internationally unless it is based on a system of 
dominant security interests. The theoretical benefits of such a system remain highly controversial and its 
prospects for international adoption are bleak7. See Lawrence J. Westbrook, A Global Solution to 
Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,2277 (2000). 
19 See Gerald Dunne, Transnational Insolvency: Centrality versus Territoriality, 112 Banking Law Journal, 
no. 3, at 21](1995); Jay M. Goffman and Evan A. Michael, Cross Border Insolvencies: A Comparative 
Examination of Insolvency Laws of Industrialized Countries, 12 JBKRLP 5 ART. 1 (2003); Wolfgang 
Lueke, The new European Law on International Insolvencies: A German Perspective, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 
369,373 -373 (2001); Liza Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border, Corporate 
Insolvencies, 32 N. Y. U. J. INrL L. & POL. 787,803 -806(2000); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for 
Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216,2216 -2220 (2000); 
Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki Symposium, Transnational Insolvency: A Multinational 
View of Bankruptcy "Claims and Priorities in Ancillary Proceedings under Section 304", 17 BROOK. J. 
INTL L. 477,480 -482 (1991); Lynn P. Harrison ET AL., Dealing with Secured Claims & Structured 
Financial Products in Bankruptcy Cases, 853 PLIXOMM 277,285 -286 (2003); William L. Norton, Jr., 
Chapter 152. International Insolvencies: Fundamental Principles of Cross-Border Insolvencies in the 
United States, NRTN-BLP § 152: 1(2003); Martin 1. Klein, Multinational Insolvencies: Implementing 
International Bankruptcy Cooperation, 12 No. 6 BANKR. STRATEGIST 7,7-8 (1995); Daniel M. 
Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, Current Developments in International Insolvency Law and Practice, 
45 BUS. LAW. 2273,2273 -2274 (1990). 20 The theory of Universalism allows all creditors to be paid from the debtor's assets regardless of their 
locations and the placement of the debtor under collective proceedings is recognized worldwide. This 
recognition may be automatic or sub ect to a formal order of recognition ("exequatue'). Automatic i 
recognition means that the foreign insolvency judgment produces the same effects in the recognizing forum 
as in the forum of issuance. See Chapter One. 
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insolvency framework, the Model Law falls short of the broader expectations a minimally 
f Irl2l. acceptable international insolvency system should uI 
In light of this theoretical deficiency and the absence of an international 
consensus on the matter, regional insolvency instruments have emerged, creating 
insolvency regimes built on an intermediary approach known as "Modified 
UniversaliSM"22 . The move to create such regional 
insolvency regimes has been driven 
by the realization of countries participating in common market schemes or free trade 
areas of the importance of predictable and fair rules to deal with the insolvency of 
multinationals across multiple jurisdictions. One important regional insolvency 
arrangement that achieves this objective is the European Union Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings 23 (the Regulation). While the Regulation is also based on a 
choice of law/forum approach with recognition and enforcement mechanisms, it offers a 
more complete and predictable approach to deal with the insolvency of multinationals 
within the European Community. 
21 See the reference in "Interim Report on Review of the Law of Insolvency: The Enactment of 
UNCITRAL's Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency" 13.5.1 (describing the principles of the Model 
Law as being "modest"). 
22 "The other branch of limited cooperation can be called modified Universalism. It accepts the central 
premise of Universalism, that assets should be collected and distributed on a worldwide basis, but reserves 
to local courts discretion to evaluate the fairness of the home-country procedures and to protect the interests 
of local creditors". See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 
BKNJIL 499,517-519. (Giving an integral definition of Modified Universalism in the American context); 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The All Principles, 
and The EU Insolvency Regulation, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 533,534 -535. These issues will be more 
fully 
covered in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. 
23 Council Regulation NO. 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings available at http: //Europa. eu-int/eur- 
lex/enAiVdat/2000/en 30OR1346. html [Hereinafter the Regulation]. The Regulation is seen to be the first 
regional enactment of'Modified Universalism as it concretizes the possibility for one insolvency proceeding 
in one of the member states (the home Member State, as defined in the directive) to be recognized and 
enforceable within the 15 EU Member States. See generally Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union 
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview and Comment, with U. S. Interest in Mind, 23 
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 25 (1997); Eberhard Schollmeyer, The New European Convention on International 
Insolvency, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 421 (1997). Another significant initiative seeking to achieve similar goals 
is the American Law Institute's Transnational Insolvency Project; see Am. L. Inst., Principles of 
Cooperation In Transnational Insolvency Cases Among The Members Of The North American Free Trade 
Agreement (2003), available at www. aii-org/ali/trans-insolv. htm (last visited January 2006). 
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This thesis will argue inter alia that, notwithstanding the special nature of the EU 
framework and legal instruments and institutions, important lessons might be learned 
from the Regulation 24 , and when combined with certain elements from a revamped 
Model Law approach, a "better" international insolvency foundational framework might 
be established, upon which more effective and more globally-oriented and respofisive 
insolvency rules and approaches might evolve over time. Indeed, despite the unique 
nature of the European Union and the level of integration between its member states, it 
will be argued in Chapter Three and Four that the Regulation may offer valuable insights 
to responsible policy-makers and academics with respect to key international insolvency- 
related issues such as the choice of law, choice of forum and recognition mechanisms. 
The contributions of the Regulation in these areas possible might be able to render the 
Model Law more responsive to the demands of domestic policies. 
The primary focus of this thesis, however is that the international community 
should exit, as argued in Chapters One and Two, from the unproductive theoretical 
deadlock between Universality and Territoriality and unrealistic visions of harmonized 
national insolvency laws. Instead, the focus should be on enhancing the pragmatic 
elements and framework suggested under the Model Law. Additionally, the international 
community should begin to explore finding appropriate vehicles within which the 
revamped and enhanced Model Law approach can be applied and further mature, one 
example of this being discussed in the concluding remarks (Chapter Five). 
In searching for the appropriate transmission vehicles, this thesis will not propose 
the definitive institutional or instrumental components of an international insolvency 
treaty; this is a subject that merits further study. While a comprehensive international 
treaty with detailed substantive, procedural, institutional and dispute resolution 
24 "Comparative study is crucial to negotiations for the evolution of transnational cooperation in bankruptcy 
matters. It is impossible to fashion mutually satisfactory and workable solutions to transnational cases 
without a sound appreciation of the differing premises and differing methods found in the other countries involved". See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 
563,567-568 (1996). 
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provisions would be ideal, given the current international environment, the prospects of 
such a treaty being enacted in the near or medium-term are unrealistic. However, this 
thesis will touch upon, in Chapter Five, a range of existing international vehic, eS25 for the 
purpose of determining whether there may be complementary or alternative tools to 
channel reforms in the area of cross-border corporate insolvency. 
C. Methodoloav 
Chapter One, by way of introduction, highlights, for background purposes, 
selective issues that might stem from the default of multinational corporations and 
exposes preliminarily some of the complexities that arise in such proceedings. This 
discussion should facilitate the understanding of why it is important to create an 
international insolvency system and what the implications of domestic insolvency laws 
are (whether economic, social or legal difficulties) when applied to multinationals. 
Throughout the issues treated, a long-term inclination (i. e., an informed preference of the 
author) toward the theory of Universalism as thý most appropriate theoretical approach in 
resolving transnational insolvency cases will become apparent. This leaning will become 
a logical theoretical conclusion to this Chapter, i. e. "Universalistic" principles appear 
more conducive than Territorial precepts in resolving a number of the difficult 
"transnational" insolvency issues that might involve the multinational. 
But, no matter how theoretically appealing Universalism may be in resolving 
certain cross-border insolvency cases, any effective concrete enactment of this approach 
has yet been realized. Chapter Two will address the most common criticisms of 
Universalism (both legal and political). It will demonstrate that Universalism is not 
exempt from legal imperfections. In fact, a Universalistic methodology to resolve the 
financial distress of large multinationals may be more detrimental to certain categories of 
25 Such as International Financial Institutions, WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Free Trade 
Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaty networks. These potential reform vehicles are discussed in Chapter V. 
20 
creditors and/or countries. This Chapter also will stress the even greater political 
infeasibility of Universalism under its pure form. As a global solution based exclusively 
on either a Universalistic or Territorial approach may not be practically attainable in the 
foreseeable future, Chapter Two ultimately supports an international insolvency regime 
that may be built on a less stringent ("modified") form of Universalism, or on a more 
coordinated form of Territoriality. 
Chapters Three and Four will suggest that the recent EU Regulation illustrates 
such a "blended" approach, from which a number of lessons might be able to be 
transmitted to the Model Law, thereby contributing to the latter's enhancement 26 . 
To identify such potential contributions, Chapter Three will focus, by way of 
example, on choice of forum provisions and their effects under both the Model Law and 
the Regulation. Although the EU Insolvency Convention was an important source of 
inspiration to the UNCITRAL working group 27 , and the Model Law and the 
Regulation 
follow similar standards in identifying the forum entitled to open insolvency proceedings 
against the multinational debtor 28; their purpose, objectives and effects greatly differ from 
each other. This comparative Chapter will be used to highlight what short or medium- 
term improvements could be made to the Model Law as regards its choice of forum 
provisions. 
26 This does not imply that the EU insolvency model may or should be projected onto a global level to 
create an international insolvency system. Rather, understanding the rationale of the Regulation and the 
underlying reasons of its success may reveal necessary pre-conditions to create an international insolvency 
regime predicated on the compromise between Universality and Territoriality. 
27 It should be noted that the Regulation contains the same provisions of the EU Insolvency Convention 
(1995), which was not ratified. See Andre Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border 
Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INTIL & COMP. L. 309,320 (1998). 
28 The approach of the Model Law however is only geared towards recognition of foreign insolvency 
proceedings, and not with the determination of criteria allowing a given forum to open insolvency 
proceedings against the debtor. 
21 
Because unambiguous choice of forum provisions are insufficient to overcome the 
difficulties that arise with cross-border insolvency cases, Chapter Four will stress, based 
on the study of the EU Regulation, the role coherent choice of law provisions should play 
in any transnational bankruptcy regime. A primary focus of this Chapter is to demonstrate 
that the applicable law to the insolvency process of multinationals produces crucial 
effects on the priority ranking of creditors and as such affects the incentives of each 
forum to cooperate with and defer to foreign proceedings when a more effective 
administration of the debtor's estate would so require. In this respect, it will be shown 
how the Regulation could reconcile conflicting priority claims and whether this 
Regulation's original and balanced conflict of law approach might be able to be 
transmitted to the Model Law. 
Although this thesis does not contemplate the creation of a full-fledged treaty on 
cross-border insolvency containing substantive and procedural rules, it is important to 
consider complementary or alternative vehicles able to channel the improvements 
identified in the third and fourth Chapters. To do so, Chapter Five will study 
preliminarily a series of international trade and investment instruments and institutions, 
which might be argued as potentially constituting viable reform vehicles in the area of 
cross-border insolvency in the short or medium term. It is suggested that such vehicles 
might contribute to the enhancement of the Model Law, which should respond to the 
demands of the "de facto" international market resulting from globalisation and from the 
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1. Introduction 
In the "Introduction" to this thesis, by way of selective "real'life" examples, the 
reader is provided a "flavour" of the current day practical importance and complexities of 
multinational insolvencies. In addition, the reader is given a glimpse into the legal 
ambiguities of current domestic insolvency laws and into the two main theories/principles 
for conceptualising international insolvency reform (i. e., Territorialism and 
Universalism). In this Chapter One, the main point being made is that the current absence 
of a viable, comprehensive and coherent transnational insolvency regime causes 
significant transactional ex ante effects (Part 11) and presents investment-related decision 
costs (Part III) for the multinational corporation/enterprise, as debtor and creditor. 
Further, in the context of ex post insolvency efforts to achieve a suitable insolvency 
resolution (Part IV), the absence of an international insolvency framework creates further 
uncertainties and dilemmas. From a theoretical perspective, the logical conclusion, as will 
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be discussed, appears to be the creation of an insolvency regime based on "Pure 
Universalism", possibly in the long-term. Only such an approach will, if ever 
implemented, be able to fully address many of the fundamental issues raised, by way of 
illustration and not by exhaustion, in this Chapter. However, as analysed in Chapter Two, 
such conclusion may be more theoretical than practical. Given this, then the realistic 
fallback and better short and medium-term alternative would be a "modified 
Universalist " approach (Chapters Three and Four) that, while not addressing initially 
many of the fundamental issues, can be developed incrementally and more fully over 
time (i. e., phased) through the use of available international legal instruments and 
vehicles (Chapter Five). As such, this Chapter One attempts to provide the reader a 
broader and appropriate context in which to place the modest thesis being developed in 
this volume as an "interim" stage in the longer-term search for a comprehensive, 
satisfactory and workable corporate insolvency regime. 
Modem domestic insolvency laws aim at establishing equitable, transparent and 
fair insolvency proceedings vis- A- vis all creditors'. Domestic public policies in many 
countries embrace these laws in a manner that generally seek to protect local creditors in 
an effective way2, though the actual policy orientation toward creditors as opposed to 
1 Although such laws can be, with varying degrees, either pro-debtor or pro-creditors, they usually seek to 
achieve the "principle of equality" between creditors by preventing each of them to individually sue the 
debtor. They also aim at reducing the abuses and simplifying the procedures by centralizing the repartition 
of the debtor's assets whenever possible. Robert F. Reilly et al., How to Value Assets and Liabilities When 
Determining Insolvency Under the IRC, ABI JNL. LEXIS 112,1-2 (2001), t Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down 
11,64 AM. BANKR. L. J. 229,229-231(1990); M. Cameron Gilreath, Overview and Analysis of How the 
United Nations Model Law on Insolvency Would Affect United States Corporations Doing Business 
Abroad, 16 BANK. DEV. J. 399,399400(2000); Susan Block-Lifb, Bankruptcy Fraud: Book Review: A 
Humanistic Vision of Bankruptcy Law: Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy 
System (Yale University Press 1997), 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 471,472 (1998); Kurt H. 
Nadelmann, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News from the Common Market and a Reflection for Home 
Consumption, 56 AM. BANKR. L. J. 65,67-68(1982); Ronald J. Silverman Et al., Second Circuit Explores 
Parameters of Ancillary Jurisdiction, ABI JNL. LEXIS 87,4-5(2001); Josefina Fernandez McEvoy et al., 
Mexico's New Insolvency Act: Increasing Fairness and Efficiency in the Administration of Domestic and 
Cross-border Cases, ABI JNL. LEXIS 133,2-7 (2000); Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset 
Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 73 
AM. BANKR. L. J. 385,386-387 (1999). 
2 Insolvency laws may also pursue other policy objectives such as providing for a "fresh starV' to financially distressed corporations. in this respect, a number of domestic insolvency laws encourage the 
24 
Chapter One. 
debtor may vary 3. But, without such "equitable" procedures being applicable in a 
predictable manner, creditors may be adversely prejudiced in trying to collect on their 
claims. This unpredictability, in turn, most likely will adversely affect the future 
availability of credit within the domestic economy. 
In order to achieve these desired policy objectives in the context of a 
multinational's default, extra-domestic legal provisions and approaches may be needed. 
In contrast, insolvency laws remain territorial in scope, as insolvency proceedings most 
often require the active intervention of the domestic judiciary and executive authorities, 
entities that are rooted in the notion of state sovereignty. This "asymmetric" relationship 
between multinationals' default and domestic insolvency laws brings forth a number of 
issues that are not effectively addressed under any domestic insolvency regime4. For 
instance, an effective adjudication of a multinational's insolvency may require the 
collection and liquidation of its assets located in several jurisdictions, whereas 
traditionally, any given court will only have access to those assets located within its 
territory. While the occurrence of multinational default might produce significant 
consequences on the domestic level, such default most likely will also highlight 
reorganization (or restructuring) of a financially distressed company when certain conditions are met 
(discussed below). 
3 Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 485, 
519 (1996); Paul L. Lee, Ancillary Proceedings under Section 304 and Proposed Chapter 15 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 115,165 (2002); Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign 
Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AM. 
BANKR. L. J. 135,175-176 (1992). 
4&, No legal system has developed a very efflcient and effective way of managing the general default of a 
multinational enterprise with assets and stakeholders in more than one country. Indeed, in principle such a 
system cannot be achieved by one country acting alone". See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational 
Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The Ali Principles, and The EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. 
BANKR. L. J. 1,5 (2002) [hereinafter Westbrook, the ALI Principles]. See also Mitchell, J., The 
Economics of Insolvency in Reforming Socialist Economies, 84 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 426,428 
(1990) (Where the author argues that Insolvency laws may have broader economic implications such as 
effects on a country's economic and developmental prospects); George M. Kelakos et al., A Report on the 
International Insolvency Colloquium, 041901 ABI-CLE 689 (2001). "Because of the void in effective 
domestic legislation and in international treaties and conventions, the insolvency community has had both 
the obligation and, as well, the opportunity to achieve advances in the current international regime for dealing with cross-border insolvencies and reorganizations". See E. Bruce Leonard, Development and 
Trends in United States/Canada Cross-border Reorganizations, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 343,346 (2000). 
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transnational issues as to which the domestic insolvency system and rules are unable to 
deal with adequately. 
A main reason for providing this background Chapter is to demonstrate 
preliminarily how and the extent to which the inadequacy of domestic insolvency laws 
- when applied to cross-border insolvency matters - may hinder the objectives of equality, 
fairness, transparency and predictability to the disadvantage of the indebted corporation' 
legitimate stakeholders, by having an adverse impact on certain fundamental ex ante and 
ex post insolvency filing considerations as to the MNC. Moreover, due to the current 
absence of a satisfactory global solution to these problems, this Chapter also, when 
discussing such considerations, will present, arguendo, why certain academic 
commentators and policyrnakers might conclude that an international insolvency regime 
built on the principles of "Universalism" may present - at least in theory -a promising 
solution to transnational insolvencies. This argument will be dealt with in length and 
more critically in Chapter Two. 
But, regardless of the legislation in question, insolvency laws exercise an 
influence on the economic and financial life of many "players"s. Not only do they affect 
the insolvent debtor's business, but also they can directly impact the legitimate 
expectations of its creditors, shareholders, employees, possibly economic and financial 
markets and even legitimate Community interests 6. The absence of a certain, fair, 
equitable and transparent international corporate insolvency regime can only adversely 
5 Aghion, Philippe et al., The Economics of Insolvency Reform, 8 Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization, 525 (1992); Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of 
Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and the United States, 16 BANK. DEV. J. 361,366-369 (2000); see 
also Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditor's Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in 
Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287,353 (2003) (arguing that insolvency 
laws affect not only the insolvent corporation but also solvent companies, lenders, employees, and capital 
markets. ) . 6 Bob Wessels, Principles of European Insolvency Law, ABI JNL. LEXIS 158,1-3 (2003); Dennis F. 
Dunne, Stock Repurchase Agreements in Bankruptcy: A Tale of State Law Rights Discarded, 12 BANK. 
DEV. J. 355,356 (1996); James I- Mayer et. al., Recharacterization from Debt to Equity: Lenders Beware, 
ABI JNL. LEXIS 205 (2003); J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 213, 
309 (1991); Bruce Markell, Changes in Attitudes, Changes in Platitudes: A Short Examination of Non- 
Uniform Approaches to Business Insolvency, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 35,37 (1998). 
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impact and impair sound decision making processes by such affected "players" and other 
legitimate interests 7. 
11. Cross-Border Insolvency and Operational /Contracting Cost Considerations 
While revealing public policy trends chosen by governmentS8, insolvency laws 
produce a significant economic impact on a number of cost and decisional related issues, 
as well as on substantive and procedural law-related issues. Indeed, the insolvency of a 
corporation often entails unforeseeable and unaccounted costs that should be evaluated in 
order to determine how detrimental the overall insolvency process may be to the indebted 
entity and its creditors. These costs, it will be argued, are exacerbated by the current 
uncertain and fragmental insolvency regime(s) and the absence of a satisfactory 
international system 9, and these costs often relate to the MNC's financial operations 
during the pre-insolvency phaselo (e. g., as discussed below in this Section, the areas of 
7 id. 
8 See Berkovitch, Elazar, and Ronen Israel, Optimal Insolvency Law Across Different Economic Systems, 
The Review of Financial Studies 12, No. 2,347-377 (1999); White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me- 
First and Other Priority Rules, II BELL J. ECON. 550 (1980). 
9 On the increasing costs of transnational insolvency litigation and multiple proceedings see Bebchuk 
Lucian A. & A. T. Gusman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J. LAW & ECON. 
775,775-777 (1999); John Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 53,54-60 (1995); Patrick Halligan, Cramdown Interest, Contract Damages, and 
Classical Economic Theory, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 131,133 (2003); William T. Vukowich, 
Civil Remedies in Bankruptcy for Corporate Fraud, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 439,439441 (1998). 
10Insolvency laws play a major role in the promotion of commercial lending and investment choices. In this 
respect, insolvency principles built on Universalism have been long argued to reduce the administrative 
cost of insolvency proceedings. Indeed, the "one court, one law" principle prevents the multiplicity Of 
proceedings, and, by the same token, allow maximization of assets available to the mass of creditors. See 
Adler Barry E., A Re-Examination of Near Insolvency Investment Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REV., 15 
(1995). See more generally Bhandari, Jagdeep S., and L. A. Weiss. Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and 
Legal Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Goode, R. M. Principles of Corporate 
Insolvency Law. 2nd ed: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003. 
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interest rates" and the cost of compiling information before contracting and otherwise 
dealing with a MNC 12). 
A. Discernina, Ex Ante, the Cost of Insolvencv Proceedinas 
Despite the differences that exist between the diverse insolvency laws, there 
appears to be a common trend in managing insolvency proceedings. The first stage 
usually begins with the acknowledgement of default and that the debtor is no longer able 
to honour its duties towards its creditors13 - This state of financial distress can be reported 
by the filing of insolvency, either by the distressed corporation or by its creditors who 
wish to secure their rights. In either case, the ensuing costs from these measures should 
be construed broadly so as to include not only the cost of filing and pursuing insolvency 
proceedings, but also the costs of lost managerial time, disruption of a corporation's 
operation, diversion of assets into risky investments as managers attempt to avoid 
insolvency, and the costs of firms continuing to operate when their assets would be more 
valuable elsewhere14. 
" "A modern, credit-hased economy requires predictable, transparent and affordable enforcement of both 
unsecured and secured credit claims by efflicient mechanisms outside of insolvency, as well as a sound 
insolvency system. These systems must be designed to work in harmony. Commerce is a system of 
commercial relationships predicated on express or implied contractual agreements between an enterprise 
and a wide range of creditors and constituencies". See Gordon W. Johnson, The World Bank's Role in 
Developing Global Principles and Strengthening Capacity in Developing Countries, 112901 ABI-CLE 207 
(2001). 
12 Transactional Cost refers to the costs of borrowing for multinational debtors when the insolvency regime 
to be applied becomes predictable. Professor Westbrook argues that a reduction of this cost "would result 
from a coherent system of trarisnational management of default. The assertion is that the increased 
predictability of the results of default would significantly reduce the costs of borrowing and other credit for 
multinationals. The reductions in cost for many millions of transactions would benefit the local citizens of 
any given country far more than any net loss they might suffer in particular defaults". See Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 457,466 (199 1). On 
the various implications of lower transaction costs, see Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and 
the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107,1111-1112 (1994); Richard V. Butler & 
Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-examination of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 269,269 (1994); Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganization, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 117,117 -118 (1991). 13 Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the 
Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337,431 (1993); Douglas G. 
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: 
A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97,103-04 
(1984). 
14 Robert K. Rasmussen and David A. Skeel, The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85,86-88 (1995) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Economic Analysis]. 
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In the context of a multinational's default, it is argued that these pricey 
disruptions are further aggravated due to uncertainties pertaining to the proceedings to be 
followed, the laws to be applied, and most importantly, the competent forum that will 
decide the case'5. Indeed, the resolution of cross-border insolvency cases can be 
financially burdensome and the more "transnational" the distressed corporation is, the 
higher the costs associated with its insolvency can be. The increase of these insolvency 
costs results from the differences between domestic insolvency laws 
16 and the diverse 
priority claims they entail, which would invite the parties to a difficult evaluation of their 
p off 
17, 
ay s should an eventual insolvency occur. In order to face such impediments to 
international contracting for instance, practicing attorneys have been encouraged to 
undertake protective measures to the benefits of their clients 18 . 
With the enactment of unified global proceedings, it is believed that assets can be 
distributed equally without the distortions that traditionally occur as a result of 
substantive legal divergences19. This method will also reduce the discrimination against 
foreign creditors in domestic insolvency proceedings. The forum handling a case would 
be aware that if it discriminates against foreign creditors to the advantage of local 
creditors, other forums are likely to reciprocate this discrimination in other cases. As a 
result, an implicit reciprocity practice may develop in the long run, along with the 
increase of cooperation among the different forums involved in a transnational 
15 Westbrook J. Lawrence, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum, 65 AMBKRLJ 457,463 (199 1) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism]. 
16 See Ian Fletcher, Cross-Border Cooperation in Cases of International Insolvency: Some Recent Trends 
Compared, 6-7 TUL. CIV. L. F. 171,171 (1992) (arguing that the insolvency laws of different countries can 
vary from minor points of detail to substantial issues of principles). 
17 See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 14 at 467. 
18 A relevant example is provided by the Practicing Law Institute's (PLI) list of recommendations for 
creditors and debtors seeking to minimize the risk involved in cross-border transactions. Available at 
http: //www. pli. edu/ (last visited December 2005) 
" Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INTL L. J. 27,31 -32 (1998) (the author argues 
that a Universalistic system with a possibility of cross-filling would limit the negative effects resulting from 
different domestic insolvency law and the priority claims they entail) [hereinafter Westbrook, Universal 
Priorities]; William L. Norton, Jr. Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, NRTN-BLP § 152: 66(1994) (argues 
that a single forum to adjudicate international insolvencies would result in a number of advantages such as 
64enhancing control of assets, enhancing business values and fair treatment of creditors. Predictability of the 
"natural" administrative forum will also be most supportive of international commerce") 
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insolvency case 20 . Westbrook's best support to this projection is found in the "Rough 
Wash" argument, according to which, "a universal rule will even out benefits and losses 
for local creditors across cases, since losses from local deference to a foreign forum in 
some cases would be offset by gains from foreign deference to the local forum in 
others2l". Differently stated, a cross-border insolvency framework based on Universality 
could increase the value available to domestic claimants in a way to offset the losses 
encountered in cases where the domestic judge defers to foreign insolvency proceedings. 
Furthermore, the various administrative costs (mainly filing and litigating) would be 
lower under a universalistic regime, whereas the same costs would swell under a 
territorial method, as the latter entails multiple insolvency cases and results in a transfer 
of estate assets from creditors to attorneys and other insolvency professionaIS22. 
From a microeconomic point of view, Universalism might well secure the 
transactional gain23. Indeed, if the applicable insolvency regime were more predictable, 
the cost of borrowing for multinationals would be reduced, thus creating other benefits, 
such as more job opportunities and economic development. To implement this 
framework, however, on a global level, an international treaty is needed to prevent 
24 countries from acting unilaterally and territorially . Indeed, by omitting the global and 
20 Shoichi Tagashira, Intra-territorial Effects of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings: An Analysis of 
"Ancillary" Proceedings in the United States and Japan, TEX. INTL L. J. 1,6 -7 (1994) (explains the 
evolution of the Japanese insolvency law ftorn a firm territorial approach to a more flexible cooperative 
stance. An interesting analogy is made with the American Bankruptcy regime where such reciprocity is 
best implemented). See also Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 14 at 468 (Professor 
Westbrook distinguishes between negative and positive reciprocity depending on whether the adjudicating 
forum is first to cooperate (negative) or it is cooperating because of a prior case (positive)); see also Patrick 
J. Borchers, Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests and other Liens in international Bankruptcies, 46 
AM. J. COMP. L. 165,180 -181(1998) (arguing that in cross-border insolvency cases, such reciprocity 
should be differentiated from a less binding international comity. ) 21 See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 14 at 464466. 22 I. F. Fletcher (Ed. ), Cross-Border Insolvency: National and Comparative Studies (Reports delivered at the 
XIII International Congress of Comparative Law, Montreal 1990) (1992), 31-33; J. S. Ziegel (ed. ), in 
Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law, at 16. 23 See supra note 11. 
241n practice, the vast majority of nations do not adopt either approach in its pure form, essentially because 
they find pure Territoriality too costly and pure Universalism politically difficult, but not impossible. See N. Cooper, R. Jarvis and S. Abeyratne, Recognition and Enforcement of Cross-Border Insolvency (1996), 46; R. M. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2nd edn. 1997), esp. Chap. 13. 
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binding character of a potential insolvency framework predicated on Universalism, 
individual countries would naturally tend to adopt a predominantly territorial approach in 
order to attract foreign direct investments and their resultant "spill-over" effects, such as 
technology transfer and employmene5. 
B. Effects of Insolvenev Laws on Interest Rates 
In commercial lending transactions, there commonly is an interest rate that is 
calculated and defined according to many parameters. One of the major factors taken into 
account when defining such a rate is the likelihood of recovery in the case the borrower 
becomes insolvent 26 
. 
Under the national umbrella, when both the lender and borrower 
conduct business exclusively within the same jurisdiction, this interest rate mirrors the 
financial soundness of the debtor. In this case, the insolvency regime is not of primary 
importance, or at the very least, it is not as decisive as in cases of multinational's default 
because there is no doubt concerning either the identification of the competent forum or 
the laws to be applied. Both are predictable factors that do not present any particular 
27 problem 
However, the equation is different when the borrower is a multinational 
corporation that possesses assets and operations overseas. The lender in this case will 
face the same unpredictability dilemma 28 resulting from uncertain transnational 
25 White Michelle J., The Costs of Bankruptcy, " in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, P. 
Newman, M. Milgate, and J. Eatwell (eds). New York: Stockton Press (1992), 19. 26 Id. 
27 See generally D. Campbell, International Corporate Insolvency Law (1992). I. F. Fletcher (Ed. ), Cross- 
Border Insolvency: Comparative Dimensions (The Aberystwyth Insolvency Papers) (1990). 28 See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 14. See also David Costa Levenson, proposal for 
Reform of Avoidance Law in the Context of International Bankruptcies from a U. S. Perspective, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 291,353 -355 (2002) (gives a hypothetical with respect to the Maxwell case 
where the unpredictability of the insolvency regime to be applied could have threatened the expectations of 
creditors). "Territorial ism with traditional successive distributions is unpredictable, even if the 
unpredictability of the location of assets is ignored". See Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset 
Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 73 AM. BANKR. L. J. 385,433 (1999) 
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insolvency rules. It is unclear at the time of contracting which insolvency laws would be 
applied, and most importantly, whether these laws will give priority to the 
creditor/lender's claim. To compensate for this unpredictability, the lender ordinarily will 
increase the interest rate on the transaction in order to secure its credit, should the 
borrower enter into formal insolvency proceedings. 
With the internationalisation of business transactions, increased interest rates can 
harm social welfare 
29 
. Firms' capital raising decisions are likely to be skewed because 
they are being charged for an inefficient insolvency regime that cannot cope with the 
30 
globalisation of business activity . Under such distortion, the principle of Universalism 
would provide the means to all lenders to treat all debtors equally, regardless of whether 
the latter primarily operate overseas 31 , where their most valuable assets are located. 
On 
the contrary, when territorial principles apply to resolve multinationals' insolvency (as it 
is widely the case), the unequal treatment between creditors will persist because such a 
treatment will be solely based upon eventual outcomes in case of the debtor's insolvency 
and not upon the debtor's financial soundness and credit records per se. In sum, a 
Universalistic approach appears to be a way - if effectively implemented - to ensure a 
higher level of cooperation among the various forums involved in the insolvency of a 
29 Bebchuk A. Lucian & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Insolvency: 
Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. (1997), E. B. Leonard and C. W. Besant 
(editors) Current Issues in Cross-Border Insolvency and reorganizations (1994), 37-39. "More expensive 
credit leads to a reduction in economic activity. The lower the amount of economic activity, the less jobs 
there will be in the country as a whole. Attempting to save jobs through an inefficient bankruptcy regime 
may therefore have the opposite of its intended effect. " See Rasmussen, Economic Analysis, supra note 13 
at 87. 
30 See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AMBKRLJ 563 
(1996) [hereinafter Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law]. Neil Cooper, International 
Initiatives: INSOL., 6 International Insolvency Review 85 (1997). 
3 "'The differences in insolvency law (both substantive and procedural) among nations create a serious 
problem in international credit transactions. In the context of a particular failed transaction, the differences 
among insolvency regimes create one more battlefield to be survived in the eventual allocation of the 
debtoes assets". See Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next Frontier, 
33 TEX. INT'L L. J. 173,176 (1998); Marie T. Reilly, The Latent Efficiency of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 
57 LA. L. REV. 1213,1252 (1997) (establishing the relationship between interest rates and the availability 
of assets to secure creditor's claims); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: 
An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and The Creditor's Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155,157 -160 (1999) 
(argues that risk taking should be measured in a more comprehensive way among debtors, hence the 
importance of the decision making process that leads to the determination of interest rate). 
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multinational corporation. This would be true as all of the debtor's assets, wherever 
located, would be collected and distributed to the mass of its creditors 
32 
, and none of 
33 
these assets would be subject to individual lawsuits in multiple forums 
C. The Cost of Information 
For illustrative purposes, consider an adjusting creditor34 in country A that has 
entered into a commercial or financial transaction with a corporate debtor from country 
B. The latter has assets in countries B, C, D, and E. Given the predominant territorial 
approach of current domestic insolvency regimes and the necessity to measure risk- 
taking, the adjusting creditor from Country A will be compelled to gather all the relevant 
information on the competent courts, proceedings and, most critically, on the laws that 
will govern the insolvency of the debtor from country B. Under this scenario, the 
creditor from country A would inquire about the insolvency regimes in each of the 
countries B, C, D, and E. As a general proposition, adjusting creditors would have to 
conduct the arduous task of collecting information concerning each jurisdiction where the 
debtor has assets. Needless to say, such a task would require considerable research, which 
32 Liza Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border, Corporate Insolvencies, 32 N. Y. U. J. 
INTL L. & POL. 787,803 -806(2000); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in 
International Bankruptcy, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2216,2216 -2220 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Case for 
Cooperative Territoriality]; Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki Symposium, Transnational 
Insolvency: A Multinational View of Bankruptcy "Claims and Priorities in Ancillary Proceedings under 
Section 304", 17 Brook. J. Int'l L. 477,480 -482 (1991); Lynn P. Harrison et al., Dealing with Secured 
Claims & Structured Financial Products in Bankruptcy Cases, 853 PLIXOMM 277,285 -286 (2003); 
William L. Norton, Jr., Chapter 152. International Insolvencies: Fundamental Principles of Cross-Border 
Insolvencies in the United States, NRTN-BLP § 152: 1(2003) 
33 Moreover, Universalism would prevent the most diligent creditors to take advantage over the less 
informed or the more limited ones. To a greater extent, this achieves one of the major preoccupations of the 
aforementioned principles of fairness and equality among creditors. The purpose of administration is to 
enable an insolvent corporate debtor to trade out of insolvency or to dispose of its assets on a more 
favourable basis than would be achieved in liquidation by allowing the debtor the benefit of a statutory 
moratorium (automatic stay of proceedings) on creditors' ability to enforce their rights. While the debtor is 
in administration, directors are suspended from their duties and a court-appointed administrator manages 
the financially distressed corporation. See Jay M. Goffinan and Evan A. Michael, Cross Border 
Insolvencies: A Comparative Examination of Insolvency Laws of Industrialized Countries, 12 JBKRLP 5 
ART. 1 (2003). "Perhaps the largest drawback of territorialism is that it encourages a race of the diligent 
around the world wherever creditors can find and seize assets belonging to the debtor. Thus, international 
insolvency proceedings involving one debtor and multiple creditors often run concurrently in a variety of 
states, with creditors competing with one another to seize a debtor's assets". See Sara Isham, UNCITRAL'S 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Workable Protection for Transnational Investment at Last, 26 
BROOK. J. INTL L. 1177,1181 (200 1) [hereinafter Isham, Workable Protection]. 
34 The terms "adjusting" and "non-adjusting" creditors are borrowed from Bebchuk A. Lucian & Jesse M. 
Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Insolvency, 105 YALE L. J. (1996) 
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can be time-consuming and costly 35 . In turn, this cost over expenditure would 
be 
reflected in the transaction itself as one of the most significant ex-ante costs of inadequate 
territorial insolvency laws. 
If Universalism could find a concrete policy enactment and the "one court, one 
law" principle is realized, either through an international treaty or through "cooperation 
protocols" among courts 36 , the cost of information would be significantly reduced 
37 
- 
Adjusting creditors' efforts in gathering the necessary information to tailor the terms of 
their transactions would be limited to the debtor's home country insolvency regime 
38 
- 
Additionally, reduced cost of information might give non-adjusting creditors the 
incentive to adjust their terms of credit and become adjusting creditors who might then 
wish to benefit from the unity of insolvency proceedings governed by one law under the 
auspices of one forum 39 . 
111. Insolvencv Principles and Ex Ante Investment Decision-makitip. 
At first glance, insolvency laws and investment appear to have few 
commonalities. However, insolvency laws can significantly influence investment 
decisions. The costs created by the insolvency of a corporation are not only considered 
once a multinational has known financial distress or has filed for insolvency. Insolvency 
laws can have ex-ante effects on investment incentives, which can result in additional 
" In association with what has been argued above, a more complete list of the costs of territorialism might 
include the administrative costs of multiple insolvency proceedings, which would oblige creditors to pursue 
their claims in many jurisdictions at the same time. In addition, attention should be given to the efforts Of 
creditors regarding the attachment of assets, especially in jurisdictions in which insolvency has not yet been 
filed. 
"E. Bruce Leonard, The Way Ahead: Protocols in International Insolvency Cases, 17-JAN AM. BANKR- 
INST. J. 12,12 -39 (1999) (explains the increasing use of protocols to resolve cross-border insolvency 
cases, he also provides a list of cases where protocols between different courts have effectively limited the 
risks associated with assets dissemination); for a general discussion on the use of protocols see Evan D. 
Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, Cross- Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, 33 TEX. INTL. L. J. 
587,593 (1998). 
37 See Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, supra note 29. 
38 Nonetheless, the concept of home country can be subject to further criticisms and legal debates (treated 
in chapter 11). 
39See Andrew T. Guzman, In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177,2201 (2000) 
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insolvency costs and can skew the investment decision-making processes of affected 
parties. 40 . 
These various costs - also known as agency costs - can be examined in three 
stages. Firstly, insolvency laws determine the principles according to which loss sharing 
between shareholders and creditors will be managed. As a result, shareholders incentive 
to invest will be dictated in light of their payoff in case of insolvency, and whether 
specific ex-ante investments will increase the value of their equity in the financially 
distressed corporation4l. As it will be demonstrated, the incentive to invest will vary 
according to the insolvency regime in place and whether or not it applies an absolute 
priority rule 42 . Secondly, and contrary to traditional versions of the 
"corporate veil" 
doctrine, domestic insolvency laws may hold domestic corporations liable for the debts 
contracted by their subsidiaries overseas. As a result, multinationals may be reluctant to 
invest in a foreign country unless risk measuring guarantees a successful investment, 
something that the most careful feasibility study cannot ensure. Hence, the size of 
investments in the long run may decrease to the disadvantage of social welfare and 
development. Finally, under Territorial insolvency principles, multinationals may choose 
to invest and to borrow strategically, not according to the revenues expected in return, but 
40 "Insolvency law determines the allocation of a firm's assets when the firm cannot meet its obligations. 
This allocation in turn affects the investment decisions of the firm outside of insolvency". See Rasmussen 
Robert K., The Ex Ante Effects of Insolvency Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1159, 
1163 (1994) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects] 
41 11 irm Id.; see also Berkovitch, Eli, Ronen Israel, and Jaime F. Zender An optima insolvency aw and f- 
s ecific investments, European Economic Review 41,487497(1997). 266 
An insolvency regime under which priority is respected would stabilize the costs associated with both 
debt and the division of ownership and control. However, in practice, creditors are never paid in full 
whereas shareholders continue to receive equity interests in the firm". See Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, 
supra note 39 at 67-72, (the author also envisages a legal regime according to which losses shall be equally 
shared between shareholders and creditors, i. e., a regime that respects contractual priorities despite the 
author's pragmatic approach in designating the most appropriate legal regime and his reluctance in 
identifying that very regime, one can reasonably deduce that this regime is based on Universalism. In fact 
the author strongly stresses the importance of a single forum and a single law to deal with cross-border 
insolvency cases). In general see C. Kenneth White, Trading Claims in Bankruptcy; Trends, issues and 




in virtue of the possibility to confer senior status to new creditors at the expense of old 
creditors, usually located in other jurisdictionS43. 
A. Absolute Prioritv Rule v. Loss-Sharin 
While the form of a better cross-border insolvency framework is the subject of 
ongoing discussions and disagreements among insolvency scholars and academics, there 
is a consensus on ex-ante insolvency costs and how they should be reduced to the 
advantage of the firm's stakeholders and society in general. It is therefore important to 
assess the role of domestic insolvency laws and their influence on investment incentives, 
as much as it is necessary to understand that these laws determine the payoffs of the 
corporation's shareholders in advance, if and when this corporation fails 
44 
. As such, the 
behaviour of those shareholders will be structured in light of the foreseeable outcome 
when the financially distressed entity is no longer able to honour its obligationsý5. These 
outcomes vary from one insolvency regime to another, especially if the liquidation 
system at stake respects an "absolute priority" rule. 
By definition, an insolvency regime that respects an "absolute priority" rule is a 
system where shareholders cannot be paid the value of their equity unless debt holders 
f 1146. 
are paid in U Moreover, shareholders cannot participate in reorganization plans (if 
any) of the distressed corporation unless creditors are fully paid, or at least a consensus 
on less than full payment is reached among the parties. As a result of this strict system, 
43 See Caryn M. Chittenden, After the Fall of Maxwell Communications: Is the Time Right for a 
Multinational Insolvency Treaty?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 161,179 (1993) (argues that the European 
Insolvency Convention would have to create a system that increases the security and predictability for both 
the company pursuing investment abroad as well as the domestic creditors funding such investment). See 
also American Bankruptcy Institute, Celebrating 20 Years of Service to Bankruptcy Professionals, 21-JUN 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 52,59 (a program titled, "Insolvency Risks Involved in Multinational Lending: 
Should Lenders to Multinational Borrowers Beware? ") 
44 See Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 3 9, at 1165. 
45 Id. "the agency costs of asset substitution, underinvestment, and managerial entrenchment all stem from 
the payouts which the various parties receive when a given project fails" 
4644 When absolute priority is strictly followed, senior claims are paid in full before junior claims get paid at 
all. Of particular significance, strict adherence to absolute priority eliminates the equity claim because it is 
the most junior". See Alan Schwartz, The Absolute Priority Rule and the Finn's Investment policy, 72 
WASH. U. L. Q. 1213,1214 (1994). 
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47 - pre-insolvency investment decisions are not taken in accordance with societal interests, 
as shareholders may want to increase the value of the firm's liquidation in the hopes of 
repaying all debt holders and at least a part of their equity value. 
To illustrate this situation, consider a corporation (C) that has assets (A = 10) and 
debts (D = 12). Because C is insolven t48, the shareholders equity value will be worthless 
after the full repayment of debt holders. On the other hand, consider that prior to the 
insolvency liquidation, the shareholders of C were presented with an investment project 
(P), with a cost of 10 and expected revenues of either nil or 14; with both possibilities 
being equally probable. The net present value of this project is -3 
49. The project's net 
value is negative and should not be undertaken by F's shareholders5o. Nonetheless, where 
insolvency laws apply an absolute priority rule to the liquidation of corporations, 
shareholders will be motivated to undertake this investment project, although doing so 
does not serve the best interest of the indebted corporation. Indeed, absent the investment 
at stake, C Shareholders equity value is nil. With this investment project being 
undertaken, the value of their equity in the best case scenario (revenue from P= 14) will 
be 2, whereas the failure of the project would not affect their equity value, which would 
be nil regardless. Such an ex-ante investment decision disregards the corporation's 
interests because it only serves the shareholders' objectives of increasing their equity 
value. 
47 This pre-insolvency period starts from the time a given corporation is facing financial distress that is 
likely to compromise its continuity. Although insolvency proceedings are not initiated by or against this 
entity, the activities of the latter are suspended or significantly reduced as a result of the lack of resources. 
During that period, transactions entered into by the management may be suspect and are often subject to 
special avoidance law rules. 
4ý The concept of insolvency used in this context is "balance sheet insolvency", where a company is 
deemed insolvent when its balance sheet shows a net deficit, i. e., when its liabilities exceed its assets. 49 See Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 39, at 1183 (wrong cross reference). "The present value of 
an investment's future net cash flows minus the initial investment". If positive, the investment should be 
made (unless an even better investment exists), otherwise it should not. 50 Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1497-98 (1993) (argues that "directors should pursue 
projects that have positive net present value to the company as a whole, and not just a positive effect on 
either debt or equity") [hereinafter Lopucki, Corporate Governance]. 
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On the other hand, let us assume the same scenario illustrated above, however 
losses are now shared among the various stakeholders through a defined pro rata of the 
liquidation proceeds. If these insolvency laws were to attribute a portion of C's assets to 
its shareholders at least equal to 2, the shareholders would have had fewer incentives to 
undertake a project with a negative net present value. In this example, the loss sharing 
approach may have prevented an inefficient capital placement, while serving societal 
interests. However, this does not mean that loss sharing will always be preferred to 
absolute priority. In fact, only when the corporation is facing an outstanding debt will 
loss sharing be the better approach to liquidate the financially distressed entity and to 
prevent irrational investment decisions to be taken by its shareholders5l. Yet the situation 
differs when the corporation in question is solvent, but is facing financial distress due to 
an inadequate capital structure. 
In the previous scenario, we assumed that C had an outstanding debt of 12 and the 
value of its assets was only 10. Let us assume all the conditions in the example above 
remain constant, save that C owes only 8 to its debt holders. C is not insolvent, but its 
shareholders should quickly reinstate a better capital structure to the corporation. The 
same potential investment project is presented with its net negative value of-3. Absent 
this investment, and under a regime that respects absolute priority, C shareholders equity 
value will be 2. In the event the investment project is undertaken, the same equity value 
can be reduced to nil. Thus, the absolute priority regime will deter C's shareholders from 
pursuing this investment project for fear of value loss of their equities in the corporation. 
On the contrary, where a loss sharing approach is applied, the shareholders can disregard 
an eventual devaluation of their equities, as the prospects of value increase are higher and 
can motivate them to undertake defective investments, harmful to the corporation's 
interests 52 . In the present example, if the project fails, C's debt holders will share the 
51 Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation, 37 XECON 157, 
159(1994) 
52 See Betker, Brian, Management's Incentives, Equitys Bargaining Power, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter II Bankruptcies, Journal of Business 68,161-163 (1995). See also Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' 
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losses and allow C's shareholders to be paid a portion of their equity value (between nil 
and 2). However, if the project succeeds, C's shareholders equity value will significantly 
increase to 6, without sharing this surplus with creditors. In other words, when losses are 
incurred under this regime, creditors and shareholders jointly bear the cost; whereas only 
shareholders will reap potential benefits 53 . In this case, shareholders will have the 
incentive to invest in a net negative value project because insolvency laws, particularly 
distribution principles and the loss sharing system encourage this type of behaviour 54 
when the corporation is facing financial distress without yet being insolvent. Needless to 
say that this distortion of capital placement can accelerate the decline of many firms, 
which might have been averted with diligent business decisions and investment choices. 
While each approach encourages deficient investment decisions under specific 
circumstances, domestic insolvency regimes are neither pro"absolute priority" rule, nor 
pro "loss-sharing". Consequently, in a number of insolvency cases, poor investment 
decisions are taken to the detriment of social welfare. Furthermore, there is no 
compelling proof on a domestic level that firms will be better off under either of the two 
approaches, and it is not the objective of the present work to identify the most appropriate 
method to liquidate insolvent firms". However, it is important to adhere to one approach 
Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989); Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": 
Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219 (1989). 
53 See Lopucki, Corporate Governance, supra note 49 at 753. See also Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra 
note 39, at 1185 (arguing that all downside risks are bome by the debt holders. "The larger the insolvency 
of the firm, the more likely it is that the firm will forgo projects which have a net present value". This 
makes the existence of a unified and predictable regime especially relevant in the context of multinationals, 
which are by definition large corporations). "Managers have an incentive to transfer wealth from debt to 
equity holders through excessive distributions to shareholders or excessively risky investment policies". 
See F. H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 243,244 (1992). 
54 It is important however to highlight that not all negative net value investment projects are against social 
welfare. In some cases, a negative net value investment can bring a financially distressed firm closer to a 
state of solvency, enabling it to subsequently undertake similar projects that would save the firm and 
reinstate it to complete solvency. Nonetheless, investing in negative net project value projects is a sign of 
firms' decline and very often dissimulates the selfish incentive of shareholders to increase their equity 
value. 
55 See Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 39 at 1180 (favoring a contractual approach to guard against 
the insurance of debts. The author argues that the issue of the most appropriate liquidation system should 
be left to the agreement between creditors and shareholders). 
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so creditors may secure their rights against flawed investment decisions taken during the 
pre-insolvency phase. 
In light of the above and the increasing number of multinational's creditors and 
shareholders located in various jurisdictions, such a unified approach to liquidation 
appears to be essential. Indeed, if global insolvency proceedings are to be foreseen in the 
future, differential treatment is likely to promote further inequalities, under-investment 
and poor capital placements 56 . This situation should multiply the disparity between 
creditors of the same class, while reducing the possibilities of restructuring of the 
multinational (see infra). Most importantly, this differing treatment should invite the 
various insolvency courts and professionals to conduct meticulous post-insolvency 
examinations of defective and fraudulent investment choices on both the domestic and 
international level 57 
. 
Furthermore, corporations regulated by an insolvency regime that respects 
absolute priority will be able to attract more creditors and funding compared to firms 
where liquidation procedures allow loss sharing among creditors and shareholders. In 
order to lend to these firms where priority of payments is not guaranteed, creditors may 
wish to charge higher interest rates on their loans (supra) reflecting the risks they are 
prepared to take. 
These two methods of liquidation bring forth the issue of priority claims among 
the insolvent corporation's stakeholders. While each domestic insolvency regime has its 
own methods to liquidate insolvent firms, and a specific order in which the various 
claimants are paid, common priority claims can be identified in most insolvency regimes. 
56 See Lopucki, Corporate Governance, supra note 49. 
57As previously mentioned, a number of deceptive practices are subject to specific control such as 
investments made during the pre-insolvency periods, which are governed by contract avoidance law rules. 
On the notion of suspect period, see article 15 in The World Bank's report entitled Principles and 
Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems available at www. worldbank. org/gild (last 
visited March 2006). 
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This being said, it is believed that an international order of priority can hardly be 
established in the short or medium term, instead an international insolvency regime can 
help establish standards of supervision during the pre-insolvency phase for 
multinationals. Such a projection does not mean that the connection between insolvency 
laws and investment will dissipate. However, under a Universalist regime governing the 
insolvency of large multinationals, the interplay between financial default and investment 
incentives can be better understood and controlled so as to reduce the negative effects of 
inefficient capital placement. It will also enable multinational firms to borrow efficiently 
without bearing the cost of risk-taking by creditors (supra). Finally, it might allow debt 
holders to protect their rights in the best way possible. 
B. Liability of a Parent Corporation for Insolvent Subsidiaries 
Enterprise law regulates the relationship between a parent company and its 
subsidiaries. The traditional view of corporate principles regarding this relationship is 
that, subject to very narrow exceptions, the subsidiary is a separate legal entity from its 
,, 8 parent. This principle is known as the doctrine of "corporate veil 5, which basically 
separates for corporate legal purposes the liability of the parent company from that of its 
subsidiaries. Despite the considerable financial and managerial dependence of the 
subsidiary vis- a- vis its parent, corporate principles have long treated both companies as 
independent legal entities liable only for their respective commitments". Although, 
domestic courts have occasionally, under differing theories to prevent fraud and 
substantial injustice, "pierced this corporate" veil6o between the parent company and its 
58 Meeran, R., The Unveiling of Transnational Corpor 
, ations: 
A Direct Approach, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999; Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 227,237 (1990); Palmiter, Alan R., and Lewis D. Solomon. Corporations: Examples and 
Explanations. The Examples & Explanations Series. 4th ed. New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003; Presser, 
Stephen B. Piercing the Corporate Veil. Corporate Law Series; 4. New York, N. Y.: C. Boardman, 1991; 
Patrick C. Sargent, Bankruptcy Remote Finance Subsidiaries: The Substantive Consolidation issue, 44 
BUS. LAW. 1223,1223 (1989) 
59 Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy, BKRENVOB § 10: 32 (2004) (argues that 
despite 'control' criteria used by courts, the overriding approach is to separate the two entities as regards 
their financial obligations). 
60 See Lubbe et al. v. Cape PLC and Related Appeals (2000) House of Lords (where the criminal liability of 
the parent company was at issue because of the tortuous conduct of its subsidiary located in another 
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subsidiaries, these are instances where the subsidiaries have been manipulated to effect a 
fraud or injustice on creditors and other third parties. Said differently, the corporate veil 
doctrine or the limited liability concept will apply to separate the parent from the liability 
of its subsidiary so long as no fraud or wilful misconduct has been committed. This is the 
same general principle that governs the liability regime of shareholders in a limited 
liability structure. 
Because subsidiaries and affiliates are usually a "tool" for realizing the economic 
goal of the parent company in the overall operation of the group 61 , an alternative practice 
was developed so as to treat a corporate group as a single entity that responds to the 
liability of the parent and its subsidiaries altogether. This practice is reflected in the 
concept of the "enterprise"62 and recognizes the existence, as a single unity, of corporate 
groups for taxation and consolidated account purposes. For instance, taxation problems 
arising from transfer pricing and inter-group trades cannot be dealt with unless the overall 
corporate group is treated as a single corporate entitY63. 
country); see also City of NY v. Exxon Corp., 112 BR at 553; Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. TL James & Co., 893 F2d 
at 83-84; United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (ED Pa. 1989); American Bell Inc. v. Federation 
of Tel. Workers, 736 F2d 879,886 (3d Cir. 1984); FruehaufCorp. v. Massardy (France), 5 
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 476 (1966); Compagnie Europdenne des Pdtroles S. A. v. Sensor Nederland 
B. V. (Netheriands)(Holland), 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 66 (1983); Dow Jones& Co. v. Attorney 
General of Canada, 122 D. L. R. 3d 731 (Fed. Ct. A pp. 198 1), affg, 113 D. L. R. 3d 395 (Fed. Ct. 1980); Tahan 
v. Hodgson, 662 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 198). 
61 See generally Berkovitch, Elazar, and Ronen Israel, Optimal insolvency law across different economic 
ystems, The Review of Financial Studies 12, No. 2,347-357(1999). 6 6 See P. Blumberg. The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems in the Bankruptcy or Reorganization of 
Parent Subsidiary corporations (1987) §§ 17.09.2,17.16,17.23.4). The new doctrine, suggested by 
Blumberg seeks to trace the decline of entity law and the emergence of enterprise law as the standard for 
application to corporate groups and their constituent corporations. Entity law, the view that each 
corporation is a separate legal personality, originally arose from philosophical roots. It was strongly 
reinforced by acceptance of the doctrine of limited liability in the early nineteenth century in the United 
States and several decades later in England. With the development of limited liability for shareholders, 
entity law became firmly established as the legal framework that preserved a strict line of demarcation 
between the corporation conducting the enterprise and the shareholders who owned the enterprise. 
63 See Vagts, Detlev F., The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, Harvard 
Law Review, 83,94-96 (1970). 
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While for accounting and taxation purposes, a corporate group can be considered 
as a single entity, the insolvency of multinationals or corporate groups remains an area 
where the separate entity approach is the overriding principle. Therefore, as it will be 
further developed and discussed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, the debtor's 
centre of main interests, presumably the debtor's place of incorporation, can be difficult 
to apply to corporate groups. Indeed, if the corporate group is formed by a number of 
subsidiaries, each incorporated in a different jurisdiction; there will be no such thing as a 
single court having overall jurisdiction over the insolvency of that group. In order to 
confer an overall jurisdiction to the parent's forum, probative evidence must be offered so 
as to reverse the presumption of the place of incorporation (as being the home country of 
each subsidiary) and to prove that the "real" centre of main interest of each subsidiary is 
located in the parent company's place of incorporation 64 . Doing so would ease the access 
to the subsidiary's, and possibly parent's assets (in instances of fraud), that are located in 
65 the parent's forum . It is needless to say that the requirements to rebut the presumption 
of the place of incorporation may differ from one jurisdiction to the other. 
As regards investment incentives, multinationals will be more reluctant to 
undertake projects or integrate markets where domestic insolvency laws allow claimants 
to easily turn against the parent corporation for the debts contracted by its subsidiaries 66 . 
Instead, an investment will be more favourably considered if it is governed by an 
insolvency regime(s) that is more stringent in shielding the parent company from claims 
64 See Sandra Miller, Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European 
Community and in the US: A Comparative Analysis of US, German, and UK Veil Piercing Approaches, 36 
AM. BUS. L. J. 73,74 (1998). 
65 Muchlinski, P., Corporations in International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the United 
Kingdom Asbestos Cases'50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1,6 (2001). 66 From a corporate governance perspective, a number of multinationals may actually rely on this fictive 
"corporate veil" to limit their liability in case their subsidiaries encounter financial difficulties. This overall 
interest of the "group" could encourage the parent company to circumvent creditors' rights. See Lynn M. 
Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1,20 -23 (1996) (argues that the parent-subsidiary 
relationship provides an effective strategy to shield the parent from liability); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L. J. 1879,1920 
(1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 
1613-14 (1991) ("A corporation can... limit its exposure to tort victims by segregating the business which 
causes injury into a separate corporate unit. "). 
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resulting from the activities of its subsidiaries. In turn, jurisdictions that are strict as to the 
application of the corporate veil doctrine and offer little prerogatives to claimants to 
reverse the presumption of the centre of main interests (arguably the place of 
incorporation) are likely to attract more foreign investments than regimes that may allow 
claimants to seek the liability of the parent company 67 . 
With such a disparity, along with the absence of global standards to regulate the 
treatment of corporate groups - especially in times of financial distress - poor investment 
decisions may be taken to the detriment of social welfare, which will equally harm the 
interests of the corporation's stakeholders. This time, bad capital placements are not 
unproductive because of a negative net present value as previously explained. Instead, 
they are faulty because the motivation underlying these investments stem from a desire to 
limit the potential liability of the parent corporation, which often does not result in the 
most economically favourable investment. There is no doubt that corporations should 
meticulously calculate the risks they are prepared to take. Measuring risk taking however 
does not mean an integral exclusion of responsibility. The potential liability of the parent 
company should not deter managers and/or directors of corporations from undertaking 
promising investment projects, as this reluctance to invest may negatively affect social 
welfare and lead to a state of stagnation of commercial activities. 
C. Privileped Creditors and Prioritv Claims 
The issue of priority claims arises when a multinational debtor decides to borrow 
from and invest in other jurisdictions. In light of current territorial rules, already indebted 
multinationals may choose to invest and borrow strategically; not according to the 
67 Edward M. Graham, Global Corporations and National Governments, Washington DC: institute for 
International Economics, 1996 (analyses the tensions between increasingly global corporations and the 
continuing national focus of governments and concludes that there is a strong need to enlarge and 




revenues expected in return, but according to the possibility of conferring senior status to 
new creditors at the expense of old privileged creditorS68. This technique enables 
multinationals to reduce the cost of borrowing because these new lenders - located in a 
66virgin 699-) jurisdiction - can be granted "senior priority") on their credits, either by law or 
contractually. As a result, privileged creditors, who acquired their rights by virtue of 
previous dealings with the multinational, may see their privilege diluted. With an 
international insolvency regime that would control this questionable practice 70 , and that 
would create binding norms "to supervise" the seniority of claims on a global basis, an 
overly manipulative multinational might likely to be deterred from pursuing this 
technique; hence, a more efficient capital allocation may be opted for. Under such an 
optimal system, the issue of priority claims would not influence multinational's choice to 
borrow and to invest in specific jurisdictions that are not the most profitable place for the 
business at stake. 
With multiple priority claims differing from one jurisdiction to another7l and the 
limited possibility for cross-filing 72 ,a global insolvency regime could also afford 
the 
protection needed to foreign creditors. Indeed, most insolvency laws are now drafted 
according to a rather territorial approach, and this creates an incentive for firms to skew 
their investment choices 73 , while diluting creditors' rights. Such an 
inefficient capital 
68 See Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 39 at 1172 (the author argues that a insolvency regime under 
which priority rule is respected would stabilize the costs associated with both debt and the division of 
ownership and control. However, in practice creditors are never paid in full whereas shareholders continue 
to receive equity interests in the firm. ) 
69 This term refers to a jurisdiction where the multinational in question has no creditors and where it does 
not conduct any commercial activity. 
"' See Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, Oxford, Cambridge MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1995. 
71 "Although most countries treat similarly situated creditors similarly, not all countries use the same 
criteria to determine what makes creditors similar". See Martin N. Flics & Michael J. Ireland, Bankruptcy 
and the Problems of Multi-Jurisdictional Workouts, 592 PLI/COMM 415,424 (199 1) 
72 On the concept of cross-filling and universal cross-priority, see Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra 
note 18 at 29 -31 (argues that the predominant territorial approach of domestic insolvency laws does not 
recognize - in the majority of cases - the status of foreign creditors, far less allow them to lodge their claims 
according to the priority they would have enjoyed before their domestic court and pursuant to their 
domestic insolvency law). 
73 See Isham, Workable Protection, supra note 32 atl 177. See Westbrook, the ALI Principles, supra note 4 
at 30 (argues that "it seemed apparent that closer integration and cooperation in the insolvencies of 
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allocation tends to be pricier than the administrative costs of insolvency per se, as argued 
74 by Michelle White 
. 
In sum, not only do insolvency laws affect the financially 
distressed corporation, but they also affect all corporations before they face financial 
distress insofar as such entities may be better off by implementing more lucid and 
economically successful investment choices, had it not been for a defective insolvency 
framework. This distortion of capital allocation is also harmful to social welfare and can 
be avoided, according to Bebchuk and Guzman, by opting for a universal system of 
supervision 75 . 
In sum, the ex-ante effects of insolvency laws are important in appreciating the 
desirability of an international insolvency framework 76 , particularly as 
insolvency laws 
exercise considerable ex-ante effects on investment incentives, and can act as a source for 
the success or failure of a business. 
IV. Insolvencv Precepts and Ex Post-Insolvency Effects 
Ex- ante effects of insolvency laws are not the only elements to consider in 
assessing the need for an international insolvency regime. Insolvency laws produce 
various effects once a given corporation has formally entered insolvency proceedings. 
Among other solutions to this state of financial distress, some insolvency systems may 
permit the rescue of the distressed corporation by creating efficient restructuring tools at 
the disposal of shareholders and creditors. Needless to say, with more corporations being 
rescued, further economic and social gains should be expected77. Along with this 
corporate rescue option, insolvency principles should also ensure that the distressed entity 
is heading in the right direction, led by competent management. Therefore, a global 
multinational companies were essential to full realization of the free flow of investment contemplated by 
the NAFTA"). 
74 See Michelle J., The Costs of Bankruptcy, supra note 24. 75 See supra note 28. See also Weiss, L, Insolvency Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of 
Claims, Journal of Financial Economics, 27,285-288 (1990). 
76 Fletcher Ian F., Insolvency in Private International Law, Oxford University Press 1997,56-60. 77 Jean Braucher, Bankruptcy Reorganization and Economic Development, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 499,499 
(1994) (argues that the rescue option for corporations would increase economic benefits). 
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insolvency system could be argued to be a vehicle for reform with respect to corporate 
governance matters in the context of multinationals. And finally, an effective insolvency 
system should encourage private initiatives to resolve insolvency cases, thus reaching 
more market-oriented solutions in the failure of multinationals. Out of court settlements 
and informal workouts take place in "the shadow" of insolvency laws and should be 
addressed by forthcoming insolvency reforms either domestically or on a global level. 
A. Multinationals' Reoreanizations 
Despite the negative perception of insolvency in commercial environments, a 
number of insolvency laws do not necessarily seek the termination of a financially 
distressed corporation or business 78 . In some cases, insolvency laws aim at availing a 
"fresh start 799-) to the indebted corporation, so as to maximize its economic value 80. 
Indeed, under a number of domestic insolvency regimes, two alternatives may stem from 
insolvency proceedings: liquidation or reorganization. 
78 See Gertner, Robert, and David Scharfstein, A theory of workouts and the effects of reorganization law, 
Journal of Finance 46,1189-1222 (1991). Aside from regional insolvency arrangements such as the EU 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings that favours reorganization over liquidation, a number of European 
countries recognize this rescue option on the domestic level. See for instance The Insolvency Act of 1986 
(UK) (provides for reorganization-oriented procedure that vests management control in one or more court- 
appointed administrators). A number of other countries (such as France, Italy, Japan, China, and Egypt) 
realize the economic benefits resulting ftom this rescue option and have accordingly started the reforms of 
their domestic insolvency regimes so as to limit the number of liquidations. The US model (chapter 11) has 
had a considerable impact on these domestic legal reforms efforts. 79 Robert E. Scott, Sharing the Risks of Bankruptcy: Timbers, Ahlers, and Beyond, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 183,189 -190 (1989). go Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L. J. 1807,1847 (1998) 
(argues that a bankruptcy system' function is to maximize the monetary value of the insolvent estate). A 
number of commentators have addressed the general question of the desirability of maximizing a bankrupt 
firm's value as a goal of bankruptcy law. See also Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 775 (1987); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to 
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of 
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991). This assumption would invite the managers of an insolvent 
or financially distressed corporation to exercise due care during the pre-insolvency phase in order to 
maximize the value of the indebted corporation's estate. Otherwise, the liquidation of the latter would 
produce little to repay creditors and the rescue alternative would be uncertain. See J. Ronald Trost, Roger G. Schwartz & Sidley & Austin, Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Insolvent Corporations, SD24 ALI-ABA 87,87-104 (1998). 
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In the first instance, the company in question has experienced severe financial 
distreSS81 and its debts largely exceed the value of its assets. In turn, these assets will be 
sold off - either as a going conceM82 or piecemeal - to satisfy the corporation's debts and 
obligations towards its various creditors and shareholders. The second alternative calls 
upon the partial or entire remodelling of the corporation in question, which is usually 
believed to have the potential to generate profits. This rescue option is known as 
restructuring or reorganization and this process is especially designed to allow the 
recovery of greater value, compared to when the corporation is simply liquidated. Beyond 
the purely economic value that may result from the reorganization of a corporation, the 
legislator may simultaneously seek other social objectiveS83. 
In 1986, Baird defined reorganization as the equivalent to a going concern 
liquidation in which the existing claimants are the purchaser 84 . In reality, this purchase 
is 
nominal, since the corporation in question is sold in exchange of existing claims and 
interests. In other words, creditors and sometimes a number of shareholders will be the 
new owners of the corporation. Yet reaching a consensus among shareholders and 
creditors to reorganize can be diffiCUlt85. When the firm's value is approximately equal to 
its debts, creditors may push for its liquidation, whereas shareholders would opt for 
" Liquidation procedures are generally opted for once there is no economically reasonable possibility of 
rehabilitation. Some legislation allows liquidation procedures only if all attempts to reorganize have failed. 82 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 10 1 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) 
(argues that a liquidation as a going concern may be viewed as a special case of the reorganization process 
in which new capital equal to the going concern value of the corporation's assets is contributed and then 
distributed to the creditors in order of their priority). 
83 In the US for example, the reorganization policy promotes the restructuring of a business to preserve 
jobs, to pay creditors, to produce a return for owners, and to obtain the fruits of American enterprise for the 
nation. See Johnson Gordon, Insolvency, Reorganization and Restructuring, World Bank working paper 
(2001), 4. 
94 Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127,145 
(1986). 
83 For instance, Cramdown provisions enable a bankruptcy court to confirm a plan of reorganization over 
the objections of some classes of creditors. See Omer Tene, Revising the Creditors' Bargain: The 
Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 
287,287 -290 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, WIS. L. REV. 465,515 -518 (1993). 
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reorganization, as they will be able to profit from the continuity of the corporation's 
86 
operations 
Because the choice between whether to reorganize or to liquidate is difficult, 
under various legislations, corporations' profitability tests take place at an early stage of 
their insolvency proceedingS87 . 
For instance, in the United States, regulations have been 
issued that allow the court to approve a reorganization plan under the rehabilitation 
"chapter IP of the federal Bankruptcy Act, despite the fact that the support required 
from creditors as a condition for court approval was obtained through a vote that occurred 
88 prior to the actual commencement of the formal rehabilitation proceedings 
On the domestic level, these laws should allow this rescue option because giving a 
"second chance" to financially distressed corporations will encourage the creation of an 
entrepreneurial class, while involving the private sector in the resolving of financial 
crisis. On the international level, a potential cross-border insolvency framework should 
achieve the same objectives stated above with respect to multinational corporations. 
Nonetheless, the reorganization of multinationals can entail further challenges that must 
89 be addressed 
" Edward M. Keech, Problems in the Liquidation and Reorganization of International Steamship 
Companies in Bankruptcy, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1239,1249 (1985) (argues that "Creditors seldom make the 
decision to reorganize, however; management files for reorganization first and consults with the creditors 
later"). 
87 Courts where the rescue option is available by law adopt a test that permits reorganization only when 
local creditors are better off under such procedures. This approach is adopted by the former IIU. S. C. § 
304, and is essentially the enquiry undertaken by the courts In re Toga and Liverpool Ltd. v. Certain 
Freights of the MN Venture Star, 102 B. R. 373(D. N. J. 1988). 
gg See Gordon W. Johnson, The World Bank's Role in Developing Global Principles and Strengthening 
Capacity in Developing Countries, 112901 ABI-CLE 207 (200 1). 
'9 Id. On the difficulties of reorganizing a multinational corporation on an international scale, such as the 
determination of the competent forum and the priority of claims, see In re The Singer company N. V., No. 
99-10578 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y., filed Sept. 13,1999). See also Arnold M Quittrier, Cross-Border Insolvencies- 
Ancillary and Full Cases: The Concurrent Japanese and United States Cases of Maruko Inc, 4 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 171 (1995). 
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Indeed, cross-border insolvency cases usually involve large multinationals that are 
likely to opt for reorganization9o, if such an option were available. This decision can 
result in complex proceedings, as multinationals' assets must be collected in an orderly 
fashion to ensure their productivity. To achieve this, it is believed that the reorganization 
of multinationals would be better administered by as single forum insofar as the "location 
of the assets affects the reorganization decision to the extent that their location affects the 
debtor's business"91. In addition, as argued by Westbrook, in the reorganization of 
multinationals, "interim financing and supervision of the company's management are 
only Iwo of the delicate functions that are difficult to carry out by cooperation between 
distantjudges"92 . 
On the contrary, reorganization will be difficult or even impossible if a common 
decision to reorganize is awaited to be taken by several jurisdictions in which the debtor 
possesses assets 93 . For this purpose, it should be understood that reorganizing a 
multinational corporation requires a centralized procedure only afforded the "one court, 
one law" principle. While Universalism may facilitate the reorganization of 
multinationals, Territoriality would encourage their liquidation when reorganizing them 
would be more valuable for stakeholders. In turn, an effective cross-border insolvency 
90 Data are taken from Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Business 
in Insolvency, 73 AM. BANKR. L. J. 499,524 TBL. 2A (1999). 
91 See Amason Jon Yard, Insolvency Law in the International Context, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL. 15 
(1996). 
92See Westbrook J. Lawrence, A Global Solution to Multinational Defaults, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,2285 
(2000). More recently, Professor Westbrook argued that such reorganization plans "cannot be achieved 
unless a court can bind all stakeholders to the reorganization plan, including dissenters. Only a system that 
conclusively resolves all stakeholders' legal rights can produce a financial restructuring that gives existing 
and future parties, including financiers, investors, and employees, a sufficient guarantee of legal certainty. 
Without such assurances, a reorganization plan cannot go forward. Such a system must be symmetrical to 
the market". E. Bruce Leonard & R. Gordon Marantz, International Bankruptcies: Developing Practical 
Strategies, 628 PLUCOMM 439,443 (1991) (argues that the wave of cross-border insolvencies requires a 
formal structure or framework to provide for an efficient reorganization or disposition of assets among 
creditors ... this would be impossible without any international mode of co- operation in place to ensure the 
equitable treatment of creditors in different jurisdictions or to at least enhance the possibility of achieving 
that goal). 
93 Most importantly, the laws of each of these jurisdictions must avail the option of reorganization. This 
would seem difficult if the jurisdiction where important assets are located does not favor reorganizations, 
and believes reorganization is inappropriate in a specific case, or simply feels that its domestic creditors 
would be satisfied out of local assets. 
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94 framework would facilitate multinationals' restructuring by availing the rescue option . 
This seems difficult to achieve under the current Territorial approach. 
B. Multinationals' Failure and Corporate Governance 
The financial distress known by corporations can be the result of many factors, 
such as the application of a poor business model, an inadequate capital structure or 
95 deficient management or a combination of factors . On the other hand, the rescue option, 
also known as reorganization or restructuring, requires good management in order to help 
96 
these corporations overcome the period of financial uncertainty and distress . While 
most reorganization plans are largely concerned with re-establishing a sound financial 
structure, little attention is paid by insolvency proceedings to corporate governance 
issueS97. This lack of attention can be costly in the long term. Indeed, despite the financial 
restructuring that firms undergo, good management is essential in order to ensure their 
survival and competitiveness in the marke? 8. 
In this sense, an explicit link between insolvency laws and corporate governance 
should be established. Many believe that reorganization plans -a component of 
insolvency proceedings - should include unambiguous references to the corporation's 
94 See Caryn M. Chittenden, After the Fall of Maxwell Communications, supra note 42 at 165, (argues that 
although a number of cross-borer insolvency did not require an international treaty to partly reorganize the 
multinationals at stake, "the implementation of such a treaty would have reduced the cost and time involved 
and would have potentially promoted reorganization over liquidation") 
9'See In re Maxwell Communication Corp., No. 91-B-15741 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1991). See generally Evan 
D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, The Role of the Examiner as Facilitator and Harmonizer in the 
Maxwell Communication Corporation International Insolvency, Current Development in International and 
Corporate Insolvency Law 621 (Ziegel ed. 1994); Leonard Hoffmann, Cross-Border Insolvency: A British 
Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2507 (1996). 
96 Berkovitch, Eli, Ronen Israel, and Jaime F. Zender, The design of insolvency law: A case for 
management bias in insolvency reorganizations, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33,4143 
(1998). 
97 Although issues pertaining to corporate governance can be analyzed at two different stages (pre- 
insolvency and post-insolvency), the present part will address the effects of insolvency laws on corporate 
governance once the firm has entered insolvency proceedings. 9' Holly J. Gregory, The Globalisation of Corporate Governance, World Bank Working Paper (2000), 24. 
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good governance and its improvemen? 9. To this end, an effective insolvency framework 
is one where the approval of a restructuring plan by the competent forum is conditioned 
upon the replacement of directors, or at least upon their close supervision'00. With recent 
scandals such as Enron'01, WorldCorn and others, insolvency laws have become an 
important vehicle to establish standards and principles for good corporate governance. 
Better corporate governance would translate into better monitoring, improved 
managerial accountability and enhanced performance 102. Practically speaking, the 
management of any given corporation is vested with powers to conduct the latter's 
operations in the best possible way. The board of directors and its various committees 
(e. g., an audit committee) stand as the primary overseers against managerial indiscretion 
103 and opportunism . When the board fails to perform this legally mandated supervisory 
task, the monitoring of corporate activity becomes especially relevant in the context of 
insolvency. The link between sound corporate governance, insolvency reforms and 
quality and transparent financial reporting highlights the amendments domestic 
insolvency laws well might undertakeI04. 
99 David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1325,1325 (1998) (argues that corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy complement one 
another. "Changes in firms' characteristic approach to corporate governance in any given country will 
provoke changes in corporate bankruptcy, and vice versa"). 
'00 In this respect, one has to distinguish between two approaches to corporate reorganization. The first is 
the US reorganization model (chapter 11) according to which the management of the insolvent corporation 
may remain in charge of administering the insolvent entity. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
follow another approach because they are more protective of creditors' interests. Therefore, English courts 
for instance would replace the management of an insolvent corporation by appointing an official 
administrator. 
101 See The Enron Power's Report available at www. chron. com/content/news/photos/02/02/03/enron- 
powersreport. pdf (last visited March 2005). 
102 LoPucki, L. and W. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Insolvency Reorganization of Large, 
Publicly-Held Companies, mimeo, University of Wisconsin (1998), 38. 103Williarn M. Hannan, The Independent Director - An Investor's Watchdog, 2 No. 26 ANCORPCLR 3 (2004) (argues that "well-run corporations have a board that is independent enough to not only review the 
decisions made by management but question those decisions. To accomplish this goal, a board must be 
truly independent"); see Harold L. Kaplan, Health Care Enters the Zone of Insolvency, 21-OCT Am. 
BANKR. INST. J. 32,33 (2002) (argues that the role incumbent on the board of directors is to exercise 
strict control on the operations of the corporation. This board should be diligent when the corporation in 
%uestion is facing financial difficulties). 
14 See Peter F. Coogan et al., Panel Discussion: The Problems of the Sinking Ship, 31 BUS. LAW. 1371 (1976); Lewis U. Davis et al., Corporate Reorganization in the 1990's: Guiding Directors of Troubled 
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Furthermore, the restructuring of corporations often requires the injection of 
capital in the form of additional equity or bonds. The incentive of those who are willing 
105 
to invest can be affected if the mismanagement of the rescued corporation persists . 
This could create a pattern of distrust regarding the restructuring of corporations' 
management and also highlight the inadequacy of insolvency principles to improve the 
managerial structure of financially distressed entities. A weak governance structure could 
negatively affect the future availability of interim financing, thus reflecting poorly on the 
objectives of the legislator in providing for a rescue option to corporations. 
As much as domestic insolvency laws play a major role with respect to the 
efficiency of restructuring plans and the improvement of the managerial structure, a 
prospective cross-border insolvency system should pursue similar objectives with respect 
to multinationals. Indeed, the restructuring of multinationals requires both a unified 
decision making process and a good administration at all levels of the corporate group. 
While mega-scandals of bad corporate governance, such as that of the magnitude of 
Enron 106 , are viewed by some commentators as 
isolated and rare, it is likely that similar 
cases will occur, where the dynamics between insolvency laws, corporate governance and 
Corporations Through Uncertain Territory, 47 BUS. LAW 1 (1991); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty 
upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485 
(1993); Stephen R. McDonnell, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors' Burden 
Form Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177 (1994) 
"5See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 109- 44 
(1991) (argues for the role that takeovers would play in subsequent corporate governance); for an 
anticipation of the interplay between corporate governance and takeovers see Henry Manne, Mergers and 
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of 
Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and Control, III Yale Law Journal 
1,3-5 (2001). Berkovitch, Eli, Ronen Israel, and Jaime F. Zender, The Design of Insolvency Law: A case 
for management bias in insolvency reorganizations, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33,444, 
(1998). 
106 "The Enron failure demonstrated a failure of corporate governance, in which internal control 
mechanisms were short-circuited by conflicts of interest that enriched certain managers at the expense of 
the shareholders". See Andrews Enron Litigation Reporter, ISDA Blames Officers, Not Derivatives for 
Enron Collapse, I No. 7 ANENRON 12 (2002). 
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financial performance must be handled carefully 107 . Corporate governance and corporate 
restructuring are issues that should be addressed by an international insolvency 
framework because such issues can affect the international financial architecture. 
C. Informal Workouts 
Not all insolvent corporations go through formal insolvency proceedings provided 
by the law. A number of financially distressed entities try to find a solution in the shadow 
of the law through negotiation between shareholders and creditors. This process is known 
as "informal workout" or "out of court bargaining or settlement" and consists of raising 
creditors' and debtors' interests without necessarily liquidating the distressed entity, nor 
08 
entering into complex reorganization plans before courts' . 
Very often, whether the 
corporation's stakeholders will resort to such a workout will depend on a comparison 
between the transaction cost of bargaining in a workout situation and the costs associated 
with formal proceedings 109 . 
Other than cost factors, informal workouts present many advantages compared to 
formal insolvency proceedings. Frequently, the financial difficulty of corporations 
requires early intervention and quick remedies that are not available under formal 
bankruptcy proceedings"O. In addition, informal workouts allow the company's 
107 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 329,330-31 (2001). 
10' The informal process essentially involves bringing together the debtor and creditors. Someone has to 
initiate this process, as there are no laws to facilitate it, which can present a difficulty. A debtor may not be 
willing to have a dialogue with creditors. Among creditors, some will be concerned for their own position 
and may not want a collective process. "A workout is required when a debtor company is confronted with 
difficulties that will not respond to short-term adjustments and finds that it is difficult or impossible to meet 
its contractual obligation in the normal course of business. The workout under these circumstances involves 
all parties with an interest in the company. Considerable time and negotiation are required to develop a 
workable plan whereby the respective interests will be balanced so that creditors and investors ultimately 
will come as close as possible to a realization of their original goals and expectatione'. See Business 
Workouts Manual, Buswork TOC (2003). 
109 Jay Alix ET. al., Financial Handbook for Bankruptcy Professionals, FINBKRPROF § 3.5 (2003) (argues 
that bankruptcy is expensive and can be more time consuming than a workout, and therefore it is usually a 




management to reach a more market-based solution because they create a suitable 
atmosphere for discussions with creditors. This flexibility increases the chances of 
rescuing the financially distressed entity at stake"'. And finally, informal workouts can 
take place without the occurrence of negative publicity that usually accompanies forinal 
insolvency proceedings. The confidential character of the process can facilitate the 
informal reorganization of the distressed corporation while conveying the participation of 
new rescuers (lenders or new shareholders) to save it. 
Often, when domestic insolvency laws are inefficient and costly, the managers of 
a financially distressed corporation might prefer informal workouts to decide the future of 
the corporation 112 . This is not by itself a negative alternative, however, one 
has to 
consider that deficient insolvency laws are usually the result of a weak institutional 
environment, where creditors' claims before domestic courts are not satisfied in a timely 
manner, nor enforced. As a result, creditors' claims and decisions taken within an 
informal workout process are even less likely to be enforced by the domestic judicial 
system. In essence, informal workouts should be supported by the appropriate legal 
infrastructure as much as formal insolvency proceedings 113 . That is, 
fair and predictable 
insolvency principles implemented by an expedient, impartial and cost effective judiciary 
system. In the absence of this pre-requisite, informal workouts may simply be used by 
unscrupulous shareholders in order to dilute creditors' rights 114 . On the contrary, when 
domestic insolvency laws duly regulate the process of informal workouts, the latter may 
111 Id. "Under certain circumstances, out-of-court settlement proves to be a very viable and preferable 
option for those involved in problem credit situations". "This form of financial settlement has the 
advantage of not being saddled with the rigid procedures and rules encountered in the courtroom. Because 
of this flexibility, the parties are given an opportunity to develop a realistic repayment schedule". See 
Stewart E. Bland, Insolvency in Farming and Agribusiness, 73 KY. L. J. 795,797 (1994) 112 Gilson, S., Managing Default: Some Evidence on How Firms Choose Between Workouts and Chapter 
11, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 4,6-7 (199 1). 
113 See Johnson Gordon, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditors Rights Systems, 
World Bank working paper; (2001), 53 (argues that "An informal process is far more likely to be sustained 
where there are adequate creditor remedies and insolvency laws"). See Tamar Frankel, Securitization: 
Structured Financing Financial Asset Pools, and Asset-Backed Securities § 21.20.1 (1991); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Structured Finance: A Guide to the Principles of Asset Securitization 16-17 (2d ed. 1993); Claire 
A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 1061,1062 (1996). 114 Gilson, S., Managing Default: Some Evidence on How Firms Choose Between Workouts and Chapter 11, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 4,7-9 (199 1). 
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serve as a useful supplement and alternative to formal insolvency proceedings"S. This 
argument is true especially in regimes where corporate insolvency is frequent and may 
lead to systemic risks, hardly manageable by the domestic court system. 
Commonly, informal workouts enable small creditors to fully recover their debts. 
The debtor then submits a restructuring/reorganization planl 16 for the remaining creditors. 
This plan has to be approved by the unanimity of creditors. One shortcoming is that the 
debtor has no powers to abide by the dissenting creditors except that it can defer to the 
courts for formal insolvency proceedings' 17, and the reorganization plan is binding to all 
creditors, including dissenting ones. This procedural parallel highlights once more that 
informal workouts - as useful and expedient as they may be- take place in the "shadow of 
insolvency laws". Without these laws, informal workouts can prove inefficient and most 
importantly, may be abused to the advantage of indebted corporations. 
When a multinational encounters financial distress, such informal workout 
procedures can be appropriate due to the impressive size of multinationals and the sums 
at stake. Nevertheless, few domestic insolvency regimes provide a reliable institutional 
framework where informal workouts can be relied upon to resolve multinational's 
insolvency disputes. This disparity between domestic insolvency laws calls upon the 
adoption of international norms and enforceable principles that facilitate a smooth 
115 See Scott, Sharing the Risks, supra note 78 at 54 "Well-established and widely used creditor remedy and 
insolvency law regimes can be used to influence the commencement and progression of an informal 
workout. The invitation to commence a dialogue should rarely be refused. If the opportunity is declined, the 
debtor faces the prospect that individual creditor remedies or formal insolvency proceedings will be 
pursued". 116 This plan is not different from the one presented before courts, had the financially distressed firm 
entered into formal insolvency proceedings. 117 W. Homer Drake, Jr. and Christopher S. Strickland, Chapter 2. Systems of Debtor Relief, CHI I REORG 
§ 2: 7 (2003) (argues that a workout has several disadvantages which may make it unrealistic. If, for 
example, the largest creditors do not unanimously agree with the proposed settlement, the workout will likely prove impossible to achieve. Likewise, it must be remembered that workouts offer no forced 
moratorium or injunction against seizures or foreclosures by rogue creditors). 
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process of informal workouts'18. This international framework should enable creditors 
and debtors to quickly reach a consensus on the future of the distressed multinational' 19. 
This framework should also ensure a sufficient degree of security to worldwide creditors 
in order to encourage them to resort to this technique when it is more cost efficient to do 
so. Finally, this will empower domestic insolvency regimes to better address the issues 
related to multinationals' insolvency while improving the legal infrastructure (effective 
insolvency principles and solid judicial system) necessary to support out of court 
settlements. 
V. Conclusion 
As illustratively explained above in this Chapter, many of the fundamental issues 
that arise when a multinational corporation encounters financial difficulty, particularly in 
the context of impact on a range of significant cost and decisional factors, leads to the 
logical and practical conclusion as to the implementation of international insolvency 
standards so as to reduce the cost of financial distress ex-ante and ex-post. Although 
many international corporate insolvency cases currently are resolved, on an ad hoc basis, 
through the agreement on protocols among individual courts, most complex resolutions 
are not entirely satisfactory and there is still a considerable amount of ad hoc 
unpredictability pertaining to the content of such protocols. This unpredictability sustains 
the threat to the international financial infrastructure because it obscures the expectations 
and planning/decision-making of creditors, debtors and other parties with legitimate 
interests- still resulting in higher operational/contracting/investment costs. 
118 International efforts to establish standards for informal workouts have taken place. in October 2000, 
INSOL international released a "A Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor 
workouts", which espouses eight best practices for multi-creditor workouts. The principals are fundamental 
to informal multi-creditor workouts and are a useful guide for developing effective practices and 
procedures in this area. 
119 Kent Pen, Corporate Workouts: A UK perspective, Bank of England, (1997) 19 (argues "the ideal 
mechanism for coping with international workouts would be an international insolvency procedure. That is 
something to aim for and the work of UNCITRAL and others is invaluable in this field. It is only realistic 
however to recognize that this is likely to take many years to achieve. The efforts of the INSOL Lenders Group to draw up internationally acceptable principles to be followed when conducting cross-border 
workouts are intended to bridge this gap"). 
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Presently, there is a growing consensus 120 that effective internationally oriented 
insolvency regimes are essential to strengthen the international financial and economic 
architecture. As much as domestic insolvency laws affect the economic life of domestic 
corporations, an international insolvency system is needed to oversee the commercial 
activity of large multinationals, especially during periods of financial distress. Despite 
extensive debates regarding the creation and implementation of such an international 
framework, the institutional dimension has often been neglected. As it will be argued in 
the subsequent Chapter Five, institutional vehicles are essential to provide for competent 
entities that ensure the implementation and enforcement of potential cross-border 
insolvency standards. Nevertheless, before treating the institutional/enforcement aspect of 
a potential cross-border insolvency framework, one has to decide what type of 
substantive and procedural laws and standards should be created. 
In this regard, arguendo, a case could be made in favour of Universalism, which, 
at least in theory, appears to be an efficient approach in dealing with a number of 
fundamental issues (including the issues raised in this Chapter). Indeed, Universalism has 
been recognized by many scholars to offer the most appropriate solution to deal with the 
consequences of international insolvency proceedings, such as the changes in the debtor's 
capital structure, management and the day-to-day operations. Its widespread 
implementation also well might prevent the unnecessary waste of resources between 
several jurisdictions to the advantage of the mass of creditors. It further might provide for 
a good level of predictability while enabling multinationals to make more fruitful 
investment decisions. Finally, a True Universalist approach might provide, within a 
transparent environment, for an equal treatment to creditors on equal footing regardless 
of their location, which again consolidates the objectives of fairness and equality. Yet the 
120 The importance given to insolvency regimes by the IFI's consolidates this view. The World Bank has 
been developing principles and guidelines on Insolvency and Creditor Right systems, selecting the most 
important components, criteria and best practices for building effective insolvency systems, by focusing on 
a system-wide approach to insolvency reforms. See World Bank publication "Principles and Guidelines for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems" 2000. On the other hand, and as a result from the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the International Monetary fund undertook its own initiative to encourage and assist 
member countries to design orderly and effective insolvency systems. See IMF publication "Orderly and 
Effective Insolvency Procedures" 1999. 
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many proposals for its implementation seem rather wanting and do not take the step of 
genuinely establishing a universal and viable cross-border insolvency regime (Chapter 
Two). 
Rather, international insolvency practice appears to comprise more of a blurry 
fusion between Territoriality and Universalism theories, militating for the time being, for 
some form of modified approach, which will be the foundation for the presentation and 
development of my modest thesis for interim, international insolvency reform in the case 
of multinationals' default. Admittedly such a modest, interim approach would not address 
satisfactorily a number of the issues raised in this Chapter and probably only a True/Pure 
Universalist framework would, but there needs to be a "practical" start-point that can be 
incrementally enhanced and perfected over time. In this author's view, however, the 
current "either-or", "all-or-nothing" debate is impractical and counterproductive to meet 
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1. Introduction 
As suggested in the previous Chapter, "Universalism", in a theoretical context, 
portrays itself as an effective methodology to deal with certain of the insolvency 
problems facing large multinationals. On its face, the selective problems raised in 
Chapter Two that stem from the financial distress of these corporate entities would be 
better addressed and resolved by a single court and/or by the implementation of one set of 
legal principles/rules/approaches to better assist worldwide claimants. As further 
suggested, this should achieve a higher degree of predictability and transparency whilst 
promoting more equitable treatment of creditors on a global level. On the economic and 
financial level, Universalism theoretically should reduce the transactional cost, augment 
the availability of credit and increase the value of the distressed multinational to the 
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advantage of its various stakeholders'. In addition, it could be well-argued that 
Universalism should facilitate the reorganization of multinationals when it is more 
beneficial and more cost-effective to do so. 
Despite these theoretical advantages, Universalism has not known any concrete 
policy or legislative enactment to date; while multinationals' failures multiply and 
continue to have considerable financial and legal effects beyond the boundaries of 
sovereign states. Before understanding the reasons underlying such a paradox, one should 
consider what Universalism entails in its various possible forms. 
A tenuous and perhaps currently the most unrealistic form of Universalism is 
known as "True" or "Pure" Universalism 2. This version proposes that a single 
international court (or court system 3) that is in charge of implementing an international 
insolvency law should be in charge of adjudicating multinationals' default. This system 
would automatically transfer the competence from domestic courts to a supranational 
judicial entity having priority to adjudicate the financial distress of large multinationale 
on a worldwide basis or at least, on a regional basis5. Although this approach would 
1 Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1107,1111-1112 (1994); Richard V. Butler & Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-examination of the Purposes 
and Goals of Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269,269 (1994); Charles W. Adams, An 
Economic Justif ication for Corporate Reorganization, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 117,117 -118 (199 1). 2 The term "True Universalism" is borrowed from Professor Westbrook. See Westbrook J. Lawrence, A 
Global Solution to Multinational Defaults, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,2328 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, 
Global Solution]. It refers to an international insolvency system built simultaneously on a single 
international insolvency court and a single international insolvency law. This form of Universalism is not to 
be confused with what is commonly referred to as "pure Universalism", which attributes competence to the 
forum of the debtor's home country to adjudicate the entirety of the debtor's estate (infra). On the 
definition of pure Universalism, see Liza Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border 
Corporate Insolvencies, 32 N. Y. U. J. INTL L. & POL. 787,789 (2000); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice 
of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT4L L. 499,514 (1991) [hereinafter 
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law]. See also Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational 
Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329 (1993) [hereinafter Aranson, 
Transnational Bankruptcies]. 
3 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2328. 4 Gaillard Emmanuel & Westbrook J. Lawrence, Four Models for International Bankruptcy, AM. J. COMP. 
L. 27,355-357(1993). 
5 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2328. 
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appear to allow significant improvements compared to the prevalent domestic embrace of 
"Territoriality", it is often perceived to be unfeasible in the short or medium terni because 
of the substantial and procedural differences that exist between the various domestic 
insolvency laws, not to mention the political compromises such an undertaking would 
entail6. In the impossibility to realize this model, there are primarily two possible interim 
solutions that are defined under Universalism umbrella, and that might fulfil some of the 
objectives of True Universalism. 
One interim, mid-terin version is the "single-court'97 Universalism, according to 
which the creation of an international sovereign court may still be required; however, 
such a court will apply the domestic insolvency laws of the countries involved in a given 
cross-border insolvency case. Indeed, this framework would not require the enactment of 
a substantive insolvency law and/or principles. The advantage of this arrangement would 
be that the application of domestic insolvency laws would neither entail unusual 
insolvency proceedings nor different social objectives from those pursued by domestic 
social policies. Yet, for such a framework to function harmoniously, it should be 
associated with effective choice-of-law provisions so as to avoid the conflict that may 
arise between the applications of several domestic insolvency laws. In addition, the 
prospects of creating an international insolvency court to adjudicate cross-border 
insolvency cases seem rather bleak as it would require the negotiation and ratification of 
a multilateral treaty and the creation of a new international institution, neither of which is 
favored by the major world governments today. Thus far, there have been no 
governmental proposals to create such ajudicial authority. 
A second form of lesser Universalism is the "single-law" Universalism, which 
would require the international community to reach a consensus on an international 
6 id. 
71d. at 2315. 
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insolvency laW8 (ideally pursuant to a treaty). It would then leave the implementation of 
this international instrument to domestic courts to apply. This system is, according to 
Westbrook, "the mirror image of the "single-court" system"9. Among other possible 
suggested advantages, such a framework might circumvent the necessity of creating a 
supranational sovereign court to adjudicate the financial default of multinationals'. 
Insolvency proceedings would then be administered by a single domestic court (located 
in the debtor's home country) that has overall and exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's 
assets wherever located. The opening of parallel or ancillary proceedingslo would not be 
permitted under such a regime. As much as the "single-court" system requires effective 
choice-of-law rules, the instant framework would require an undisputed criterion to 
determine the debtor's home country (infra). When authors and scholars refer to 
Universalism, they often imply the lesser form of this theory represented by the "single- 
law"Universalism. 
It is frequently claimed that Universalism has not been implemented due to its 
political implausibility and the difficult compromises sovereign states must make to reach 
an international consensus on the choice of a single forum and/or a single set of legal 
principles. The impracticality on a political level further highlights the difficulties that 
arise from the diversity of public policies within different jurisdictions. For instance, and 
notwithstanding that domestic insolvency laws are pro-debtor or pro-creditors with 
varying degrees, the protection of domestic creditors has always been a major concern for 
insolvency legislators and judges", especially when the debtors' local assets, a 
significant guarantee to domestic creditors, are transferred to other forums. 
8 This law (or treaty) would include substantive and procedural rules. These rules would define the 
threshold of insolvency, determine the commencement of insolvency proceedings, establish a universal 
order for priority claims, etc. 9 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2329. 10 On the distinction between these two types of proceedings, see Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 
2, at 2300. 
"See Unt Lore, International relations and international insolvency cooperation: liberalism, 
institutionalism, and transnational legal dialogue, LAW AND POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS VOL. 28,4-6 (1997) [hereinafter Lore, International Insolvency Cooperation] - 
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Others have argued that agreeing upon an international insolvency framework 
based on Universalism would entail the export of domestic social policies from one 
forum to another and this could undermine the objectives pursued by the legislator in 
each forum12, thereby rendering such a framework rather impossible to achieve. This 
being said, Westbrook addresses this critique by referring to the United States' 
bankruptcy regime; he states "Experience in the United States and elsewhere 
demonstrates that a national, market-symmetrical law can largely accommodate local 
policies]3". The analogy to the U. S. federal legal system and largely homogeneous and 
integrated economic and financial market, however, is difficult to apply on a much more 
fragmented global environment. 
Clearly, no definite evidence exists as to what extent a Universal insolvency 
framework would impinge on domestic policies. The dissimilarities between domestic 
insolvency systems, their procedural arrangements and overall objectives appear however 
to be incompatible 14 . As a result, the diverse "academic" proposals for the creation of a 
truly international, binding and universal insolvency framework have failed, producing a 
rather pessimistic vision towards the achievement of such a project. 
Aside from the political and social objections to Universalism, there are a number 
of legal concerns as to the definition and feasibility of this framework. Indeed, according 
to Universalism, the administration of multinationals' insolvencies is handled by one 
court, traditionally located in the home country of the debtor. Yet to realize such a model, 
one has to determine what the home country of a multinational is, and what criteria 
12 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 2216,2216 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality]. 
13 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2277. 14 See generally Campbell Dennis, International Corporate Insolvency Law, Butterworth (1992); Francis 
Hilliard, A Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy and Insolvency, 2nd ed. Clark, N. J.: Lawbook Exchange, 2003; Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
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should be taken into account. That is to say, the very definition of Universalism may give 
rise to extensive legal debates because the benchmark for the determination of the 
debtor's home country varies from one insolvency regime to another. Even assuming that 
a predictable method may be used to that end, the current ad-hoc system of recognition 
and enforcement of foreign insolvency judgments may present another significant 
impediment to Universalism. It is therefore important to understand how these various 
legal issues practically affect the creation of an insolvency framework based on 
Universalism under any of its forms. 
In sum, this Chapter will consider various social, legal and political objections to 
Universalism. This should further our understanding of why such a framework that could 
render many benefits has not been created. This Chapter will also serve as an introduction 
to the concept of "modified universalism", which regional implementation among EU 
countries will be more fully covered in Chapter Three and subsequent chapters. 
11. Universalism and Creditors' MAN 
In 1944, Professor Nadelmann asserted that "in most of the countries, delivery of 
local assets ... is refused at least if opposed by local creditors"15. This assertion remains 
largely true to this day. Even under the most "universalistic" insolvency regime, courts 
16 invariable will refuse the delivery of assets in order to protect domestic creditors . 
Numerous national insolvency systems are disposed to territoriality precisely to protect 
these creditors, who often are small and medium size enterprises. Herein stems one of the 
major reasons why Universalism has not yet known any concrete policy enactment, or 
15Kurt H. Nadelmann, International Bankruptcy Law: Its Present Status, 5 U. TORONTO L. J. 324,351 
(1944). 
16 For instance, section 304 of the U. S. Federal Bankruptcy Code, as in existence at September 2005, 
permits a U. S. court to order, among other things, the turnover of a bankruptcy estate's property to a 
foreign jurisdiction. See IIU. S. C. § 304 (c). A number of American courts have used § 304 over the 
years. There is a set of cases that grant the application of § 304 (c) liberally. Nevertheless, these are cases 
where the turnover of assets would not have harmed directly or indirectly the interests of domestic 
creditors. See In re Gee, 53 B. R. 891 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1985) & In re Culmer, 25 B. Rý 621 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1982) (where the court decided to transfer assets to a Bahamian court only after ensuring that basic rights such as equity and due process would be respected in the foreign proceedings). 
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even implicit recognition. This judicial protectionism of domestic claimants further 
elucidates why some creditors may be better off under a strictly territorial approach, and 
how Universalism can distort capital allocation and risk taking by lenders. At last, 
Universalism is also criticized to affect distribution priorities set by domestic insolvency 
laws to the detriment of the social policies the legislator pursues. 
Before treating the prejudicial effects of Universalism on creditors' rights, one 
must distinguish the various types of creditors and why they are so categorized. This step 
is essential to comprehend how Universalism can constitute a threat to certain categories 
of claimants, especially to strongly non-adjusting creditors17. 
A. Types of Creditors 
18 According to Bebchuk and Fried , creditors can be classified 
into two categories, 
adjusting and non-adjusting creditors. Adjusting creditors are those who systematically 
adjust the terms of their loans to offset the negative effects of risk taking. Usually, these 
creditors are "sophisticated" and well informed about the different aspects of insolvency 
laws and are able to enter into many contracts with the utmost security. Thus, the term 
adjusting creditors reflects their ability to properly measure risk-taking in light of the 
potential insolvency of one or many of their debtors'9. As a result, adjusting creditors are 
more prepared to face the insolvency of their debtor(s) than the second category of 
creditors: non-adjusting creditors2o. The latter are those creditors whose credit nature 
does not allow any adjustment, such as tort creditors, trade creditors, and taxation 
authorities, to name just a few. They do not take into account the risk associated with 
17 The terms "adjusting" and "non-adjusting! ' creditors are borrowed from Bebchuk Lucian A. & Jesse M. 
Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L. J., 866(1996). 
18 Id. 
19 Among others, this category encompasses the active players of capital markets where the terms of 
lending are adjusted to reflect the potential risks. 
'0 Although known as non-adjusting creditors, this category of creditors may also be perceived as at least 
partially adjusting creditors. Such creditors may, for instance, refuse to lend to debtors who are considered 
too much of a credit risk. In addition, creditors may voluntarily be non-adjusting because it would be costly 
to measure risk taking for each transaction they enter into. See Steven L. Harris & Charles w. Mooney, Jr, 
Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security interests in 
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349,1372 (1997). 
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their transaction with the debtor, including the risk of non-payment. It is important to 
note that non-adjusting creditors may voluntarily be strongly non-adjusting creditorS21 
like credit card companies who, for example, find it too costly to calculate interest rates 
on a transactional basis 22 . They may also be involuntarily strongly non-adjusting creditors 
like tort creditors, due in part to an accident or injury. These latter creditors could not 
have negotiated the terms of their credit as these terms are judicially determined, and are 
not subject to any bargaining by the parties. 
Guzman 23 further deepens the classification scheme by arguing that non-adjusting 
creditors can be separated into two sub-categories, strongly non-adjusting and weakly 
non-adjusting creditors. The former have no recourse to adjust their credit on any terms, 
neither on a case-by-case basis nor according to their credit portfolio, thus stressing the 
importance of the insolvency. regime to be applied. The second sub-category - weakly 
non-adjusting creditors - can adjust their overall credit portfolio in order to face non- 
payment risks, although such adjustments do not take place on a case-by-case basis. 
Clearly, when Universalism is criticized to produce hardship to domestic creditors 
when local assets are to be transferred, it is understood that such hardship is primarily felt 
by strongly non-adjusting creditors, i. e. usually individuals and small/medium size 
corporations. In contrast, adjusting creditors' transactions are usually well studied and 
secured that even if the debtor's assets were insufficient for a complete recovery, they 
would not be prejudiced as much as strongly non-adjusting creditors. In fact, for 
adjusting creditors, insolvency rules are roughly deemed as equivalent as regards credit 
recovery. Nevertheless, they may prefer a framework based on Universalism because 
21 See LoPucki Lynn M, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. (1994); Bridge Michael & 
Robert Stevens, Cross-Border Insolvency and Security, Oxford University Press, 2001. 22 There are nonetheless more sophisticated approaches with respect to credit card companies. Although 
these corporations do not tailor the terms of their lending on a debtor-by-debtor basis, they may decide to 
charge different rates to different categories of cardholders. 23 Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2182 -2183 (2000). 
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such a system can entail great savings off the debtor's assets, thus rendering the total 
repayment of all creditors all the more likely. 
B. Non-Afflustine Creditors under Universalism 
The above presentation of the various types of creditors leads us to explore the 
types of problems strongly non-adjusting creditors may face under Universalism, and 
how these impediments are commonly used to discard Universalism and opt for 
Territoriality. There are in fact two arguments why the position of non-adjusting creditors 
under Universalism should be carefully considered. This section will address the 
particular position of strongly non-adjusting creditors and how an insolvency framework 
based on Universalism can affect their rights. 
As explained above, strongly non-adjusting creditors fail to tailor the terms of 
their transactions so as to offset risk taking. As a result, the mass of borrowers will 
collectively support the burden of risk, regardless of their financial soundness and 
structure. This means that low-risk borrowers will borrow too little and high-risk 
borrowers will borrow too much. This encourages inefficient borrowing decisions and 
biased capital placements. 
With an insolvency framework based on Universalism, where domestic courts are 
not always in charge and domestic laws do not necessarily apply, further capital 
distortion may occur. Indeed, a domestic non-adjusting creditor dealing with a foreign 
MNC subsidiary would carefully reconsider the terms of the transaction if aware that the 
potential insolvency of his debtor could entangle it in lengthy insolvency proceedings 
held before a foreign court (the debtor's home country), where unfamiliar insolvency 
laws are applied 24 . Thus, in this situation, it could be argued that the merits of 
24 In contrast, see Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies, supra note 2, at 350 (arguing that "creditors 
presumably know of the potential for bankruptcy and its attendant complications when they decide to do business with foreign companies"). Even assuming that this statement is founded, it does not legitimise the 
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Universalism are refuted, as causing harm to the interests of domestic strongly non- 
adjusting creditors by increasing the unpredictable risks at stake. 
In the alternative, one might argue that the insolvency framework has no effects 
on strongly non-adjusting creditors. By definition, these creditors do not rely on any legal 
regime because they do not calculate the risks they are prepared to take. Admitting that a 
greater capital distortion would occur to their detriment under Universalism presumes 
that strongly non-adjusting creditors have deliberately chosen the territoriality of 
insolvency proceedings and have taken the latter into consideration when contracting 
with a foreign subsidiary. Although this argument raises the lack of reliance on the 
insolvency regime to be applied, strongly non-adjusting creditors may have implicitly, to 
a certain extent, taken into account the prospects of insolvency proceedings in case of 
non-payment. Indeed, if the transaction with a foreign subsidiary were concluded in a 
domestic environment, it would seem reasonable to expect that the risks resulting there 
from will equally be governed by the domestic court system and domestic laws. Although 
non-adjusting creditors do not measure risk taking per se, to assume a complete non- 
reliance on the insolvency regime would violate their minimal expectations regarding the 
competence of the domestic judicial system. Furthermore, non-adjusting creditors' 
acceptance of risks takes place on a domestic level. With the implementation of a 
Universalistic framework entailing either the competence of a foreign court or the 
application of a foreign law, such an acceptance may be unwontedly extended beyond the 
domestic contexe5. 
breach of creditors' rights in case of insolvency. It is believed that creditors' awareness or expectations 
should not constitute a waiver of their rights. 
2' This is particularly relevant when, according to Universalism, local assets may be transferred to other 
forums. While non-adjusting creditors did not calculate the value of these assets, it does not imply that they 
were oblivious as to their existence and location. See Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, 




The further argument discrediting Universalism stems from the protection given 
by judges and legislators to small domestic creditors 26 . In fact, a number of arguments 
have been posited in favour of Territoriality, under which no return of local assets may be 
required and therefore more protection can be extended to domestic creditors 27. To argue 
against this premise, supporters of Universalism have found subterfuge behind the 
"Rough Wash" argument, according to which the losses of domestic creditors will "be 
evened out byforeign deference of local assets in other cases,, 28. Despite the strength of 
such an argument, most multinational corporations do have their home country in the 
developed industrialized world, i. e., colloquially referred to as the " North". This is likely 
to lead to a situation where in the majority of cross-border insolvency cases, the same 
jurisdictions - located in the North - will demand the transfer of assets located in the 
developing world, i. e., colloquially referred to as the "South. " Therefore, it might be 
argued that one should differentiate between the domestic creditors in the North and the 
ones conducting their businesses in the South. For the latter, the "Rough Wash" argument 
seems less veracious as courts in developing countries would be more frequently asked to 
defer to foreign proceedings than they would be asked for the transfer of assets 29. As a 
result, a Universal approach to insolvency could be criticized that it will produce unequal 
results between creditors located in developed countries and those located in less 
developed countries30. 
26 Section 304(c) of the U. S. Bankruptcy Code, prior to its amendment in late 2005, provided that the U. S. 
court may consider, in deciding whether to grant the foreign representative relief, "the protection of claim 
holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience. " See IIU. S. C. § 304(c)(2) (existing at 
September 2005). 
27 See Jay M. Goffman & Evan A. Michael, A Comparative Examination of Insolvency Laws of 
Industrialized Countries, 050503 ABI-CLE 11 (2003) [hereinafter Goffman, Comparative Examination] 
(arguing that "many countries will only agree to the designation of a home court if they are confident that 
the foreign court will provide protection to both domestic and foreign creditors, and many countries are 
skeptical that this will occur"). 
28See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice 
of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 457,464465 (199 1) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism] - 29 See Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining 
Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 73 AM. BANKR. L. J. 385,426 (1999)[hereinatler 
Rammeskow, Predictability and Protection]. 
30 To further elaborate this observation, the incentive to establish a universalistic insolvency regime will 
considerably vary from one country to another. Countries that are the home country of many multinationals 
will be more eager to adopt Universalism because their local courts will benefit from a higher number of 
cases that are deferred from non-home forums. 
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C. Universalism and Prioritv Claims 
The issue of creditors' rights and their classification brings forth additional legal 
complexities pertaining to the implementation of an insolvency framework predicated on 
Universalism. It is common that national insolvency laws aim at protecting domestic 
creditors in general and specific social groups in particular. The legislator usually pursues 
these objectives by granting a high priority of distribution off the liquidation proceeds to 
specific categories of claimants 31 . 
Because Universalism urges domestic courts to defer to foreign proceedings 
where different priority arrangements apply, the social objectives pursued by the 
domestic legislator may be undermined. Should a foreign court apply its domestic 
insolvency law and its ensuing priority rules of distribution to the mass of creditors, the 
protection sought by the legislator in other forums may be hindered. Certain social groups 
that are domestically well protected may not be able to maintain the priority of their 
claims under a foreign insolvency system. In this respect; Universalism is often criticized 
as changing domestic distribution priorities, thereby limiting the reach of national 
policies. Critics of Universalism, such as Lopucki32, often use this argument to question 
the feasibility of Universalism, as benefits would be extended to a handful of creditors 
and countries rather than to all participating nations 33 . Furthermore, Lopucki advocates 
the current state of Territoriality over any form of Universalism, as the "grab rule" of 
Territoriality secures at least a portion of the debtor's assets which proceeds can be 
distributed according to the domestic social objectives pursued by the legislator in each 
forum. 
3 'See Lore, International Insolvency Cooperation, supra note 11, at 15. 32See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 12, at 2219. 33 This argument refers to the necessary distinction between the North and the South, and the unlikely 
incentives of developing countries to opt for Universalism. 
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Professor Westbrook attempts to address these concerns by raising two pertinent 
arguments 34 . First, he refers to the interplay between state and federal bankruptcy laws in 
the United States. Despite the existence of federal bankruptcy laws enacted by the 
Congress, state laws prevail in all domestic cases to the extent that local priority rules of 
distribution are respected. By analogy, Westbrook stretches by presuming that an 
international bankruptcy regime may leave some leverage to national bankruptcy 
arrangements. He further proffers that the reconciliation between the diverse domestic 
insolvency systems would be eased because certain categories of creditors recurrently 
receive priority of distribution under most (but not all) insolvency laws 35 - 
The second argument brought forth by Westbrook is that an intemationa 
bankruptcy regime would solely address the financial distress of large multinationals and 
their subsidiaries. Such a regime would not replace domestic judiciaries to adjudicate the 
financial distress of medium size and small enterprises. This repartition of competence, 
he argues, would enhance the possibility of establishing an international bankruptcy 
regime based on Universalism. Certain categories of domestic creditors would be able to 
maintain their priority of distribution granted by their domestic bankruptcy laws as far as 
the debtor satisfies the criteria for the application of that domestic law. According to 
Westbrook, if the size of the debtor were greater and included several subsidiaries and 
branches located in multiple forums, distribution priorities will follow an international 
priority order, which would - to the greatest extent possible - embrace the main priorities 
of domestic bankruptcy systems. 
While it is credible that Universalism may be able to accommodate the priorities 
set by domestic bankruptcy laws on the long-term, creating an immediate international 
order of priority that retains most domestic customary practices seems highly difficult as 
34 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2322. 35 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Developments in Transnational Bankruptcy, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L. J 745, 




a practical endeavour. Such a task would suggest that significant efforts of harmonization 
among the diverse domestic insolvency regimes are well underway 36. Unfortunately, this 
is not the case and it further appears that the international community may have decades 
ahead before reaching a consensus in that area37. Westbrook's comments are certainly 
valuable and inspiring as to the matter discussed. Yet, such arguments pre-suppose a 
global insolvency system marked by the maturity of and full compliance with 
international law. At present, these longer-term solutions can hardly be relied upon to 
resolve the issues that arise from the default of multinational corporations. 
111. The Home Countrv Standard 
According to Universalism, managing cross-border insolvency proceedings 
requires the identification of a single forum that will decide a particular case. This forum 
is, by definition, the debtor's home country. As easy as this task may sound, the 
difficulties encountered can be paramount because one has to decide what criteria to use 
in identifying the debtor's home country, and subsequently attribute judicial competence 
to that specific forum. Before accepting deterministic criteria however, one should 
understand the elusiveness of the home country concept and its various definitions: this 
will be considered in sub-section A immediately below. Sub-section B to this Part III will 
emphasis the place of incorporation as it has known greater popularity by domestic 
insolvency laws. At last, the debtor's home country concept engenders considerable 
controversies as regards corporate groups. Then, sub-section C will analyze the legal 
issues that might arise from the determination of a multinational's home country. 
36 See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 28, at 468 (arguing "the second prerequisite to 
obtaining the benefits of universalism is general similarity of laws. Similar laws about distributions, 
avoidance, and the like are not in principle necessary to the acceptance of universalism, but in practice 
similarity is very important"). 
37 See James Garrett Van Osdell, The Transnational Insolvency Dilemma: Congress Should Emphasize 
Comity of Nations, 49 S. C. L. REV. 1327,1334 -1335 (1998) (arguing that because nations must overcome immense cultural, political, and philosophical differences, an international treaty structure that could 




A. Vap-ueness of the Concept 
The indeterminacy of the debtor's home country primarily stems from the 
different definitions given to it by the diverse laws, treaties, and international 
conventions. There are mainly three different approaches that define the debtor's home 
country, which indeterminacy may be another shortcoming of Universalism 38 . 
One approach would provide that the debtor's home country should be 
determined by its place of incorporation (domicile). The advantage of this definition is 
the predictability according to which the competent forum can be chosen. Furthermore, 
the effortless identification of the place of incorporation could well minimize the cost of 
information to the advantage of creditors during the pre-contractual phase. The country of 
incorporation criteria presents an additional advantage in that it is in line with the path 
followed by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and the EU 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 39 . It is likely that such an alignment would enable, 
over time, further harmonization of domestic and international insolvency standards. 
However, the criterion of the country of incorporation is argued to be ineffective, as it 
could be subject to manipulations and could encourage forum shopping (discussed 
below). 
A second approach would recognize the "principal place of business 4091 as the 
debtor's home country. This latter approach is criticized as being unstable and subject to 
constant changes. Indeed, even excluding the bad faith of a corporate debtor that may be 
38Lynn LoPucki & William Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, WISC. L. REV. 11,17-19 (1991) (arguing that the 
indeterminacy of the debtor's home country constitutes an important impediment to Universalism thus 
jeopardizing its feasibility and maintaining its study to the theoretical stage) [hereinafter Whitford, Forum 
Shopping]. 
39 Council Regulation N*. 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings available at http: //Europa. eu. int/eur- 
lex/en/lif/dat/2000/en_300RI346. btmI (last visited September 2005). 
40 See Martin N. Flics & Michael J. Ireland, Bankruptcy and the Problems of Multi-jurisdictional 
Workouts, 553 PLIXOMM 175,180 (1990) [hereinafter Ireland, Multi-Jurisdictional Workouts]. This 
criterion presupposes that the enterprise has an obvious center of its activities in one country; where the 
business of the enterprise is substantially related to several countries, arguments about expectations and 




motivated to mislead its creditors 41 , the principal place of business is often prone to 
modifications as the debtor's business expands. The unpredictability of such a method is 
striking within a global commercial world, where multinationals are constantly evolving 
in order to thrive in the international market. However, the principal place-of business 
was widely accepted and relied upon in the past 42 . As a result, a number of scholars are 
more favourable to such a method in determining the debtor's home country. For 
instance, Trautman argues that the principal place of business would be the most effective 
compared with other definitions, since debtors would be deterred from manipulating the 
location of their center of gravity due to the high cost of such an operation 43 . While it 
is 
true that the costs of displacing the principal place of business could be financially 
burdensome, the issues at stake should not be underestimated. Indeed, if displacing the 
center of gravity (principal place of business) would grant the distressed corporation a 
better chance to be rescued, reorganized or simply liquidated pursuant to more 
advantageous rules to shareholders and/or managers, it is unlikely that the cost of such an 
operation would deter the corporate debtor from so doing. 
The place of incorporation and the principal place of business are commonly used 
by domestic courts. Nevertheless, a third approach deserves a brief mention. This most 
contestable approach defines the debtor's home country as the place where most of its 
assets are located. Needless to say, this criterion is pre-disposed to manipulation by 
corporate debtors, who can easily transfer assets, to the detriment of their creditorS44. 
" See Whitford, Forum Shopping, supra note 38, at 19 (arguing that the principal place of business can be 
subject to manipulations). 
42 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. (In re Commonwealth Oil Refining 
Co. ), 596 F. 2d 1239,124445 (5th Cir. 1979) (where the court's opinion is a reminder that "the principal 
place of business, though later joined by location of principal assets, was the only venue available to a 
corporate debtoe'). See Robert M. Fishman & Brian L. Shaw, Business Bankruptcy Venue-Past and Present 
Courtesy Of In Re Peachtree Lane Associates, Limited, No. II NRTN-BLA 4 (1998). 
43 Donald T. Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29 HARV. INTL L. J. 49, 
56-57 (1988). See also Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique 
of the Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AMBKRLJ 135 (1992). 
44 "Nowhere in the world is location of the principal assets used (or accepted) as basis for assumption (or 
recognition) of bankruptcy jurisdiction. The definition is misleading. It has led to confusion already". See 
Kurt H. Nadelmann, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News from the Common Market and a Reflection for Home 
Consumption, 56 AMBKRLJ 65 (1982). 
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Moreover, the transfer of assets is likely to be less troublesome and costly than the 
transfer of headquarters. In other words, this method would simply give the debtor the 
upper hand in deciding which forum shall decide its case. It would appear that the 
inefficiency of this last approach increases considerably under Territoriality as the 
transfer of assets could mislead various creditors to believe they are facing a favourable 
bankruptcy regime. In turn, creditors would constantly have to exercise strict control 
upon the debtor's activity thus committing more resources than necessat Y45. 
What is important is that the legal debates regarding the debtor's home country 
determination are primarily concerned with the best approach to adopt. The one that is 
likely to resolve judicial competence issues in all cross-border insolvency cases. In 
reality, a more pragmatic solution may call for a less stringent approach. Indeed, any of 
the first two methods above described could be suitable to determine the debtor's home 
country, because the aim of harmonizing domestic insolvency laws and thereby 
increasing the possibilities for the creation of an international insolvency system is to 
improve predictability for creditors, not to seek perfection. What is more, there will 
always be cases where the principal place of business and/or the place of incorporation 
are inappropriate to attribute jurisdiction to a specific foruM46. In short, either method, 
most probably, would be appropriate, as long as there is an international consensus on its 
definition and implementation. 
45 See Gilson Stuart, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially 
Distressed Firms, 52 J. OF FINANCE, 567 (1997). 
46 See Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 2, at 502 (arguing that under either criterion there 
will be circumstances that will exist in which determination of the home country of a corporation will be diff icult). 
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B. The Place of Incorporation 
Lopucki argues that the use of the place of incorporation to determine the debtor's home 
country will lead to Forum Shoppine7 and to the manipulation of the place of 




"Forum shopping" has always been perceived as a negative practice to the extent 
that, on the domestic level, it provides for a quasi-irrefragable presumption of bad faith 
against its perpetrator 48 . This 
is particularly true when there is only one court that should 
decide a specific case and filing a petition before another court would simply be 
construed as a breach of the obligation of bona fides in trade and commercial dealings. 
However, fearing forum shopping in cross-border insolvency cases may well be treated 
and perceived differently. 
By definition, transnational insolvencies are too broad to be captured and 
subjected to only one jurisdiction. In most - if not all cases - there usually is more than 
one forum that can reasonably assert jurisdiction to adjudicate the insolvency at stake. 
Against the multiplicity of the proceedings before these different courts, the common law 
doctrine of "forum non-convenienS49-)g could serve as a deterrent against unscrupulous 
47 See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality; supra note 12, at 2219 (arguing "as Delaware competes as a 
"haven" for domestic bankruptcy cases, Bermuda, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands stand ready to 
compete as havens for international bankruptcies. One easily could imagine a Universalist world of the near 
future in which over half of all large multinational bankruptcy cases are filed in Bermuda ... The 
Bermuda 
legislature would set the relative bankruptcy priorities of creditors throughout the world"). 48 See In re Silberkraus, 253 B. R. 890,36 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 995 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 2000) (the court 
decided that "it constitutes bad faith for Chapter II debtor to file bankruptcy to impede, delay, forum shop, 
or obtain a tactical advantage regarding litigation ongoing in a non bankruptcy forum, whether that 
nonbankruptcy forum is a state court or a federal district court"). See also William Thomas Thurman & 
Brett P. Johnson, Bankruptcy and the Bad Faith Filing, 10-DEC UTAH B. J. 12,17-17 (1997). it is also 
noteworthy to mention that the negative perception of Forum Shopping may be subject to discussion. See 
Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 227,253 -254 
(1990) (arguing that Forum Shopping can render a number of economic benefits and could also result in a 
higher degree of fairness to the benefit of the parties at trial). 49 This doctrine was developed to counter a plaintiffs ability to forum-shop and holds that a court May 
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when the letter of a general venue statute authorizes jurisdiction. 
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plaintiffs (either creditor or debtor). This approach will be restrictive of forum shopping 
50 
while it encourages closer cooperation among courts located in different countries 
Furthermore, the ultimate aim of an eventual international insolvency framework 
would be most likely to agree upon a common method (substantive and procedural) to 
clearly determine where the debtor's home country is located, rather than seeking 
irreproachable criteria to determine the same. In reference to Lopucki's observations 51, it 
would not necessarily be an aberration if Luxemburg courts were to decide a significant 
number of cross-border insolvency cases according to their domestic insolvency laws so 
long as basic procedural rules are observed 52 . Even if the laws applied by these courts 
allow lower recoveries than any other place, the most important element at stake, 
according to Lopucki, is predictability. Creditors would be aware that lower recoveries 
are imminent under the laws of certain jurisdictions and would thus contractually protect 
themselves 53 against such divergences 54 . This, of course, assumes these pre-insolvency 
contractual assurances would be upheld and enforced post-bankruptcy by the forum 
court. 
Forum non-conveniens is a relevant consideration only when both jurisdiction and venue are proper. See 
William L. Norton, Jr. International Law and its Influence on Cross-Border Insolvencies, NRTN-BLP § 
152: 21 (2003). 
50 In making a discretionary decision on whether or not to hear a case onforum non-conveniens grounds, a 
court should be guided by both the private interests of the litigants and the public interests of the two 
forums involved. This is likely to foster the application of "international comity" and cooperation in cross- 
border insolvency cases. This approach has been relevant in a number of insolvency/comity decisions. See 
In re Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, 91 B. R. 661 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1988) (emphasizing the 
role of comity in a cross-border insolvency proceedings); Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of MN Venture 
Star, 102 B. R. 373,377 (D. N. J. 1988). However, the notion of forum non-conveniens is a controversial 
notion in and of itself and often practically falls within judicial discretion. 
51 See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 12, at 2219. 52 This assumption would entail similar concepts to due process under US law, or other guarantee of fairness 
and impartiality under other legal systems. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning 
Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 931,941 (1994). See Campbell, In Search of Uniformity, 
supra note 41, at 45 (arguing that U. S. courts have deferred to foreign insolvency proceedings in the 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, and Sweden after finding the foreign law 
was similar or 'ýprovidedfundamental standards ofproceduralfairness "). 53 This assumption rules out non-adjusting creditors who are likely to run greater risks under an international insolvency system predicated on universalism. 54 See Alan Schwartz, Contracting about Bankruptcy, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 127,127 - 131 (1997). 
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Nevertheless, the fears stemming from forum shopping are not only related to the 
substance of the various insolvency laws and the priority claims they entail. But equally 
relate to concerns over the unreliability of certain judicial systems that may come to 
adjudicate significant cross-border insolvency cases in favour of domestic creditors, 
55 
national interests, or pursuant to other personal interest domestic judges may have 
Thus, the opinion of Lopucki and other like-minded scholars 56 relates to the observance 
of the fundamental principles ofjustice and fairness in insolvency proceedings. 
However, a traditional solution possibly may address these concerns. For courts 
that are reputed for their incompetence, bias or lack of transparency, a convenient 
solution may be found on the grounds of the denial of recognition and enforcement of the 
very decisions rendered by these courts. The role of a cross-border insolvency framework 
would be to define minimum standards granting fair and transparent insolvency 
proceedings. These standards would preserve the rights of the parties in international 
insolvency litigations and insure that unfair judicial practices produce minimal legal 
effects against the prejudiced party. To this end, decisions rendered by unscrupulous 
courts would be denied recognition by other jurisdictions and would hence lose their 
overall objectives. 
In sum, there seems to be remedies against forum shopping in cross-border 
insolvency cases. Yet, the most intricate issue - aside from the vulnerability of non- 
adjusting domestic creditors under Universalism - is how an eventual cross-border 
insolvency framework should be designed to best address the problems that arise under 
forum shopping. 
55 In this regard, the risk of bribery and corruption in a number of judiciary systems should be taken into 
account, especially when the sums involved in the insolvency proceedings are considerable. 
56 See J. H. Dalhuisen, International Insolvency and Bankruptcy (MB) § 1.0 1[I] (1986) (arguing that under 
Universalism, domestic courts are likely to confer a preferential treatment to domestic creditors); see also 
Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent 





the Place of Incorporation 
As further argued by Lopucki, the place of incorporation also can be subject to 
manipulations by debtors in order to mislead creditors. After a given corporation has 
accumulated substantial debts, it could voluntarily change its place of incorporation, thus 
conferring a senior creditor status to new creditors, to the disadvantage of previous 
lenders. This argument elicits a number of comments. First, changing the place of 
incorporation is certainly possible but would be quite complex. Indeed, changing the 
place of incorporation of an established and operating corporation is an extraordinary 
decision that most probably would require the vote of a qualified majority of 
shareholders, not a simple task. The decision to transfer the place of incorporation is 
rather difficult to reach, and cannot be dealt with as a routine corporate decision of 
shareholders. Secondly, in contrast with changing the principal place of business due to 
business expansion without any procedural requirements 57 , transferring the place of 
incorporation may oblige the concerned entity to notify all its creditors before transfer 
procedures begin. This would allow existing creditors to report their grievances and 
alternatively seek more guaranties to secure their rights58 . Finally, creditors could secure 
their rights contractually in various ways. One of them would be to stipulate that credits 
and/or loans would be considered to have reached maturity if the debtor is about to 
change its place of incorporation. These measures are usually construed as a deterrent to 
firms from changing their place of incorporation, thus adding more stability and 
predictability to the latter concept. 
Above all, opting for the place of incorporation could overcome the important 
issue of asset removal. Insofar as the place of incorporation is the benchmark for 
attributing jurisdiction to a single and specific forum, the removal of assets from one 
" See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 12, at 2225 (favoring the principal place of business 
as a method in determining the debtor's home country. The author argues that changing a company's place 
of business is not burdensome. He uses the example of BCCI and Dreco Energy that moved their principal 
place of business on the eve of bankruptcy). 
For instance, it is suggested that a change of registered offlce from one EU-state to another can only take 
place if the creditors and other holders of rights in respect of the company either consent or are granted 
adequate security for their claims/rights. See the European Union Corporate Directive No. 14, Art. 8. 
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jurisdiction to another may seem a trivial issue 59 , although it may affect the possibility of 
reorganization at a later stage, especially under a Territorial insolvency systeM60. Yet 
still, the place of incorporation would attribute jurisdiction to a single forum. While the 
principal place of business may be subject to transfer resulting from business expansion, 
and while assets may be subject to removal from one location to another, a corporate 
debtor is necessarily incorporated in only one forum. In turn, this would encourage 
deference to this competent forum, not on the grounds of comity and cooperation 61 , rather 
on the basis that no other forum is competent to adjudicate the insolvency at stake. 
In light of the above, the place of incorporation may be the most effective and 
predictable method in determining the debtor's home country on the domestic level62. It 
may however present a number of problems when applied to multinational corporations, 
especially under Universalism. Therefore, it is necessary to stress the flaws of such a 
method when the corporate debtor is composed of several subsidiaries each incorporated 
in a different forum. 
C. The Home Countrv of a Multinational Corporation 
The determination of a multinational's home country has always been 
controversial. The very nature of multinational corporations has engendered many 
problematical issues not only in the course of bankruptcy proceedings, but also in many 
other areas 63 . As previously explained, one such issue is the question of how 
multinationals are legally defined. One approach is to define the latter as networks of 
59 Where the place of incorporation is the benchmark to attribute jurisdiction, the emplacement of assets 
will not be probative of the debtor's home country. 
60 See Chapter One demonstrating that under Territoriality, the removal of assets is a rather important 
element that is hardly controlled and unlikely prevented, much to the detriment of creditors. 61 See supra note 49. 
62 See Ireland, Multi-Jurisdictional Workouts, supra note 40 at 181 (arguing that most countries generally 
require a company to have its place of incorporation within the country to qualify for bankruptcy within the 
jurisdiction). 
3 See generally Meeran, R., The Unveiling of Transnational Corporations: A Direct Approach, Kluwer 
Law International, 1999; Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 227,237 (1990); Patrick C. Sargent, Bankruptcy Remote Finance Subsidiaries: The Substantive 
Consolidation Issue, 44 BUS. LAW. 1223,1223 (1989). 
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parent corporation and several subsidiaries, each incorporated in a specific country, each 
have it own limited liability shield and each subject to its laws and courts. Conversely, 
one may also consider that the financial and legal relationships between several 
subsidiaries create a single entity governed by the laws of the parent's place of 
incorporation. In fact, these issues have been long identified and debated for over three 
decades. Whether or not the laws of a given country deal with the issue using the single 
entity approach64, the insolvency process of multinationals can cause further difficulties 
under Universalism 65 . 
Lopucki similarly argues that the very nature of corporate groups poses an 
enormous problem affecting the credibility of a Universalistic regime66 . Insofar as the 
home country of multinationals remains difficult to identify, Universalism does not seem 
capable of progressing past the theoretical stage. He adds that the criterion of the place of 
incorporation may be satisfactory so long as the competent forum is where the distressed 
subsidiary is incorporated, regardless of where its parent is incorporated. This Territorial 
approach - founded on the separate entity perception of multinationals - is argued as 
increasing predictability in commercial and financial transactions, and providing a certain 
level of protection to domestic non-adjusting creditors. 
These arguments are relatively well-founded and highlight some beneficial 
aspects of Territoriality. Unlike Universalism, Territoriality affords domestic non- 
adjusting creditors a better chance to be paid off the liquidation of the debtor's assets 
located in the forum of opening. As previously explained, domestic social policies would 
64 See Chapter One. According to this approach, corporations are treated as one legal entity. When 
insolvency proceedings are then initiated against this entity, all its assets are liquidated and all its 
worldwide creditors can lodge their claims in those proceedings that take place before one forum. 
Therefore, the single entity approach is best suited to the objectives of Universalism. 65 However, it is noteworthy to mention that the difficulty encountered in administering the insolvency of 
corporate groups does not stem from Universalism or Territoriality, but rather from the very nature of 
corporate groups itself. The conflict between the separate entity approach and single entity approach 
underlie the conflict between a territorial insolvency system and a system predicated on Universalism. 66 See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 12, at 2228. 
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often prefer this method because there will be at least a share of the debtor's liquidation 
proceeds that are distributed according to the domestic order of priority, thereby 
providing a certain level protection to vulnerable social classes. In addition, these non- 
adjusting creditors may - if permitted by foreign insolvency laws - lodge their claims in 
secondary or parallel proceedings held before foreign jurisdictions so as to recover 
additional portions of their claims. Insofar as a single entity perception of multinationals - 
along with the application of Universalism to their insolvency process - does not provide 
that same level of protection, a separate entity approach will be the favoured choice of 
most nations. This would in turn encourage maintaining the status quo of Territoriality in 
managing multinationals' insolvency proceedings 67 . 
In addition, if the parent's forum (Le., the parent's place of incorporation) were to 
determine the insolvency of the entire group, further unpredictability will incur. 
Regardless of whether certain subsidiaries are financially distressed or not, the court in 
the parent's home country would collect their assets for the purposes of liquidation (or 
reorganization). This method could prove ineffective as regards independent subsidiaries 
that are financially sound. It would invite the latter to respond to the debts contracted by 
their parent to the detriment of their financial soundness. It could also mislead diligent 
creditors who might have closely followed the sound financial performance of their 
debtors (subsidiaries) and who might have relied upon it to collect on their claims. 
To address this indeterminacy, an alternative method has been proposed by 
several commentators to decide the home country of a multinational corporation. This 
67 Conversely, under the separate entity approach, two consequences are inevitable. First, it will render the 
reorganization (when possible) of the insolvent subsidiary more difficult, particularly if significant assets 
necessary to its operations are located in other jurisdictions over which the court in charge has no power. Second, this approach would allow firms that are part of the same corporate group to rile for bankruptcy 
strategically. Indeed, the order in which firms file for bankruptcy can have tremendous effects on the benefits that can be reaped off the debtor's assets. In sum, the risk of manipulating the bankruptcy of a 




method suggests that through an integration test , one can identify the subsidiaries 
whose operations are directly inter-connected and hence attribute jurisdiction to the 
forum of the "controlling"' subsidiary. Put another way, the corporate group will be 
segmented into smaller conglomerates inside which the subsidiaries' activities are inter- 
dependent. This solution is neither a territorial nor universal approach based and should 
be thought of as a compromise aiming to conciliate two incompatible theories. However, 
this solution does not enhance the ex-ante predictability for creditors because it seems 
rather difficult for a third party to evaluate the degree of integration of the subsidiary to 
its parent's operations. Furthermore, this approach is likely to give non-negligible 
discretionary powers to the court in assessing the degree of integration provided for under 
a potential integration test. Thus, the international community may witness different 
standards of integration depending on the forum in charge. Needless to say that such a 
disparate method may not satisfy the objectives of predictability and fairness necessary 
within an international insolvency framework. Even considering that integration can be 
measured according to more objective and uniform criteria, such as the ownership by the 
parent of at least 50% of its subsidiary, this will not overcome the instability resulting 
from this method because equity interests are in constant variation throughout the life of 
any given corporation, therefore the ex-ante predictability for creditors is not much 
improved. 
The various arguments brought forth in favour of Territoriality considerably 
weaken the case for Universalism. In this respect, considering multinational corporations 
as a network of separate legal entities may, in a number of instances, improve the ex-ante 
predictability in commercial and financial transactions. Importantly, it would palliate one 
significant deficiency of Universalism, that is, the vulnerability of domestic non-adjusting 
creditors. 
69 See Wilson Chu, Avoiding Surprises Through Due Diligence, Business Law Today, Jan. /Feb. 1997, at 8; 
see also Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 89,630 (1975). 
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IV. Recoanition and Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction 
Universalism advocates the resolution of multinational's default by a single forum 
that has an overall and primary jurisdiction over the debtor's assets wherever located. 
Such a scheme may be difficult to implement if it is not associated with a viable regime 
to ensure the recognition and enforcement of foreign insolvency judgmentS69. Indeed, 
absent such a pre-requisite, the adjudicating forum may be powerless to administer the 
debtor's assets that are beyond its territorial reach, thus rendering their collection and 
liquidation rather impossible. 
Recognition, however, has evolved in a substantive way with the surge of 
international conventions aiming at easing the recognition of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters 70 . Unfortunately, most of these developments 
have systematically 
excluded insolvency from their scope of application 71 , thereby acknowledging the 
exclusivity of insolvency proceedings and further highlighting that a state's sovereignty 
and policy choices can be represented - or at least expressed - within its insolvency 
system. As a result, the recognition of foreign insolvency judgments is handled 
69 See Ulrich Huber, Creditor Equality in Transnational Bankruptcies: The United States Position, 19 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 741,744 (1986) (arguing that because Universalism prescribes broad 
competence to the adjudicating forum, non-adjudicating forums will have to recognize foreign judicial 
decisions so as to enable a proper implementation of Universalism). See also Michael P. Bigelow, Public 
Policy Concerns Prevent Application of Comity to Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings that Discriminate 
against Tax Obligations Owed to the United States Government. Overseas Inns S. A. P. A. V. United States, 
24 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 571,5 84-585 (199 1). 
70 On the international level, see Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters available at www. hcch. net/e/workprog/jdgm. html (last visited July 2005); 
see also Procedures Regulation - An Act Respecting the Convention between Canada and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, n. b. reg. 88-206, available at 
http: //www. canlii. org/nb/ýegu/cmb/20040210/1988r. 206/ (last visited September 2005); on the European 
level, see Council Regulation (EQ No 44/200 1, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [officialjournal 112 of 16.01.20011. 71 See Hague Convention, supra note 70, article 1(5) (excluding from its scope of application questions of 
bankruptcy, compositions or analogous proceedings, including decisions which may result therefrom and 
which relate to the validity of the acts of the debtor); see Council Regulation (EQ No 44/2001 article 2(b) 
(the regulation does not apply to "bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent 
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedinge'). 
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domestically and is subject to different level of scrutiny from one forum to the other 72 . 
While a number of jurisdictions are more flexible to recognize the insolvency judgments 
rendered by other forums, most nations attempt to limit the legal effects these judgments 
may produce domestically. This non-uniformity among national practices raises a number 
of questions as to the feasibility of Universalism. Perhaps, a more sensitive solution to 
this problem may be to advocate alongside Universalism, a general system of recognition 
that would best serve the purpose of the "single court, single law" principle. Even 
assuming that such a system is politically feasible, it still would not be exempt from 
criticisms. Indeed, a quasi-automatic system of recognition as vindicated by Universalism 
is often condemned because it would occasionally implicate the exporting of social 
policies from one forum to another. This would, in turn, undermine the very concept of 
judicial and legislative sovereignty 73 . 
This Part IV will address the various challenges the recognition of foreign 
insolvency judgments presents, and how the latter affect the feasibility of an international 
insolvency system predicated on Universalism. 
A. Recounition and Nexus Tests 
When applied to the insolvency of a multinational corporation, Universalism 
might be seen to lead to situations where the debtor's operations are totally unrelated to 
its home country. This would contradict the legal requirements and conditions for the 
74 recognition of foreign judgments set by most, if not all, nations . As a result, 
judicial 
72 See Shoichi Tagashira, Intraterritorial Effects of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings: An Analysis of 
"Ancillary" Proceedings in the United States and Japan, 29 TX INT. L. J. 12 (1994) (arguing that the most 
practical problem of the international effect of insolvency proceedings is whether and to what extent each 
country is willing to cooperate with principal foreign proceedings). 73john K. Londot, Handling Priority Rules Conflicts in International Bankruptcy: Assessing the 
International Bar Association's Concordat, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 163,196 (1996) (highlighting the 
difficulty of reconciling pure universality with the "sovereign beast"). 
74 While states vary in their requirements for the recognition of civil judgments, each invariably requires 
that the rendering court have jurisdiction over the defendant-judgment debtor. See Von Mehren Arthur & 
Donald T. Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems, Sweet & Maxwell, 73,1965 (arguing that "in 
Anglo-American law recognition of foreign judgments turns basically on the question whether in the view 
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requirements of connectivity (or nexus) in civil and commercial matters are frequently 
not met under Universalism, and far less so under the debtor's home country assertion of 
competence. Therefore, scholars such as Tung 75 have argued that under Universalism, the 
46 76 
. )P 
from one country to another is more likely to take place exporting ofsocialpolic 
The rationale to this argument is that domestic insolvency systems are different in 
many respects. Their substantive and procedural rules, priority of claims and social 
objectives are, in fact, often dissimilar 77 . It is therefore understood how the substantive 
degree of fairness and predictability they equally seek may practically call for different 
measures and processes. Therefore, it could be understood how these variations from one 
insolvency system to another embody and underlie specific social policy considerations. 
If a global system were to render foreign insolvency judgments readily recognized and 
enforced in other forums - as encouraged under the patronage of Universalism - domestic 
social policies will be easily transferred from one jurisdiction to another and foreign laws 
and courts might contestably determine the rights of local subjects. 
Because Universalism is not viewed as effectively addressing these national 
concerns, its study is often characterized as being "theoretical". In addition and so long as 
of the recognizing court the rendering court had adjudicatory jurisdiction in the international sense"). See 
Alan Reed, A New Model Of Jurisdictional Propriety For Anglo-American Foreign Judgment Recognition 
And Enforcement: Something Old, Something Borrowed, Something New?, INTL & COMP. L. REV. 243, 
243 -247 (2003); Martiny, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Paper presented at the XIIth Congress of Comparative Law, Australia, Aug. 1986). 75 Frederick Tung, Skepticism about Universalism: International Bankruptcy and International Relations, 
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series. Paper 43 (2002) [hereinafter Tung, 
Skepticism about Universalism] (referring to the concept of "state's courts exporting social policy", the 
author notes that "the jurisdictional test for recognition of foreign judgments can be understood as a 
mechanism to deter such ambitions"). See also Lopucki Lynn M., Cooperation in international Bankruptcy: 
A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696,759 (1999) [hereinafter, Post Universalist- 
Approach] (arguing that "an involuntary claim is the direct product of some country's social policy and to 
require a second country to reorganize that claim exports the social policy of the first"). 76 Id. 
77 See Goffman, Comparative Examination, supra note 27 (arguing the diversity of domestic systems in 
realizing the same objectives). Adversely, one can argue that material and procedural differences may be 
reconcilable since most if not all insolvency laws pursue the same objectives. As a result countries' social 
policies with respect to insolvency matters may be convergent to a greater extent than one may think. 
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cross-border insolvency cases are unequally distributed between developed and least 
developed countries, a reciprocity based argument according to which the recognizing 
forum will be able - in some cases - to "export" its own social policies 
78 may be 
misleading. The enactment of Universalism on a global level may hence require 
significant concessions on behalf of each forum to accept and to enforce insolvency 
precepts different from those that apply domestically. Unfortunately, current international 
law, international relations and state practices have not sufficiently matured to enable 
practical reliance on such assumptions. 
Although these arguments elucidate in part the reluctance of nations to adopt 
Universalism, one may alternatively argue that the essence of recognition is to "accept" 
foreign judgments so long as the latter were rendered under fair proceedings by 
professionally competent and impartial courts. Otherwise, the fear of "exporting social 
policy" would imply that the recognition of foreign insolvency judgments should be 
granted only if both forums (adjudicating and recognizing) engage in exactly the same 
social policies and use identical means to realize them. Not only would this situation 
probably stimulate a crisis in international judicial relations as recognition will seldom be 
granted, but it might also give rise to the rhetorical question of why would the recognition 
of foreign judgments be a pre-requisite to enforcement if all social policies must initially 
be one and the same? 
Another significant impediment to the recognition of foreign insolvency 
judgments is domestic tendencies to assert exorbitant adjudicatory powers. In this 
respect, Tung argues that, although a corporation may be incorporated in a given state, 
this is not sufficient to confer on that State's courts a 'Jurisdictional reach that is 
internationally recognized"79. He subsequently notes, "While this state [the rendering 
state] might claim such exorbitant jurisdiction for its courts, such an approach is 
78 See Westbrook, TheorY and Pragmatism, supra note 28, at 469. 79See Tung, Skepticism about Universalism, supra note 75. 
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typically condemned by other states"80. This observation stresses that the debtor's home 
country may not present sufficient ties to the debtor's insolvency. The very definition of 
Universalism is argued to further these inconsistencies because in a number of cases, the 
debtor's home country may not closely relate to the debtor's activities. Although this 
lack of connectivity between the debtor's operation and its home country often motivate 
the denial of recognition in a number of forums, one may wish to express further thoughts 
with respect to the specificity of insolvency proceedings and judgments, especially in the 
context of multinational corporations. 
It is true, regardless of whether a commercial transaction or a criminal offense, 
that judicial competence is usually assessed and asserted according to unequivocal nexus 
tests. However, the aim of insolvency proceedings is neither to administer nor to resolve 
one transaction or one incident. Instead, these proceedings seek to adjudicate the overall 
financial activity of a given corporation throughout its life period. Therefore, undisputed 
ties to a specific forum can be difficult to establish as the insolvency of a corporate debtor 
encompasses all the financial and commercial activity that the debtor entity may have 
engaged in across a number of jurisdictions. As a result, one may need to opt for more 
objective criteria that are predictable and stable. The place of the debtor's incorporation 
for instance may provide for such a benchmark to attribute jurisdiction to a single forum. 
In addition, it would not be legally incoherent to admit that corporations ought to be 
created and liquidated (or reorganized) in the same forum, regardless of the place where 
they have conducted most of their activities. 
Because domestic legal systems are not ready to follow such progressive 
principles, the uneasy recognition of foreign insolvency judgments continues to be a 
major impediment to the implementation of Universalism. 
go Id. (arguing that while a unified administration of insolvency proceedings might make economic sense, it 
would require "drastic assertion of cross border jurisdiction"). 
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B. Domestic Practices and the Exhortations of Universalism 
The common method to recognize foreign judgments in general is often viewed as 
twofold. First, there must be a relevant link between the rendering court and the matter 
disputed in order to grant such recognition (discussed above). Second, the private 
international laws of many jurisdictions require that foreign judgments be considered for 
recognition, unless this recognition should be denied on the grounds ofpubliC policy 81 or 
other similar considerations. Alongside these rules, the recognition of foreign judgments 
is often conditioned upon reciprocity of treatment among forums. Indeed, the lack of 
abiding global rules to govern recognition has led to a situation where a given court that 
systemically refuses to recognize foreign judgments is less likely to see its own decisions 
given full legal effect in other states. This setting is further consolidated by the broad 
lines of the Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters 82 . 
While the above reflects most domestic practices to recognize foreign judgments 
in general, insolvency judgments are weighed differently for recognition and enforcement 
purposes. Such a distinction should have been expected considering that the financial 
default of any given corporation affects not only the rights of creditors, but also all 
entities and/or individuals who may hold an interest, financial or otherwise, in the 
proceedings. 
In this regard, foreign insolvency judgments are often recognized on the grounds 
of International Comity83. As defined in the Hilton case 84 , this doctrine 
is - in a legal 
81 The concept of public policy can be extremely vague and consequently gives domestic courts significant 
discretion to decide what shall be considered part of public policy. See Belinfante Fr6res, La Codification 
du Droit International de la Faillite, La Haye 138,1895 (arguing that in France for instance, the extent of 
courts' discretion and the praetorian role of the judge in insolvency cases has been subject to many legal 
controversies and debates for several decades). On the elusiveness of the concept of Public Policy, see also 
Jonathan H. Pittman, Note, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 22 
VAND. J. TRANSNATI L. 969,970 (1989). 
2 See Hague Convention, supra note 70. 3 See Stuart A. Krause et aL, Relief Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Clarifying the Principal 
Role of Comity in Transnational Insolvencies, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2591 (1996); The Chaos of 
90 
Chapter Two. 
sense - "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy 
and good will, upon the other". Although international comity is frequently invoked in 
cross-border insolvency and other transnational cases, its definition is ambiguous at best. 
This ambiguity results from the introduction of a hybrid concept in the legal literature 
within which, a duty should either exist or it does not. Adversely, international comity 
neither prescribes a duty to recognize foreign judgments nor provides for a mere 
discretion to grant foreign judgments legal effeCtS85 . As a result, a number of non- 
uniform applications of this doctrine and inconsistent outcomes have swelled across 
cases 86 . This disparity does not 
improve the ex-ante predictability for creditors who may 
have relied on the judgments issued by their domestic court to dispose of the debtor's 
assets located in foreign jurisdictions. There is indeed little confidence whether a court 
will recognize a foreign insolvency decision. It is certain that this ad-hoc system of 
recognition is not suitable to Universalism and its exhortations. 
In the United States for instance, the US federal Bankruptcy Code (section 304), 
as it existed as of September Pt, 200587 , adopts a different approach 
in recognizing 
proceedings initiated before a foreign jurisdiction. American courts do not automatically 
recognize the findings of such proceedings, far less so when the debtor has considerable 
assets located within the US. Instead, section 304 allowed foreign representatives to file 
for bankruptcy in the US according to less stringent rules. In other terms, the simplified 
international insolvency--Achieving Reciprocal Universality Under Section 304 or MIICA, 6 
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 373,374 (1993); Stacey Allen Morales & Barbara Ann Deutcsh, Bankruptcy Code 
Section 304 and U. S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 BUS. LAW. 1573 
(1984). 
84See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113 (1895). For particular insights on the application of International 
Comity to cross-border insolvency cases see In re Linneas Areas de Nicaragua, 13 B. R. 779 (Bankr. S. D. 
Fla. 1981); In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B. R. 165,170 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 1983); In re Linneas Areas de 
Nicaragua, 13 B. R. 779 (Bankr. S. D. Fla. 1981); Cunard S. S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 F. 2d 
452,458 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S. A., 130 B. R. 705,712 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 
199 1); In re Gercke, 122 B. R. 621,631 (Bankr. D. C. 199 1). 
85 See Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies, supra note 2, at 329 (arguing that rules of International comity 
are not satisfactory when applied to cross-border insolvency cases. "Judicial discretion... has made the 
comity doctrine unworkable. The doctrine simply gave the courts too much leeway, allowing them to grant 
recognition sometimes, and other times not, without adhering to intelligible principlee'. ) 
6 See supra note 84. :7 




procedure opens up two options to the foreign administrator, either liquidating the 
debtor's assets in the US or seeking their reorganization. Thus, recognition in the US is 
not to be understood under its common meaning (L e., recognition of a final judgment on 
the merits of the case), rather recognition aims at acknowledging the proceedings 
initiated before a foreign competent court. Although this approach may seem restrictive 
with respect to the scope of cooperation among bankruptcy courts, very few jurisdictions 
follow such simplified procedures as the US Bankruptcy regime does. As it will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters, even with the enactment of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, many countries are still reluctant to provide for a full- 
fledged system of recognition and enforcement of foreign insolvency judgments 88 . 
C. Extra-Territorial Reach of Domestic Insolvencv Laws 
The term "recognition" usually refers to the acknowledgment and acceptance of 
foreign judgments. The various examples of domestic or international instruments cited 
above attest that recognition has different meanings depending on the jurisdiction and 
regime in question. For instance, under the U. S. Federal Bankruptcy Code, recognition 
only indicates that bankruptcy proceedings initiated before a foreign court are accredited. 
It does not mean however that the judicial decision on the merits of a given bankruptcy 
case, such as the reorganization of the indebted corporation or its liquidation, is 
recognized. While a quasi-automatic system for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign insolvency judgments is argued to benefit the international community, it should 
be noted that certain forums are already prone to exporting or imposing their judgments 
beyond their territorial boundaries. 
88 Judge Tina Brozman, former Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York 
noted: "Enormous waste and damage to creditors due to jurisdictional battles and territorial approaches 
which have impaired the possibility of saving viable enterprises and jobs"; Jonathan Flexer, United States 
Senate Subcommittee Hold Hearings on UNCITRAL Cross-Border Insolvency Proposal (INSOL WORLD, 
London), March 1998 (quoting Professor Jay Westbrook, speaking before a Senate Subcommittee meeting in December 1997). 
92 
Chapter Two. 
For instance, the U. S. federal Bankruptcy Code allows greater cooperation among 
U. S. and foreign courts than other legal systems. However, this Code appears to contain 
contradictory provisions with respect to US courts' extra territorial competence. Indeed, 
according to 28 U. S. C. 133489, US courts may be allowed to assert full jurisdiction in rem 
over the debtor's assets wherever located. Such grounds of exorbitant jurisdiction are not 
surprising for mainly two reasons. First, protecting local creditors has always prevailed in 
bankruptcy cases before US courts and elsewhere. Second, this practice follows a long- 
standing tradition in the US judicial system according to which US long-arms statutes are 
to be applied unconditionally and universally whenever justice and fairness require such a 
course of action. While US courts would merely recognize the initiation of bankruptcy 
proceedings before foreign courts (see section 304 as existing at September 2005), they 
would assert jurisdiction beyond their boundaries so as to protect their domestic creditors. 
Similarly, and despite the recent break through in the area of cross-border 
insolvency9o, a number of EU member states possess national laws allowing local forums 
to assert international jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. Not surprisingly, these 
different provisions are waived within the European context. In other words, European 
courts can use these provisions in order to assert jurisdiction beyond their boundaries, 
only if no other EU member state is involved directly or indirectly in the litigation at 
stake. These various domestic practices highlight how difficult it is to agree on an 
international setting within which, creditors - located in different jurisdictions - can be 
equally treated. 
89 28 U. S. C 1334 reads, "d) the district court in which a case under title II is commenced or is pending 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the 
commencement of such case, and of property of the estate. " 90A number of different international bankruptcy initiatives and projects were undertaken to fill the gap in 
International law, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Concordat, and the Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA). 
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Additionally, Federick Tung 91 argues that the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments 'fibrbids the application of a rule ofjurisdiction provided for 
under the national law of a Contracting State ... if there is no substantial connection 
between that State and the dispute, and more particularlyforbids exercise ofJurisdiction 
based solely on the domicile, habitual or temporary residence, or presence of the plaintiff 
in a particular State". He further comments "The concept of habitual residence under 
this convention is approximately the same as the home country concept under 
universalism. " Thus, unilateral and deliberate extra-territorial jurisdiction of certain 
forums can produce negative effects and impede the creation of an international 
bankruptcy regime predicated on Universalism. Perhaps, the latter's flaw is to seek the 
creation of an idyllic international bankruptcy system, rather than attempting to establish 
greater predictability ex-ante and to reduce the various costs of bankruptcy ex-post. 
V. Political Implausibilitv of Universalism 
As one can see, cross-border insolvency cases involve numerous issues. For 
many, the implausibility of creating an international insolvency regime predicated on 
Universalism is also due to the complexity of the subject and its encompassment of 
elements outside the scope of the law. The impracticability of such a regime is usually 
perceived as the simple manifestation of State's sovereignty 92 and how states are 
reluctant to come to terms with the idea that domestic insolvency cases (involving 
domestic creditors) can be decided by foreign courts pursuant to foreign social policy 
objectives. Alongside these impediments, Tung explains what he refers to as "the 
91Tung Frederik, Is International Bankruptcy Possible, 23 MICH. J. INrL L. 31 (2001). 
921t is believed that such a mechanism would constitute a partial concession of their sovereignty. See supra 
note 76, on the issue of social policy and its susceptibility of exportation under Universalism. See also Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INTIL L. J. 27,37-38 (1998) [Hereinafter Westbrook, 
Universal Priorities] (arguing that state sovereignty along with governmental priority of claims constitute a 
"bright line" as to whether courts will cooperate or not in cross-border insolvency cases). In addition, the 
"Act of State" doctrine has received little or no application in cross-border insolvency cases. That is to say, 
for a number ofjurisdictions, foreign acts and laws shall have no effect on the domestic level and far less so 
when insolvency matters are in question. See Remington Rand Corporation-Delaware v. Business Systems, 
Inc., 830 F. 2d 1260,4 U. S. P. Q. 2d (BNA) 1355 (3d Cir. N. J. 1987) (where the court states that Acts of foreign bankruptcy trustees should not be afforded deference under act of state doctrine, as trustees' acts do 
not rise to dignity of acts of foreign sovereign) 
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Prisoner's Dilernma"93 according to which, reaching an international consensus on the 
issue may be difficult due to the failure of many countries to reciprocate deference to 
foreign courts. 
The following sub-scctions A and B of this Part V aim at highlighting the 
different political challenges to Universalism. Although these challenges will be 
discussed and weighed from different perspectives, it seems undeniable that the failure to 
achieve Universalism to date further testifies to its political implausibility. The last sub- 
section C will focus on the necessity of an institutional framework to reach an 
international and enforceable consensus among several countries. 
A. Incentives for Non-Deference in Least Developed Countries 
Tung94 argues against the feasibility of a cross-border insolvency regime built 
upon Universalism. He stresses that Universalism is unlikely to be achieved due to what 
is known as the Prisoner's Dilemma mentioned above95. He further contends that one of 
the primary reasons why countries will not have the same incentive to reciprocate and to 
defer to foreign insolvency proceedings is that "least Developed Countries (LDCs) would 
find themselvesfar more often deferring to industrial country bankruptcy regimes, rather 
than seeing their own domestic regimes applied extraterritorially , 96 . He argues, 
9' See Tung, Skepticism about Universalism, supra note 75. 
94 Tung Frederick, Fear of commitment in International Bankruptcy: The Political Implausibility of 
Universalism, 33 GEO. WASH. INTL L. REV. 555,580-581(2001)[hereinafter Tung, Fear of 
Commitment]. 
9' Id. (arguing that the reciprocity in deferring to foreign bankruptcy proceedings between states would be 
impeded by the fear of non-reciprocity in other cases). See Jack Hirshleifer, Practice Theory and 
Application 287 (6 th ed. 1998) (asserting that "when state A is put to the choice of cooperation or defection, 
it will already have observed state's B earlier strategy choices when state A was the home country 
requesting State's B cooperation. Whether players move sequentially or simultaneously, or which player 
moves first in the sequential game, does not affect the equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma game") 96 See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 94, at 587 (explaining that since far more multinational firms 
are headquartered in industrial countries, those countries-and not LDC's-would more often be the home 
country for multinational corporations). 
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"Multinational debtor's assets will be disproportionally distributed across jurisdictions 
relative to the amounts of local creditor's claims in eachjurisdiction "97 . 
While it is true that - under Universalism - LDCs will defer more often to foreign 
proceedings, the resulting unequal treatment among foreign and domestic creditors 
should not be imputed to Universalism. Indeed, if the adjudicating forum were to favour 
domestic creditors arbitrarily, it would then achieve the opposite intended objectives of 
Universalism. Contrary to Tung's assumptions, a mere deference to foreign proceedings 
does not necessarily achieve an application of Universalism. Indeed, one should 
differentiate between Universalism and "Unity,, 98. Under the latter concept, proceedings 
would be held before one court where the local priority of claims is preserved. Although 
foreign creditors might have the right to cross-file" their claims, they would not enjoy 
cross-priorityloo under the concept of Unity. As a result, foreign creditors would be 
excluded - or paid last at best - from the insolvency proceeds. Such inequality of 
treatment between foreign and domestic creditors, as argued by Tung, would 
systematically take place under such a system. In contrast, Universalism advocates the 
competence of a single court before which the primary proceedings are held and where 
equal treatment between foreign and domestic categories of creditors may be insured 
through the application of cross-priority to foreign claims. It is undisputed that under any 
of its forms, Universalism would require that foreign creditors be treated in the same way 
domestic creditors are. Absent this principle, cross-border insolvency cases would be 
adjudicated on the basis of cooperative territoriality at most, and not Universalism. 
97 id. 
9' On the distinction between the two concepts, see Cameron Gilreath, Overview and Analysis of How the 
United Nations Model Law on Insolvency Would Affect United States Corporations Doing Business 
Abroad, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 399,408 (2000). 
99 "Cross filing ... means that foreigners (with the possible exception for tax claims) are allowed to file in the local proceeding". See Rammeskow, Predictability and Protection, supra note 29, at 387. 100 Professor Westbrook developed the cross priority theory. It means "granting non-local creditors the 
same priority as is given to the class of local creditors to which the non-local creditor belongs". See Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 92, at 57. 
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In spite of this distinction'01, it is reasonable to accept the second argument 
advanced by Tung that LDCs would forfeit control of multinational insolvency 
proceedings to industrialized countries 102 . It would be misleading however to deduct from 
that situation an automatic favouring of domestic creditors. As explained, it is 
conceivable that a single court can be in charge of adjudicating a multinational default, 
while treating all creditors (foreign and domestic) equally; thus realizing the objectives of 
Universalism. If this were the case, one can rightly question why LDCs would oppose the 
enactment of Universalism, if their domestic creditors were assured to receive equal 
treatment and a fair share of the multinational debtor's proceeds under this system. 
Perhaps, the main issue that arises in this context would be the sort of guarantees 
the adjudicating forum can, a priori, extend to deferring forums so as to ensure equal 
treatment of foreign creditors. Although an international instrument, such as a treaty, may 
provide for a plausible solution to this problem, one may doubt countries' degree of 
compliance with their commitments. This uncertainty may be further increased if these 
commitments are not effectively enforced on a global level. Rightfully, Tung questions 
the feasibility of Universalism because states have no means to ensure reciprocal 
cooperation. He further adds that "no supranational sovereign exists to force states by 
their commitments and that even an International Treaty does not create its own coercive 
enforcement aulhoriV" 03 . 
101 Tung himself acknowledges this subtle distinction between the two regimes. See Tung, Fear of 
Commitment, supra note 94, at 583 (arguing that "National treatment of foreign creditors - treatment of foreign creditors on a par with local creditors - appears to be theformal rule injurisdictions and may 
ameliorate this problem to some extenf') 
102 Id. Tung alternatively argues that Universalism has a slim chance to be implemented between states that 
have similar commercial relations. He asserts "the prisoner's dilemma model seems appropriate among 
countries for which mutual advantage from Universalistic cooperation would seem to exist". In making this 
statement, Tung underestimates the importance of foreign investment to LDCs and how the latter may find 
the incentive to comply with international standards so as to attract foreign multinationals. The pre- 
rý 
,g 
uisite of similar commercial relations however may be the subject of a further study. 10ý1 Id. 
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Indeed, the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism renders the 
compliance with an international treaty on cross-border insolvency unlikely. Because of 
the social concerns that arise from the insolvency of a multinational, domestic courts will 
often find a way to protect and favour their domestic creditors. Nonetheless, one should 
consider that the current state of international law, along with the intervention of 
international institutions, well might enable the enactment of a binding international 
treaty to administer the insolvency of large multinationals. In fact, during the last decade 
the international community has observed many areas in which regulation through 
international organizations and/or instruments has been successful and binding upon 
member nations' 04. Perhaps the possibility of creating an international insolvency regime, 
with binding effects and enforcement mechanisms, may not be possible at present. 
However, in light of the fast developmental pace of international law and the increasing 
pressure of globalisation, this solution should not be discarded out of hand in the longer 
105 term future . 
Despite their shortcomings, Tung's remarks are useful because they retrieve and 
consolidate some of the major impediments to the implementation of Universalism. 
Achieving Universalism does not only require an international consensus, but also yearns 
for the institutional and judicial infrastructure to enforce it. While the fulfilment of this 
requirement may seem difficult for the moment, the effect of globalisation and 
international efforts to promote stability in many fields through regulatory convergence 
and minimum standards (including insolvency and creditor rights' 06) impel the 
international community in that direction. 
104 See for instance, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) under the WTO (www. wtO. Org); 
"without enforcement, the rules-based system would be worthless. The WTOs procedure underscores the 
rule of law, and it makes the trading system more secure and predictable". 105 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2296 (making the analogy between the TRIP's 
agreement and the DSU of the WTO. He adds that linkages of that sort might be used to "develop other international commercial regimes, like a bankruptcy law, that can similarly claim a close connection to 
encouragement of truly global trade and investment... The WTO is a global forum with real teeth"). 106The World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, 2001; 
available at http: //www4. worldbank. org/legal/ (last visited June 2006). 
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In sum, Tung has provided considerable comments regarding the feasibility of 
Universalism, and remains rather skeptical on the immediate possibility of creating an 
international insolvency regime based upon the "one court, one IaW' principle. One has 
also to admit that there are other elements to take into account in order to form a more 
objective opinion on the feasibility of Universalism. Among the issues that should be 
examined is the question of reciprocity and its likelihood to push countries into adopting 
Universalistic principles. 
B. Reciprocal Commitments and Effective Enforcement Mechanisms 
As asserted by Tung, "costs and benefits associated with compliance and cheating 
vary, so does the likelihood of compliance "107 . In connection to this argument, 
it is 
important to understand the role of reciprocity and its effects on courts' decision to defer 
to foreign insolvency proceedings. Arguably such a decision depends on how courts will 
assess the benefits and losses from not complying with a prospective international 
insolvency system predicated on Universalism. Contrary to what is argued by Tung, a 
well-grounded rationale can be presented that reciprocity may, in fact, be used to ensure 
the success of this international system if the latter provides for enforcement mechanisms 
and possibly economic sanctions against non-complying states. This would create a 
situation where a given court's unwillingness to defer to foreign proceedings - when 
required to do so - might engender greater costs than benefits. 
A major flow of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" metaphor used by Tung is that it 
purports to forecast reciprocity and compliance tendencies between only two countries. 
The conclusion it reaches, however, may be different if it were applied to a larger pool of 
participants. As an illustration, let us assume that the world is comprised of five 
countries, A, B, C, D and E. They all play a role in the global economy, without 
necessarily possessing the same level of commercial, financial and industrial power. 
Where an eventual international insolvency system promotes close cooperation and 
107 See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 94, at 587. 
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deference between these forums so as to adjudicate multinationals' default more 
effectively, country E persists on using its purely territorial approach. That is to say, E's 
courts repeatedly fail to defer to foreign proceedings when they are required to do so. As 
a riposte to E's territorial and uncooperative behaviour, the other countries will 
reciprocate this non-deference when E is in charge of conducting the main insolvency 
proceedings of a multinational incorporated on its territory. So far, these projections are 
not different from the assumptions of the "Prisoner's Dilemma". Yet, while E may have 
benefited from its non-deference to the advantage of F creditors in a number of cases, 
the cumulative effect of A, B, C and D non-deference to E is likely to outweigh benefits 
previously sustained by E. Even assuming that country E is a powerful industrial 
country; it will incur significant losses due to its uncooperative behaviour. On the whole, 
although E' choice of non-deference would accrue immediate benefits, it cannot be a 
viable long-term policy. Thus, one may consider that reciprocity can either constitute a 
motive for non-deference 108 or can be used as a compliance catalyst'09. While it could be 
difficult to achieve complete and unconditional reciprocity in cross-border insolvency 
cases at first, it would not be surprising if reciprocity were to act as a feedback 
mechanism, and ensure compliance among countries once the system is effectively 
builtilo. 
Assuming that reciprocity is used coercively and entrenched within an effective 
enforcement mechanism, it could - based on the above illustration - serve as the 
compliance instrument necessary to achieve an international consensus on cross-border 
insolvency. In contrast, when the costs/benefits balancing test is applied between only 
two countries, non-deference will be the expected and most profitable choice for courts. 
Yet the costs and benefits of non-compliance should be envisaged among more than 180 
log This is mainly the "Prisoner's DilemmCmodel used by Tung. 
109 See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 28, at 467 (advancing the "critical mass 
reciprocity" argument where there is "an extent of multilateral cooperation sufficient to convince each 
cooperating state that enough other states have joined in reciprocal relationships to ensure the obtaining of 
the benefits expected to flow from a particular sort of cooperation". Unlike the illustration above, 
Westbrook does not presume the existence of an effective enforcement mechanism. However, his argument 
stresses the importance of the multilateral approach - and not bilateral - to the reciprocity problem). 110 Id. 
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countries, each of which has its own interests, policies and fears of retaliatory measures 
from either a group of countries or a given institutioni II- 
The illustrative example 112 of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" brings forth another 
aspect of effective enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, not only the creation of an 
international insolvency system requires a certain level of commitment on behalf of 
countries, but may also require the use of economic sanctions sufficiently elevated so as 
to deter individual nations from acting unilaterally 113 . To ensure compliance via 
sanctions, on the other hand, calls for a viable institutional framework - possibly an 
international judicial authority 114 - that would ensure that countries abide to their 
commitments. So long as such a framework is unavailable for transnational. insolvency 
purposes, Universalism cannot be achieved' 15. 
A more difficult question however is what type of institutional framework would 
be best suited to an international cross-border insolvency system. Based on other 
111 For instance, the Dispute Settlement Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes under the WTO GATT stipulates in article 2 "... the Dispute Settlement Body shall have the 
authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of 
implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other 
obligations under the covered agreements. " 
112 See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 94, at 584 (illustrating the prisoners' dilemma by the 
following example "two individuals agree to swap vacation homes for the summer. They each agree to care 
for the other's home, including certain regular maintenance chores. While on vacation, however, 
maintenance is time consuming, expensive, and boring, so there is an incentive to avoid doing so. The 
standard prisoner's dilemma model predicts that neither party will honour their promise to care for the 
other's home. ") 
113 See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 94, at 584 (adding to the example illustrated above that "If.. 
the agreement is enforceable, then a party that fails to do so must pay damages. If the damages are high 
enough, both parties can be induced to carry out the promised maintenance. The prisoner's dilemma is 
solved by the addition of a penalty for the party that fails to honor its obligation. In other words, law 
changes the payoffs received by the parties. To change the equilibrium, the penalty must change the 
payoffs enough to make cooperation a dominant strategy for each party, '). Applying the same rationale 
however to sovereign courts and states is impossible without a sovereign and impartial institution that 
oversees the fairness of such a process. See Lore, International Insolvency Cooperation, supra note 11, at 8 
(arguing that in contrast to the domestic sphere, in which a state's bankruptcy law can be centrally imposed 
to regulate the conduct of that state's creditors, in the international system there is no sovereign to create 
order out of anarchy of self interested state actors) 114 The Dispute Settlement Understanding mechanism under the WTO may be a suitable model to follow in 
order to enforce cross-border insolvency arrangements against defaulting nations. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 2, at 233 1. 115 See Lore, International Insolvency Cooperation, supra note 11, at 9. 
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experiences in the area of international law, the idea of an international forum to 
adjudicate multinationals' default is becoming more plausible. 
C. The Institutional and Judicial Framework: Realitv or Utopia? 
Among the issues treated in this volume is the role of an institutional and judicial 
framework to achieve an international consensus in the area of cross-border insolvency. 
Although this issue will be more fully covered in subsequent Chapters, it may be helpful, 
at this point, to provide a brief overview of this issue. Using an institutional-based 
approach to resolve legal issues on the global level is not a novel approach" 6. There are, 
in fact, various models whereby nations may be conveyed into agreeing upon and 
implementing uniform standards and codes. 
For example, the institutional framework can be illustrated by the regulatory and 
advisory powers of certain entities. A number of international institutions nowadays 
enjoy a broad mandate to regulate given areas of the law by the creation of norms, 
standards and codes to which states may choose to abide 117 . Regardless of the field 
in 
question, this mechanism usually involves extensive consultation and analyses of 
domestic practices, social policies, and local infrastructure in various countries. 
Frequently however, these supra-national regulators and standard setters are not endowed 
with effective enforcement mechanisms. Their effectiveness relies on the willingness of 
nations to follow their recommendations and their advice is valuable insofar as these 
nations unilaterally apply their guidelines. Nonetheless, they are able to offer useful 
technical assistance on sensitive issues to many countries. 
116 See The International Labor Organization chart and the issuance of "Standards and Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work", available at www. wto. org (last visited July 2005). The ILO's standards take 
the form of international labor Conventions and Recommendations. The ILO, s Conventions are 
international treaties, subject to ratification by ILO member States. Its recommendations however are non- 
binding instruments - typically dealing with the same subjects as Conventions -, which set out guidelines to 
orient national policies and actions. 
117 For instance, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, available at www. bis. org (last visited 
September 2005). The committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority, and its 
conclusions do not, and were never intended to, have legal force. Rather, it formulates supervisory 
standards and guidelines and recommends statements of best practice in the expectation that individual 
authorities will take steps to implement them through detailed arrangements - statutory or otherwise - which are best suited to their own national systems. 
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On the other hand, the creation of an international consensus on cross-border 
insolvency will probably require the issuance of standards, recommendations, guidelines 
and identification of best practices in this field. In this respect, a solution to the 
transnational insolvency dilemma may lie between the hands of specialized international 
bodies that would be in charge of harmonizing domestic insolvency systems via a purely 
advisory method. Under this approach however, no enforcement mechanisms would be 
created and there would be far less coercive powers exercised against non-complying 
states. The primary question remains though as to whether such a regulatory/advisory 
approach would be deemed sufficient to create a suitable international system to deal 
with the financial default of multinational corporations? 
In light of the problems that arise from cross-border insolvencies and the need for 
effective enforcement mechanisms to resolve the latter, one may answer the above 
question in the negative. Additionally, experience in the area of insolvency would seem 
to confirm this opinion. Indeed, efforts towards "harmonization" in the field of 
insolvency have already begun, but only advisory texts have resulted, such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law 118 on Cross-border Insolvency or even the World Bank 
Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems"9. It is 
true that these various international efforts have taken a step forward towards the 
identification of "best practices" in the area of domestic and cross-border insolvency. 
Their most valuable contribution, however, is to demonstrate that for the adoption of an 
effective insolvency framework, mere regulatory and/or advisory measures may be 
inadequate if not associated with enforcement tools. Despite the extensive work and 
research underlying the aforementioned instruments, most countries did not implement 
them 120. And those who did enact the Model Law, for instance, expectedly chose to 
118 See UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, U. N. Commission on International Trade 
Law, U. N. Doc. A/52/17 (1997), available at www. un. org (last visited September 2005). 119 Available at http: //www4. worldbank. org/legal/ (last visited September 2005). 120 See E. Bruce Leonard et al., A New Milestone in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 16-AUG AMBKRIJ 20 
(1997); see also Alastair & Smith Andrd Boraine, Crossing Borders into South African Insolvency Law: 
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exclude certain provisions deemed too detrimental to their interests. This sporadic and 
erratic implementation of standards and model laws could hardly be relied upon to 
achieve any consensus on cross-border insolvency matters, and far less so to implement 
Universalism on a global level. 
As such, one is left with the recourse to institutions that can fulfil a judiciary role. 
An unlikely scenano only a decade ago, some institutions can now adjudicate cases in 
various areas of the law 121 . Their adjudicatory powers are most commonly driven from 
the creation of binding norms that are implemented upon their constituency. This 
judiciary role is often combined with the regulatory power as its main enforcement 
mechanism 122 . The question of whether the creation of an international insolvency regime 
may require this sort of judicial intervention 123 is one of the focuses of this thesis. This 
issue will be treated through the identification of the institutional and legal underpinning 
to the European insolvency system. 
More generally and despite the critiques of Universalism, one can observe the 
growing evolvement of international law in the past decade to various arenas, such as 
trade, taxation, money laundering, banking and investment, just to name few. This 
From the Roman-Dutch Jurists to the UNCITRAL Model Law, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 135,138 
(2002) (arguing that few countries have enacted the Model Law in their national systems). 
12 1 For instance, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes provides facilities for the 
conciliation and arbitration of disputes between member countries and investors who qualify as nationals of 
other member countries. Recourse to ICSID conciliation and arbitration is entirely voluntary. However, 
once the parties have consented to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, neither can unilaterally 
withdraw its consent. 
122 "Understanding how to encourage participation in Dispute Resolution Procedures sheds light on the role 
of International Organizations. These bodies have an important role because they can be used to coordinate 
international interactions in such a way as to increase the likelihood that states will submit themselves to 
the authority of Dispute Resolution Bodies. The obvious example of this sort of behavior is seen at the 
World Trade Organization. Although certainly not a flawless process, the WTO is able to resolve disputes 
among members and impose sanctions closer to the optimal level". See Guzman Andrew T., International 
Law: A Compliance Based Theory, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823,1829 (1999). 
123 Clearly, an international tribunal in the area of cross-border insolvency will be required according to the 
definition of the "single -court universalism" (supra). This tribunal will require supranational powers that 
are available to international courts (which settle cases of international public law) in order to enforce its 
decisions on an international level. Concurrently, it will handle the settlement of disputes between 
multinational debtors and their various creditors (Le., subjects of private international law). This hybrid 
nature may seem rather unrealistic and may create further difficulties in implementing Universalism 
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growing "internationalization" of the law has led to the empowerment of a number of 
international institutions, enabling them to play custodian to numerous conventions. This 
may present a potential opportunity to implement Universalism. In spite of this global 
movement, however, and the birth of supranational entities capable of enforcing legal 
standards on an international scale, critics still contend Universalism to be unrealistic and 
politically implausible. Though the current cooperative and discretionary approach has 
proven unpredictable and inefficient, little has been done to test the universalistic 
approach under its various forms. 
In addition, it has been argued "to solve the coordination problems present in 
international insolvencies, one should explicitly consider the underlying demands of 
bankruptcy policy and of the international system. Universalism only considers the 
former" 124 . As such, the international system should consider including not only self- 
interested nations in pursuit of implementing their national and social policies, but should 
also should consider encompassing international institutions and sovereign entities that 
have a significant impact on the development of international law. These institutions 
possible might bring original solutions to the transnational insolvency problem. Put 
simply, they might come to offer, on the long term, the necessary institutional 
components or foundation for a binding, comprehensive cross-border insolvency 
framework. 
V1. Conclusion 
Critics of Universalism have attacked and weakened the plausibility and 
practicability of this theory in various ways, such as with respect to its definition, pre- 
requisites and most importantly its political impracticability. In summary, Universalism is 
deemed difficult to achieve in the absence of three pre-requisites. 
124 See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 94, at 594. 
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First, Universalism appears to require core similarities between domestic 
insolvency systems. Because of the insufficient degree of harmonization among domestic 
laws, the adoption of "Pure" or "True" Universalism as an international model is often 
discredited. The problems that stem from the priority of claims and the protection of 
domestic creditors are only two indicators of the divergence that exists between 
jurisdictions. Although non-negligible efforts of harmonization have already begun, 
insolvency systems remain - to a great extent - territorial in scope and seldom allow 
foreign courts to decide the insolvency of a domestically incorporated debtor. 
Second, Universalism can hardly be adopted unless countries have similar level of 
economic development. Insofar as the efficiency of universalism is conditioned upon its 
collective implementation, all nations must have equal or at least analogous incentives to 
adopt it. The fulfilment of this requirement seems rather difficult because most 
multinationals have their "home" in developed countries. This would create a situation 
where less developed countries will more often defer to foreign insolvency proceedings. 
As a result, an international insolvency system built on Universalism might be 
detrimental to their domestic creditors. Although certain mechanisms may be developed 
so as to ensure equal treatment between domestic and foreign creditors, the incentive of 
developing countries to implement Universalism remains questionable at best. 
Third, the implementation of Universalism must be associated with an e ective 
institutional framework to ensure enforcement. Experience in international law has 
frequently demonstrated that sovereign states do not abide by their commitments. In the 
area of insolvency, this assumption is reinforced due to the benefits that accrue on the 
domestic level from the non-deference to and non-cooperation with foreign courts. In 
order to address this problem, effective enforcement mechanisms and possibly even 
economic sanctions may be necessary to implement True Universalism. There is little 
doubt that specialized international bodies will have to have a significant role to play in 
this process. So long as there is no supranational judicial authority to monitor and 
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supervise domestic judiciaries in the insolvency process of multinationals, Universalism 
will be difficult to achieve. 
Because these various pre-requisites are difficult to fulfil, the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law issued in 1997 the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency. Although the Model Law is non-binding by its nature, it 
remains the only truly international instrument that suggests a pragmatic approach based 
on moderate choice of forum/law provisions (and not on substantive law) and aimed at 
improving cooperation through the establishment of an easier system for the recognition 
of foreign insolvency proceedings. While the Model Law has a number of significant 
merits that could serve as a foundation for a more rational international corporate 
insolvency framework, it falls short of the broader expectations a minimally acceptable 
international insolvency system should fulfil. In parallel, a significant regional insolvency 
arrangement in the form of the European Union Council Regulation (1346/2000) on 
Insolvency Proceedings (the Regulation) has recently been enacted125. While the 
Regulation is also based on a choice of law/forum approach with recognition and 
125 It is important to note however, the lengthy and uncertain historical events that led to the adoption of the 
Regulation some 40 years after the creation of the European Union. In 1960, at a time when a general 
convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters was taking 
shape, a committee of experts was designated to agree upon and draft an insolvency convention within the 
European Union. Their work resulted in a 1982 text, which was never signed by member states and was 
officially abandoned in 1985. In light of the objectives of the treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (the Treaty) and the difficulties that arose from a number of cross-border insolvency cases, EU 
member states re-launched the insolvency project in 1989. After several years of negotiations, they reached 
a regional proposal in 1995 in the form of a EU convention on insolvency proceedings. The text - including 
55 articles and three annexes - was signed by all member states except the UK. Short of this signature, the 
convention was never ratified. It is only after the Treaty of Amsterdam, which urged closer "cooperation on 
justice and home affairs", that this EU convention was converted into an acceptable Regulation to govern 
insolvency proceedings within the Community. The Regulation applies to insolvency proceedings initiated 
after the 31' of May 2002 and does not operate retroactively. See in Re Finoper S. A. (Tribunal de 
Luxembourg, 12.11.2004 (11 No. 1190/04)). Furthermore, potential conflicts between the Regulation and 
previous legislative instruments within the EU are not imminent. Indeed, the Brussels Convention, which 
was the key convention onjudicial cooperation and recognition within the EU, does not apply to insolvency 
proceedings. It should be noted however, that according to the Preamble, the Regulation only applies when 
the debtor's centre of main interests (infra) is located in one of the EU countries. The Regulation 
incorporates some of the objectives of the treaty of Amsterdam in maintaining and developing "the Union 
as an area of freedom, security and justice". It further secures the goals stipulated in article 65 of the same 
treaty and facilitates judicial cooperation by harmonizing and simplifying the recognition and enforcement 
of insolvency proceedings initiated within the territories of member countries. 
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enforcement mechanisms, it provides for a more complete and predictable approach in 
dealing with the insolvency of large multinationals within the European Community. 
To more fully develop the primary theme of this thesis, the subsequent chapters 
will identify what lessons can be learned from the EU Regulation and when combined 
with certain elements from the UNCITRAL Model Law, a better cross-border insolvency 
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1. Introduction 
The prior Chapters of this thesis focused on the various implications of the 
insolvency of multinationals and uncovered why the creation of a global insolvency 
regime built on "Pure Universalism" is thought to be difficult to implement, at least in the 
near and medium term future. This and the next Chapter will identify and examine the 
lessons that can be learned from the European Union Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings' (the EU Regulation or Regulation), which may in turn serve to enhance the 
' The EU legislation on cross-border insolvency was consolidated by the issuance of the Council 
Regulation N1.1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings. Available at http: //europa. eu. int/eur-lex/en (last 
visited July 2005). The Regulation retrieves to a great extent the provisions of the non-ratified EU 
Insolvency Convention, in connection to which an official explanatory report was issued. Most of the 
comments and underlying policy considerations contained in that report remain valid to elucidate the 
purpose and objectives of the newly adopted Regulation. See Miguel Virgos & Etienne Schmit, Report on 
the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, available at http: //aei. pitt. edu/archive/00000952/ (last visited July 2005) [hereinafter the Virgos Schmit Report] 
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provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border InsolvenCY2 (the UNCITRAL 
Model Law or Model Law). 
As the EU Regulation opts for a coherent choice of forum and law to resolve 
multinationals' insolvency, its provisions may provide further guidance on how the 
international community could channel narrower and more effective cross-border 
insolvency reforms through the Model Law. More specifically, the European model may 
shed light on certain potential improvements and desired additions to the Model Law 
with respect to the choice of forum, choice of law, access to foreign representatives and 
recognition matters. 
Some authors have argued the EU Regulation offers little to base an international 
3 insolvency system on beyond the boundaries of a relatively "small" community 
However, the Regulation well may offer some key lessons that might be used by the 
international community to reach a more viable international insolvency arrangement. 
Indeed, the Regulation has addressed the same issues and concerns as those treated under 
the Model LaW4, but in a more complete manner. Although the Regulation may be the 
result of closer legal, judicial and market integration among EU member states5 and while 
the overall European insolvency regime may not be implemented elsewhere in its 
2 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, U. N. Commission on International Trade Law, 
U. N. Doc. A/52/17 (1997). Available at www. uncitral. orgluncitral/en/uncitral texts/insolvency/1997 
Model. html (last visited September 2005) 
3 See Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview and 
Comment, With U. S. Interest In Mind, 23 BROOK. J. INTL L. 25,48 (1997) [hereinafter Fletcher, The 
European Union Convention] (arguing that the European Insolvency model anticipated by the adoption of 
the 1995 convention, may not serve as a "blueprint" for other groupings of states. The author further adds 
"what is considered to be almost a matter of necessity for such a closely coordinated and coalescent group 
of sovereign states as those comprising the EU may well seem totally impractical to states less deeply 
committed to the principles of supranational integration. ") 
4 These issues were exposed in the first and second chapter of this thesis. Mainly, the determination of the 
debtor's home country, the forum entitled to open insolvency proceedings against this debtor, creditors' 
ranking of claims, and the law to be applied in course of such proceedings. 
3 Such an achievement is often regarded as the result of the institutional infrastructure already present 
within the European Community. While mutual efforts of creating a common market, along with 
established and shared institutional traditions have undoubtedly facilitated the adoption of the Regulation, 
one may ask - based on the European experience - what degree of legal and judicial integration is necessary 
to achieve Modified Universalism on a global level. Although treating such a question is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, this could be the basis of a further study in the area of cross-border insolvency. 
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entirety, there are nonetheless some useful approaches that could be transmitted to the 
Model Law, thereby making the latter more responsive to the demands of domestic social 
policies, creditors, debtors, and the insolvent multinational's stakeholders in general. 
For instance, the first set of issues the Regulation had to address was related to 
rather general, yet vital concerns such as creditors' rights, equity, fairness 6 and 
expediency 7. Although a perfect insolvency regime that entirely satisfies the claims of all 
parties involved does not exist, some systems are considered more predictable than others 
and can facilitate insolvency proceedings and meet the expectations of the parties to a 
greater extent. In this regard, the Regulation may be considered a breakthrough in terrns 
of enhancing predictability, equality among creditors and judicial cooperation 8. 
The second set of issues dealt with under the Regulation stems from traditional 
legal uncertainties and primarily pertained to the scope of the Regulation, the rules 
governing the choice of law and forum, recognition and enforcement of foreign 
insolvency judgments9. Because the Regulation addressed these concerns in a 
comprehensive and clear manner, its study may suggest a number of improvements to the 
Model Law, increasing the prospects of its adoption by a greater number of countriesio. 
This, however, does not imply the replication of the Regulation, nor its projection onto 
the global level; rather the Regulation illustrates that despite significant differences 
6 See Article 21 of the Preamble: "a creditor should be able to keep what he has received in the course of 
insolvency proceedings but should be entitled only to participate in the distribution of total assets in other 
roceedings if creditors with the same standing have obtained the same proportion of their claims". 
See the Model Law' guide to enactment where the UNCITRAL commission stressed that one of the 
primary objectives of the Model Law is to increase expediency in the resolution of cross-border insolvency 
cases. Available at www. uncitral. org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/insolvency/1997/Model. html (last visited 
September 2005) [hereinafter Guide to Enactment]. 
8 Bob Wessels, Primer on the New European Insolvency Framework, 17-AUG AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 
12 (1998) [hereinafter Wessels, The European Insolvency Framework]. 
9 See Regulation at article 8. 
10 Insofar as each country has no obligation to enact the Model Law, the latter's success or failure would 
greatly depend on the number of countries that have deliberately adopted it. In this regard, the UNCITRAL 
commission has made every effort to render the Model Law more appealing and flexible in order to 
accommodate domestic constraints in each country. 
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between the domestic insolvency laws of EU member countries", a binding and 
importantly, predictable regional insolvency system could be created. 
In parallel, the Regulation fashioned a realistic compromise between the 
Universality and the Territoriality of insolvency proceedings12 through a simple conflict 
of laws approach (and not substantive insolvency laws), something the international 
community has not yet achieved; not even through the Model Law, which provisions are 
rather wanting in many respects. As a result, the European insolvency regime may be 
thought of as a "pilot system" on cross-border insolvency that yields certain advantages 
of both theoretical approaches. Such a pragmatic approach could inspire the international 
community into upgrading the Model Law by including more effective and functional 
provisions with respect to the competent forum, the applicable law, and recognition of 
foreign insolvency judgments. To this end, a thorough and comparative analysis of the 
Regulation and the Model Law could prove constructive and stimulating to the 
protagonists of a more adequate global solution to multinationals' default. 
This Chapter will focus on choice of forum provisions and their effects, under 
both the Model Law and the Regulation. Although the EU Insolvency Convention was an 
important source of inspiration to the UNCITRAL working group 13 , and the Model Law 
and the Regulation follow the same standards in identifying the forum entitled to open 
11 Article II of the preamble stipulates that because of the "widely differing substantive laws" between 
member states, the Regulation could not provide for a single set of universal proceedings. "Why didn't 
Europe devise a single exclusive universal form of insolvency proceedings for the whole of the 
community? The answer is this: diversity. It was considered too difficult to implement a universal 
proceeding without modifying, by the application of the law of any state of its opening of proceedings, pre- 
existing rights created before the insolvency under the different national laws of the member states". See 
Bob Wessels, Principles of European Insolvency Law, 22-SEP AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28,28 (2003) 
[hereinafter Wessels, Principles of European Insolvency Law]. 
12 See Anne Nielsen el. al., the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the Resolution 
of International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 533,534 -535 (1996) (arguing Modified Universalism 
to be the most appropriate approach to combine the benefits resulting from both the Universalistic and 
Territorial theory while discarding many of their respective disadvantages) [hereinafter Nielsen, Cross- 
border Insolvency Concordat]. 
13 It should be noted that the Regulation contains the same provisions of the EU Insolvency Convention 
(1995), which was not ratified. See Andre Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border 
Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309,320 (1998) [hereinafter 
Berends, Comprehensive Overview]. 
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insolvency proceedings against the multinational debtor, 4; their purpose, objectives and 
effects greatly differ from each other. Part 11 of this Chapter will highlight how the scope 
of main insolvency proceedings is much broader and uninhibited under the Regulation 
than it is under the Model Law. Whether the Model Law could follow the Regulation's 
approach by enabling the forum of main proceedings to have overall jurisdiction over the 
debtor's assets, including those located in jurisdictions where non-main proceedings 
cannot be initiated, will be considered. This could prove more effective in creating a 
cheaper and more expedient process to administer the multinational debtor's estate, while 
increasing the chances of reorganizing the multinational debtor. 
In contrast, domestic proceedings, whether known as secondary or non-main 
proceedings". are more restricted under the Regulation. This provides more viable 
protection to domestic creditors by enabling the latter to apply for specific types of relief 
in order to secure their credit. Part III of this Chapter will therefore identify what the 
advantages are of such a restricted approach, and how the Model Law falls short of 
realizing these benefits by conferring an undefined reach to non-main proceedings. Part 
IV will consider the interesting aspect of the Regulation with respect to the relationship it 
establishes between main and secondary proceedings. Indeed, the primacy of main 
proceedings over secondary proceedings under the Regulation realizes some important 
advantages of Universalism. Although the Model Law modestly implies such a primacy, 
the ensuing benefits remain subject to courts' discretion and are contingent upon whether 
an ad-hoc understanding could be reached among the various courts involved in a cross- 
border insolvency case. 
14 The Model Law however is only concerned with recognition matters, and not with the determination of 
criteria allowing a given forum to open insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 15 The term "non-main proceedings" is used under the Model Law to denote that no hierarchy between the 
scope of such proceedings and main proceedings exists. In contrast, the Regulation uses the terms main and 
secondary proceedings, the latter being limited to the territory of opening and could only consist of winding 
up proceedings (infra). 
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11. Main Proceedings and the Debtor's Centre of Main Interests 
Rather than engaging in lengthy discussions on the most appropriate criteria to 
determine the debtor's home country, the Regulation has established a rebuttable 
presumption as to where such a place is located, thus giving courts the upper hand in 
deciding difficult cases. Indeed, the debtor's centre of main interests, synonymous with 
the debtor's home country, is presumably the place where that debtor is registered. After 
all, the determination of the debtor's home country seems more a question of fact, where 
courts should have the final word in light of the circumstances surrounding each case. 
In reality, this presumption only reverses the burden of proof and gives a 
procedural boost to creditors who have taken into account the laws of the forum where 
the debtor is registered 16 . Therefore, the first part of this section will study the 
definition 
and purpose of the debtor's home country as spelled out under the Regulation. Although 
the UNCITRAL working group follows the definition of the debtor's centre of main 
interests contained in the Regulation, the second part will explore how the concept of the 
debtor's centre of main interests fulfils a significantly restricted purpose under the Model 
Law than it does under the Regulation. The third part will highlight how the Model Law 
approach differs from that of the Regulation, and how the latter achieves higher 
predictability and unity with respect to the scope of main proceedings. The final part of 
this section will explain the underlying policy choices that led each instrument to follow a 
different approach and whether a change in the Model Law policies is desirable. 
A. The EU Reaulation 
In order to achieve a substantive degree of unity in insolvency proceedings, the 
Regulation prescribes an innovative methodology to determine the forum that is entitled 
to decide the debtor's insolvency within the EU. Pursuant to article 3.1 of the Regulation, 
there is a single forum that has exclusive jurisdiction over the entirety of the debtor's 
estate. Such proceedings - known as the main proceedings- take place where the debtor 
" This presumption applies in the case of an adjusting creditor who has measured risk taking before 
entering into a transaction with the multinational debtor. See Chapter Two on the difference between 
adjusting and non-adjusting creditors. 
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has the centre of its main interests. While the Regulation does not give a rigid definition 
of this centre, it provides for certain guidelines in order to determine - with substantial 
certainty - where that centre is located. Indeed, article 3.1 establishes a rebuttable 
presumption according to which the centre of main interests is located at the "place of the 
registered office". This indication would, in most cases, prove useful to decide where the 
main proceedings could be opened. 
Although this criterion fails to give clearer guidelines in cases where the debtor 
has registered several of its offices, the preamble of the Regulation, which should be 
construed as a complementary instrument to the Regulation and thus binding 17 upon 
member states, provides further guidance regarding the interpretation of the debtor's 
centre of main interest. It stipulates in article 13 that this centre is presumed to be the 
place "where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis 
and therefore ascertainable by thirdparties". 
This rather flexible approach of defining an important concept can clearly be open 
to criticism18. According to some scholars19, the indeterminacy of the debtor's centre of 
20 
main interests could affect the predictability necessary in insolvency proceedings 
Although the registered office of the debtor is easily identifiable, it is argued that the 
language of the Regulation may encourage creditors to reverse this presumption to their 
advantage. A given class of creditors might benefit from privileged priority claims under 
17 In this regard, it is important to mention that traditionally common and civil law countries perceive the 
preamble differently. Generally, this preamble has an executory force in civil law countries and provides 
for mere non-binding guidelines to common law courts. See Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union 
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33 TEX. INT'L L. J. 119,119 -120 
(1998) [hereinafter Fletcher, the European Union Convention]. 
Is See James H. M. Sprayregen et. al., International Issues: Are You Ready for the New European Union 
Regulations?, 041802 ABI-CLE 287 (2002) (arguing that the "EU Insolvency Regulation leaves many 
%uestions unanswered, and itself gives rise to many questions and uncertainties") 
I Id. 
20 Jack Weinberg, What Are U. S. Creditors' Rights?, 20 No. 7 BKRST 3 (2003) (as regards the 1995 
European convention on insolvency proceedings, which contains the same provisions as the EU Regulation 
to determine the debtor's centre of interest, the author argues that the convention "failed because it did not 
provide sufficient predictability to creditors attempting to determine which of the jurisdictions involved in a 
cross-border bankruptcy will be the forum for the main proceeding. Obviously, that inability was critical 
because creditors could not predict which state's laws would govern their claims. ") 
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the rules of the forum they seek to establish as the debtor's centre of main interest. To 
achieve this, those creditors may try to establish the fictiveness of the place of 
registration, thereby extending the process with all its ensuing costs. If these creditors 
were to succeed in assigning the jurisdictional competence to another forum 21 , less 
sophisticated creditors may face a less favourable insolvency regime. This could create a 
certain inequality among creditors, especially when there has been a reliance on the 
debtor's place of registration as indicated by the Regulation. 
Despite these critiques, the flexible definition of the debtor's centre of main 
interests can be an advantage, if not a necessity. Indeed, 14 member countries ratified the 
Regulation 22 , each with its own domestic insolvency 
laws and differing underlying 
policies. These differences translate into diverse legal principles, objectives and purposes 
that domestic insolvency proceedings 23 seek to achieve. A flexible definition of the 
debtor's centre of main interests presents the advantage of coping more easily with the 
requirements of each domestic insolvency law. It can further facilitate the implementation 
of the Regulation between member states, without the need to amend domestic laws. 
On the other hand, the presumed location of the debtor's centre of main interests 
could enable domestic courts to handle situations where the registered office is not 
relevant, or when creditors have relied on a fictive and misleading centre, irrespective of 
the debtor's good faith. Indeed, the Regulation affords creditors the right to claim that the 
21 Forum Shopping is argued to present a high risk under the Regulation. A recent decision by the French 
court of Appeals of Versailles testifies to that risk. See In Re ISA Daisytek SAS, available at 
http: //www. iiiglobal. org/country/european - union. 
html (last visited July 2004). See also Roland Montfort & 
Lefevre Pelletier, European Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies: Status of French Practice after the E. U. 
Regulation, 23-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28,73 (2004) [hereinafter Pelletier, European Law] (arguing 
that the court of appeals' decision in Re ISA Daisytek SAS may be considered as a "confirmation of 
possible dangers, including the risks of forum and/or law shopping toward the member state whose 
insolvency laws would be more favourable to specific interests. It is likely that the trend of forum and law 
shopping when applied to insolvency cases will become even stronger when the E. U. Regulation on the 
European Company becomes effective in October 2004" 22 All European countries ratified the Regulation except Denmark. 23 These differences are such that the Regulation does not even define the meaning of insolvency 
proceedings. Each member state is bound by its own insolvency laws and by the definitions contained 
therein. The Regulation however enlists in annex A, for each country, what insolvency proceedings are 
according to the various domestic laws of member states. 
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debtor has conducted its business from a place other than its registered office. While the 
exercise of this option may require the presentation of probative evidence in each case, it 
is feasible to establish that although registered, a given office was not primary, or the 
managerial and administrative decisions of the debtor were regularly taken from another 
location. For instance, in Re Collins & Aikman 11124 , the English court found that the 
location of the centre of main interests of a German subsidiary does not correspond to its 
place of incorporation. Rather, considering the evidence as to the managerial and close 
links between the German subsidiary and its parent in the UK, the Court found this centre 
to be located in the UK. On a balance of probabilities, which is the test conducted by the 
English court, the centre of main interests was not the place of incorporation. The English 
Court confirmed that by following this test, and by allowing more flexibility in 
administering the estate of closely related group companies, value return to creditors 
could be enhanced. 
It seems more difficult however, to tie such activities to the perception of third 
parties. Indeed, the preamble of the Regulation indicates that such a centre should, in 
part, be "ascertained by thirdparties" in order to confer jurisdictional competence to the 
forum where this centre is located. In this regard, the Regulation appears to operate on 
two different levels. The protection of third parties would require the application of a 
standard test 25 to determine what these third parties believed, or had reason to believe, 
24 See in Re Collins & Aikman III High Court of Justice London ([2006] EWHC 1343 (Ch)). See also In Re 
Silvalux Sarl (Tribunal de Luxembourg, 15.04.2004 (11 No. 365/05), where the court considered the mailing 
address and the social security system applicable to the employees of a French subsidiary to deduct that the 
subsidiary's centre of main interests was located in the Luxembourg and not in France which is the place of 
incorporation. On a post financial distress transfer of headquarters, see in Re Eurogyp (Tribunal de 
Commerce de Bruxelles of 12 December 2003). The court has rightfully implemented the Regulation and 
has found for the main jurisdiction of the Belgium courts despite the transfer of legal siege, which was 
considered fraudulent and misleading to third party creditors. 25 See Pelletier, European Law, supra note 21 (arguing that the decision in Re ISA Daisytek SAS is "a 
correct application of certain provisions contained in the Regulation allowing a court to use a reality test to 
determine the localization of the centre of a debtoes main interests"). The issue remains however, whether 
courts will deduct third parties' perception in light of their status as sophisticated or non-sophisticated 
creditors. Similarly, in Re Energotech (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lure 29.03.2006 No. 06/01), a 
standard test was conducted by the court to confer main jurisdiction to the French court system, despite that 
the company's place of incorporation was in Poland. Among the criteria taken into account by the court so 
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when they entered into a business relationship with the debtor. When the third party at 
stake is an individual (with neither professional qualification nor expertise), this test is 
likely to be less stringent since no special knowledge is required from that individual. 
The situation may be different when the third party is a corporation that has carefully 
studied the transaction with the debtor. 
This distinction may be useful to now analyse proposals suggesting that an 
international insolvency regime should only apply to resolve insolvency cases between 
large multinationals and sophisticated creditors. This system would entail the possibility 
of deference and asset transfers from one forum to another. That is to say, individuals and 
non-incorporated entities would remain under the protective umbrella of domestic laws 
and should seek recovery of their credit from debtor's assets that are located in that same 
jurisdiction. Rather than explicitly limiting its scope of application in such a manner, the 
Regulation leaves the appreciation of facts to the court(s) of opening 26, and allows the 
latter to draw circumstantial conclusions on an ad-hoc basis27 in order to determine the 
intentions of the parties. It is likely that these domestic courts will de facto treat 
individuals and corporations/sophisticated creditors differently, thus recognizing that 
each is held to a distinct standard of knowledge and expertise. 
B. The Model Law 
The Model Law uses the concept of the debtor's centre of main interest to 
determine, in the case of multiple proceedings, which forum is the main forum. This step 
is essential to foresee the effects the opening and recognition of main proceedings would 
as to assert primary jurisdiction over the foreign entity, attention was given to the forum of meeting of the 
board of directors, the applicable law to major contracts, the place where the commercial strategy of the 
subsidiary is decided and the emplacement of the banking and financial institutions to which the subsidiary 
is indebted. 
26 While the EU convention remains silent on many aspects of its implementation, it would be reasonable to 
deduce that domestic courts will implement the Regulation consistently with its intended effects. See 
Wessels, the European Insolvency Framework, supra note 8 at 13 (arguing that where governments fail, 
ýdges play a major role in cross-border insolvency cases as "deputy-legislators"). 
7 Furthermore, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its broad powers of interpretation support this 
pragmatic approach. Indeed, the ECJ encourages deference from domestic courts whenever there are 
uncertainties regarding the implementation of a European legislation. 
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produce in the enacting state. The following parts will respectively explore the 
implementation of this concept under the Model Law and highlight the effects that ensue 
from the recognition of foreign main proceedings in the enacting forum. 
1. Defining the Centre of Main Interests 
As mentioned above, the EU Insolvency Convention was an important source of 
inspiration to the UNICTRAL Working Group 28 . As a result, the Model Law also 
recognizes the competent forum to open main insolvency proceedings as the place where 
the debtor has the "centre of its main interests". The Model Law working group, unable 
to find a better definition 29 , presumed this centre to also be the place of registration, i. e. 
the place of incorporation. 
The concept of the centre of main interests was discussed at length amongst the 
various representatives of the working group 30. As each law has a different approach in 
identifying the home country of the debtor, opting for a flexible definition, such as the 
centre of main interests, which is presumably the place of registration, was the most 
effective approach. As it is the case under the Regulation, this approach could prevent 
fictive registrations in a tax heaven or in jurisdictions where insolvency laws would be 
more favourable to the debtor and to the protection of its estate. 
It is noteworthy to mention that there were other proposals during the negotiation 
phase so as to include more than one criterion in defining the debtor's home country. 
Such proposals were bound to fail since the aim of the Model Law is to recognize only 
one forum entitled to instigate main proceedings against the debtor". With more than one 
28 See Berends, Comprehensive Overview, supra note 13, at 330. 
29 id. 
'0 Id. See also Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work of the Eighteenth Session, 
U. N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 5, U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/419 (1995); Report of the Working Group on Insolvency 
Law on the Work of the Nineteenth Session, U. N. GAOR, 30th Sess., at 5, U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/422 (1996); 
Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work of Its Twentieth Session, U. N. GAOR, 30th 
Sess., at 5, U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/433 (1996). 31 id. 
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criterion to confer such a jurisdiction over the debtor's estate, the courts of the enacting 
state of the Model Law could face a situation where more than one foreign forum may 
present a legitimate claim to be recognized as the main forum. 
Given the professional and geographic diversity of the drafters of the Model Law, 
representatives were well aware that in each forum exist various insolvency and domestic 
laws - such as trade or commercial law - which may impact the insolvency of corporate 
entities 32 . This is why the Model Law does not refer to main foreign insolvency 
proceedings; rather, it simply refers to foreign proceedings, whether compulsory or 
voluntary 33 , in which creditors are collectively involved in view to reorganize or liquidate 
the debtor's business 34 . In other words, it is not relevant whether the foreign law 
recognizes the foreign proceedings as insolvency proceedings. The Model Law approach 
is mindful in this regard because it has opted for an all-inclusive terminology so as to 
extend its provisions of recognition to instances where the foreign proceedings would not 
qualify as insolvency proceedings pursuant to the law of the recognizing forum. 
Although the test to determine the debtor's home country and the forum entitled 
to open main proceedings is identical under the Regulation and the Model Law, there is a 
fundamental difference regarding the scope and objectives of these two instruments. 
2. Effects of Recoanition 
The core aspect of the Model Law is the effect foreign proceedings produce on 
the domestic level once they are recognized by the enacting state 35 . According to article 
20 of the Model Law, the enacting state - through its judiciaries or any other 
administrative entity that is in charge of adjudicating corporate insolvencies - is bound to 
attach certain effects to the recognition of foreign main proceedings. These effects 
32 id. 
33 See Guide to Enactment, supra note 7, at 22. 34 id 
3 3 Article 31 of the Model Law reads "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, recognition of aforeign 
main proceeding is ... proof that the debtor is insolvent'. 
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translate into certain types of relief, such as a moratorium against creditors, a stay of the 
pending proceedings or enforcement against the debtor and a suspension of the right to 
transfer the debtor's assets from the enacting forum to another 36 . Although the Model 
Law suggests that these types of relief should be automatically granted to the foreign 
representative upon recognition, it acknowledges that the intervention of the court is 
sometimes, if not often, necessary to enable foreign insolvency proceedings to produce 
these effects on the domestic level37 . Thus, the Model Law, though by its nature lacking 
the necessary biding powers, seeks to encourage enacting states' courts to implement the 
provisions of article 20. 
Where a uniform implementation of article 20 would enhance cooperation among 
forums involved to resolve the insolvency of a multinational debtor, there are a number 
of exceptions within the same article that give considerable leeway to domestic courts. 
Indeed, the effects of recognition sought under the Model Law may be modified or 
terminated pursuant to the provisions of the laws of the enacting state. Such domestic 
laws, whether related to insolvency or not, may empower domestic courts to considerably 
limit the intended reach of foreign main proceedings; a situation likely to arise if 
domestic creditors are unable to collect on their claims 38 as a result of the relief 
automatically granted to the foreign representative. 
As indicated in the previous chapters, the protection of domestic creditors is a key 
policy matter that often dictates the extent of domestic courts' cooperation with foreign 
courts and whether foreign proceedings will be permitted to produce domestic effects. 
Therefore, article 20.4 allows further limitations to the relief granted upon recognition. 
This article stipulates that the recognition of foreign main proceedings shall have no 
effect on the right to commence proceedings under the laws of the enacting states. Thus, 
36 For a complete list of relief available upon recognition of foreign main proceedings, see article 20 of the 
Model Law. Also, it should be noted that the Model Law does not prevent the enacting forum from availing 
further types of relief to foreign creditors if the law of the enacting forum so permits. 37 See Guide to Enactment, supra note 7, at 24. 
38 As seen under article 20, there could be, in theory, instances where the recognition of foreign main 
proceedings entails the issuance of a stay of execution against the debtor's assets, thereby preventing domestic creditors in the enacting state to collect on their claims. 
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the actual reach of a moratorium against creditors in the enacting state becomes 
questionable, should domestic creditors be granted a right to initiate legal process against 
the debtor, even after recognition of foreign main proceedings. 
In addition to the automatic relief mentioned above, the foreign representative 
may seek further types of relief in the enacting states, such as the entrustment of the 
administration of the debtor's assets with him or with another person designated by the 
court. Although article 21 of the Model Law contains a non-exhaustive list of relief 
available to the foreign representative, the court of the enacting state has discretion over 
granting specific relief required by the foreign representative, even after recognition of 
the foreign main proceedings. This is to say, despite the Model Law's inclusion of an 
arsenal of tools that should ensure a higher degree of cooperation between the enacting 
forum and the foreign representative, a complete and faithful implementation of the 
Model Law remains primarily subject to the discretion of domestic courts. 
While it is true that the Model Law is not binding and was not intended to compel 
enacting states to follow a certain course of action, the possible limitations to the effects 
of recognition constitute a major impediment to improving coordination among courts 
and empowering the foreign representative. Perhaps the UNCITRAL working group was 
too eager to see the Model Law adopted by a large number of countries 39 , and to achieve 
this, has included certain provisions that unfortunately hinder the very purpose of the 
Model Law and leave the discretion of domestic courts intact over cooperation. 
Compared with the Regulation, the provisions of the Model Law lack decisiveness, 
regardless of the unbinding nature of the instrument as a whole. While textual differences 
between the Model Law and the Regulation may be the easiest to discern, other 
substantial differences between these two instruments' overall approach are more subtle. 
The subsequent sub-section will highlight how the approach of the Regulation is 
fundamentally different and more effective from that of the Model Law. 
39 One such presumption may be implied from the limited objective of the Model Law combined with an 
overly permissive language. 
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C. The Model Law's Passive Approach 
The concept of the debtor's centre of main interests, as discussed above, has 
resolved a significant problem with respect to the insolvency process of multinational 
corporationS40. The Model Law and the Regulation apply this concept though main 
proceedings under each instrument fulfil different roles. 
Indeed, the Regulation takes a pro-active role in main proceedings and directly defines 
the prerogatives of the main forum. Most importantly, the main forum has power over the 
debtor's assets, wherever located, and can demand from other foreign courts within the 
EU to defer and transfer the debtors' assets located within their respective jurisdiction. 
Although such powers may be curtailed when the debtor possesses an establishment in 
other forums (infra), they are nonetheless significant, as by definition they were intended 
to have a universal reach over the debtor's estate4l. 
In contrast, the Model Law has adopted a passive view of main proceedings, 
where the identification of such main proceedings is only relevant for recognition 
purposes and the resulting effects may be subject to numerous restrictions by either the 
enacting forum or pursuant to the latter's law. The main forum under the Model Law was 
not intended to have overall jurisdiction over the debtor's assets, not even when such 
assets are located in a forum where the debtor has no establishment (infra). 
In addition, recognition under the Model Law does not refer to the recognition of 
a foreign insolvency judgment that should produce some effects on the debtor's assets 
40See Chapter Two on the determination of the debtor's home country. In this respect, the Regulation and 
the Model Law have overcome a substantial amount of indeterminacy to identify the debtor's home 
country. 
41 See Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, the ALI principles, 




located in the enacting state 42 . Rather, recognition simply means that main foreign 
proceedings are acknowledged and it is at the discretion of the courts of the enacting state 
to grant relief to the foreign representative, provided that the Model Law was not 
modified from its original version and was enacted as is. In this regard, it is evident that 
under the Regulation, a foreign liquidator and more so, a liquidator designated in the 
course of main proceedings, can rarely be denied the relief sought before foreign courts. 
This is because the Regulation, unlike the Model Law, is not crippled with substantive 
exceptions regarding the mandatory extent of cooperation and coordination between 
courts. Whenever multiple insolvency proceedings are initiated against the same debtor 
within the EU, they automatically produce certain restraining effects on each other, 
without being subject to the discretion of the various courts involved or their applicable 
laws. 
Since the Model Law is solely geared towards recognition, or more precisely 
towards the acknowledgment of foreign proceedings, which may or may not entail the 
granting of provisional relief to the foreign representative, it contains no explicit 
provisions on the extent of powers available to the enacting forum when the latter is in 
fact the main forum. The Model Law actually advises the enacting state to follow a 
cooperative course of action when a foreign representative presents an application for 
recognition. It does not however inform the enacting forum how its own demand for 
recognition will be dealt with before other forums and what effects the opening of 
proceedings in the enacting state produce elsewhere. These questions cannot be answered 
with any conviction under the Model Law because each case will have its own set of 
circumstances, including a more or less cooperative recognizing forum and variably 
accommodating foreign domestic laws. This stands in contrast with the Regulation, 
where the prerogatives of the main forum are well defined and the effects of main 
proceedings in other jurisdictions are known in advance. Needless to say that under the 
42 See Chapter Two on the distinction between the recognition of a foreign insolvency judgment on the 
merits (where the recognizing forum would enforce a foreign court' decision on its territory) and the 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings (where the recognizing forum may or may not allow such foreign proceedings to produce effect on its territory). The Model Law is only concerned with the second type of recognition. 
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Regulation, predictability is much higher than under the Model Law. Yet the Regulation 
did not create any substantive insolvency law; it opted for unequivocal language with 
respect to the relationship between main and secondary proceedings (infra). 
As a result of the Model Law's passive approach, a number of issues, most 
importantly the issue of cooperation is largely dealt with subject to the discretion of the 
court in the enacting state. In fact, one may further reflect on the degree of cooperation 
among courts in the absence of the Model Law. As mentioned in the previous chapters, 
cooperation between courts located in different jurisdictions is almost always contingent 
upon the satisfaction of domestic creditorS43 . This premise has not changed under the 
Model Law, pursuant to which domestic courts dispose of a number of provisions that not 
only allow them to modify or terminate the relief granted to the foreign representative, 
but also to deny such relief in the first place. As it can be fairly argued that the last 
decade has seen a shift towards more cooperation between courts, rather than conflict in 
resolving significant cross-border insolvency caseS44, one may question how the Model 
Law, enacted almost a decade ago, furthers today this cooperation and coordination 
among several sets of proceedings. 
Undoubtedly, the Model Law remains a good initiative as it provides for some 
guidelines on cooperation, while it assists domestic legislation in coping with the very 
nature of transnational insolvencies 45 - However, the relatively recent enactment of the 
Regulation sheds light on the major shortcomings of the Model Law, especially with 
43 See Unt Lore, International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: Liberalism, 
Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue, Law and Policy and International Business vol. 28,4-6 
(1997) [hereinafter Lore, International Insolvency Cooperation]. See also Kurt H. Nadelmann, International 
Bankruptcy Law: Its Present Status, 5 U. TORONTO L. J. 324,351 (1944). 
44 See Reed, Alan, A New Model Of Jurisdictional Propriety For Anglo-American Foreign Judgment 
Recognition And Enforcement: Something Old, Something Borrowed, Something New?, 25 LOY. L. A. 
INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 243,243 -247 (2003). On the increasing use of protocols, especially among 
common law jurisdictions, to overcome difficulties of cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases, see 
Derrick Tay, Insolvencies without Frontiers: The Emergence of the Cross-Border Protocol, Insolvency 
institute of Canada (1999), available at http: //www. globalinsolvency. com/insol/intinsolvencies/ 
overview. htmI (last visited August 2005). See also cooperation efforts that led to the first coordinated liquidation of a multinational debtor in re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B. R. 800 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 
1994), affd, 186 B. R. 807 (S. D. N. Y. 1995), affd, 93 F. 3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 45 See Guide to Enactment, supra note 7, at 19. 
125 
Chapter Three. 
respect to the considerable leverage the Model Law extends to domestic courts in their 
decision to cooperate wit a oreign representative. 
In parallel, it can be argued that the provisions of the Regulation, which are 
narrower that those of the Model Law, were the result of closer economic and legal 
integration among EU member states 46 . While this may be partially true, the Model Law, 
unlike an international treaty, was not intended to be binding on its signatories. Thus, one 
may enquire why the UNCITRAL working group did not issue more compelling 
cooperation rules containing fewer exceptions, and conferring broader powers to the main 
forum. Either way, the non-binding nature of the Model Law would have enabled each 
enacting state to waive any provisions deemed too prescriptive or far-reaching. Even if 
this were the case and the Model Law would have seemed less appealing to countries, a 
narrower and more compelling approach might have created a more complete and 
adequate international instrument to resolve cross-border insolvency matters. A flaw of 
this instrument would be its lacking binding powers, and not its permissive language as is 
currently the case. 
D. Underivina Policv Choices 
Projecting the success or the failure of the Model Law in the next decade is a 
difficult task and it is beyond the scope of this work. However, an awareness of the 
policies underlying the Model Law and the intent of its drafters may help develop an 
understanding of how this non-binding instrument may be improved in the future, and 
whether regional insolvency arrangements 47 , such as the EU Regulation, may have any 
impact on its maturity. 
46 Most importantly, the Regulation, as much as any European legislation, has the necessary binding power 
to compel member states to abide by its provisions. Despite this biding character however, it took well over 
forty years to agree on a suitable insolvency framework within the EU Community. 
Although this study only covers the Regulation and its potential contributions to the Model Law, other 
regional insolvency instruments may be the subject of further studies, such as the European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy (1990), the Montevideo treaties on international commercial law (1889 and 1940), the Convention regarding Bankruptcy between Nordic States (1933) and the 
Convention on Private International Law (Bustamante Code) (1928). 
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In many respects, the Model Law is the result of pragmatic and truly international 
efforts to address the issues that arise from the insolvency of multinational corporations. 
Many countries and international organisationS48 , either in their capacity of participant or 
observer, have contributed to the issuance of the Model Law. Insolvency experts, judges 
and practitioners from all over the globe have provided insightful comments on the 
Model Law during the various working sessions leading to its final version49. Because 
these global efforts in the area of cross-border insolvency were considered a premiere in 
the mid-1990s, a substantial amount of pressure was on the participants to create 
acceptable international guidelines capable of fostering cooperation between courts 
involved in cross-border insolvency cases5o. This mounting pressure first arose in the 
course of the initial discussions regarding the form these international efforts should take 
and culminated in a choice between a convention and a model law. By opting for the 
latter, the threshold of expectations and commitments was significantly lowered, thereby 
placing the Model Law on a fast track for approval". 
On the substance of the Model Law, the working group has made a clear policy 
choice based on the treatment of specific issues, within which modest contributions were 
originally sought 52 . This low profile approach had a number of merits. First, it 
encouraged a large number of countries to participate in the elaboration of the Model 
LaW53. In fact, if the Model Law were intended to be a binding convention among the 
participants, the negotiation process would have been longer and certainly more 
48 Recently, the area of insolvency, including its potential cross-border implications, has gained the 
attention of international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The 
contributions of these institutions will be treated in the next chapter. See Bank's Principles and Guidelines 
for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System, available at www. worldbank. org/ifa/rosc_icr. html 
(last visited July 2005). 
49 See Guide to Enactment, supra note 7. 
50 See Mlevin C. Zwaig, Developments and Trends in United States/Canada Cross-Border Reorganizations, 
9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 343,347-348 (200 1). 
51 Id. See also Note from the UNCTIRAL Secretariat: Cross-border insolvency, A/CN. 9/378/Add. 4 (1993), 
available at www. uncitral. org/pdf/english/yearbooks/Yb-1993-e/vol24-p248-253-e. pdf (last visited 
September 2005). For a preliminary study to assess the desirability of a cross-border insolvency 
framework, see Report of the UNCITRAL Assembly General, U. N. GAOR, 26 th Sess., Possible Future 





complex 54 . Second, the modest aim of the 
UNCITRAL working group made the Model 
Law more defensible and has allowed such an instrument to create its own anchor in the 
realm of cross-border insolvency. Today, the Model Law remains an important tool for 
anyone interested in the subject matter. 
Despite its merits and the head start it had when it was issued in 1997, the Model 
Law may now seem somewhat outdated and incomplete. As trade and investment are 
increasing in magnitude and complexity, the limited approach and objectives of the 
Model Law progressively appear to be inadequate". Furthermore, the issuance of the EU 
Regulation has demonstrated that more effective methods of cooperation are possible, 
even among countries that have significant differences between their domestic insolvency 
laws. The Regulation is more complete as it deals with the majority of problems that arise 
from the insolvency of multinational corporations, without creating substantial 
insolvency rules. Importantly, the attributes of integration between EU member states 
should not be overblown. In fact, should this integration be the only reason why the 
Regulation was enacted, it would not be possible to explain the long process and the 
several failed attempts that finally led to its issuance- 
In light of the above, it could be argued that the Model Law was indented to be a 
mere stepping stone that would subsequently be subject to further amendments and 
improvements. Many scholars share such a view and contend that the Model Law may 
further mature and more effectively and completely address the issues that arise from the 
insolvency of multinational corporations 56 . To do so, it is necessary that the international 
34 See Berends, Comprehensive Overview, supra note 13, at 328. 
55See Westbrook J. Lawrence, A Global Solution to Multinational Defaults, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,2280 
(2000) (arguing that while the Model Law may improve cooperation to reorganize multinationals, it is 
'frustrating the efforts to engage in manipulation of assets and other ftaudulent activiV) [hereinafter 
Westbrook, Global Solution]. For a comprehensive critique of the Model Law and any other insolvency 
system implicating the application of universalistic precepts see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trojan Horse in 
UNCITRAL, 33 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) No. 25 at A5 (1999). 
56 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INTL L. J. 27 at 28 (1998) [hereinafter 
Westbrook, Universal Priorities]; Peter J. Murphy, Why Won't The Leaders Lead? The Need for National 
Governments to Replace Academics and Practitioners in the Effort to Reform the Muddled World of 
International Insolvency, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 121 (2002) (arguing that the international 
community should look ahead to increase cooperation through the ratification of a treaty and stresses that 
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community draws some lessons from the Regulation, which establishes the first regional 
and binding insolvency arrangement with the explicit remit of increasing predictability 
and equality among creditors. Perhaps the first lesson from the Regulation is that the 
main forum should be conferred broader and more assertive powers. This would endow 
cross-border insolvency proceedings with Universalistic traits, thus reaping the chief 
advantages offered by this theory. Moreover, it is essential to reduce the permitted 
exceptions to the effects of recognition under the Model Law. This would tend to ensure 
uniformity of application and to result in a higher degree of predictability. In other words, 
the enacting/recognizing forum should no longer be in a position to restrict the reach of 
foreign main proceedings and to condition the mandatory effects of such proceedings to 
the satisfaction of its domestic creditors. 
It is hoped that the purpose and scope of main proceedings under the Model Law 
would be amended so that the main foreign representative is empowered to preserve the 
rights of creditors. Such an improvement however, may require the main forum to assert 
extra-territorial powers in order to administer debtor's assets located in other 
jurisdictions. Because this approach may constitute a foreseeable threat to domestic 
creditors in the enacting/recognizing state, special attention should be given to the choice 
of law provisions capable of creating a minimum threshold of protection to at least 
certain categories of domestic creditors. This is precisely the system established by the 
Regulation and discussed in the next Chapter. 
From a regional perspective, the Regulation has effectively resolved the issues 
that arise from the determination of the debtor's home country. It has met the demand for 
flexible yet predictable criteria, by choosing the debtor's centre of main interests as 
the Model Law does not address "the substantive differences in national insolvency laws andprocedures ") 
[hereinafter Murphy, Why Won't the Leader Lead? ]. See also Brian Devling, The Continuing Vitality of 
the Territorial Approach to Cross-Border Insolvency, 70 UMKC L. Rev. 435,450-51 (2001) (arguing that 
Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy code, which adopts the Model Law, is full of escape hatches that may 
hinder the objective of achieving cooperation chiefly founded on the precepts of universalism). 
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presumably the place of registration of its business. Thus, the novelty of the Regulation is 
less the choice of the approach to follow, but the powers extended to the main forum and 
its ability to administer the debtor's assets, wherever located. Also, by not imposing a 
strict application of this methodology, domestic courts are able to settle a handful of 
cases where the centre of main interests is not located in the place of incorporation. This 
would considerably reduce deceptive practices where a corporate debtor willingly 
incorporates in a jurisdiction whose insolvency laws are more favourable 57 and would 
facilitate the shielding of assets from the reach of foreign creditors 58 - 
This being said, an advantage the Regulation may have over the Model Law is the 
experience of the European Community regarding the subject matter. Indeed, by the time 
of issuance of the Regulation, three texts had already been elaborated, discussed, argued 
and criticized among member countries. Such a unique experience has facilitated the 
creation of an almost "flawless" cross-border insolvency regime 59 , four decades after the 
first attempts. This regime includes the accommodating concept of the debtor's centre of 
main interests, broad and unequivocal main insolvency proceedings, and most note- 
37 A strict definition of the debtor's centre of main interests as the place of registration would have allowed 
and encouraged such deceptive practices. 
5' Manfred Ba1z, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 
485,507 (1996) [hereinafter Balz, The European Union Convention] (arguing that "by focusing on 
insolvency related issues where no community-wide single conflicts approach can be found, the 
Convention produces legal certainty", he further adds that the process set forth by the convention would 
reduce the incentives for Forum Shopping). Nonetheless, this opinion is not shared among scholars. See 
Nielsen, Cross-border Insolvency Concordat, supra note 12, at 552 (arguing that "the EU Convention may 
encourage forum shopping by a debtor to select a contracting state to be the plenary proceeding, if the 
debtor considers that the laws of that State are favourable to debtore'). This uncertainty leads to the 
observation of an early case that arose from the insolvency of Enron. As a result of an order issued by an 
English court recognizing its primary competence to adjudicate the insolvency of the debtor (an Enron 
subsidiary), a French court refused the opening of main insolvency proceedings requested by that debtor 
which was operating in Spain, but effectively headquartered in England. As one can see, the effectiveness 
of the Regulation to prevent forum shopping will greatly depend on domestic courts. The latter will serve 
as guardians of the Regulation and should help ensure its proper implementation so as to prevent forum 
shopping. See Pelletier, European Law, supra note 21. See also E. Bruce Leonard, The International Year 
in Review, 22-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22,22 (2004). 
59"Although the EU Insolvency Regulation bears some uncertainties and leaves some issues unresolved, its 
result fills an embarrassing 40-year-old blind spot in the broader framework of EU civil and insolvency 
law, and for that reason only, it should be welcomed". See Wessels, Principles of European Insolvency 
Law, supra note 11, at 3 1. 
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worthy, limited secondary (or ancillarY60) proceedings where the debtor has an 
establishment. 
111. Domestic Proceedinas 
Given that a purely universalistic insolvency regime was not feasible in the EU, 
not even between countries committed to a high level of integration, the Regulation 
allows the opening of secondary proceedings before any forum where the debtor has an 
establishment. The process of opening such secondary proceedings and their purpose and 
benefits will be examined in the sub-section A of this Part 111. As much as the Model Law 
has borrowed the concept of the debtor's centre of main interests from the EU insolvency 
convention, it has also resorted to use the concept of establishment as elaborated under 
the EU insolvency system. Sub-section B will attempt to demonstrate that despite using 
the same concepts as the Regulation, the Model Law fails to achieve the same objectives 
set forth by the Regulation, especially regarding the protection of domestic creditors. 
Finally, sub-section C will examined whether a restriction on the scope of non-main 
proceedings under the Model Law could help achieve greater protection of domestic 
creditors, thereby fostering cooperation among the various courts involved in the 
insolvency process of the same multinational debtor. 
A. Secondary Proceedinas under the Regulation 
Before examining the conditions imposed by the Regulation for the opening of 
secondary proceedings and their scope, one should first consider how the European 
system is inherently different from previous proposals that suggest either the application 
of Universalism or Cooperative Territoriality on a global level. 
1. Retrieving the Benefits of Territoriality 
Despite a Universal approach clearly spelled out in the Preamble 61 , the Regulation 
establishes an overall insolvency process that encompasses strong elements of 
60 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 55, at 2328. Ancillary proceedings describe limited insolvency proceedings, which aim at aiding the main proceedings. These limited proceedings are also 
referred to as "secondary proceedings". 
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Territoriality. While the Regulation empowers a specific court to open the main 
proceedings, thus conferring to that forum exclusive and general competence over the 
debtor's assets, it also allows the opening of secondary proceedings in other jurisdictions 
against the same debtor. In actuality, it could be argued that the Regulation captures the 
essence of Universalism by allowing only one court to administer the debtor's assets, 
wherever located. Indeed, the Regulation is simply a medium whereby the objectives of 
Universalism find a regional implementation. However, whereas pure Universalism 
advocates the opening of one set of proceedings in a single forum and forbids the opening 
of secondary proceedings in other forumS62 , the Regulation allows the opening of 
secondary proceedings alongside main proceedings and therefore does not faithfully 
adhere to a purely universalistic model. Its approach to insolvency within the EU cannot 
be reconciled with Cooperative Territoriality, where no main proceedings take place. 
Indeed, under the latter approach, insolvency proceedings may be initiated against the 
debtor on a strictly territorial basis 63 . The term "cooperative" refers to the discretion of 
courts to cooperate on an ad-hoc basis by sharing information and transferring assets 
when there is a surplus 64 ,a situation that rarely occurs because the claims of domestic 
creditors are seldom fully satisfied. Clearly, the European model does not follow either 
system. 
The explanation to such a hybrid approach is simple. Building a purely 
universalistic regime within the EU was not feasible due to substantial differences 
61 See Regulation at art. 12. 
62 Under Pure Universalism, jurisdictions where the debtor has assets are compelled to cooperate, provide 
assistance and defer to the forum where main proceedings are held. This translates into asset transfers from 
one forum to the other. As seen in Chapter Two, such transfers would be harmful to certain categories of 
creditors. Pure Universalism also entails the election of a representative in the foreign proceedings and 
most importantly, the issuance of a moratorium against all creditors in other forums. See Jay M. Goffman 
& Evan A. Michael, A Comparative Examination of Insolvency Laws of Industrialized Countries, 050503 
ABI-CLE 11 (2003) [hereinafter Goffman, A Comparative Examination]. 
63 See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INTL L. 1 
(1997). 
64 In this respect, the Regulation goes beyond the courtesy provided for under the rules of "International 
Comity". Indeed, pursuant to article 35 of the Regulation, the court of opening of secondary proceedings is 
compelled to transfer local assets when local creditors are satisfied. This approach was neither adopted on 
the international nor regional level. The Model Law for instance does not demand the transfer of assets 
even after the satisfaction of domestic creditors. 
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between the various domestic insolvency laws'5. In turn, it was necessary to provide for a 
margin of security to local creditors who may find their preferential rights affected under 
the main proceedings held before another forum. 
As previously discussed, "Pure Universalism" has often been criticized as 
negatively affecting the rights of small domestic creditors who do not necessarily have 
the means to effectively protect themselves against the default of their debtor 66 . The 
opening of limited secondary proceedings, as permitted under the Regulation, offers 
domestic creditors an appealing alternative to avoid lengthy and complex main 
proceedings, where their priority claims might be affected. Thus, the opening of such 
secondary proceedings would at least enable domestic creditors to hold to the debtor's 
assets as security until the main proceedings, held before another forum, comes to an end. 
Used as a preservation tool, secondary proceedings would deter the debtor from 
transferring assets to more favourable jurisdictions within the EU, or in the worst-case 
67 
scenario, outside the European community and beyond the reach of European courts . 
These explanations give strong justification to the opening of secondary proceedings. It is 
therefore understood why the Regulation has permitted the opening of such proceedings, 
either before or after the opening of main proceedings. 
2. The Presence of an Establishment 
According to article 2 of the Regulation, secondary proceedings may be opened in 
forums where the debtor possesses an establishment68. The notion of establishment may 
be construed broadly because the Regulation does not give further guidance as to what 
constitutes an establishment, and whether such an establishment must enjoy a legal 
personality. Conversely, the issue becomes relevant where the debtor has effectively 
65 See Regulation at art. 11. 
66 See discussions in Chapter Two on the critical position of non-adjusting creditors under Universalism. 67 it should be noted that a mere transfer of assets outside the community does not prevent the application 
of the Regulation. Assets located outside the European Union may be governed by the Regulation so long 
as the debtor's centre of main interest is located in a member country of the EU. Although the Regulation 
thereby receives a broad scope of application, European courts may be unable to retrieve assets located 
outside the community, even if these assets were fraudulently transferred overseas. 68 See also article 12 of the Preamble. 
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registered several of its offices. Drawing the line in these cases may be difficult given the 
lack of guidance in the Regulation. For the most part, the word establishment - as 
commonly referred to - can be a branch, a representative office or simply a building 
carrying the debtor's name and engaging in limited non-transitory commercial 
activities 69 . 
As long as the possibility to cross-file a claim is available to creditors, the 
opening of secondary proceedings in a secondary forum will only be an attractive option 
in cases where the debtor has valuable assets in that forum. These secondary proceedings 
are limited in scope to the assets located in that jurisdiction and pursuant to article 3 of 
the Regulation; they can only be winding up proceedings. In other words, secondary 
proceedings cannot administer the entirety of the debtor's estate and far less so, attempt a 
reorganization of the debtor's busineSS70 . 
Although domestic creditors' rights seem 
vested to seize the debtor's assets located in their jurisdiction subject to the presence of 
an establishment, there are two important limitations to this principle. 
The first stems from the ability of the liquidator in the main proceedings to order 
preservation measures against the debtor's assets located in another jurisdiction, where 
the debtor may have an establishment. These preservation measures supersede domestic 
creditor's rights to carry on with the winding up proceedings against the debtor's estate. 
The second limitation pertains to the timing of the opening of secondary proceedings. 
Indeed, article 4 of the Regulation provides only for one situation where the opening of 
69 On a recent application of the Regulation as to the definition of an establishment, see In Re Conception 
(Belgian Court of 18 March 2003). The court in Belgium had to decide on a case where a UK based debtor 
(Conception Entreprises Limited, registered in Dover/Kent) had an establishment in Belgium. The Belgian 
court opened limited territorial proceedings recognizing that a branch had been opened and registered in 
Belgium and that the branch had a representative in Belgium. On the notion of establishment, see also 
Tellia v. Hillcourt [2002] EWIIC 2377(Ch). Nevertheless the Belgian court had to admit that the branch 
office in Belgium was a mere mailbox. See also Fletcher, the European Union Convention, supra note 17, 
at 137. 
70 For instance, in Re UK Rover Group High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, II May 2005 (Rover 
Group companies), the court highlighted that the aim of secondary proceedings is to assist main 
proceedings in the administration of the debtor's estate and accordingly, domestic proceedings should 
liquidate the debtor's estate only if no reorganization plan can be reached. As such, the English court has 
conferred main jurisdiction over the insolvency of the Rover Group to the English court system. 
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secondary proceedings can take place before the instigation of main proceedings. This is 
where the law in force at the debtor's centre of main interests does not allow the opening 
of insolvency proceedings against that debtor 71 . In such a case, only domestic creditors 
who reside in the same jurisdiction where the debtor has an establishment could exercise 
this right. In principle, non-yesident creditors cannot bring action against the debtor 
unless their claims arise from the operation of the establishment located in the secondary 
forum. 
Despite complex procedural rules, the Regulation has shrewdly allowed the 
opening of secondary proceedings. In practice, this right may rarely be exercised due to 
the absence of an establishment that belongs to the debtor, lack of valuable assets or 
simply as a result of the preservation measures exercised by the liquidator in the main 
proceedings. Yet the possibility of limited secondary proceedings was believed to be an 
important element to the issuance and adoption of the Regulation. Without such a right, a 
number of states would have been reluctant to ratify the Regulation, fearing a complete 
inability to protect their domestic creditors 72 . This is particularly true when one considers 
the reasons behind the failure of the 1982 text elaborated between the EEC member 
states. The 1982 insolvency proposal prescribed the holding of main proceedings that had 
a universal reach, even beyond the boundaries of the community. Domestic creditors 
under the 1982 Draft had no right to commence secondary proceedings and national 
courts in the EU were compelled to cooperate with and defer to the court conducting 
main proceedings 73 . Not surprisingly, this proposal was faced with strong opposition 
by 
71 This provision indicates an important digression from a purely universalistic regime. Allowing the 
opening of secondary proceedings at that particular time also reveals that prudential measures are necessary 
for the entire system to function properly, given the substantive differences between domestic insolvency 
laws. 
72 E. Bruce Leonard, Melvin C. Zwaig, Developments and Trends in United States/Canada Cross-Border, 9 
J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 343,345 -346 (2000) (arguing that generally countries are reluctant to cooperate 
in cross-border insolvency cases so as to protect their local creditors. The author further adds that the 
existence of a primary/secondary scheme of proceedings may considerably reduce the risk of forfeiture to 
local creditors. ). 
73 See Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The International Void in The Law of Multinational 
Bankruptcies, 42 BUS. LAW 307,312 (1987) [hereinafter Gitlin, the International Void] (arguing that the 
1980 Draft proposes that original bankruptcy jurisdiction be exercised only by the courts of the state where 
the debtor's centre of administration' is located). See Fletcher, The European Union Convention, supra note 
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several countries, thus leading to its abandonment. In actuality, it will always be difficult 
- if not impossible - to satisfy small domestic creditors' claims to a full extent when 
it 
comes to the insolvency of large multinationals. However, availing a protective option to 
these creditors would, in many cases, overcome the reluctance of governments to abide 
by a binding cross-border insolvency arrangement. Under the Regulation, secondary 
proceedings might seldom be initiated, yet the psychological effects they produce were 
necessary to reach a consensus built upon an original combination of Territoriality and 
Universalism 
B. Non-main Proceedinas under the Model Law 
Similarly, the Model Law recognizes the opening of domestic insolvency 
proceedings - known as foreign non-main proceedings - before the forum where the 
debtor possesses an establishment. The definition of establishment is very similar to that 
used under the Regulation, if not identical74. 
Although the notion of establishment under the Model Law was borrowed from 
the EU convention 75 , there are some fundamental 
differences between the Regulation and 
the Model Law in this regard. First, as it is the case for main proceedings, non-main 
proceedings are only relevant for their recognition by the enacting forum. As a result, the 
Model Law does not define the scope of competence of non-main courts; far less 
compelling the recognizing (enacting) state to give effect to such non-main proceedings 
upon their recognition. While the Model Law simply encourages the enacting forum to 
recognize non-main proceedings and to grant the non-main representative the relief 
sought, the enacting forum may still enjoy a considerable amount of discretion when 
deciding whether or not it would follow a cooperative course of action. 
17, at 124 (arguing that "the EU Convention has avoided the twin errors that gave rise to the fatal flaws and 
inconsistencies for which the earlier versions of the Convention were so notorious, namely of aspiring to 
unattainable levels of doctrinal purity while simultaneously seeking to appease basic, national instincts 
among its own participants"). 
74 On the definition of establishment, see Model Law at art. 2 (f). 
75 See Berends, Comprehensive Overview, supra note 13, at 324. 
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Secondly, the scope of non-main proceedings under the Model Law can address 
any type of action initiated against the debtor, whether it is an action to liquidate or to 
reorganize the debtor's business. As discussed, the Regulation provides only for limited 
secondary proceedings, intended to be territorial in scope, and 'restricted to winding-up 
proceedings. Needless to say, in this regard, the Regulation achieves a more unitarian 
approach to the overall insolvency process of the debtor, while it increases the chances 
for its possible reorganization 76 . Indeed, because main proceedings under the Regulation 
are endowed with primacy over secondary proceedings (infra), secondary courts are 
bound to abide by the findings of the main court. Therefore, when the debtor possesses an 
establishment and assets in secondary jurisdictions, and the main court finds that these 
assets are important to achieve the reorganization of the debtor; secondary courts must 
cooperate and could be required to transfer these domestically located assets if and when 
the need arises. In contrast, under the Model Law, main proceedings do not supersede, 
either materially or territorially, the scope of non-main proceedings, and the non-main 
forum has no obligation to wait for and comply with the decision of the main forum. 
Consequently, reorganization can be a difficult process insofar as the debtor's assets 
located in the non-main forum are essential to the reorganization process of that debtor. 
Finally, the very terminology "non-main proceedings" used by the UNCITRAL 
working group testifies to the independence of such proceedings vis-a-vis main 
proceedings. In other words, the opening of main-proceedings is not necessary for 
creditors to initiate non-main proceedings. As seen under the Regulation, the opening of 
secondary proceedings before the opening of main proceedings is restricted to very 
specific instances. This ensures a higher degree of coordination between the courts 
involved to resolve the insolvency of the same multinational debtor and limits the 
possibility of multiple proceedings against the same debtor. 
76 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 55. 
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While these differences greatly affect the effectiveness of the Model Law to 
establish a uniform and predictable regime to increase coordination and cooperation 
among courts, there are other issues that render the Model Law lacking relative to the 
Regulation in terms of predictability and equality. The first problem pertains to the 
location of the debtor's assets and how under the Model Law, any given forum where the 
debtor possesses only assets, is not prohibited from initiating insolvency proceedings 
against that debtor. Another remarkable divergence between the Regulation and the 
Model Law stems from the type and most importantly, the objectives of the relief 
available to the non-main foreign representative 
1. Presence of Assets 
Whereas the Model Law encourages the enacting forum to recognize and give 
effect to the opening of foreign non-main proceedings, it is silent regarding the effect the 
opening of "asset-based", 77 proceedings should produce in the enacting forum. 
In actuality, during the discussions in the working sessions leading to the Model 
Law, heated opposition arose between the proponents of a broad definition and purpose 
to the notion of establishment, which should include the emplacement of assets, and those 
78 who advocated a more restrictive definition inspired by the EU convention . It has been 
argued that a strict adherence to the EU convention and to the specific purpose of the 
notion of establishment 79 would be unfeasible on a global level. Indeed, under the EU 
insolvency regime, only the presence of an establishment allows the opening of 
secondary insolvency proceedings against the debtor. In other words, the presence of 
assets cannot confer a proper basis of jurisdiction to the forum where such assets are 
located. While this EU approach is more cost effective and avoids the multiplicity of 
proceedings against the same debtor, it was argued during the course of elaboration of the 
77 Asset based proceedings are those instigated in a forum where the debtor possesses neither the centre of its main interest nor an establishment. Such proceedings are initiated on the basis of the presence of assets in the forum of opening. Under the Model Law, these proceedings do not qualify as main or non-main 
proceedings. 
78 
See Fletcher, the European Union Convention, supra note 17, at 137. " This is a place where the debtor conducts its business by using labour and capital. 
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Model Law that following the same approach would entail a significant curtailment of 
states' sovereignty because jurisdictions, where the debtor possesses only assets, would 
be prevented from opening insolvency proceedings against that debtor. 
In order to overcome this problem under the Model Law, and because the 
approach of the Model Law is geared towards recognition rather than determining the 
criteria that would allow a given court to open insolvency proceedings against the debtor; 
the UNCITRAL working group reached a compromise and spelled out the effects 
resulting from the presence of an establishment and those deriving from the mere 
presence of assets in the opening forum. It was decided that only the presence of an 
establishment would enable the foreign proceedings to be conferred the status of foreign 
non-main proceedings and hence, the non-main representative may demand recognition 
and relief before the enacting forum. In contrast, it has been stressed by the Model Law 
guide to enactment that the mere presence of assets in any given jurisdiction would not 
80 
prevent courts from opening full-fledged insolvency proceedings against the debtor 
Such proceedings however, will not be conferred the status of foreign non-main 
proceedings, and as a result, the foreign representative cannot apply for their recognition 
before the enacting forum. 
Although this compromise may have seemed necessary in order to avoid longer 
and inconclusive discussions on this matter, it emphasises an important shortfall of the 
overall approach contained in the Model Law. By solely focusing on the issue of 
recognition, the Model Law, unlike the Regulation, fails to provide for assertive rules 
with respect to the conditions for the opening of insolvency proceedings against a 
multinational debtor. In turn, the mere presence of assets in a given jurisdiction under the 
Model Law constitutes an acceptable criterion to open insolvency proceedings against the 
debtor. This is a basic application of the "grab rule", which has often been accused of 
increasing inequality among creditors of the same class. In addition, such asset-based 
80 These proceedings will be limited to the assets of the debtor located in the state of opening. See Guide to 
Enactment, supra note 7, at para. 73 & 128. 
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proceedings would not be recognized under the Model Law, which creates no rules to 
ensure cooperation among courts when such proceedings are initiated against the debtor. 
Tberefore, it is difficult to comprehend how the Model Law ensures cooperation among 
courts in these instances. 
Because it can be fairly argued that the EU assertive approach was unfeasible 
under the Model Law, perhaps the Model Law should have allowed full recognition to 
the opening of insolvency proceedings based on the mere presence of assets. After all, the 
objective of the Model Law was to foster cooperation among courts and not to create 
certain criteria that would allow courts to open insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 
Under the Model Law as it stands today, a forum where the debtor possesses only assets 
may find it advantageous to not submit to the findings of, or cooperate with main and 
non-main proceedings, especially when these assets have a significant value. This would 
entitle such a forum to liquidate the debtor's assets on a purely territorial basis and 
distribute the proceeds to domestic creditors. 
2. Provisional Relief 
As seen under the Regulation, domestic creditors in secondary proceedings may 
resort to specific relief in order to preserve their rights vis-a-vis the main liquidator and 
against creditors located in other jurisdictions. This ensures that domestic creditors will 
be treated equally in the course of main proceedings, and that the main liquidator is 
81 
obliged to accommodate the demands of domestic creditors in secondary proceedings 
Although the issue of provisional relief and the conditions of its granting to the 
foreign representative is central under the Model Law, there is a substantial amount of 
ambiguity as to the nature of the relief that can be granted to the non-main representative 
and the limits that may apply to such a relief. First, the Model Law does not specify 
whether the provisional relief available is of a collective or individual nature". Collective 
I See Regulation at art. 18.2. See also Murphy, Why Won't the Leader Lead?, supra note 56, at 139. 2 See Berends, Comprehensive Overview, supra note 13, at 358. 
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relief, such as a moratorium against all creditors, can only be granted upon the 
recognition of foreign proceedings and could act as a deterrent to other creditors from 
pursuing their claims against the debtor 83 . By contrast, provisional individual relief would 
only attach to specific assets, thereby ensuring that foreign creditors preserve their rights 
without "freezing" the continuance of proceedings before the enacting forum 84 . Whereas 
the Regulation has provided for specific individual relief to the secondary liquidator, the 
UNCITRAL working group has left the type of relief available to be decided by each 
forum pursuant to the latter's laws and procedures. This, in turn, does not endow 
recognition with uniform effect and non-main representatives may seldom know in 
advance what consequences the recognition of non-main proceedings could produce in 
the enacting forum. 
Secondly, as much as the automatic relief available to domestic creditors under 
the Model Law can be subject to modification or termination (supra), provisional relief 
does not create any vested rights for foreign representatives. Whereas the relief under the 
Regulation represents an essential tool that is hardly challengeable, ensuring that 
domestic creditors are not disadvantaged under the main proceedings, the Model Law 
does not provide for any definite reach resulting from the provisional relief that could be 
granted to the foreign non-main representative. Indeed, article 19 of the Model Law 
stipulates a series of measures the enacting forum may undertake, pending the 
recognition of foreign proceedings, in order "to protect the assets of the debtor or the 
interests ofcreditors"85 . While such measures could, 
in many cases, prevent fraud and the 
displacement of assets from one jurisdiction to another, article 22 of the Model Law gives 
the enacting forum the authority to either subject the grant of the provisional relief to any 
additional condition its deems appropriate (article 22(2)) or to terminate the provisional 
relief in its sole discretion (article 22(3))86. 
93 Id. 
94 The Regulation affords this type of relief to the secondary liquidator who, among other prerogatives, may demand the transfer of assets that were fraudulently removed from the secondary forum. 85 See Model Law at art. 19. 86 Additionally, pursuant to article 22 (1) of the Model Law, the modification or termination of the relief 
granted must be satisfactory to the court of opening with respect to the right of "creditors and other 
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In light of the above, it is understood that the UNCITRAL working group aimed 
at endowing the foreign non-main proceedings with a variety of tools to ensure the 
protection of domestic creditors. However, the Model Law fails to provide for any 
certainty and compulsive reach for such provisional measures, whose original purpose 
was to increase protection to creditors and foster cooperation among the various courts 
involved in the proceedings of the debtor's insolvency. By contrast, despite the fact that 
the Regulation enables the foreign liquidator to apply for a specific type of relief as a 
measure of preservation, the reach of the latter may hardly be disputed, amended and far 
less be terminated under the sole discretion of the main forum. Thus, instead of leaving 
this issue to be governed by each forum and subject to the discretion of the recognizing 
court, the Model Law could have achieved more uniformity and certainty by restricting 
the type of relief available to the non-main foreign representative, while ensuring that the 
conditions to grant such relief are homogenous and not dependent on the discretion of 
each forum. 
C. Protectina Domestic Creditors 
Perhaps one of the most significant contributions of the Regulation is the 
protection afforded to domestic creditors in secondary proceedings. Such a high level of 
protection however, is not surprising in light of the previous tentative conventions on 
insolvency proceedings among EU member states 87 . Indeed, European countries 
learned 
from their various experiences that the success of any EU arrangement on cross-border 
insolvency would always be contingent on the satisfaction of each forum on the treatment 
of its domestic creditors. This equality of treatment was ensured under the Regulation 
interested persons". Since the interests of domestic creditors traditionally conflict with the interests of 
foreign creditors, the court of opening would systematically amend or terminate the provisional relief 
granted to the foreign representative if such a modification or termination would serve better the interests 
of its domestic creditors. By contrast, the Regulation does not allow the court of main proceedings to 
terminate a relief granted to the foreign liquidator unless there are compelling public policy grounds to do 
SO. 
97 See Gitlin, the International Void, supra note 73, at 314. 
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through unequivocal language and the few exceptions with respect to the power of the 
secondary liquidator and the preservation measures the latter can undertake for the 
benefit of domestic creditors. In other words, while the Regulation establishes an 
insolvency regime conditioned on strong elements of territoriality and embodied in the 
form of secondary proceedings, it does not create "secondary creditors" as far as the 
priority claims of such creditors is not affected by the opening of main proceedingS88 . By 
the same token, the protection of domestic creditors, achieved through a consistent choice 
of forum and special choice of law provisions, was conducive to a political compromise 
pursuant to which the forum of opening of main proceedings could assert extra-territorial 
powers over the debtor's assets located in other jurisdictions where the debtor has no 
establishment. 
Although the protection of domestic creditors has long been an impediment to the 
creation of a global cross-border insolvency system, the provisions of the Model Law 
seem to marginalize this issue. Of course the non-main representative under the Model 
Law disposes of unrestricted powers" in comparison with a secondary liquidator under 
the Regulation and may apply for recognition and for relief before the enacting forum. 
However, the acts of the non-main representative under the Model Law are associated 
with lesser certainty than those of the secondary liquidator under the Regulation. Even 
when the Model Law is adopted as is and is not modified from its original version; the 
acts of the non-main representative remain subject to the scrutiny and discretion of the 
recognizing forum. This results in lower protection of domestic creditors under the Model 
Law, lower level of predictability and most importantly, lesser cooperation between 
courts. 
88 This is true so long as the secondary court would apply its own domestic law along with its home priority 
ranking to liquidate the debtor's assets domestically located and to distribute the proceeds resulting 
therefrom. 
89 These powers are unrestricted to the extent that they are not defined. Unlike the Regulation, there are no 
provisions under the Model Law that stipulate what kind of actions the non-main representative may or 
may not undertake, whether in the course of main or non-main proceedings. 
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This is why the Model Law reaches neither a political compromise that ensures 
that main and non-main proceedings have their respective scopes without overlapping, 
nor does it provide for an acceptable margin of security to domestic creditors. 
Additionally, because of the limited objectives of the Model Law and its sole dedication 
to recognition matters, forums where the debtor has only assets are not prevented from 
opening insolvency proceedings against the debtor. When such proceedings are banned 
from recognition, it is understood how creditors might be subject to a significantly 
different treatment from one forum to the other. 
Although the debate between Pure Universality and Pure Territoriality is moot, 
the EU experience has shown that an effective combination of these theories can offer 
higher predictability and equality among creditors, irrespective of their location. In this 
respect and as argued by Westbrook, the Regulation may seem "breathtakingly 
Universar'90 when there are no secondary proceedings initiated against the debtor. When 
secondary proceedings are opened however, the Regulation manages to extract the 
benefits of each theory to the advantage of creditors, whether sophisticated or not. By 
contrast, the Model Law does not exalt any of the advantages of either theory, whether or 
not non-main proceedings are initiated against the debtor. Therefore, it is believed that 
certain adjustments to the scope of non-main proceedings under the Model Law would be 
desirable. One such improvement that could be learned from the Regulation is that 
through the empowerment of the non-main representative, non-main proceedings could 
be tailored to satisfy domestic creditors' needs. In fact, such an empowerment can only 
take place if the Model Law endows the non-main representative with specific 
66 preservation" tools and incontestable prerogatives, which could be used before the main- 
forum without challenge. Achieving this nonetheless may require that the Model Law 
shifts its basic approach, from one geared towards recognition to one aiming to establish 
a direct relationship between main and secondary proceedings9l. 
90 See Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 56, at 38. 91 So far the Model Law has established an indirect relationship channelled through the enacting state, 
which has fulfilled the role of a buffer between main and non-main proceedings. 
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IV. Primaev of Main Proceedinas 
One of the recurrent themes of the Regulation is the primacy of main proceedings 
over secondary proceedings. Therefore, the first part of the following section will identify 
how such a primacy was achieved and what benefits may result therefrom. The second 
part will study the level of primacy between main and non-main proceedings established 
under the Model Law. Based on international experience in cross-border insolvency 
matters, it will be examined whether the Model Law may be conducive to an 
unconditional and universal degree of primacy, thereby increasing predictability and 
cooperation among courts. 
A. The EU Context 
One of the lessons to be learned from the European insolvency regime and from 
international experience is that the initiation of multiple proceedings against the same 
debtor is not sufficient to create a viable and coordinated system to resolve the insolvency 
of large multinationalS92. Indeed, in addition to allowing the opening of several sets of 
proceedings, the EU Regulation establishes a number of ground rules to govern the 
relationship between these proceedings. In order to achieve the advantages conferred by 
Universalism, and to overcome the traditional territorial approach, the Regulation has 
given broader scope, reach and hierarchic superiority to main proceedings. This spirit is 
reflected in a series of actions only the court of main proceedings can take 
93 and in the 
limitations imposed on the court of secondary proceedings 94 . 
92 Current practices in cross-border insolvency have proved ineffective although the "grab rule" encourages 
the opening of multiple proceedings against the same debtor. In other words, the opening of concurrent 
proceedings is not by itself a solution to the transnational insolvency dilemma. See for instance the Model 
Law at art. 28. The Model law explicitly allows the opening of multiple proceedings against the same 
debtor so long as countries comply with guidelines for cooperation. The modalities of concurrent 
proceedings under the Model Law are studied below. 
93 The court of opening of main proceedings is endowed with broader powers than courts of secondary 
proceedings. These powers are either expressed materially (different types of actions that could be 
exercised in the main proceedings) or territorially (these actions encompass the entirety of the debtor's 
assets located inside or outside the forum of opening) "Conversely, limitations on secondary proceedings entail territorial insolvency proceedings, which can 
only liquidate the debtor's assets located in that jurisdiction. In the alternative, secondary proceedings may 
entail preservation measures on local assets subject to the broader powers of the court in main proceedings. 
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Initially, the objectives of the Regulation were to limit the settlement of 
insolvency cases to one forum that has the authority to open main proceedings. Because 
such a system is not feasible on the community level, and far less so on a global leve195, 
the authors of the Regulation had to contemplate the opening of secondary proceedings, 
which would have a limited scope. In actuality, secondary proceedings may be thought of 
as a 66political" compromise necessary to reach a regional insolvency arrangement. This 
rationale is implicitly expressed throughout the Regulation by the presence of a 
considerable number of provisions limiting the prerogatives of the courts in secondary 
proceedings. 
For instance, the preamble of the Regulation restricts the opening of secondary 
proceedings to what is "absolutely necessary', 96 when such proceedings are initiated prior 
to the opening of main proceedings. As a result, the primacy of main proceedings has 
endowed the Regulation with a rather Universal character. Two subsequent sub-sub- 
sections will analyse this primacy. The first will envisage the role of the liquidator under 
each set of proceedings. The second will explore the limits imposed on secondary 
proceedings and other forums regarding their right to refuse recognition on the grounds 
of public policy. Although the issues pertaining to recognition and enforcement will be 
studied separately, it is appropriate to tackle the Regulation's restrictive definition of the 
concept of "public policy" in the context ofjudicial powers. 
1. Role of the Liquidator 
Traditionally, the liquidator must act in the best interests of the creditors. In the 
domestic context, this requires a thorough understanding of the needs and entitlements of 
the creditors, employees, holders and other parties, and how best to achieve the 
realization of the debtor's assets to match those entitlements. To achieve these objectives, 
the liquidator guards against the premature dismemberment of the debtor's business and 
95 See Chapter Two on the political impracticability of Pure Universalism. 96 See article 17 of the Preamble. 
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endeavours to preserve the assets within the reach of the court that appointed him. When 
the debtor is a multinational corporation with assets dispersed across the globe, it is 
97 
crucial that the liquidator has adequate powers and means to preserve these assets 
It is not surprising that the first article of the Regulation explicitly mentions the 
presence of the liquidator. It even makes it one of two necessary conditions for the 
Regulation to apply. For instance, Annex B of the Regulation enlists, by country, all the 
possible denominations of the liquidator under the various insolvency laws. Because of 
the numerous provisions that deal with the role of the liquidator (infra), it could be fairly 
argued that the authors of the Regulation have dedicated much attention to the 
liquidator's tasks and powers. 
Indeed, liquidators play an important role in insolvency proceedings, especially 
when cross-border implications arise. The duties to provide information and to liaise 
ICUlt98. among several courts make the tasks of the liquidator burdensome and diff In the 
EU context, the powers of the liquidator seem to miffor those of the court where the 
former was appointed. The fact that the main liquidator is conferred broader powers than 
those conferred to his counterpart in secondary proceedings retrieves the theme of 
primacy of main proceedings over secondary proceedings. It is also a way to ascertain the 
recurrent Universal character of the Regulation. Such an unequal attribution of powers 
ensures that there is a single set of proceedings that shall have overall jurisdiction over 
the debtor's assets and that there is only one person that should be able to dispose of the 
debtor's estate, wherever located. 
" On the different tasks of the liquidator on the domestic level, see Francine L. Semaya & Cozen 
O'Connor, Insurance Insolvencies: Has the Current Cycle Peaked?, 854 PLUCOMM 111,132 -134 (2003); 
Roger Enock & Geoff Nicholas London: The Company Market and Insolvency: Schemes of Arrangement; 
Section 304; The Policyholders Protection Board, 735 PLI/COMM 71,95 (1996); Leslie H. Miles, Jr. et 
al., Choosing a Liquidator and Negotiating the Fees, 16-SEP AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26,26 (1997). The 
liquidator's responsibilities are however extended and become more complex in cross-border insolvency 
cases. See, for instance, Arnold M. Quittner, Maxwell Communications and Cross-Border Insolvency Issues, 752 PLI/COM M 647,65 8 -660 (1997). 98 For instance, on the duty of the liquidator to notify the various creditors located in different jurisdictions, See in Re R. Jung GmbH Cour d'appel d'Orldans 25 February 2006. 
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Aside from the general duty to cooperate and to provide information when 
requested, article 18 of the Regulation defines the role of the liquidator, either in main or 
secondary proceedings. In the first case, and pursuant to article 18-1, the liquidator enjoys 
66all the powers conferred on him by the law of the state of the opening ofproceedings in 
other member state". Despite the special attention given to the liquidator and its role, the 
Regulation does not enunciate the prerogatives the main liquidator may dispose of to 
complete his task. Instead, the Regulation purports to the law governing the main 
proceedings so as to determine what the functions of the liquidator are 99 , and how his 
duties and limitations should be determinedloo. This simply shows that the court of main 
proceedings may, through the liquidator it appoints, exercise extra-territorial powers to 
administer the debtor's assets located in other jurisdictions. In many respects, the 
Regulation has left enough room for the main forum to define the boundaries of its own 
judicial powers. While some commentators have criticized such an extra-territorial reach, 
the broad powers of the main forum resulting from the Regulation's flexible approach 
101 have rendered the Regulation more appealing and effective in many ways 
In turn, the primacy of main proceedings over secondary proceedings seems 
sufficient to prevent, or at least limit future conflicts between liquidators respectively 
designated in each set of proceedings. Also, it should be noted that the role of the 
liquidator in the main proceedings is not limitless. The same article 18 of the Regulation 
99 See Bob Wessels, European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 20-NOV. AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 24,31 (200 1) (arguing that under the EU Regulation, "a liquidator may automatically exercise all 
powers conferred on him by the member state's lex concursus"). This provision, like many others, was 
inherited from the 1995 EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings. See Fletcher, The European Union 
Convention; supra note 17 at 134 (asserting that "article 4(2)(e) of the EU Convention affirMs the basic 
principle that it is for the lex concursus to determine the extent of the liquidatoes powers in relation to 
current contracts") 
100 Id. This approach may seem surprising, especially when these provisions are designed to handle such a 
complex process involving multiple courts and proceedings. Indeed, a greater need for precision is often 
ex ected when it comes to cross-border issues. 
lolp"Flexibility in the rules appears to be indispensable in international bankruptcy. The situations which 
arise are so varied that any one rigid rule cannot solve all of them satisfactorily ... neither the 
theory of 
territoriality nor the theory of ubiquity can cope adequately with the divergent situations. " See Professor 




confines these powers when prior preventive measures were duly undertaken' 02 before 
other forums. Additional restrictions to the liquidator's prerogatives derive from article 
18-3, where in the course of his duties, the liquidator is not entitled to use "coercive 
measures or the right to rule on legal proceedings or disputes". Nonetheless, in general 
terms and under main proceedings, the liquidator has the power to remove the debtor's 
assets from one jurisdiction to another and similarly initiate any action in order to 
preserve creditor's rights. 
Such extensive powers stand in stark contrast with the restricted prerogatives of 
the liquidator in secondary proceedings. Pursuant to article 18-2 of the Regulation, the 
secondary liquidator has the right to avert the assets that have been removed from one 
jurisdiction to another. This liquidator has the privilege to do so either out of, or before 
the courts of any other member state. Apart from the recognition of his status and access 
to EU courts, the liquidator plays a restricted, yet vital, role in secondary proceedings. 
However, a mere obligation to alert and inform does not include any entitlement to 
remove assets, unlike his counterpart's prerogatives in the main proceedings. The same 
article grants the secondary liquidator the possibility to "bring an action to set aside" 
with no further details as regards the requirements of such an action. Clearly, the 
Regulation has extensively curtailed the role of the liquidator in secondary proceedings. 
This reveals the limited impact intended to result from the opening of secondary 
proceedings. It also emphasizes that the main liquidator, along with the main court, will 
have an unchallenged upper hand in adjudicating the insolvency of the corporate debtor 
throughout the EU. 
The relationship between liquidators in main and secondary proceedings 
embodies the very spirit of the Regulation. This primacy is an important aspect that may 
promote closer cooperation in cross-border insolvencies. It would however, be incorrect 
to consider the EU regime as a purely Universalistic model; the possibility for secondary 
102 Article 18.1 prevents the liquidator from using the prerogatives conferred to him under the lex concursus 
66as long as no other insolvency proceedings have been opened there nor any preservation measure to the 
contrary has been taken there further to a request for the opening of insolvency proceedings in that State. " 
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proceedings attests to the contrary. Yet the intended limited effect of secondary 
proceedings reflected in their scope and supplemented by the restricted, no less definite, 
powers of the secondary liquidator, renders the Regulation more identifiable to 
Universalism, and thus more viable. The powers accorded to the court of main 
proceedings and to main liquidator hardly seem challengeable, not even on public policy 
grounds. 
2. Limited "Public Policy" Concept 
Automatic recognition of foreign judgments is a landmark of the European Union. 
It first appeared in the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 103 and has also been a long-standing 
tradition expressed in several legislative texts that are binding to all member states in the 
community 104 . With minor variations between the 
instruments that are built upon such a 
method for recognition, the general principle is that all judicial decisions rendered by the 
courts of one member state are automatically and unconditionally recognized within the 
territories of all other member sates'05. This practice has so far helped achieve the 
objectives set in the treaty to create a common market with a certain degree of trust upon 
which participants can rely. However, domestic courts can refuse the recognition of 
foreign judgments when the exequatur of these decisions is incompatible with the public 
policy of the recognizing forum 106 . 
103 See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Sept. 27,1968, amended by art. 5,1990 O. J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 I. L. M. 1413,1419 (1990). 
[hereinafter the Brussels Convention]. Article 26 of this convention reads: "A judgment given in a 
Contracting State shall be recognized in the other Contracting States without any special procedure being 
re ed" ,0 
quir 
4 See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19,1980,1980 O. J. (L 266) 1, 
art. 15, reprinted in 19 I. L. M. 1492 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
105 See the Brussels Convention, supra note 103. '06See the Brussels Convention, supra note 103, article 27-1: "A judgment shall not be recognized... if 
such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought". 
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Although the concept of public policy is somewhat elusive and has never been 
defined'07, it is the role of the recognizing court to assess whether a given foreign 
judgment constitutes a breach of this concept. Generally, violations of the principles or 
objectives pursued by the recognizing country's legislation are often construed to be 
against the public policy of that forum, hence recognition will not be granted. As regards 
the implementation of automatic recognition of foreign judgements, some jurisdictions in 
the EU have used the public policy argument rather extensively. In France for instance, it 
was common practice that courts would find a violation of public policy or order when 
foreign courts decided a case in a different manner than French courts would' 08. 
However, when courts follow such a "chauvinistic" approach, not only do they run the 
risk of seeing their own decisions unrecognised by other forums 109 , they also breach their 
duties under the Treaty and the Brussels convention' 10. For many years, this weight of 
reciprocity combined with community obligations have functioned as deterrents to this 
practice and have in fact reduced the abusive use of the public policy exception. 
Despite a reasonable use of this defence among EU member states, the Regulation 
found the necessity to restrictively define public policy so as to increase cooperation 
among EU courts in insolvency matters. According to article 26111 of the Regulation, 
public policy is limited to the cases where 'fundamental rights or the constitutional 
rights ... of individuals" are at stake. That is to say, in the majority of cases, courts will not 
be able to raise the exception of public policy against the recognition of insolvency 
proceedings and/or decisions rendered by the court of opening of main proceedings. 
Indeed, it seems difficult to stretch the terms "fundamental" and "constitutional rights" to 
"' Each jurisdiction has its own definition of public policy. Thus there is no uniform public policy concept, 
not even between member states to the EU. 
log Under the French legal system, there are two public policy concepts. The first is known as "ordre 
publique national" and relates to purely domestic considerations, and which is hardly waived by French 
courts. The second is known as "ordre publique international" which is more flexible as it applies when 
international aspects arise from the case at stake, such as an international contract or a tort occurring in a 
foreign jurisdiction and nevertheless producing some effects in France. 09 See Chapter Two on reciprocity and recognition of foreign judgments. 10 See the Brussels Convention, supra note 103, article 29: "Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance". 
"1 See Regulation at art. 26. 
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include the loss of a preferential right on the insolvency proceeds, or even an injunction 
to transfer assets from one jurisdiction to another, so long as foreign creditors have a right 
to lodge their claims before the court of main proceedings. 
The drafters of the Regulation were aware of the sensitive character of insolvency 
proceedings and how courts may be willing to broadly resort to "public policy" defences 
to protect their domestic creditors. Indeed, without such a narrow definition, domestic 
courts would have often resorted to the use of public policy arguments to refuse 
recognition of insolvency judgments that run against the interests of their domestic 
creditors. Article 26 completes the objectives of the Regulation to endow the court of 
opening of main proceedings with broad and universal powers. The automatic recognition 
of insolvency judgments, along with the limited grounds for the recognizing state to 
refuse recognition achieves these objectives. 
If the primacy of main proceedings could be effectively achieved within the EU, 
perhaps a similar hierarchic relationship between main and non-main proceedings could 
be more fully implemented under a revamped Model Law. 
B. Channelling Primacy through the Model Law 
Given the UNCITRAL working group was inspired by the EU convention, the 
theme of primacy has been spelled out in the Model Law. However, the primacy of main 
proceedings over non-main proceedings is limited to recognition matters, and the 
enacting forum is exempt from complying with such a primacy, even when the debtor 
possesses only assets in the territory of that enacting State. The first part of this Section B 
will study the provisions of the Model Law that seek to establish a certain primacy of 
main proceedings over non-main proceedings when concurrent and multiple proceedings 
are initiated against the debtor. The second part will demonstrate that there is a real 
potential to improve the provisions of the Model Law, thereby creating an unambiguous 
hierarchic rapport between the various courts involved in the insolvency of a 
multinational corporation. It will be argued that courts around the world are familiar with 
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the notion of primacy and that there is already a "de facto" primacy, based on the location 
of the debtor's assets in a given forum. 
1. Concurrent and Multiple Proceedings 
While the Regulation creates a direct relationship between main and secondary 
forums and favours the primacy of main proceedings over secondary proceedings, the 
Model Law only establishes a limited relationship between the various forums involved 
in the resolution of a multinational's insolvency. In fact, the closest the Model Law has 
come to establishing a direct rapport between several sets of proceedings is through 
chapter V dealing with concurrent proceedings. Furthermore, the Model Law does not 
attempt to set up a full hierarchy between main and secondary proceedings. 
According to article 28 of the Model Law, once the enacting forum has 
recognized foreign main proceedings, domestic proceedings may be initiated in the 
enacting forum only if the debtor possesses assets in that forum. Such domestic 
proceedings are - pursuant to the same article - limited to the assets located in the 
enacting forum. Surprisingly, the Model Law does not use the concept of establishment 
in the case of concurrent proceedings. This means that domestic proceedings (in the 
enacting forum) cannot be recognized as non-main proceedings or even recognized at all 
by other enacting states 112 . As aforementioned, asset-based proceedings may, under the 
Model Law, be initiated against the debtor, though they cannot produce any effect in 
other jurisdiction because they cannot be recognized. 
Although this may be viewed as an attempt to establish a certain primacy of main 
and non-main proceedings over asset-based proceedings, such an approach is not in line 
with the very spirit of the Model Law. Indeed, if the objective of the Model Law was to 
increase cooperation and predictability, and since chapter V includes certain rules related 
112 1 ty It jfi ay The Guide to Enactment provides that this approach "wou d pically not be he mos e cient w to 
protect the creditors, including local creditors ". 
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to the opening of proceedings against the debtor 113 , it should have provided that asset- 
based proceedings cannot be initiated before the enacting forum, especially when the 
latter has already recognized foreign proceedings as main foreign proceedings. Since the 
concept of establishment was used in the Model Law for the purpose of recognition, 
article 28 should have extended the application of this concept, thereby imposing certain 
conditions on the enacting forum to open insolvency proceedings against the debtor. Such 
an inconsistent approach was highlighted in the Model Law guide to enactment, which 
provides that "the enacting state would act in line with the philosophy of the Model Law 
if it enacts the article (article 28) by replacing the words "only if the debtor has assets in 
this State ... with the words "only ifthe debtor has an establishment in this State " ". 
In addition to the Model Law's inconsistent approach in article 28, article 29 
reiterates a strong hold of territoriality and advocates the "pre-eminence" of domestic 
proceedings over foreign proceedings, whether main or non-main. First, article 29 (a)(i) 
provides that once the proceedings are initiated before the enacting forum, any 
provisional relief based on the protection of foreign creditors (article 19), along with any 
relief to the foreign non-main representative (article 21), must be consistent with such 
proceedings, irrespective of whether or not the enacting forum is in actuality the debtor's 
centre of main interest. Hence, if the rights of foreign creditors were in jeopardy, the 
main or non-main representative would be denied relief based on urgency considerations, 
such as preservation measures, so long as this relief may prevent domestic creditors in the 
enacting forum from liquidating the debtor's estate. Clearly, these provisions cannot 
improve coordination between the courts, and far less so achieve equality among 
creditors. 
Furthermore, article 29 (a)(ii) states that the provisions of article 20 shall not 
apply once proceedings are opened in the enacting forum and foreign main proceedings 
"' Although the Model Law has an overall approach geared towards recognition, chapter V comes into 
play when foreign proceedings have already been initiated and recognized (or on the verge of recognition) 
by the enacting forum. Therefore, chapter V provides for certain rules related to the possibility of opening insolvency proceedings against the debtor in light of the foreign proceedings already initiated before other forums. 
154 
Chapter Three. 
are pending for recognition before that forum. Somehow, article 29 (a)(ii) makes sense 
because article 20 may entail an automatic moratorium against creditors, which would 
have resulted in the discontinuance of the proceedings in the enacting forum. This being 
said, the waiver afforded to the enacting forum as regards the application of article 20 as 
a whole, indicates a major alienation and weakening of main proceedings. Indeed, the 
debtor centre of main interest seems to lose its meaning and purpose every time 
concurrent proceedings are simultaneously initiated before a foreign court and before the 
enacting forum. Additionally, such a waiver to the application of article 20 places main 
and non-main proceedings on equal footing, if not giving a certain pre-eminence to 
foreign non-main proceedings so long as they are consistent with the proceedings in the 
enacting forum (supra, article 29 (a)(i)). 
In term, the effect of main and secondary proceedings and the relief that may be 
granted to foreign representatives will be determined within the confines of article 29 
(a)(i) and will be conditioned on the consistency of the provisional relief demanded with 
the proceedings in the enacting forum. The Model Law guide to enactment itself provides 
that the aim of article 29 was not to establish "a rigid hierarch)P between the 
proceedings because it would have prevented the courts from cooperating with each 
other. This argument will be discussed in the following part. 
Despite the rather territorial and inconsistent articles 28 and 29, the idea of 
primacy of main proceedings over non-main proceedings was envisaged under the Model 
Law. In fact, the UNCITRAL working group has indeed attempted to remedy the 
territorial orientation of the Model Law and salvage its territorial approach through article 
30, which advocates a limited primacy of main proceedings over non-main proceedings. 
Article 30 stipulates, among other provisions, that upon recognition of foreign main 
proceedings by the enacting forum, the relief granted or to be granted by the enacting 
forum to foreign non-main representatives must be consistent with foreign main 
proceedings. Certain prerogatives, such as the right to modify or even terminate any relief 
granted under article 19 and 21 are left to the enacting forum to ensure that non-main 
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proceedings are consistent with main proceedings. Thus, the Model Law indirectly 
establishes the primacy of main proceedings only when there are no proceedings initiated 
before the enacting forum. When proceedings are opened before the enacting forum, 
article 28 and 29 ought to apply. 
It is somewhat unclear why the UNCITRAL working group decided to provide 
for the limited application of primacy of main proceedings, to which the enacting forum 
would not be subject. In fact, where proceedings are opened before the enacting forum, 
the Model Law as a whole may seem extraordinarily territorial because not only would 
the enacting forum be entitled to open proceedings on the basis of the presence of assets, 
but such a forum would also have very limited obligations vis-A-vis foreign courts and 
representatives, whether main or non-main. One plausible reason behind the exemption 
of the enacting forum from the provisions of article 30 is that the UNCITRAL working 
group wanted to issue an instrument that would attract states to adopt it. Had the Model 
Law provided that main proceedings prevail over non-main proceedings opened in the 
enacting forum, or that the enacting forum had no right to initiate proceedings against the 
debtor based solely on the presence of the debtor's assets on its territory, the Model Law 
would have been less appealing to states. This eagerness to please may in actuality have 
skewed the very objectives of the Model Law and prevented it from becoming a more 
effective international instrument. 
Although the Model Law has borrowed a number of important concepts from the 
Regulation, such as the "debtor's centre of main interests" or the debtor's 
64 establishment", it has employed these concepts in a different and less effective manner. 
As seen, the Regulation has used these very concepts to create a hierarchic ranking 
between main and secondary proceedings, the Model Law has reverted back to the 
precepts of a longstanding and criticized purely Territorial approach. This stance is 
surprising when one considers that a "de facto" hierarchic ranking and primacy among 




2. Prospects of Advocating Primacy 
The primacy of main proceedings in the EU context created a rather Unitarian 
approach to cross-border insolvency cases within the community. Comparing this scheme 
to the prospects of advocating primacy of main proceedings over non-main proceedings 
under the Model Law may seem rather unrealistic in many respects. 
Unlike most countries, EU member states previously abided by regional 
arrangements that contained provisions on the choice of law, forum and automatic 
recognition of judgments 114 . Although the Regulation marks a clear 
distinction from 
previous instruments, EU member states were "ready" to move to the next stage in 
regards to judicial cooperation' 15 . The acceptance of a regulation that prods the main 
116 forum to assert extra-territorial powers in the area of insolvency testifies to this fact . 
In 
turn, it could be argued that most countries in the world do not have the expertise 
necessary to engage in such a process, which requires a certain level of knowledge, 
familiarity with cross-border issues and judicial integration. As much as situations of fis 
pendens are often difficult to resolve on a global level' 17 , 
it would be equally difficult to 
expect that a forum would give priority to another to settle the insolvency of a 
multinational debtor that has an establishment and/or assets in the territory of the first. 
Furthermore, the Regulation gives certain autonomy to the courts in EU member 
states to implement its provisions. Although the Regulation provides guidelines for 
interpretation and construction, the EU insolvency regime could not be created without 
114 On the EU experience on cross-border insolvency matters, see Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises, 
supra note 41, at 8 (arguing that the issuance of the UNCITRAL model law was a great achievement, 
although unexpected by the international community. He further adds that such an achievement was 
possible because of the participation of EU delegates, who previously ingrained a certain expertise in cross- 
border insolvency matters in the course of creating the EU Regulation) 
3" Id. See also supra notes 103 & 104. 
116 More so, when secondary forums accept a curtailment in their right to initiate full-fledged insolvency 
proceedings against a multinational debtor that has an establishment on their territory or when secondary 
forums accept the primacy of main proceedings over their own proceedings. 117 See Black's Law Dictionary 932 (West 6th ed. 1990) ("Lis pendensI); Gersten, The doctrine of lis 
pendens: The need for balance, FLA. B. J. 83 (1995); Levy, Lis pendens and procedural due process: A 
closer look after Connecticut v. Doehr, 51 MD. L. REV. 1054, (1992). 
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the existence of a supreme court (ECJ) to supervise the implementation process and 
ensure the uniform application of insolvency principles. The absence of a similar 
authority on the global level could render the adoption of a global instrument containing 
such progressive precepts, such as an amended or improved Model Law, rather difficult. 
Another impediment to the primacy of main insolvency proceedings on the global 
level is the risk of using public policy defences to refuse recognition of foreign 
insolvency judgments' 18 . Despite the success of a limited definition of this concept 
in the 
EU context for recognition purposes, there is nothing to guarantee uniform interpretation 
of and compliance with the concept of public policy, should an international instrument 
stipulate similar provisions'19. Under the Model Law for instance, the UNCITRAL 
working group has only reiterated the public policy exception to recognition and 
cooperation, without providing for any restrictions. During the negotiation process of the 
Model Law, article 6 was discussed at length and it has been agreed that the UNCITRAL 
working group cannot define this concept since each jurisdiction has its own definition. 
In the alternative, the Model Law has only attempted to restrict the interpretation and 
implementation of this notion by stipulating in article 6 that the enacting forum may 
refuse to recognize foreign proceedings if and when such proceedings "would be 
manifestly contrary to the public policy" of the enacting state. 
Despite these critiques, it could be argued that a de facto primacy of insolvency 
proceedings often occurs in cross border insolvency cases. The most common situation is 
where a multinational debtor possesses valuable assets in one jurisdiction, even without 
the presence of a registered office or establishments in that forum. Because the 
"' See also Chapter Two on the dangers of exporting public policy form one forum to another. 119A primary concern would be founded on the notable differences in implementation between developing 
and developed countries, where the former will more often invoke public policy exceptions to refuse the 
recognition of foreign insolvency judgments. See John K. Londot, Handling Priority Rules Conflicts in 
International Bankruptcy: Assessing the International Bar Association's Concordat, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 
163,176 -177 (1996). Public Policy defences are likely to be used more often in developing countries so as 
to protect domestic creditors from unfavourable foreign insolvency judgments. This argument should be 
understood in light of the potential disparity between developed and developing countries to be the forum 
of opening of main proceedings (see Chapter Two on the disadvantages resulting from a Pure Universal 
system vis- 6- vis creditors in developing countries). 
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administration of those assets is important to the overall insolvency proceedings against 
that debtor, the forum where such assets are located would find itself in a privileged 
position vis-a-vis other forums, where the debtor has minor or no assets at all. Indeed, 
when the debtor's assets located locally are insufficient to satisfy the claims of domestic 
creditors in any given forum, a natural advantage arises to the benefit of the forum where 
the debtor's most significant and valuable assets are located. Because forums deprived of 
this advantage cannot administer the debtor's assets that are located overseas 120 , these 
forums are left no option but to hope that the forum where the "enriched jurisdiction"' 21 
will cooperate and possibly transfer any surplus from the proceeds of the debtor's 
liquidation. Although there is no international treaty to regulate the relationship between 
the various forums involved when such a situation arises, the presence of assets will 
automatically confer to the forum where they are located certain primacy and broader 
powers over the debtor's estate. For instance, decisions to reorganize or to liquidate will 
depend on the privileged forum's willingness to cooperate and to transfer assets when 
required 122 . When these situations take place, the attitude of courts will vary 
from one 
jurisdiction to another. Some courts would be recalcitrant to cooperate; others will try to 
reach a compromise between all stakeholders in the proceedings. That is to say, the 
primacy of a given set of proceedings on the global level is not a new situation. Albeit, 
disorganized and unforeseeable 123 in comparison with the EU Regulation, courts around 
the globe have had opportunities to administer a multinational's large estate on a 
"' This is a straightforward consequence of state sovereignty, which has so far prevented the assertion by 
any given forum of extra-territorial judicial powers. To illustrate, see In re Sefel Geophysical Ltd., 62 
Alta. L. R. 2d 193,70 C. Bankr. (N. S. ) 97 (Q. B. 1988) (where the Canadian court limited the stay on the 
insolvency proceedings to assets located in Canada. To stay the proceedings as regards assets located 
overseas, creditors need to present their claim before the court where such assets are located. ) 
12 1 This expression is borrowed from Professor Westbrook and refers to the forum where the debtor's 
valuable assets are located at the time insolvency proceedings are initiated against that debtor. See 
Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 56, at 4 1. 
122 This assumption stems naturally from the predominant state of territoriality. Since courts are never 
compelled to transfer assets (see chapter 11 on international comity), the location of important assets in a 
given jurisdiction would prioritize the latter's decision to cooperate or not. See Fletcher, The European 
Union Convention, supra note 3, at 123 (arguing that "the insolvency laws of the world's constituent states 
lay claim to worldwide effectiveness over the debtor's assets, wherever they may be found (although such 
pretensions cannot be translated into concrete effect without the concurrence of the rules of private 
international law of the countries where the assets happen to be located"). 123 This method is unforeseeable because the primacy of a given set of proceedings will depend on the location of the assets at the time of opening. 
159 
Chapter Three. 
worldwide basis. It is doubtful that these courts will lack expertise if they ascertained 
primacy in insolvency proceedings, only this time in an organized and pre-determined 
fashion. 
A step closer to confer a global primacy to a given set of insolvency proceedings 
against a multinational debtor is the use of protocols between courts to settle the 
insolvency of large multinationals. These protocols are legal arrangements between 
124 forums to decide how assets in different countries will be dealt with . Commonly, 
protocols determine how bankruptcy courts in those different jurisdictions will coordinate 
their actions. This helps restructure businesses on an international scale 125 and thus 
preserves the corporate asset value for all investors, employees or other stakeholders. It 
could also enable a more effective liquidation of the debtor's estate, hence achieving a 
higher degree of equality between creditors of equal standing. Although protocols in 
cross border insolvency cases foster cooperation between courts, one should not overlook 
126 
the negotiation process that determines each court's rights, duties and prerogatives . 
This is not an equity-based process; rather there is often one forum that has the upper 
hand in the insolvency proceedings at stake. More likely than not, this will be the forum 
27 
that has the debtor's most valuable assets under its control, compared to other forums' . 
124 "Protocols provide a case-specific structure to govern how parties to an international insolvency 
communicate, take actions, and apply the procedural and substantive elements of law". See Steven G. 
Golick, What, How, Where, and When to File: Considerations and Implications in Cross-Border Insolvency 
Proceedings in Canada, 12 JBKRLP 5 ART. 2 (2003) 
125 See Chapter One on the reorganization of multinationals. 
126 Id (arguing that although Canada and the United States agreed on the ALI guidelines to facilitate 
cooperation and protocols in cross-border insolvency cases, these Guidelines "are not meant to be static, 
but are meant to be adapted and modified to fit the circumstances of individual cases") These arguments 
support that in each case, there is a "bargaining" process which leads to the creation of a protocol among 
courts. 
127 See Shinichiro Abe, Recent Developments of Insolvency Laws and Cross-Border Practices in The 
United States and Japan, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47,81(2002) (arguing that in negotiating a 
protocol on a given case, the court of ancillary proceedings may "decide to surrender the assets 
conditionally... it must negotiate an agreement with the court of the home country" so as to ensure that its 
domestic creditors are satisfied. ) The absence of a protocol on the contrary would entail a total discretion of 
the forum where such assets are located to cooperate. If no agreement were reached among courts, these 
assets would be exclusively distributed among domestic creditors, thus perpetuating the overriding state of 
territoriality. See also William L. Norton, Jr., Part 19. Related Laws and Issues, Chapter 152. International 
Insolvencies, V11. Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, NRTN-BLP § 152: 66 (1994) 
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The communication process between the courts, though channelled through the parties, 28 11 
certainly makes the proceedings more civil and organized. Yet the assertion of 
jurisdiction and the prerogatives resulting thereof are based on the same traditional 
criterion: the emplacement of the debtor's assets. 
In contrast to the European model, the superiority of one forum over others is a 
-frequent occurrence in cross-border insolvency cases. If courts had been technically and 
legally able to handle the administration of a multinational's estate under the present and 
somewhat disorganized system, there is no reason to believe that they will not be able to 
carry the same tasks pursuant to an international arrangement embodied in a possible 
amendment to the Model Law. Based on such analysis, it may be realistic to believe that 
the primacy of insolvency proceedings may be formally established through the Model 
Law. Doing this would require abolishing the exemption of the enacting forum from the 
rule of primacy 129 and ensuring that non-main proceedings opened before the enacting 
forum are consistent with the relief granted to the foreign main representative. While it 
should be expected that such provisions would, in the majority of cases, be waived by 
enacting states, this approach provides for a pragmatic indication as to which extent 
countries would refute the principle of primacy and oppose restrictions on their 
prerogatives when the debtor holds its centre of main interests in another jurisdiction. On 
the bright side however, it will determine how far or close the international community is 
from establishing a global insolvency system that retrieves the basic advantages of 
Universality, without implementing a purely Universal approach. 
V. Conclusion 
Despite the striking similarities that exist between the Regulation and the Model 
Law on the concepts used to determine an acceptable basis of jurisdiction, the provisions 
129 id. 
129 The current version of the Model Law opts for a flexible criterion, which includes the mere presence of 
assets, to attribute jurisdiction to the enacting forum. As mentioned above, this has given many countries 
the incentives to adopt the Model Law. See articles 28 and 29 of the Model Law. 
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of the Model Law seem lacking than those of the Regulation. Through its unequivocal 
language and regardless of its binding character, the Regulation has significantly 
increased predictability and equality among creditors located in different jurisdictions, 
something the Model Law has fallen short in achieving. 
One of the more probable reasons why the UNCITRAL working group did not 
follow the approach of the EU Convention to a greater extent was the mounting pressure 
to accommodate the different insolvency principles and policies in the majority of 
countries. Since it was unsure how the international community would react to the 
issuance of the Model Law, the working group made a conscious choice not to issue far 
reaching insolvency provisions and limited its objectives to the confines of uncertain 
cooperation and sporadic recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. 
Today however, such parameters have considerably changed. A number of 
countries, including the United States, have implemented the Model Law' 30 (at least 
partially) thereby giving a certain weight to the UNCITRAL initiative. Although it is 
hoped that more countries will adopt the Model Law in the near future, the pressures that 
previously arose from its potential failure and rejection have notably decreased. On the 
other hand, the Regulation, which was the main source of inspiration to the UNCITRAL 
working group, has demonstrated that the same concepts may be put to better and more 
effective use to address the insolvency of multinational corporations. The provisions 
governing the choice of forum under the Regulation are just one aspect of this more 
effective approach. This being said, the choice of forum provisions under the Regulation 
could not have achieved this degree of predictability and protection to domestic creditors 
unless they are associated with insightful and complementary choice of law provisions. 
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1. Introduction 
To increase the level of coordination and cooperation among the various courts 
involved in cross-border insolvency cases, unambiguous rules for the opening and 
recognition of proceedings in and by each forum are insufficient. So long as the 
applicable law to each set of proceedings determines the ranking of domestic and foreign 
creditors, the prerogatives of the foreign representative and the procedures to be 
followed; choice of law provisions are essential to enhance predictability 1. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law constitutes the first truly international effort to 
address the various issues that arise from the insolvency of multinational corporations, 
specifically those relating to the recognition of foreign proceedings. However, the Model 
' The choice of law is doubly important in cross-border insolvency cases. First, the applicable law will 
govern all procedural aspects of the proceedings (the forms to submit, the admissibility of evidence and the 
timeframe within which these various proceedings should be completed). Because of the broad guidelines 
of the Regulation, this law will also be the sole reference to determine the prerogatives and powers of the 
various participants in the proceedings (liquidator, creditor, debtor and the court). Secondly, the applicable law will bear considerable consequences on creditors' rights. It will determine the ranking of creditors (privileged or not) and the order according to which they ought to be paid from the debtor's assets. 
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Law does not contain explicit choice of law provisions and falls short of the 
characteristics a comprehensive cross-border insolvency arrangement should have in 
order to offer an utmost predictability and protection to foreign creditors. In contrast, the 
EU Regulation has designed functional conflict of law rules according to which, the 
forum of opening may accommodate the needs of foreign creditors to a greater extent. 
Notably, the EU insolvency system has acknowledged that each country has important 
needs to protect certain categories of creditors deemed too fragile to compete either in 
domestic or in cross-border insolvency cases2. 
This Chapter will examine choice of law provisions as spelled out in the 
Regulation and will attempt to identify the contributions of the EU insolvency system in 
this regard. This is an important step in assessing the suitability of creating developed 
choice of law provisions under a revamped and enhanced Model Law approach. To do so, 
Part II of this Chapter will analyse the general principle under both the Model Law and 
the Regulation, which provides that the court of opening shall apply its own law to the 
proceedings. As will be highlighted, the application by the "forum of opening" of its 
domestic law3 (the lex concursus) presents various advantages. 
Although the Regulation and the Model Law provide for the application of the lex 
concursus, the Regulation has set its distinctive mark by stipulating a series of useful 
exceptions to the application of this general principle. Some of these exceptions will be 
the subject of Part III of this Chapter, which will demonstrate how the application of a 
law other than the lex concursus can ensure the certainty of domestic transactions while 
significantly improving the protection of foreign creditors, especially to certain categories 
thereof. In turn, it will be examined whether the Model Law can, through adequate choice 
of law provisions, enable certain categories of foreign creditors to maintain their home 
priority of claims in the proceedings initiated before the enacting forum. It will be argued 
2 Such categories are those traditionally and commonly protected by the legislator in most jurisdictions. To 
protect the interests of employees for instance, the Regulation provides for special choice of law provisions 
(infi-a). 
3 This law is also known as the "lex fori concursus", and refers to the law of the court of opening [hereinafter the lex concursus]. 
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that this approach can further cooperation among courts that are often reluctant to 
cooperate unless their domestic creditors are fully protected, or at least equally treated in 
the course of foreign proceedings. 
Because a "universal" order of priority is difficult to create either on the EU or 
global level, Part IV of this Chapter will attempt to explain how choice of law provisions 
in the Regulation can achieve an appealing alternative to a system of "cross-priority')'4 
among the various creditors. Such an alternative regime may seem particularly relevant 
when one considers that despite the non-discrimination principle and the "hotchpot rule"5 
spelled out in the Model Law, the latter fails to produce a system even comparable to a 
66cross-priority" regime, and far less so to ensure a minimal level of equal treatment 
between domestic and foreign creditors. Instead, the Model Law has limited its objective 
of improving cooperation to the confines of cross-filing and subject to the discretion of 
each enacting forum to accept foreign claims and to treat domestic and foreign creditors 
equally. 
11. Conflict of Law Rules 
Before tackling the scope of application of the lex concursus and understanding 
how this principle is implemented under the Model Law and the Regulation, one should 
highlight the important role conflict of law rules play in cross-border insolvency cases. 
In fact, experience in creating a cross-border insolvency instrument, whether 
regional or international, has shown that choice of law provisions were too often 
neglected at the cost of an adequate insolvency framework that would preserve the rights 
of both domestic and foreign creditors 6. One possible explanation to the marginalization 
4 Cross-priority is "the availability of local priorities to foreign creditors whose claims would qualify for 
priority treatment ifthey were local creditors". See Westbrook J., Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INT'L L. J. 
27 (1998) [hereinafter Westbrook, Universal Priorities]. 
5 See Model Law at art. 32. 
6 See generally Hannah L. Buxbaurn, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice- 




of choice of law provisions stems from the very theories of "Territoriality" and 
"Universality" (discussed in previous Chapters) around which the debate of creating a 
cross-border insolvency system has long revolved 7. Indeed, the primary focus of this 
debate has been centred on the identification of the forum entitled to instigate insolvency 
proceedings against a multinational debtor. Hence, there has always been an assumption 
under either theory that the adjudicating forum will simply apply its domestic law to the 
proceedings, with no room left to accommodate the provisions of any other foreign law, 
even when the application of the lex concursus would result in an unfair outcome to 
foreign creditors. Under the pristine model of "Universalism", for instance, such a law 
would be applied to the administration of the debtor's assets located in other jurisdictions 
8 and would, as a result, determine the ranking of foreign creditors . 
Although tentative instruments to resolve cross-border insolvency cases have long 
ignored the role of "balanced"9 choice of law provisions, practical experience in the 
realm of cross-border insolvency has shown that the decision of a domestic court to 
cooperate and to defer to foreign proceedings often implicates a "de facto" choice of law 
processlo. The most frequent example arises when a foreign representative files a claim 
before a domestic court in order to attach the debtor's assets or to stay the proceedings 
before that court in favour of foreign proceedings". By deciding to stay its domestic 
proceedings or to transfer assets to foreign jurisdictions, the domestic court accepts that a 
law other than its own can determine the rights of its domestic creditors and the priority 
of their claims. Such an implicit process entails that the domestic court first assesses the 
7 Id. at 25-26. 
8 Such a far-off vision however would be unrealistic to achieve on a global level. As seen in the second 
Chapter, the pristine model of Universalism stands little of a chance of being implemented globally. This 
being said, in order to ensure that cross-border insolvency proceedings are fair, irrespective of the location 
of the debtor's assets, states would have to reach a compromise where they accept that foreign insolvency 
laws may produce certain effects on the domestic level, especially with regard to certain special categ6ries 
of claimants (infra). 
9 Conflict of law rules should strike the balance between protecting national interests and promoting 
equality of treatment between domestic and foreign creditors. 10 See Hannah, Rethinking International Insolvency, supra note 4, at 32. 11 Id. 
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content of the foreign law, its provisions with respect to priority claims and how this law 
might affect the rights of its domestic creditors. 
Therefore, the decision to stay or to defer would be taken by a domestic court 
only if this court finds in favour of the foreign law, and that the application of the latter 
would not negatively harm the interests of the deferring court's domestic creditors. This 
overall process stresses that cooperation among courts is largely contingent on the 
content of the law applicable to the insolvency of a multinational debtor and not merely 
on the forum in charge of adjudicating the insolvency at stake. Thus, it seems surprising 
to contemplate a cross-border insolvency system aimed at increasing cooperation without 
providing for choice of law provisions therein. Indeed, the lack of choice of law 
provisions does not encourage the adjudicating forum to consider the application of a law 
other than its own, nor to defer to foreign proceedings so as to accommodate the 
legitimate expectations of foreign creditors. 
Unfortunately, the Model Law does not deviate from the long-standing practice 
that neglects choice of law provisions and opts instead for the application of only one law 
without exception, the lex concursus. Furthermore, as a result of the Model Law's 
primarily territorial and passive approach centred on recognition matters, the scope of 
application of the lex concursus under the Model Law is more limited than under the 
Regulation. The subsequent parts will highlight the modalities of the application of the 
lex concursus under both instruments and will demonstrate how the broad application of 
the lex concursus under the Regulation achieves an important symmetry between 
2 domestic insolvency laws and the market within which these laws ought to apply' . 
A. The Lex Fori Concursus 
After deciding on what grounds main and secondary proceedings can be opened 
to adjudicate the insolvency of the debtor, the Regulation establishes conflict of law rules 
12 On the market-symmetry argument, see Westbrook J. Lawrence, A Global Solution to Multinational 
Defaults, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,2280 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, Global solution] 
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to decide which law should apply to these proceedings. The Regulation commands that 
the applicable law is the one of the forum where the insolvency proceedings were 
opened. That is to say, the debtor's centre of main interest not only determines the main 
forum that will have overall jurisdiction over the debtor's estate, but it will also 
determine the law that will govern main proceedings and the assets located in 
jurisdictions where the debtor has no establishment. The same rationale follows for 
secondary proceedings where the law of the "forum of opening" applies to the winding- 
up of the debtor's assets located in that secondary jurisdiction 13 . 
While these rules are not as elaborate as traditional conflict of law rules, they 
present the advantage of certainty 14 . Once insolvency proceedings have been initiated 
before one forum, there will be little doubt as to what law this forum must apply. Within 
the EU, the simplicity of this rule is more appreciable when one comes to assess complex 
situations under the simultaneous application of the Rome" and Brussels 16 conventions; 
where the forum that adjudicates a given case may be compelled to apply the laws of 
another EU member state or in some cases, the laws of a third country. The first sub- 
section of this Section A, therefore, will explain the modalities of application of the lex 
concursus under the Regulation. 
In parallel, the Model Law also provides for the application of the lex concursus, 
though it does not provide for a "choice of law" per se. In fact, while the Model Law 
empowers the enacting forum to apply its own law to govern the proceedings, it limits the 
effects of the lex concursus to the territory of the enacting forum. Therefore, the second 
sub-section of this Section A will demonstrate how the application of the lex concursus 
13 See Regulation at art. 4. 
14 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INTL L. 
499,517 -518 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Avoidance Law]. See also Manfred Balz, The European 
Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 485,507 (1996) [hereinafter Ba1z, 
The European Union Convention]. 
15 See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19,1980,1980 O. J. (L 266) 1, 
art. 15, reprinted in 19 I. L. M. 1492 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
16 See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Sept. 27,1968, amended by art. 5,1990 O. J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 I. L. M. 1413,1419 (1990) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. 
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under the Model Law remains primarily territorial in scope, and fails to achieve the 
results a "minimally global" insolvency system should produce. 
1. Modalities of Application under the EU Reaulation 
Pursuant to article 4.1 of the Regulation., the "court of opening" of the 
proceedings applies its own domestic insolvency laws to administer the debtor's estate. 
Unless otherwise stipulated in the Regulation, this law will apply with all its ensuing 
effects and legal principles it contains 17 . In this respect, the Regulation does not 
distinguish between main and secondary proceedings for which the same principle 
applies; that is, the application of the lex concursus to govern all aspects of the 
proceedings. 
Aside from increasing predictability for creditors", the Regulation presents an 
advantage that is often overlooked. When the lex concursus finds such a pre-determined 
and certain scope of application, the court of opening should be able to implement the 
provisions of its own domestic insolvency law more aptly'9- Unlike traditional conflict of 
law rules where courts are sometimes bound to apply the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, 
the EU Regulation establishes a system where there is little room for error in 
interpretation as to the meaning of the applicable law and all its effects. This also 
20 translates into less recourse to the European Court of Justice , thereby saving a 
considerable amount of time and resources, to the benefit of creditors. 
17 All substantive provisions of the lex concursus should apply to the proceedings, either main or 
secondary. In this respect, the Regulation excludes any "renvoi" whereby the court of opening would apply 
the law of another state. See Miguel Virgos & Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention of Insolvency 
Proceedings, EU Council Doc. 6500/96, DRS 8 para. 87 (CFC) (May 3,1996) [hereinafter Explanatory 
Report]. 
18 See Westbrook, Avoidance Law, supra note 14, at 518-5 19. 
19 See Ulrich Drobnig, Secured Credit in International Insolvency Proceedings, 33 TEX. INTL L. J. 53,67 
(1998) [hereinafter Ulrich, Secured Credit] (arguing that the administrator of an insolvency will be more 
familiar with its own insolvency law, rather than complying with the laws of another state). 20 See generally Blankenburg Erhard and Hann Schepel, Mobilizing the European Court of Justice, in The 
European court of justice, ed. Weiler J-J. and G. De Burca, Oxford University Press (2001); Rasmussen 
I-Ijalte, European Court of Justice, Gadjura, (1998), at 128; see also Mads Andenas (ed), article 177 
References to the European Court - Policy and Practice, Butterworths, 1994. 
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Article 4.2 of the Regulation contains a non-exhaustive list of 13 matters where 
the application of the lex concursus is the rule. Although most of these provisions are 
self-explanatory, it would be appropriate to comment on a few of them. 
Subject to the exceptions set forth in the Regulation, article 4.2(i) reaffirms that 
even to these exceptions; the principle that remains is the application of the lex 
concursus. Thus, the application of a law other than the lex concursus takes place only in 
specific instances and subject to certain conditions (infra). Most importantly, the same 
article confirms that the law of the place of opening will determine the creditors ranking 
of claims regarding the proceeds that result from the liquidation of the debtor's assets 
located in the forum of opening. When the forum of opening is in fact the main forum, 
the lex concursus will also determine creditors' priority claims with respect to the 
debtor's assets located in jurisdictions where secondary proceedings cannot be opened. 
Despite growing concerns in the EU and on a global level regarding creditors' rights and 
the priority of their claims, the general rule in the EU regime is to set aside foreign 
priority schemes and to apply the order of priority provided for under the lex concursus. 
Other well-founded provisions are contained in article 4.2(m) of the Regulation, 
which introduces the notion of "legal acts detrimental to all creditors". These provisions 
are commonly found under domestic insolvency laws and allow national courts - at the 
request of the liquidator or creditors - to nullify the debtor's acts which were executed 
prior to, or after the opening of proceedings, and which may substantially affect the value 
of the debtor's estate 21 . While creditors and liquidators often resort to this method 
in 
1, , --domestic disputes 
in order to prevent the fraudulent dissemination 22 of the debtor's estate, 
21 See Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487,545 (1996); see 
also James H. M. Sprayregen et. al., International Issues: Are You Ready for the New European Union 
Regulations?, 041802 ABI-CLE 287 (2002); Gary W. Marsh, The Many Faces Of Directors' Fiduciary 
Duties, 22-SEP AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14,54 (2003); See Wolfgang Lueke, The New European Law on 
International Insolvencies: A German Perspective, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 369,394 (2001) [hereinafter 
Lueke, German Perspective]. 
22 See Martin Vlieland-Boddy v. Clive Vlieland-Boddy [2004] EWHC 2752 (Ch)). 
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the Regulation establishes a new and effective mechanism to implement this concept on a 
community-wide basis. 
Indeed, in domestic insolvency cases, the detrimental character of the debtor's 
acts 23 is appreciated in light of the applicable law to the suspect transaction. For instance, 
when the act consists of a real property transfer from the debtor to a third party, the 
applicable law will be that of the place where the property is located 24 (lex silus). By 
contrast, the Regulation has modified this rule by applying the lex concursus to all acts of 
the debtor in order to assess whether or not such acts are detrimental to creditors. This 
approach is conducive to a more centralized procedure, whereby the acts of the debtor 
can be consistently and uniformly supervised. Thus, a court of the main proceedings may, 
by applying its own law, nullify the acts of disposition of the debtor's assets located in a 
foreign jurisdiction so long as no secondary proceedings were opened in that jurisdiction. 
This extends an unprecedented reach to the lex concursus and considerable authority to 
the main forum. 
Because the acquirer of such assets or rights may be a bona fide third party 25 , who 
has no knowledge of the current or imminent insolvency proceedings against the 
transferor (the debtor); the Regulation, under limited circumstances, allows the 
application of a law other than the lex concursus. Article 13 enables the beneficiary of 
these acts to raise its defense based upon the law of another contracting state. More 
precisely, this third party will be able to preserve the rights created by these acts if it 
proves that (1) "the said act is subject to the law of a member state other than that of the 
state of opening of proceedings" and (2) "that law does not allow any means of 
23 These acts are usually contracts whereby the debtor transfers part of his assets to a third party. It is a way 
to preserve those assets and place them out of the reach of collective proceedings. See Christoph G. Paulus, 
The New German Insolvency Code, 33 TEX. INT'L L. J. 141,155 (1998) (arguing that courts dispose of a 
broad range of powers to nullify any acts entered in by the debtor, which may affect the value of the latter's 
assets) 
24 For enforcement purposes, the law of the land is commonly applied to detennine proprietary and non- 
proprietary rights (such as a right to lease, or an encumbrance) relating to a real estate. ! See Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law 




challenging that act in the relevant case". This article provides for the inapplicability of 
the lex concursus when the defense is based upon the content of the law of another 
member state. 
In turn, avoidance powers are governed by the lex concursus as far as the 
detrimental character of a transaction is invoked by creditors or by the liquidator for the 
preservation of rights. Conversely, the law of another contracting state will govern the 
validity of the same transaction when the beneficiary (a bona fide third party) proves the 
transaction's unimpeachable character under that law. The cumulative application 26 of 
two different laws helps to achieve important objectives. It facilitates the task of the 
liquidator who henceforth will only refer to one law, that of the state of opening of 
proceedings. This provides him with more autonomy and certainty to lead his tasks to a 
successful end. In parallel, the exception to the application of the lex concursus provides 
for a degree of protection to third parties who have relied on the validity of the 
transaction they entered into 27 . Avoidance powers are 
just an example among many of 
how conflict of law rules, when adapted to the nature of cross-border insolvency cases, 
may achieve a higher degree of coherence and predictability. 
26 Id. However, such a cumulative use of the lex concursus along with the law of another member state is 
not new for some European courts; see Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), Judgment of 21 November 1996, case 
IX ZR 148/95, BGHZ, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen, 134,116,121 [U. S. 
citation: 134 BGHZ 116, at 121 (1996)] (where the court confirmed a cumulative use of the lex concursus 
and the law of another member state so as to govern avoidance powers). On a recent implementation of the 
Regulation on the law governing avoidance powers, see In Re BBB (Netherlands Supreme Court 24 
October 1997, NIPR 1998,114; NJ 1999,319) (The court had to decide on the question of applicable law 
with regard to transaction avoidance between a German debtor and a Dutch claimant. The Dutch Supreme 
Court considered that according to Dutch private international law, the law, which was applicable to 
liquidation, was the lex concursus. Nevertheless the principle of ascertainability and legal certainty 
demands to take into account that a Dutch contracting party of the foreign insolvent debtor will not be 
prepared for the application of non-Dutch rules in a case where the legal act (of payment) is not subject to 
that foreign claim (as the contract implied a choice for Dutch law)). 
27 See Lueke, A German Perspective, supra note 21 (arguing that avoidance powers would less likely be 
exercised because of the cumulative application of the lex concursus and the law that "normally" governs 
the transaction at stake. The author further adds that such a system is more "protective of the legitimate 
interests of the person who benefited from the detrimental act"). On the modalities of application of the 
"paulian action" allowing creditors and/or the liquidator to seize the debtor's assets in possession with a 
third party acquirer, see Robert M. Zinman et. al., Fraudulent Transfers According To Alden, Gross And 
Borowitz: A Tale Of Two Circuits, 39 BUS. LAW. 977,987-988 (1984). 
172 
Chapter Four. 
The general applicability of the lex concursus to all aspects of the debtor's 
insolvency is suited to the broad powers of main proceedings. It would have been 
unrealistic to grant the forum of opening of main proceedings extensive authority with 
little means to exercise it. A balance between authority and legal instruments is therefore 
necessary to a successful cross-border insolvency arrangement. The EU Regulation uses 
the lex concursus to achieve this objective; by the same token, it enables domestic courts 
to implement their own insolvency laws in order to adjudicate multinational's default. 
2. Implied and Limited Application under the Model Law 
Throughout its provisions, the Model Law consistently refers to the application of 
the lex concursus 28 . This is primarily due to the legislative format of the Model Law, 
which was intended to be transposed, preferably without major amendments, onto the 
laws of each enacting forum. As a result, the enacting forum always applies its domestic 
law to the proceedings; no matter how unfair and impractical the application of this law 
proves to be to foreign creditors. 
Additionally, in contrast to the Regulation where the reach of the lex concursus 
mirrors the powers of the adjudicating forum, the Model Law is silent as to the reach of 
the lex concursus, irrespective of whether the enacting forum is the main or non-main 
forum. Indeed, even when the enacting forum is the main forum, the latter cannot 
exercise extra-territorial powers by applying its own law in other jurisdictions. Thus, the 
lex concursus is only applied territorially and for the limited purpose of recognizing 
foreign proceedings and where possible, for granting the foreign representative specific 
relief. 
As seen in the previous Chapter, the Model Law does not Prevent any forum from 
initiating proceedings against the debtor, even when the debtor has no establishment in 
28 As such, the Model Law does not refer to the lex concursus per se; rather, it refers to the relevant law of 
the enacting state, and requires the legislator in each enacting forum to insert in the Model Law format, the 
title of the domestic law that governs insolvency proceedings. 
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that forum29. This is why initially there was no reason to enable the enacting forum under 
any circumstances to apply its domestic law to administer the debtor's assets located in 
other jurisdictions. For instance, the mere presence of assets in a given forum would, 
pursuant to the Model Law, confer to the courts of that forum an acceptable basis of 
jurisdiction. Although chapter V of the Model Law seems to establish a limited primacy 
of main proceedings over non-main proceedings, it does not entail that the lex concursus 
of the main forum would in any event produce effects in other jurisdictions. 
As one can see, there is a recurrent territorial theme under the Model Law. Article 
10 for instance, reiterates the "Umitedjurisdiction" principle underlying the Model Law 
and pursuant to which, the enacting forum cannot extend the effects of domestic 
proceedings to either foreign creditors or foreign assetS30. In this regard, it could be 
argued that the drafters of the Model Law never intended to confer excessive extra- 
territorial powers to any forum, and therefore, did not endow the lex concursus of the 
main forum with far reaching effects even after an enacting forum recognizes foreign 
main proceedings. While there is a certain consistency to limit both the powers of the 
main forum along with its applicable law to that forum's territory, the Model Law falls 
short in creating a single set of proceedings which would be able to administer the 
debtor's assets in jurisdiction where the debtor has no establishment. In sum, unlike the 
Regulation, the Model Law does not use the concepts and purpose of "main proceedings" 
and "main forum" to the fullest extent, thereby making the distinction between main and 
non-main proceedings questionable at best. 
There is little doubt that a number of participants to the UNCITRAL working 
group would have objected to an extra-territorial reach of the main forum's lex 
concursus. Doing so would have required that when the debtor's centre of main interests 
29 See Andre Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency: A Comprehensive 
Overview, 6 TUL. J. lN'PL & COMP. L. 309,333 (1998) [hereinafter Berends, Comprehensive Overview]. 
'0 This limited jurisdiction applies even when the foreign representative has filed a claim before the 
enacting forum for the recognition of foreign proceedings. 
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is located in another jurisdiction, the enacting forum must refer to the law of such a 
jurisdiction (known as main forum only after recognition by the enacting State) to decide 
the manner whereby the debtor's domestic assets can attach and importantly, to 
determine creditors' ranking of claims according to the provisions of that foreign law. 
Although these concerns may be understood (since one of the key issues in cross-border 
insolvency cases is the protection of domestic creditors and the priority of their claim), an 
intriguing fact is that neither the UNCITRAL Guide to enactment nor any other official 
report issued in connection with the Model Law envisaged an extra-territorial application 
of the lex concursus, or even the application of a law other than the lex concursus to 
decide the order of priority of special categories of creditors (infra). It is believed that a 
mere introduction of the idea would have been a major step forward in terms of 
developing an agenda that would fully address the issues that arise from multinational's 
insolvency. It is likely the participants would not have supported this approach, and 
consequentially the main forum could not exercise its powers and implement its domestic 
law extra-territorially. This being said, debating this issue within such an international 
venue could have demonstrated how likely participating countries may (or may not) 
accept applying a foreign insolvency law or to give full effect to insolvency proceedings 
initiated against the same multinational debtor before foreign jurisdictions. 
In parallel, the territorial implementation of the lex concursus under the Model 
Law affects the method of supervising and preventing detrimental acts to creditors. As 
seen under the Regulation, avoidance powers can be governed by two different laws, 
thereby achieving more predictability to creditors and liquidators and more certainty to a 
bona fide third party (acquirer of rightS)31. Similarly, the Model Law foresaw the 
necessity in allowing foreign creditors to challenge the acts of disposition of the debtor's 
assets before the enacting forum and to prevent their fraudulent dissemination. However, 
according to article 23 of the Model Law, the detrimental and fraudulent nature of such 
acts is solely appreciated in light of the domestic law of the enacting forum 32. In other 
3 'See supra note 27. 
32 See the Model Law at art. 23. 
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words, a third party bonafide acquirer has no means but to refer to the lex concursus of 
the enacting forum in order to prevail in his claim as to the validity of the transaction he 
entered into with the debto ?3. This could create legal uncertainty with respect to 
concluded transactions since any transaction that allegedly took place with a malicious 
intent and during the suspect period 34 , may initially be governed by the laws of another 
state, and may furthermore be valid under such a law. Hence, the sole application of the 
lex concursus may seem unfair since the third party acquirer may have been unable to 
determine which law would apply to the transaction and even if he did, he could have had 
no knowledge of the fraudulent character of the transaction under that foreign law. 
It could be fairly argued that the material rigidity 35 and limited application of the 
lex concursus under the Model Law makes the latter rather inadequate and inflexible to 
govern a broad range of issues that arises from the insolvency of multinational 
corporations. One such issue is the necessity to apply the law of another state in order to 
determine the validity of a transaction executed under that law. Furthermore, where the 
Regulation enables the main forum to apply its domestic law extra-territorially, subject to 
certain conditions 36 , it achieves an important symmetry between insolvency law and the 
European market, an objective the drafters of the Model Law did not even contemplate. 
B. Market Svmmetrical Insolvencv Law 
33 id. 
34 In a number of insolvency laws, there is a period within which the acts of disposition of the debtor's 
assets are void, regardless of the debtor's fraudulent intent. This period is most commonly known as the 
"suspect period". See for instance, Luiz Bernardo Gomide el al., Commercial Financing And Insolvency 
Law In Brazil, 2 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 123,138 -139 (1995); Sandy Shandro, Italian Law Reform, 24- 
OCT(What if OCT) Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 18,18 (2005). 
35 Such a rigidity primarily results from the strict application of the lex concursus to all aspects of the 
debtor' insolvency and that, the Model Law does not provide for instances where the enacting forum would 
be able to apply a law other than its own, even when the circumstances would justify a deviation from the 
lex concursus. 
36 The main forum can exercise extra-territorial powers and apply its law in other forums when the debtor has no establishment in such forums, and as a result, no secondary proceedings could be opened therein. By 
creating a "judicial vacuum" in certain areas, the Regulation gave the main forum a justified purpose to 
administer the debtor's assets located in other jurisdictions. 
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The comparison between the scope of application of the lex concursus under the 
European insolvency regime and the Model Law brings forth one of the most interesting 
arguments made by Westbrook. In defending the theory of Universalism, he stresses, 
"Bankruptcy is one ofthose laws that cannot perform itsfunction unless it is symmetrical 
to the market in which it operates"37 . Presenting another defense of Universalism is not 
the purpose of this thesis, thus it is preferable to understand the interplay between a given 
market and insolvency laws, regardless of the regime pursuant to which such laws are 
modelled. 
Westbrook's argument, also known as the "market-symmetry" argument, states 
that commercial activities and insolvency laws should, in essence, cover the same scope, 
whether geographically or materially. Any dissymmetry between their scopes could lead 
to inconsistencies, where any given business will either be too restricted by all-embracing 
insolvency laws, or contrarily, commercial activities will be vastly un-regulated due to 
38 the limited and territorial approach of insolvency proceedings 
In this regard, the Regulation presents a recent and interesting example of market- 
symmetry application. Indeed, the Regulation does not create a "purely universal" 
insolvency regime, yet it promulgated a number of insolvency principles to cover the 
European internal market as defined by its geographical boundaries. In parallel, the 
Regulation established certain rules - although not substantive 39 - to cover the broad 
range of transactions that one can engage in within that market. From secured 
transactions to contracts of employment, there is always a set of rules that is more likely 
37 Virtually all theorists share this view and it is reflected in the nearly unanimous practice of nations, 
including the United States. "Although political predictions are difficult, it is evident that globalization is 
producing enormous pressures for legal convergence and those pressures are most likely to prevail as to 
laws that require market-symmetry to be successful". See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 4, at 
2288. 
39 See Jay M. Goffman and Evan A. Michael, Cross Border Insolvencies: A Comparative Examination of 
Insolvency Laws of Industrialized Countries, 12 JBKRLP 5 ART. 1 (2003); See also Lueke, A German 
Perspective, supra note 2, at 373 -373; Liza Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border, 
Corporate Insolvencies, 32 N. Y. U. J. INTL L. & POL. 787,803 -806(2000). 3' As demonstrated in the previous Chapter, the Regulation simply provides for a choice of law/forum, 
whereby it achieves a higher level of equality among the various stakeholders. 
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than not to settle the various claims that arise when a multinational debtor faces financial 
distress within the European Communities. 
On this basis, it can be inferred that the market symmetry argument is not just 
relevant when applied to Pure Universalism. With the Regulation4o, such symmetry was 
necessary to facilitate and regulate commercial activities within the internal market, along 
with an insolvency regime built on modified Universalism. The fact that the lex 
concursus of the main forum may be applied extra-territorially, so as to embrace the 
operations of the multinational debtor within the EU, brings forth the question of whether 
a similar approach could at least be contemplated on the global level through the Model 
Law. 
In actuality, the Model Law has come a long way in creating a limited symmetry 
between the law of the enacting forum and the overall insolvency process of the 
financially distressed multinational. As explained in the previous Chapter, although the 
Model Law does not prevent any forum from initiating domestic proceedings against the 
multinational debtor on the basis of the presence of assets, it does not require the enacting 
forum to recognize such proceedings. As a result, foreign proceedings that stand a chance 
of being recognized by the enacting forum are those that would qualify as either main or 
non-main proceedings, as per the criteria set out in the Model Law. 
This being said, the mere fact that "asset-based" proceedings could be opened in 
the first place - thereby encouraging fragmented and uncoordinated insolvency processes 
against the same entity in multiple forums - refutes any justification for the main 
/enacting forum to extend the application of its law in order to administer the debtor's 
assets located in jurisdictions where "recognizable"' proceedings cannot be opened. 
'0 Although the primary focus of this work is on the EU regime, other regional insolvency arrangements are 
being currently debated. See the American Law Institute's Transnational Insolvency Project, which is being 
proposed as a potential regional bankruptcy regime for member countries of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), available at http: //www. ali. org/ (last visited March 2006). 
178 
Chapter Four. 
Perhaps, the Model Law should introduce certain limitations on the opening of 
proceedings in the enacting forum when the debtor possesses only assets therein. 
However, since doing so could be considered an important attenuation to the 
sovereignty of the enacting forum 41 , such limitations cannot consist of an absolute denial 
of the right to open proceedings against the debtor. Instead, the opening of "asset-based" 
proceedings in the enacting forum could be limited to situations where domestic creditors 
would suffer irreparable harm. as a result of the application of the law of the main forum. 
In other words, the enacting forum would conditionally refrain from opening proceedings 
so long as the adjudicating foreign main forum fairly and equitably deals with the claims 
of the enacting forum's domestic creditors. This would be conducive to more cooperation 
and court-to-court communications leading to further ad hoc agreements and insolvency 
protocols among the forums involved in a given cross-border insolvency case. 
Importantly, this method would significantly reduce the number of proceedings 
against the same entity, while giving the opportunity to the main forum to apply its law 
extra-territorially, thereby achieving more market symmetry. While such a proposal may 
be founded on a far-off vision to globally harmonize domestic insolvency laws, an 
adequate market-symmetry implementation of insolvency proceedings is necessary to 
cope with the very nature of multinational corporations and their cross-border 
commercial activities. In this regard, it would not be absurd to believe that the "de facto" 
international market, with its current pace of development and liberalization, could 
prompt nations to head to this direction. Indeed, a considerable driving force behind this 
phenomenon is the expansion of international trade 42 , propelled 
by an ever-increasing 
number of multinational corporations. Many corporations no longer compete solely on a 
domestic level, and national borders have considerably lost their meaning when 
confronted with international commerce. 
41 See Berends, Comprehensive Overview, supra note 29, at 333. 
42 See Michael P. Malloy, Note, Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a Changing World, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1911 (1994). 
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In parallel to this phenomenon, globalisation has also had a profound impact on 
the legal sphere by 'internationalising' the domestic legal systems of countries. 
Therefore, a justified and extra-territorial implementation of the insolvency law of a 
given forum - deemed necessary to address the financial distress of a multinational 
corporation, along with the various transactions this entity may have engaged in 
throughout its life and across the borders of sovereign states - may not seem as surprising 
as it was a decade ago. Additional incentives to create such a system may be derived 
from Professor Westbrook's argument. Mainly, the Model Law's purely Territorial 
application of domestic insolvency proceedings is no longer adequate to oversee the 
insolvency process of a large multinational. That is to say, the current state of 
Territoriality is unconstructive in developing an international market and the continuous 
application of the "grab rule" will prove even more ineffective as multinationals' 
activities increase in scope and complexity across the boundaries of sovereign stateS43. 
It is believed that the market symmetry argument could well enhance the Model 
Law by making the latter come closer to following a more Universal approach (although 
not necessarily pure UniversaliSM)44. Otherwise, trade and investment may ultimately 
stagnate due to the inadequacy of the international legal infrastructure to regulate global 
activities. In the same way European institutions had to address this issue on the 
European level and ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, there should be 
genuine international efforts that provide for the same legal adequacy on a global level, 
43 id. 
44 This does not mean that there should be a single set of proceedings governed by the insolvency laws of a 
single country. Rather, the creation of a system - similar to the European regime -could enable a single forum to have overall jurisdiction while allowing domestic courts to protect their local creditors. Although 
this view suggests a strong approval of the market-symmetry argument, it may somehow differ from the 
purely universalistic approach advocated by professor Westbrook. "Virtually all theorists have agreed that 
bankruptcy requires a single proceeding in which all of the debtor's assets and claims are administered 
under a single set of rules - in traditional terms, in rem. To achieve that result, it is necessary that the 
bankruptcy law cover the entire market in which the debtor company operates, and bind all of its 
participants. It is therefore unsurprising that virtually every country has established a national bankruptcy 
regime co-extensive with its national market". See Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises In 
General Default: Chapter 15, The ALI Principles, and The EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. 
L. J. 1,34 (2002) [hereinafter Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises]. 
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preferably through an international instrument that has already gained popularity, such as 
the Model Law. 
In sum, insolvency laws should be symmetric to the market they govern. This 
paradigm is not restricted to the European Union no more than it is with respect to "pure 
Universalism". The incentives to build a cross-border insolvency system should, to a 
greater extent, stem from achieving this market-symmetry objective, as the absence of 
which may impede the proper functioning of the international market. Such global efforts 
should also take into account the role of international institutions and instruments capable 
of channelling and enforcing global insolvency standards45. 
111. Exceptions to the Lex Concursus 
Contrary to the principle of applying the lex concursus to all aspects of the 
proceedings, the Regulation has established a series of exceptions where the applicable 
law is not the lex concursus. These exceptions apply to specific categories of claims, and 
the applicable law is that of another member state 46 . This 
law may be the "lex situs", the 
"lex causae" or the "lex contractus". The first part will study some of these exceptions, 
their application, and how conflicts that rise between the lex concursus and other 
applicable laws are overcome under the Regulation. In the same way the Regulation 
allows the opening of secondary proceedings to make the overall insolvency system 
acceptable to all member states, it has also anticipated situations where the lex concursus 
could be detrimental to special categories of creditors. Hence, it is important to 
understand how far the Regulation has come in accommodating public policy concerns of 
each state and waiving the application of the lex concursus when the protection of special 
categories of foreign creditors so requires. 
45 See Chapter Five. 
46 Such as claimants of set-off rights, employees, third party rights in rem, etc. In such instances, the 
Regulation provides that the law of the place where these claims arise should apply. 
181 
Chapter Four. 
As the Regulation achieved a workable system to settle these issues, the second 
part will determine the extent to which the Model Law, as it currently stands, protects 
foreign creditors. Importantly, it will be examined whether the Model Law could, through 
choice of law provisions, further protection to special categories of claimants. The 
analysis in this part will be based on the premise that despite dissimilarities between EU 
countries' privileged categories of creditors, the Regulation could achieve a 
comprehensive system of priority claims, although not a "universal" order of priority. 
A. The EU Apiproach 
1. "Special" Categories of Creditors 
Aside from the general application of the lex concursus, the Regulation stipulates 
a series of special conflict of law rules 47 to ensure the smooth functioning of the EU 
insolvency system. Among these various exceptions, special attention will be given to the 
provisions that apply to third parties rights in rem, set-off claims and employment 
contracts. 
a. Third Parties' Riizhts in Rem 
The Regulation gives a broad definition to rights in rem. These can be assets that 
are "tangible or intangible, moveable or immoveable 9948 . Additional 
details are provided 
under article 5.2, which enumerates certain prerogatives with respect to these in rem 
rights that remain unaltered by the opening of insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 
Indeed, in order to protect third parties and creditors who have entered in a 
secured transaction with a multinational debtor, article 5 of the Regulation establishes an 
exception to the application of the lex concursus. For instance, when proprietary rights 
are used as collateral in structured finance transactions, the beneficiary should have direct 
recourse to this security in order to cover any risk of default. Therefore, the most 
47 See Regulation at art. 4. 
49 See Regulation at art. 5-1. 
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important concern when insolvency proceedings are initiated against the debtor is 
creditor's access to this collateral at the appropriate time in the course of the proceedings. 
Hence, the location of the collateral and the applicable law to its enforcement is of 
paramount importance to creditors and third parties who have been granted a security 
interest in a specific asset from the debtor49. Moreover, in cross-border insolvency cases, 
third parties may be impeded from enforcing their security because the collateral is 
located in another state and governed by the laws and procedures of that forum. As a 
result, the application of the lex concursus to all aspects of the proceedings would render 
access to and enforcement of such a security interest more difficult to foreign creditors 
than it would have been under the laws of the state, which initially applied at the creation 
of this security5o. To remedy this situation, thereby increasing the predictability for 
foreign secured creditors, the Regulation provides for the application of the law that - 
absent insolvency proceedings - should govern the security at stake. 
Although the Regulation shifts from the application of the lex concursus, it does 
not provide for full-fledged conflict of law rules to determine which law should apply to 
in rem rights. Because the determination of this law may depend on many factors, such as 
the contract creating the credit/debt relationship between the parties 51 , or the location of 
the security at the time the beneficiary wishes to enforce its right 52 , it is more consistent 
4' Nick Segal, The Choice of Law Provisions in The European Union Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 369,393 -394 (1997) [hereinafter Segal, Choice of Law]; see also Ulrik 
Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability 
and Protection of Local Interests, 73 AM. BANKR. L. J. 385,433 (1999)[hereinafter Rammeskow, 
Predictability and Protection] (arguing that under the EU convention, the applicable substantive law that 
governs creditors' security interests in the debtor's assets is usually the lex rei sitae at the relevant time") " Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor 
Releases In Chapter II Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959,1037 (1997) (arguing that the concept 
of exclusive jurisdiction applies to an in rem or quasi in rem action to the extent that possession or control 
of property is necessary for effective relief) 
51 See Ulrich, Secured Credit, supra note 19, at 67 (arguing that the inapplicability of the lex concursus to 
secured claims is more protective of secured creditors. The author adds that the application of the lex 
contractus or lex situs would satisfy the expectations of secured creditors). See also Roy Goode, Security in 




to delegate the of choice of the applicable law to the domestic court before which 
53 
evidence as to the existence of such in rem rights is submitted 
For instance, the general rule for real security is the application of the law of the 
state where such a security is located, also known as the lex situs. This applies to 
situations where secured creditors wish to exercise direct recourse to pre-determined 
assets upon the occurrence of an event of default from their debtor. To this end, article 
2(g) of the Regulation provides some guidance as to the location of these assets. In the 
case of tangible property, it is the "state within the territory of which the property is 
situated'. For property or ownership rights that are registered in a public register, it is the 
state where such register is kept. Lastly, with respect to claims - which is understood as 
the right of the debtor against a defaulting third party- the Regulation cites the basis of 
jurisdiction under article 3-1, where the applicable law is that of the state where the third 
party has the centre of its main interests. 
In light of these various provisions, the Regulation has not established substantial 
rules to settle the claims of secured creditors within the EU Community. Its provisions 
are less innovative and daring than those pertaining to the choice of forum and the 
general competence of main proceedings. In actuality, the authors of the Regulation 
chose to limit the effects of the Regulation with respect to secured creditors and to 
exclude the latter from the scope of application of the lex concursus. This not only placed 
secured creditors beyond the reach of insolvency proceedings per se 54 , but it has also 
increased the predictability for anyone acquiring an in rem security interest from a 
multinational debtor. 
53 The lex situs or lex contraclus appear to be the most appropriate law to govern real security in the 
European context, and perhaps, by analogy, on a global level. A deviation from the principle of the lex 
concursus is therefore justified, if not desirable. 
54 Jose M. Garrido, Some Reflections on the EU Bankruptcy Convention and its Implications for Secured 
and Preferential Creditors, 7 INSOL INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 79 (1998). The contributions of the 
Regulation in this regard can only be welcomed because one of the most intricate questions that arise in 
cross-border insolvency cases is how to reconcile the interests of secured creditors that are located in different jurisdictions, while respecting the different rules governing the enforcement of their rights. 
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The reason why the drafters of the Regulation adopted a different approach vis-A- 
vis secured creditors is quite simple. Due to notable divergences between the laws of the 
European states with respect to collaterals and secured transactions, it was impractical 
and unrealistic to design a uniform European regime5s. Indeed, these various domestic 
laws prescribe different procedural rules, not to mention the public policy implications 
they bear. It is more convenient, although not progressive, to refer these rights to the law 
that initially enabled their creation. 
Had the Regulation imposed a strict application of the lex concursus to these 
situations, two major consequences would have resulted. First, even if the secured right 
was recognized before the court of opening, the security in question may eventually be 
inaccessible because of a general moratorium against all creditors for the purpose of 
reorganization 56 . Hence, secured creditors would be unable to enforce their right 
57 
. 
Secondly, the inability of secured creditors to collect on their claims would defy the very 
essence of security in commercial transactions. In turn, creditors would perceive the 
futility of collateral security and compensate risk taking by other means (price increases, 
interest rates etc. ). As mentioned in the first chapter, this practice would be detrimental to 
any free market environment and would prevent the development thereof. On the 
European Community level, this could have slowed the creation of a common market and 
58 hindered the implementation of fundamental principles stipulated in the EC Treaty 
55See Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law Institute NAFTA Insolvency 
Project, 23 BROOKLYN J. INTL L. 7,12 (1997) (arguing that important technical issues, such as the 
differences between the regimes that apply to secured claims, constitute a strong impediment to the creation 
of an insolvency system among several countries) 
56 See Ian G. Williams, Time for a Change: Will the U. K. Embrace the "Rescue Culture"?, 20-MAR AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 18,18 -37 (arguing that the issuance of a moratorium practically prevents secured 
creditors from exercising their rights on the security) 
57 Seefor instance the EU Convention Art. 4(2)(i) and see the Explanatory Report, supra note 17, at 174 
(stating that the EU Convention does not contain substantive rules on reduction due to security 
interests/setoff rights, but leaves it to the law of state where the proceedings are opened). Therefore, it is 
apparent why the Regulation avoided the prescription of general rules to govern in rem rights, especially 
when they are used as collateral in secured transactions. This is an area of cross-border insolvency that is 
too contentious to be substantially regulated. 
"These principles encompass the right to freely engage in commercial undertakings within the community. 
See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, MAR. 25,1957,298 U. N. T. S. 11,1973 GR. 
BRIT. T. S. NO. I (Cmd. 5179-11). This treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rome, entered into force on 
January 1,1958 and is still in force, though much amended, as part of the complex series of treaties, which 
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b. Set-off Claims 
A second exception the Regulation establishes is the applicable law to set-off 
claims". When such a situation arises, article 6 of the Regulation provides that the 
applicable law is the law that governs the debtor's claim. The availability of this action 
will thus be detennined according to that law, regardless of the lex concursus' 
provisions 60 in this regard. 
At first glance, the Regulation appears to contain conflicting provisions regarding 
the applicable law to set-off claims. Indeed, article 2(d) of the Regulation elects the lex 
concursus to determine the availability and conditions of these claims when insolvency 
proceedings are initiated against the debtor. As previously mentioned, the lex concursus 
enjoys a broad scope of application in the European insolvency regime. This applicability 
extends to all aspects of the insolvency proceedings, including set-off claims. It is 
therefore important to understand the interplay between article 2(d) and article 6 of the 
Regulation, and how the court of opening can ensure the uniform application of these 
seemingly contradictory provisions 61 . 
currently link 15 European states as members of the EU. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
Feb. 7,1992, O. J. (C 224) 1 (1992), (1992) 1 C. M. L. F_ 573 (1992). 
59 In the context of insolvency, a set-off is a claim by the debtor that the creditor owes him money that 
should be subtracted from the amount the debtor owes to the creditor. For the purposes of the Regulation, 
either the debtor or the creditor in the proceedings can present these claims. The doctrine of set-off 
provides "[t]he equitable right to cancel or offset mutual debts" to parties with lending relationships. See 
Black! s Law Dictionary 1372 (6th ed. 1990). "Setoff is a time-honored creditor's remedy whereby mutual 
debts may he netted-out". See Jack F. Williams, Application of the Cash Collateral Paradigm to the 
Preservation of the Right to Setoff in Bankruptcy, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 27,63 (1990). 
60 Eventually, there will be cases where the lex concursus is the applicable law to determine the effects of 
insolvency proceedings vis-A-vis set-off claims. 
6 'In a recurrent way, the Regulation brings forth the broad mandate of the lex concursus to govern all 
aspects of the proceedings. On the other hand, the exceptions to this principle are carefully drafted so as to 
limit the application of another law when it is only necessary. The creation of these various exceptions 
derives from the need to protect creditors from some negative aspects that main proceedings and lex 
concursus may entail. Therefore, it is expected that courts will extensively recourse to the ECJ with 
interpretation claims in order to effectively implement the Regulation. It is customary though that new 
legislations in the European Community are subject - in the first years of their implementation - to a 
number of interpretative decisions from the ECJ. 
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In practice, to reconcile the provisions contained in article 2(d) and article 6, 
courts will first apply the lex concursus in order to determine the admissibility of set-off 
claims in the course of the proceedings. This law will also dictate the requirements for 
these claims to be granted. If the lex concursus does not allow either party to raise its 
claim, or if the conditions for such claims are not fulfilled from the evidence presented 
before the court of opening, the parties may seek recourse to article 6 of the Regulation. 
To do so, they will have to prove that the relief they are seeking "is permitted by the law 
applicable to the insolvent debtor's claj&'62. 
This dual approach is certainly similar to the provisions regarding the applicable 
law to third parties' rights in rem 63 (supra). For the second time, the Regulation operates 
on two levels to provide for a substantive degree of flexibility, should the application of 
the lex concursus be detrimental to some of the stakeholders involved. In this regard, it is 
difficult to determine whether the Regulation is pro-debtor or pro-creditor. Unlike most 
domestic insolvency laws, the Regulation does not seem to take side on the issue, instead 
it provides alternatives, albeit restricted alternatives, to both parties in order to bring their 
claims. Original conflict of law rules help to achieve this objective while satisfying 
domestic concerns with respect to sensitive issues (rights in rem, contracts of 
employment, etc). 
This approach would also ensure that non-adjusting creditors do not suffer 
irremediable consequences from the opening of main and "universal" proceedings against 
the debtor. This approach could, from a global perspective, mitigate the disadvantages 
suffered by certain categories of creditors under a universal insolvency regime. While 
adjusting creditors will be able to measure and protect themselves against risk taking, 
non-adjusting creditors would be protected under the law that normally applies to their 
62 See Anne Nielsen & Mike Sigal, The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the 
Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 533,554 . 555 (1996) (arguing that the 
applicable law under the EU convention to setoffs can either be the lex concursus or the law that governs 
the claim of the debtor). See also Fletcher, The European Union Convention, supra note 25, at 139. 63 See Lueke, A German Perspective, supra note 21, at 391 (arguing that the regime applicable to set-off 
claims is similar to the one applicable to third parties rights in rem). 
187 
Chapter Four. 
credit 64 , should the lex concursus 
fail to provide such protection in the first place. The fall 
back on the application of a law other than the lex concursus is a novel element in the 
Regulation that could inspire the creation of a similar regime regarding domestic 
creditors' rights on the global level. 
More specifically, the law that governs the admissibility of set-off claims is 
important when such claims arise in the course of the proceedings. The principle of 
equality among creditors of equal standing - also known as the pari passu principle - may 
be hindered if the court of opening systemically allows settlements of debts based on the 
subtraction of sums due between the multinational debtor and its creditors. The latter 
would enjoy a de facto privilege over other creditors 65 who - according to the law 
governing the priority of their claims - should be paid first from the liquidation proceeds. 
Yet, the Regulation does not create material rules to limit this practice, nor does it seek 
harmonization between domestic insolvency laws in the European community. 
In order to limit the breaches of the pari passu principle, the Regulation 
anticipates the possibility of applying a law other than the lex concursus. So long as the 
law that normally applies to the debt (the law of the debtor's claim) was taken into 
account when the creditor and the debtor entered into an agreement, both parties can rely 
on the possibility of set-off claims. When the lex concursus denies them the right to bring 
this action, this may affect their legitimate expectations at the time of execution of the 
transaction. Although this reasoning is slightly far fetched, the Regulation consistently 
minimizes its effects and restricts the application of the lex concursus when the parties 
could benefit from different solutions under the law that normally applies to their 
transaction. 
, Oil 
'4See Bob Wessels, Principles of European Insolvency Law, 22-SEP AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28,29 (2003) 
[hereinafter Wessels, Principles of European Insolvency Law] (arguing that there is a protective effect of 
the EU insolvency proceedings through the issuance of important provisions such as the reversal of 
juridical acts, set-off, etc). 
5 Lawrence Kalevitch, Setoff And Bankruptcy, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 599,600 -602 (1993) (arguing that 
setoff claims have the "effect of conferring a priority on holders of setoff rights"). Afore generally see 
Samuel R. Maize], Setoff and Recoupment in Bankruptcy, 820 PLIXOMM 279,281(200 1) 
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Since domestic insolvency laws treat set-off claims differently, with varying 
degrees of admissibility, it is important for creditors to realize what the applicable law to 
their claims will be, and whether this law would allow them to bring their action for 
mutual settlement. Lastly, it is noteworthy to mention that the most significant 
discrepancies as to the treatment of set-off claims exist between the common and civil 
law approaches 66 . 
c. Contracts of EmployMen 
Although the Regulation establishes other exceptions to the application of the lex 
concursus 67 , this category was deliberately chosen because the Regulation follows a 
different and unequivocal approach in determining the applicable law to contracts of 
employment. Article 10 of the Regulation stipulates "the effects of insolvency 
proceedings on employment contracts and relationships shall be governed solely by the 
law ofthe Member State applicable to the contract ofemployment". This somewhat short 
article bears a number of public policy concerns. Before understanding the justification 
for this exception, one must first study the peculiarity of the Regulation with respect to 
contracts of employment. 
In this particular case, the Regulation does not create a system where two 
different domestic laws are equally applicable to resolve the same issue. To deten-nine the 
effects of insolvency proceedings on contracts of employment, the court of opening shall 
66strictly" apply the law that ordinarily governs the contract at stake. It is only under 
specific circumstances that the lex concursus applies to determine these effects (infra). 
66 "In the United Kingdom, set-off is treated as a mandatory process which must be applied, as a matter of 
public policy, in both individual and corporate insolvencies in which the necessary requirement of 
mutuality is present. In most civil law systems, on the other hand, the prevailing view is that set-off 
constitutes a violation of the principle ofpari passu distribution, and that as a matter ofpublic policy it 
must be confined to the most carefully limited circumstances, as where the cross-liabilities arise out of one 
and the same contract or obligation. " See Fletcher Ian, Insolvency in Private International Law: National 
and International Approaches, Oxford University Press, 1999,273. 67 See Regulation at art. 4. 
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The restrictive language of article 10 highlights domestic concerns around the 
protection of employees when they are creditors in insolvency proceedings. Perhaps more 
vulnerable than other creditors, these employees may not be able to collect their wages 
due to the insolvency of their employer (debtor). The risk of unemployment, added to the 
potential difficulty of collecting overdue wages (and possibly compensatory sums), have 
generally prompted legislators in a number of countries to protect employees from the 
lengthy and somewhat uncertain outcome of cross-border insolvency proceedings. To 
achieve this, most jurisdictions endow employees' claims with a high priority of payment 
from the insolvency proceeds. If the lex concursus were to apply to these claims and 
determine employees' rights, the objectives of domestic law would be considerably 
unrealised. Indeed, while most jurisdictions favour employees in the context of 
insolvency proceedings, the law that normally governs contracts of employment may be 
more protective and grant higher priority claims to employees than does the lex 
concursus. It is therefore understood why the Regulation confines the effects of 
insolvency proceedings to the law that governs employment contracts, and not to the law 
of the state of opening. 
This exception, however, is in line with previous legislative instruments 
pertaining to either the choice of law or the choice of forum between EU member states 
in civil and commercial matters. Both the Rome 68 and Brussels 69 conventions contain 
special provisions on the settlement of disputes arising from contracts of employment. 
Although these contracts are executory in nature and should be subject to the same 
principle that governs other similar contracts, the European council has, in order to 
protect employees, prioritised the objectives of domestic legislation over those of 
harmonizing domestic laws in EU member states. 
Since the lex concursus does not apply to these employment contracts, the court 
of opening would have to determine the applicable law to settle such employment claims. 
69 See Rome Convention, supra note 15. 
69 See Brussels Convention, supra note 16. 
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To do so, the court of opening will refer to conflict of law rules that are dictated 70 by the 
Rome Convention 71 . When the provisions of this convention point to the application of 
the law of one member state of the EU, that law will solely govern the claims that arise 
from employment contracts, and will determine the effects of insolvency proceedings vis- 
A-vis employees' rights. Conversely, and unlike the Regulation where only the law of an 
EU member state applies, the Rome convention may point to the law of a third country 
that is not part of the European Union. In this case, the Explanatory Report elects the lex 
concursus to determine the effects of insolvency proceedings vis-A-vis contracts of 
employment. 
The reason underlying this choice is simple. In the same way each member state 
protects its domestic employees (who are part of a "vulnerable social group") from the 
magnitude of a multinational insolvency, the European council sought to protect 
employees from the application of foreign non-European laws and the unfamiliar 
provisions contained therein. Indeed, these laws may provide for completely different 
dispositions with respect to employees' priority claims in the context of insolvency 
proceedings. Therefore, the lex concursus - which by definition is the law of a contracting 
state - serves as the last resort to protect European employees. 
It is noteworthy to mention that despite substantial differences between domestic 
insolvency laws in the EU, certain issues are treated similarly among member states. 
Public policy in each forum pursues the same objectives regarding certain issues, such as 
the protection of employees, taxation authorities' right, the claim of those who initiated 
70 in asserting so, it is important to note that the Regulation says little about employment contracts, and it 
does so with respect to a number of exceptions that prescribe the application of a law other than the lex 
concursus. Most importantly, the Regulation does not explicitly refer to the Rome convention. However, 
these assertions are drawn from the Explanatory Report upon which, much of the interpretative work is 
based. The report was originally drafted to accompany the 1995 European convention on insolvency 
proceedings. Since the Regulation retrieves most of the provisions contained in that convention, courts are 
likely to seek guidance from this report so as to uniformly implement the Regulation. 
71 See Rome Convention, supra note 15, at art. 6. 
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insolvency proceedings against the debtor, etc. This explains why it is always preferable 
to apply the lex concursus rather than apply the law of a third non-EU country72. 
2. A Necessary Compromise 
In many respects, it can be argued that the Regulation, through choice of law 
provisions, achieves an essential compromise between the universality of insolvency 
proceedings and the need to protect local interests. The special choice of law provisions 
studied above reveals the two principal approaches followed by the Regulation to achieve 
such a compromise. 
Firstly, as seen with respect to third parties' rights in rem and set-off claims, the 
Regulation provides for the application of the lex concursus along with the possibility to 
deviate from this rule when such an application will affect the certainty of concluded 
transactions or prove detrimental to certain creditors. Secondly, as regards especially 
sensitive categories of claimants, such as employees, the Regulation completely and 
unconditionally discards the application of the lex concursus. As a result, the opening of 
proceedings in a given forum against the multinational debtor produces no effect on the 
applicable law to employees' claims in other forums. Indeed, this approach leaves 
employees' domestic priority of distribution unaffected by the insolvency of their 
multinational employer. 
Perhaps an important lesson to be learned from the Regulation is that one need not 
create substantive insolvency laws containing specific rules on the priority of distribution, 
in order to afford greater protection to foreign creditors. The EU experience has shown 
that simple choice of law provisions, taking into account several special categories of 
72 This could also point to the possibility of creating universal priority claims that favour the most 




claimants, may significantly improve predictability and the equality of treatment between 
foreign creditors and those residents in the forum of opening. 
Despite the Regulation's original approach with respect to choice of law 
provisions, it has been argued that the various exceptions to the application of the lex 
concursus considerably reduce the broad and "universal" character of main proceedings 
within the EU73. While this critique may be well founded, and that the Regulation would, 
without such exceptions, be strictly universal in scope, one must acknowledge the merits 
of these exceptions rather than their shortcomings. Indeed, the Regulation is the first 
instrument that pragmatically deals with broad and sensitive set of issues, such as priority 
claims, while departing from the long and unproductive theoretical debate between 
"Universality" and "Territoriality"74. Thus, resorting to these exceptions was the only 
plausible way to achieve any advancement with respect to cross-border insolvency 
proceedings, which is an area marked by an unproductive debate for over 40 years within 
the European Union. 
In other words, without the very exceptions to the application of the lex 
concursus, the Regulation could not have been ratified, because to this day, significant 
differences exist among domestic insolvency laws of EU member states 75 . In the same 
manner the Regulation has mitigated the opening of one set of "universal" main 
proceedings against the multinational debtor by enabling domestic secondary proceedings 
to be initiated, it has foreseen the necessity to provide for the application of a law other 
than the lex concursus to ensure that each forum would be able to cooperate without 
infringing upon the rights of its domestic creditors. 
B. The Model Law: Modest Protection to Foreign Creditors 
73 See Segal, Choice of Law, supra note 49, at 73. 
74 See Fletcher, the European Union Convention, supra note 25, at 139. 75 See Preamble of the Regulation at art. 11. 
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Following the analysis of special conflict of law rules under the Regulation, this 
part will explore how the Model Law has come to establish a number rules aimed at 
improving the treatment of foreign creditors. The subsequent parts will respectively treat 
the non-discrimination principle under the Model Law, the provisions relating to the 
distribution of proceeds in concurrent proceedings, and at last, will expose the three basic 
models that may be found under the various domestic insolvency laws for the treatment 
of foreign creditors. 
1. Non-Discrimination Rule 
Although the drafters of the Model Law did not attempt to create a system 
whereby foreign creditors can maintain their domestic priority of claims, it would be 
improper to consider that the Model Law did not provide for any kind of protection to 
foreign creditors. In fact, the Model Law introduces some standards to ensure that foreign 
creditors are not discriminated against in the proceedings held before the enacting forum. 
Article 13 of the Model Law stipulates a "non-discrimination" principle pursuant to 
which foreign and domestic creditors are to be treated equally, at least in theory 
76 
. This 
implies that the enacting forum is obliged to treat in the same manner domestic and 
foreign creditors, which according to the lex concursus 77 , 
belong to the same class of 
creditors irrespective of their domicile. 
Because this approach is rather ambitious and contradicts the long-standing 
impulse of each forum to favour its domestic creditors, the same article provides for the 
first exception to the non-discrimination principle by setting a minimum threshold for the 
treatment of foreign creditors. Article 13 stipulates that, in all events, foreign creditors 
shall not be ranked lower than "general non-preference claims". While such a threshold 
76 Article 13 contains both the principle of non-discrimination and the exception thereto. While the first 
paragraph of article 13 states 'fibreign creditors have the same rights regarding the commencement of, and 
participation in, a proceeding" under the law of the enacting forum, the second paragraph provides for 
significant exceptions that would in fact favor domestic creditors over foreign creditors. 
77 The application of the lex concursus to such a matter means that the enacting forum shall not "import" 
foreign classification of creditors. Instead, it would apply its own law to determine whether a given foreign 
creditor fulfils the conditions to be considered and treated as a given class of domestic creditors, regardless 
of how such a creditor may be treated under its domestic law. 
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for the treatment of foreign creditors may seem less progressive than the general above 
mentioned principle of "non-discrimination", it appears more realistic and adapted to 
common provisions found under a number of domestic insolvency laws, which generally 
confer a lower ranking to foreign creditors. The establishment of such a threshold in the 
Model Law reflects the concerns of each forum to prioritise its domestic creditors and to 
place greater risks of non-payment solely on foreign creditors. 
Although the lowering of the ranking of foreign creditors to that of "general non- 
preference claims" may constitute a significant curtailment of foreign creditors' rights, 
the Model Law allows the further inequality of treatment between domestic and foreign 
creditors. The third exception under the Model Law, which is in fact "an exception to the 
exception"78 , provides that 
foreign creditors may be ranked lower than general non- 
secured creditors, if the nature of their claim places them in the same category as 
domestic creditors who, in virtue of the lex concursus, are ranked lower than such general 
non-secured creditors. Since the ranking of priority claims may greatly differ from one 
jurisdiction to another, it is needless to say that such an exception may significantly affect 
the legitimate expectations of foreign creditors who could have benefited from a much 
higher ranking pursuant to the law that, absent insolvency proceedings, would normally 
govern their transaction with the multinational debtor. 
Aside from the rather permissive exceptions detailed above, the "non- 
discrimination" principle as spelled out in the Model Law may be subject to further 
discussions. In the best-case scenario, the lex concursus may provide for no special 
ranking to foreign creditors and the latter's claims will be treated equally with domestic 
claims of the same category. However, because a number of domestic insolvency laws 
place foreign creditors in a low priority ranking, and since the Model Law does not 
establish any substantial priority rule, and far less so identifies special categories of 
foreign claims to which a law other than the lex concursus applies, the prospects of 
achieving this equal treatment under the Model Law seem rather bleak. 
79 See Berends, Comprehensive Overview, supra note 29, at 345. 
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In light of the exceptions that are stipulated in article 13, which substantially 
affect the reach of the non-discrimination principle, it may be argued that foreign 
creditors have little incentive to participate in foreign proceedings and should instead 
concentrate their efforts and resources on domestic proceedings, if any. That is to say, the 
possibility to file a claim before a foreign jurisdiction considerably loses its significance 
if there is no strict adherence to the non-discrimination principle, so as to ensure equal 
treatment between domestic and foreign creditors. Unfortunately, the Model Law gives 
too much leeway to the enacting forum to favour its domestic creditors; a purely 
territorial and continued practice to which the Model Law does not put an end. In this 
regard, the Model Law is lacking behind the Regulation, which not only ensures equal 
treatment between domestic and foreign creditors, but also in certain cases, allow foreign 
creditors to benefit from their "home treatment', 79 (infra). 
2. Payment in Concurrent Proceedings 
Other than the attempt to achieve equality between domestic and foreign 
creditors, the drafters of the Model Law included a further provision in order to ensure 
that equality is also achieved among creditors of the same class. Article 32 of the Model 
Law stipulates a "rule of payment in concurrent proceedings", according to which a 
creditor who has received partial payment of his claim in other proceedings against the 
same debtor cannot lodge his claim before the enacting forum, unless creditors of the 
same class have also received partial payment of their claim in the same proportion. 
While this rule on payment, also known as the "hotchpot rule", is found in the 
Regulation under article 20, there are important differences between the Model Law and 
the Regulation in this regard. The first stems from the Model Law's silence with respect 
to the method of calculation that should be used in order to determine the paid and unpaid 
portion of each claim. Whereas the Explanatory Report provides for a pre-determined 
79 This means that certain categories of creditors, such as employees, would always benefit from their home 




method of calculation 80 , so as to render the EU insolvency system more predictable and 
to ensure its uniform implementation from one forum to the other, the Model Law guide 
to enactment fails to provide for any such guidelines. As a result, under the Model Law, 
each enacting forum is entitled to apply its own method of calculation to determine - 
which portion of the creditors' claim has been satisfied when partial payment has taken 
place in the course of other proceedings and if creditors, who obtained partial payment in 
concurrent proceedings, will be entitled to lodge their claims before the enacting forum. 
The second and more important distinction between the Model Law and the 
Regulation with respect to the application of the hotchpot rule arises from the applicable 
law to identify the different classes of creditors. As previously mentioned and more 
elaborated below, under the Regulation each forum automatically recognizes foreign 
classification of creditors. For instance, when the courts and laws of the country of 
opening recognize a creditor's claim as an employee claim, other forums within the 
European Union would be bound by such a classification, even though it was made 
pursuant to the provisions of a foreign law. This method is conducive to more equality, 
not only between creditors of the same class, but also between domestic and foreign 
creditors Onfra). 
By contrast, the Model Law entitles the enacting forum to "re-classify" each 
creditor who has obtained partial payment in other proceedings and who is subsequently 
seeking to obtain payment of the unpaid portion of his claim before the enacting forum. 
For example, an employee in state B may have received partial payment of his claim 
before the courts of that state, which affords a high priority ranking to employees' claims. 
When such an employee seeks to claim the outstanding amount of his claim before the 
court in state A (which is an enacting state), employee B stands the risk of neither being 
considered, nor treated as an employee according to the laws of state A. Hence, should 
the laws of the latter place the claim of the employee from country B at a low ranking, 
go See Explanatory Report, supra note 17, at 175. 
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such as general non-preference claims8l, it may be that the employee from state B has 
already received a greater portion of his claim than other general non-preferencc claims. 
Thus, the employee from state B would, under the Model Law, be prevented from 
lodging his claim before the enacting forum. 
In term, the implementation of the hotchpot rule under the Model Law entails the 
"re-classification" of creditors according to the provisions of the lex concursus. Although 
the rule on partial payment in concurrent proceedings aims at achieving equality among 
creditors of the same class, its concrete application would spawn further inequalities 
between domestic and foreign creditors. Indeed, creditors who have obtained partial 
payment of their claim in foreign concurrent proceedings are often, if not always, foreign 
creditors. As such, the re-classification of these creditors offers further means to the 
enacting forum to prevent foreign creditors from accessing and participating in the 
proceedings opened before it. Thus, foreign creditors will not be able to lodge their 
claims before the enacting forum and would not benefit from the liquidation proceeds of 
the debtor's assets located in the enacting forum. 
The lack of a uniform method of calculation, along with the possibility to re- 
classify creditors who obtained partial payment in concurrent proceedings would increase 
the possibility of the enacting forum to discriminate against foreign creditors and would 
reduce the incentive of such creditors to lodge their claims in multiple foruMS82. This 
constitutes an important shortcoming of the Model Law insofar as it legitimises the 
territorial application of the liquidation proceeds, and impedes further cooperation among 
forums in the long run. This being said, this problem may be remedied through the 
inclusion of moderate choice of law provisions in the Model Law. 
3. Models for the Treatment of Foreign Creditors 
81 See Model Law at art. 13. 
82 As seen under the Regulation, for the "hotchpot" rule to reach its intended objectives, special attention 
was given to the method of calculating the partially paid portion of each claim, and most importantly, to the 
acceptance of foreign classification of creditors. 
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In light of the different provisions of both the Regulation and the Model Law as 
studied above, it appears that achieving equal treatment between domestic and foreign 
creditors may call for several models. As it will be demonstrated, these models vary 
considerably from a tolerant insolvency system accepting foreign classification of 
creditors, to one that would result in the sole application of the lex concursus and the 
systematic re-classification and alienation of foreign creditors. The following sections 
will expose the characteristics of each model in order to determine how far the Model 
Law is behind the Regulation in terms of equality of treatment between domestic and 
foreign creditors. 
a. Lower Priority Ranking 
The first and perhaps most territorial among other models for the treatment of 
foreign creditors consists of conferring to foreign creditors, irrespective of the nature of 
their claim, a low priority ranking while conferring senior priority rankings only to 
domestic creditors. Such a system ensures that domestic creditors would always be the 
first to benefit from the liquidation of the debtor's assets located in the forum of opening. 
Although the Model Law does not directly advocate such an inequality of treatment 
between domestic and foreign creditors, its provisions remain too permissive83. Indeed, 
when the law of the enacting forum confers a low priority ranking to foreign creditors, 
the Model Law does not condemn such a disparity of treatment so long as certain 
conditions are met 84 . As previously stated, this system considerably affects the incentives 
of foreign creditors to lodge their claims in multiple forums. 
In light of the objectives of the Model Law, it is difficult to comprehend how the 
marginalization of foreign creditors would improve cooperation among the forums 
involved in a cross-border insolvency case. Undoubtedly, this system will prove more 
detrimental in the long run, as foreign creditors will recurrently fail to obtain satisfaction 
of their claims before the enacting forum. 
93 See Model Law at art. 13 and the exceptions to the non-discrimination principle (supra). 94 Id. 
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Furthermore, this system could well be misleading with respect to the objectives 
of the Model Law in fostering more cooperation, coordination and unity in managing 
cross-border insolvency cases. Placing foreign creditors at the bottom of the priority scale 
does not mean that foreign creditors are unable to lodge their claims before the enacting 
forum. Thus, this system cannot be considered as purely territorial in nature, insofar as 
foreign creditors have the right to lodge their claims before the forum of opening. At the 
same time, the unequal treatment between domestic and foreign creditors produces the 
same results in practice as if the enacting forum were applying a territorial "grab rule" 
and distributing the liquidation proceeds only to domestic creditors. 
It should be mentioned however, that the drafters of the Model Law did not intend 
to encourage this approach. It is only by way of an exception to the 66non-discrimination" 
principle that this method of dealing with foreign creditors' priority claims would be 
acceptable. The reason why the drafters of the Model Law did not foresee a strict non- 
discrimination principle free of any exceptions is unknown. This being said, a possible 
explanation to these exceptions is that a number of domestic insolvency laws allow the 
participation of foreign creditors in domestic proceedings, so long as the participation of 
these foreign creditors does not constitute any threat to the interests of domestic 
creditors 85 . This means that foreign creditors implicitly relinquish any priority of claim 
the law of their home country may have bestowed upon them in order to participate in 
foreign proceedings. 
b. National Treatment 
A second model for the treatment of foreign creditors calls for a simple 
application of the "non discrimination" principle as advocated under the Model Law, this 
time, however, without any exceptions. This means that foreign creditors are to be treated 
equally with domestic creditors of the same class. While such a system prevents the 
" See Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 4, at 30-3 1. 
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enacting forum from conferring a low priority ranking to foreign creditors, even when the 
lex concursus contains such provisions, there are two variants of this model. 
The first requires that the determination of the class of foreign creditors 86 takes 
place pursuant to the criteria set by the lex concursus. For instance, a foreign creditor 
who is an employee of the multinational debtor could, upon the fulfilment of the criteria 
set by the law of the court of opening to qualify as an employee, be treated as a domestic 
employee of that forum. Unlike the previous model studied above, the re-classification of 
foreign creditors here takes place on an individual basis, rather than placing the mass of 
foreign creditors at a low priority ranking. Although this approach is bound to produce 
more equality between domestic and foreign creditors, it remains greatly subject to the 
provisions of the lex concursus and the different categories of creditors this law 
recognizes 87 . 
The second variant of this model entails no re-classification. The forum of 
opening simply accepts foreign classification of creditors as they are, and treats the latter 
as its own domestic creditors of the same clasS88 . As it will be more fully 
discussed in the 
subsequent parts of this chapter, this system is built on the cross-priority of claims where 
the forum of opening does not re-assess the status of each foreign creditor pursuant to the 
provisions of the lex concursus. The recognition of foreign categories of claimants takes 
" This classification is different from the first model studied insofar as the forum of opening would not 
assign a general ranking to foreign creditors irrespective of each individual claim. Rather, such a 
classification seeks to determine whether or not a given foreign creditor could be considered as a priority 
claimant pursuant to the criteria set by the lex concursus. In term, this approach waives any general ranking 
of foreign creditors that may be provided for under the lex concursus. 
97 But for the permissive exceptions in the Model Law (article 13) with respect to the non-discrimination 
principle, it could be fairly argued that the re-classification process reflects the initial intent of the Model 
Law's drafters. Although such a systematic reclassification pursuant to the provisions of the lex concursus 
may considerably affect the rights of foreign creditors, this practice may be regarded as an improvement 
compared to the current status of affairs where most domestic insolvency laws either confer an overall low 
priority ranking to foreign creditors (the first model of treatment), or in the worst case, forbid foreign 
creditors from lodging their claims in domestic proceedings (unavailability of cross-filing). Another risk 
may stem from the implementation of the lex concursus to determine the ranking of foreign creditors; that 
is when the forum of opening does not recognize certain categories of creditors, who enjoy preferential 
treatment by their home court. 
88 See Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 4, at 30-3 1. 
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place quasi-automatically and the recognizing forum is compelled to treat domestic and 
foreign creditors of the same class equally. Such a system, which will be more thoroughly 
studied in the subsequent parts, is more commonly referred to as a "cross-priority" 
system. 
c. Home Treatment and Special Choice of Law Provisions 
The last model for the treatment of foreign creditors is by far the most progressive 
and ambitious amongst the models discussed above. This time, not only does the forum 
of opening automatically recognize foreign categories of creditors and treat such foreign 
creditors equally with domestic creditors of the same class, but also ensures that certain 
categories of creditors and/or claims receive the same treatment and ranking their home 
court would normally confer to them. 
Despite the advantages that derive from this model, no international instrument 
has contemplated the creation of an insolvency regime that combines both cross-priority 
to the mass of foreign creditors (Le., a strict non-discrimination principle) and home 
treatment to certain categories thereof. The Regulation for instance, preserves the priority 
ranking of those special categories of claimants, which are typically protected by the 
legislator in their home country, without spelling out a non-discrimination principle vis-A- 
vis other categories of foreign creditors. 
Despite the absence of the non-discrimination principle in the Regulation (Le. 
, cross-priority system), the latter has gained the support of EU member kates by ensuring 
the home treatment to these special categories of claimants and made certain that each 
forum is more lenient towards cooperating with the forum of opening 89. As seen, the 
various exceptions to the application of the lex concursus provided for under the 
'9 This is true especially when one considers that these special categories of claimants usually emanate 
from sensitive public policy concerns in each state. Through conflict of law provisions, the Regulation has 




Regulation, through adequate conflict of law rules, could achieve in part a home 
treatment model9o. 
In light of the different models the forum of opening may follow in determining 
the priority ranking of foreign creditors, it becomes more evident how the Model Law is 
far behind the Regulation as regards the equality of treatment between domestic and 
foreign creditors. Whereas efforts within the European Communities have, after 40 years 
of debate, yielded a system partially based on the home treatment of certain categories of 
foreign creditors throughout the EU, the UNCITRAL commission could not even ensure 
that even a partial national treatment model is unequivocally and without exceptions 
provided for under the Model Law. 
While such a shortcoming is a hurdle in achieving equal treatment between 
foreign and domestic creditors under the Model Law, it is important to consider that even 
within the European Community and despite the strong commitment of each EU member 
state to the process of legal and judicial integration, reaching a consensus on the 
categories of foreign claimants that enjoy special treatment has been a long and uncertain 
process9l. Indeed, the insolvency law of each member state of the EU contains diverse 
categories of creditors and different orders of priority ranking, which were difficult to 
reconcile on a community wide basis. By analogy, the determination of such categories 
on a global level may yield no concrete result in the short run 92 , yet it is believed that 
following an EU pattern of choice of law provisions is a route that should not be 
" This system achieves only partial home treatment because not all categories of claimants benefit from 
such a treatment; rather certain pre-determined categories of foreign creditors do enjoy this privilege. 
"' Therefore, it could be argued that the process of determining the most commonly privileged categories of 
claimants on a global level would prove even more difficult and uncertain than it was within the European 
Union. However, as it will be argued in the subsequent chapter of this thesis, the international community 
may today possess further incentives and additional tools in order to reach a more effective cross-border 
insolvency framework. 
92 Had the UNCITRAL working group attempted, a decade ago, to pursue a similar venture and identify 
those categories of claimants that are most commonly privileged in and by each forum, its efforts may have 
been bound to fail. It is believed however that today, the international legal infrastructure along with 
stronger incentives to address the difficulties that arise from cross-border insolvency cases, could 
contribute to the improvement of the Model Law. This argument will be more fully treated in Chapter Five. 
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discarded by the UNCITRAL commission, so as to remedy one significant shortcoming' 
of the Model Law. 
IV. Cross-Filine and Cross-Prioritv 
A number of observations stem from the Regulation's method of handling the 
exceptions to the application of the lex concursus. The first pertains to the possibility of 
"cross-filing" within the European Union. This means that creditors - through the 
domestic liquidator - enjoy the right to lodge their claims wherever insolvency 
proceedings are initiated against their debtor. By doing so, they avail the determination of 
their rights and the priority of there claims to the application of the lex concursUS93. It is 
therefore important to understand how the European cross-filing system works and how 
domestic courts treat foreign creditors with respect to priority claim issues. The study of 
this model in Section A below may suggest some improvements to the Model Law as 
regards the mechanics of cross-filing. A second observation relates to the concept of 
cross-priority as defined by Professor Westbrook. More precisely, the second section will 
analyse how the European insolvency regime effectively addresses the issue of 
conflicting priority claims and achieves equality among creditors, despite the absence of 
cross-priority provisions in the Regulation94. Lastly, after asserting the importance of 
conflict of law rules in determining the ranking of creditors, the third section will shed 
more light on the issue of "universal priorities". More specifically, whether the 
similarities between priority claims in the various domestic insolvency laws combined 
with a Universal cross-filing system would enable the creation of global system of 
priority claims that may be advocated by a revamped Model Law. 
A. Access to the Foreign Representative and-Cross-Filing 
The possibility to cross-file a claim would considerably lose its purpose if the 
foreign representative were prevented from accessing the court before which proceedings 
93 Aside from the exceptions earlier exposed, the law of the state of opening will also determine the ranking 
of creditors, procedural and material rules that shall govern the administration of the debtor's estate. 94 While the European insolvency regime allows cross-filing, it does not provide for cross-priority (i. e. 
national treatment to foreign creditors). Despite a strong universalistic character, the Regulation does not 
provide for local treatment to foreign priority claims. As Westbrook notes: "Universal ism-territorial ism and 
cross-priority vel non are independent variables". 
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are initiated. Thus, the issues of cross-filing and access to the foreign representative are 
closely related, if not interdependent. The subsequent parts will each study the 
availability of cross-filing and the ease of access to the foreign representative under both 
the Regulation and the Model Law. 
1. Unconditional Access under the Regulation 
The possibility for creditors to file their claims in forums other than their own is 
not a new practice in the realm of cross-border insolvency. The Model Law for instance, 
attempts to foster cooperation between courts located in different jurisdictions where a 
foreign representative "is entitled to apply directly to a court , 95 located in the enacting 
state. Another example is the former section 304 of the U. S. Bankruptcy code, which 
allows foreign representatives, after fulfilling some threshold requirements 96 , to lodge the 
claims of foreign creditors before American courts. Other examples of cross-filing are 
also found in other jurisdictions 97 . 
This being said, the majority of countries do not recognize such a right, or in the 
best case, strict conditions are imposed on cross-filing, rendering this right practically 
impossible to exercise 98 . This practice reflects the strong hold of territoriality 
in handling 
95 See Model Law at art. 9. See also Chapter Two on the access of foreign representatives and creditors to 
courts. 
96Former section 304 of the American Bankruptcy Code would allow the foreign representative to file a 
claim if the latter establishes that (1) a foreign proceeding has been commenced in the appropriate 
jurisdiction; (2) the petitioner has been duly appointed in the foreign proceeding; (3) the foreign debtor 
qualifies as a debtor under foreign law; (4) the foreign representative is authorized under foreign law to 
commence proceedings in the United States regarding the foreign debtoes property or the administration of 
the foreign debtoes estate and, if need be, the foreign substantive law has extra-territorial effect; (5) the 
foreign debtor has complied with at least one of the § 109(a) criteria; and (6) if need be, the debtor has 
assets in the relevant district (Note on Status of 304) 
97 See Goffman, A Comparative Examination, supra note 27. For a discussion on the recent changes in the 
German law of insolvency and cross-filing provisions, see Klaus Kamlah, The New German Insolvency 
Act: Insolvenzordnung 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 417 (1996); for a discussion on the French Insolvency law, 
see Richard L. Koral & Marie-Christine Sordino, The New Bankruptcy Reorganization Law in France: Ten 
Years Later, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 437 (1996). See also Fujimoto Mie, Japan's New Law on Recognition 
of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings, ABI Journal, July/August 2001 at 14. 
98 On some of the logistical and material difficulties encountered by the foreign representative/creditors to 
lodge their claims or to obtain ancillary relief before US courts, see In re Papeleras Reunidas, S. A., 92 B. R. 
584,590 (Bankr. E. D. N. Y. 1988) (the Spanish representative was not entitled to ancillary relief because 
Spanish law/proceedings do not recognize certain US creditors' contingent claims). Similarly, In re 
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cross-border insolvency cases. The "grab rule" entails a purely domestic application of 
insolvency laws, where local assets are exclusively confined to satisfy the claims of local 
creditors. It is only after local claims are fully satisfied - which rarely ocýurs - that the 
court of opening may consider the transfer of the remaining proceeds to other forums. 
Thus, there is no room in the proceedings for the intervention of a foreign liquidator, far 
less so for the satisfaction of foreign claims. 
Within the European Community, and more so beyond its boundaries, cross-filing 
is an attractive option to creditors in two situations. The first is when the multinational 
debtor possesses little or no assets in a given forum. Without the possibility to cross-file 
their claims, and pursuant to the rule of forgiveness", creditors located in that forum will 
be compelled to accept lower settlement sums than the value of their claim. Aside from 
affecting creditors' rights on a domestic level, this situation is likely to increase the 
inequality among creditors on a global level. This is particularly troubling when the 
insolvent debtor possesses valuable assets in other forums where domestic creditors 
might recover a higher portion of their claim. 
Irrespective of a system founded on cross-priority, where foreign claims benefit 
from a national treatment (infra), ease of access to domestic courts would enable foreign 
creditors to receive, at the very least, a higher portion of their claim compared to what 
they would recover solely before their home court. Hence, cross-filing should be 
discussed in connection with the issue of access and the conditions imposed by each 
forum to allow a foreign representative to file the claims of foreign creditors. 
Hourani, 180 B. R. 59 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1995) (relief was denied because Jordanian liquidation proceedings 
1 ovide for no "adequate assurance offairness"). 
9 See Edward J. Balleisen, Navigating Failure: Bankruptcy and Commercial Society In Antebellum 
America 28 (N. Carolina Press 2001), 522 (indicating that debt forgiveness is essential function of 
bankruptcy law); Nathalie Martin, Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences, 
II AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 367,410, (2003). 
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A second situation occurs when insolvency laws in the home forum does not 
allow the opening of insolvency proceedings against the multinational debtorloo. Home 
creditors in this case would naturally turn to other jurisdictions where the debtor may 
possess valuable assets. If the forum where such assets are located ban the access to the 
foreign representative, then home creditors may, in practice, be prevented from cross- 
filing spawning further inequalities between those creditors who have the right to 
participate in the proceedings and those that are unable to cross-file their claims. The 
latter, with no immediate recourse against their debtor, will also be unable to apply for 
preservation measures before the forum of opening. In this respect, reference should be 
made to the European regime, which contains specific provisions allowing the opening of 
secondary proceedings before main proceedings are initiated and availing preservation 
measures to the mass of creditors, irrespective of their domicile. 
In connection with the issue of cross-filing, it is understood how the access of the 
foreign representative, whether to participate in or to initiate foreign proceedings, is 
important. Such prerogatives. enable foreign creditors to file their claims in multiple 
forums, and where the need for prompt action arises, allow foreign creditors to request 
preservation measures in the forum of opening. This is precisely why the Regulation 
spells out the rule according to which a foreign liquidator always has the right to 
participate in the proceedings held before the forum of opening, regardless of whether or 
not the law of that forum initially allows such an intervention' 01. Thus, the right of the 
foreign liquidator to participate in the proceedings held before the forum of opening is 
unconditional' 02 and unsubordinated to the content of the law in the state of opening 103 . 
100 This situation may occur even when the debtor is on the verge of insolvency and might not be able to 
honor its obligations vis-A-vis its creditors. See "balance sheet" insolvency. 
` On the possibility to cross-file a claim under the Regulation, despite that such a filing may be in breach 
with the provisions of the Lex Concursus, see in Re Cedarlease Ltd. High Court of Ireland, 8 March 2005 
(2005 No. 23 COS). The powers of the liquidator under the Regulation are determined pursuant to the law 
of the forum that appointed him and not according to the law of the forum where the liquidator seeks to 
intervene. See Regulation at art. 18. In this regard, it may be argued that the Regulation overrides any 
restrictive domestic provisions, which objective is to ban foreign liquidators from participating in domestic 
PI ceedings. 
Or2o It should be noted however that, the powers of the foreign liquidator would have to comply with the 
provisions of the lex concursus. 
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2. The Model Law: Achieving Uniform Access 
Given the above mentioned arguments highlighting the usefulness of cross-filing 
in any given insolvency regime, it could be argued that the Model Law fails to provide 
the certainty to ensure that the foreign representative has an unconditional right to 
commence proceedings before the enacting forum. 
Article II of the Model Law stipulates that the foreign representative possesses 
such a right "if the conditions for commencing such a proceeding are otherwise met" 
under the law of the state of opening. Unlike the Regulation, the Model Law does not 
reserve the right to commence proceedings only to the foreign main representative. This 
right is afforded to both main and non-main representatives, who may request the 
commencement of proceedings if doing so would facilitate the administration of the 
debtor's estate. Thus, the Model Law could, in theory, entail greater potential for the 
opening of proceedings in multiple forums, which would result in more cross-filling 
possibilities to foreign creditors' 04 . This being said, a notable difference exists 
between 
the Model Law and the Regulation in this regard. 
Although article II seems to grant an irrefutable right to both the main and non- 
main representative to commence proceedings, such a right remains subject to the 
national law in the enacting forum where the foreign representative wishes to commence 
such proceedings. Indeed, as noted in the Model Law's guide to enactment, many 
national laws deny the foreign representative the right to commence proceedings before 
"' Despite an unconditional right to participate in the proceedings, the Regulation provides that only the 
foreign main liquidator has the right to open secondary proceedings in other jurisdictions. 
'0' As state above, the Regulation confers the prerogative of opening insolvency proceedings only to the 
main liquidator so as to limit the number of proceedings initiated against the same debtor, thereby 
endowing the EU insolvency regime with Universalistic traits. This approach was possible because member 
states to the EU accepted certain limitations to their judicial sovereignty, which is something difficult to 
achieve among countries less committed to achieve legal and judicial integration. 
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their courts'05. When the law in the enacting forum contains such restrictive provisions, 
article II of the Model Law neither changes, nor overrides these provisions. As a result, 
the access of the foreign representative to the courts of the enacting forum is uncertain 
and the possibility for foreign creditors to cross-file their claims could be limited to 
situations where proceedings have already been initiated in the enacting forum 106 . 
Thus, the inability of the Model Law to override the provisions of the law in the 
state of opening may constitute an obstacle to foreign creditors to cross-file their claims. 
This could be especially harrnful when the debtor has little assets in the home state of 
such creditors, or when domestic proceedings in that home state cannot yet be initiated 
against the debtor. Perhaps a desirable, though progressive amendment to the Model Law 
should be made to article II so as to endow the right of the foreign representative to 
commence proceedings in the enacting forum with more certainty, regardless of any 
contrary provisions that may exist in the latter's law. More realistically, the drafters of the 
Model Law could have attempted to provide for a non-discriminatory rule according to 
which, the foreign representative shall be subject to the same conditions as domestic 
creditors for the commencement of proceedings. As long as domestic creditors may 
commence the proceedings against the debtor, the foreign representative would enjoy that 
same right, subject to the same conditions. 
By such a method, the access of foreign representatives to the courts of the 
enacting forum would be more certain and uniformly implemented amongst enacting 
forums, thereby increasing predictability and encouraging foreign creditors to take the 
lead in initiating proceedings against their debtor before multiple forums. Even if this 
approach produces fragmented territorial proceedings against the same debtor, it has the 
105 See Model Law's Guide to Enactment at 97. 
106 The Model Law's guide to enactment stresses that article II serves to give standing and procedural 
legitimisation to the foreign representative before the enacting forum. Undoubtedly, the law of the state of 
opening should always dictate the conditions for the commencement of proceedings. This is the primary 
premise upon which both the Regulation and the Model Law are founded. However, the drafters of the 
Model Law have attempted to confer a given right to the foreign representative and laid down the rationale 
for its exercise, whereas the exercise of such a right may not at all be available to the foreign representative 
pursuant to the provisions of the lex concursus. 
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merit of enabling foreign creditors to either cross-file their claims, or to obtain prompt 
conservatory measures when the circumstances so require. 
Although the benefits of cross-filing may seem marginal compared to the 
advantages conferred to foreign creditors pursuant to a cross-priority system, justice and 
equality objectives would be better served on the global level if countries followed 
uniform and predictable rules enabling the filing of foreign claims before national courts. 
This would constitute a substantial step towards cooperation in cross-border insolvency 
cases. Recent developments in international and domestic insolvency principles seem to 
head in this direction, where acknowledging that foreign creditors may have legitimate 
expectations and an undisputed right to participate in the proceedings is a pre-requisite 
for effective coordination among courts located in different countries. 
This being said, Professor Westbrook argues that a cross-filing system would be 
more beneficial to foreign creditors if associated with a cross-priority scheme. The 
interplay between the two systems would, to a greater extent, produce the same effects as 
a system built on modified Universalism. While this assumption is probably true, it does 
not imply that the combination of cross-filing and cross-priority is the only way to 
achieve a satisfactory result. The Regulation for instance, allows cross-filing and does not 
provide for cross-priority, yet the insolvency system it created within the EU Community 
is nonetheless promising and deserves further analysis. 
B. Enhanced Cooperation through Cross-Priority 
Cross-priority is a system where foreign creditors are treated as local creditors 
with respect to the distribution of the liquidation proceeds. In other words, foreign 
creditors benefit from the same priority of claims domestic creditors of the same class 
enjoy. For instance, an employee in country A will be entitled to file a claim against the 
employer (debtor) in multiple forums (cross-filing). The court in country B before which 
the claim is lodged grants the same priority of payment to the employee from country A 
as it would to employees from country B. As discussed above, cross-priority compels 
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domestic courts to recognize foreign categories of creditors and treat them as domestic 
creditors of the same category. 
1. Pre-requisites of a Cross-Priority System 
Although cross-priority facilitates cooperation between domestic courts on the 
global level, a domestic insolvency regime that grants "national treatment" to foreign 
claims does not seem to exist. The issues of priority and the need to protect domestic 
creditors have long impeded the creation of a more equitable approach to multinational's 
insolvency. Professor Westbrook argues "the discussion ofpriorities with cross-border 
insolvencies has been to note the difficulties that variations in priority present for 
harmonization or cooperation"' 07 . To 
highlight this problem, he envisages the application 
of cross-priority to both the Universal and Territorial insolvency regimes, and concludes 
that such a system would systematically result in a substantial degree of predictability 
and equality among creditors under either regime"'. Thus, according to Professor 
Westbrook, cross-priority in cross-border insolvency cases would be the most effective 
method to address the differences between the various domestic priority claims. 
While the analysis advanced by Professor Westbrook brings forth a number of 
advantages associated with a system that implements cross-priority, the difficulties he 
refers to arise from the differing categories of claimants and priority rankings that exist in 
each forum. As a consequence, non discriminatory treatment of foreign creditors would 
not only require the forum of opening to cast off all patriotic considerations, but would 
also require that priority rankings between countries are identical. Without such pre- 
requisites, the forum of opening may be led to grant foreign creditors more rights than 
would their home court, while impeding the rights of its own domestic creditors. 
If for instance, the law in a given forum granted employees a fourth priority 
ranking and the law in the state of opening grants its employees a first priority ranking, 




the implementation of a cross-priority system in the state of opening would compel the 
latter to treat foreign employees on a first priority basis, (66national treatment") despite the 
lower priority their home forum would have conferred to them. In turn, and as noted by 
Professor Westbrook, unless priority rankings among countries are identical, the 
implementation of a cross-priority system will increase the discrimination between 
classes of creditors, rather than between domestic and foreign creditors 109 . 
Although most countries have in common certain categories of claimants that arc 
privileged as regards the distribution of proceeds, the underlying public and social policy 
requirements in each forum produce different priority rankings, no matter how slight such 
differences may be. Thus, a cross-priority model will always amplify the inequalities on 
the domestic level between the different categories of claimants, thereby advancing 
further reasons for its rejection by most jurisdictions. 
Insofar as each country has its own priority rankings, a system of cross-priority 
may seem difficult to implement. The drafters of the Model Law for instance, have 
allowed considerable exceptions to the application of the non-discrimination principle 
because it was understood and agreed that affording national treatment to foreign 
creditors would imply that harmonization among the various insolvency laws is well- 
underway. This, unfortunately, is not the case and it may take long before policymakers 
in each country perceive and handle insolvency related matters, including the issue of 
priority claims, in the same manner. 
A last testimony to the rather difficult implementation of a cross-priority system 
lies within the EU insolvency regime itself The EU model illustrates that even a 
substantial degree of legal, social and political integration among EU member states is 
insufficient to shape an insolvency regime that would enforce the non-discrimination 
principle throughout the EU community and favour foreign creditors with national 
treatment. Instead of pursuing the seemingly difficult objective of implementing cross- 
109 See Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 4, at 3 1. 
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priority within the EU community, the Regulation focused on a more pragmatic and 
feasible choice of law provisions, whereby certain categories of foreign claimants still 
enjoy their home priority ranking. 
2. The EU Alternative to Cross-Priority 
Although some of the exceptions to the application of the lex concursus have been 
discussed above, along with their underlying rationale, it is important to understand how 
the overall EU priority system operates and how the Regulation bas created an alternative 
model to cross-priority, while fostering cooperation among European forums. As 
previously mentioned, the Regulation allows cross-filing through the liquidator in charge; 
yet it contains no specific provisions regarding the equal treatment of foreign creditors. 
Cross-priority is not applied within the European insolvency regime. 
Instead, the Regulation designates the foreign law that typically determines the 
priority of the aforementioned claims"O through conflict of law rules. It identifies a 
number of privileged (unsecured) categories of creditors to which the application of a law 
other than the lex concursus would be possible, and sometimes even compulsory. This 
method circumvents the establishment of cross-priority within the European insolvency 
regime. The court of opening will apply the law that creates these priorities to certain 
foreign claims, thereby ensuring that foreign creditors' rights and predictability are 
secured throughout the community. 
It can be argued that this alternative model to cross-priority complicates 
insolvency proceedings and may burden domestic courts with the application of foreign 
laws. While this may be true, it should be noted that the European alternative to cross- 
priority presents the same advantages as the home treatment model studied above. This 
system offers a substantial level of protection to the most sensitive categories of creditors, 
with respect to the priority of their claims. It also increases the chances of creditors to 
110 Instead of opting for cross-priority per se and exporting a pre-established categorization of creditors to 
the court of opening, the Regulation chose to keep the priority claim of certain creditors under the 
protective shelter of their domestic law. 
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collect from foreign insolvency proceeds when the debtor has little or no assets located 
within the reach of their home court. Finally, this method increases the incentives of at 
least certain categories of claimants to cross-file their claims, without imposing pre- 
established categories of foreign creditors on domestic courts. The court of opening 
simply accepts the classification of foreign creditors that took place pursuant to the 
provisions of the foreign lawl II and applies priority rules contained in such a law. 
Undoubtedly, the European insolvency regime was adeptly designed to 
accommodate priority claims in more than one country and to find an acceptable 
compromise among several forums so as to ensure their cooperation in resolving cross- 
border insolvency cases within the EU Community. Perhaps the most interesting 
provisions in the Regulation pertain to the choice of privileged categories of creditors and 
claims that should receive home treatment when the multinational debtor is subject to 
insolvency proceedings in multiple forums. Because the Model Law fails to provide for 
an effective system to handle priority issues, foreseeable improvements in this regard 
may require choosing between a system of cross-priority and an alternative system based 
of conflict of laws (such as the EU insolvency regime). In light of the current structure of 
the Model Law and the various public policy issues that arise under the different 
domestic insolvency laws, the following section will attempt to shed light on the most 
effective and realistic path to follow in order to enhance the Model Law, and to make it 
more responsive to priority issues. 
C. Prospects under the Model Law 
After establishing that the Regulation has come closer than the Model Law to 
achieving a system rooted in transparency, predictability and equality between domestic 
and foreign creditors, it may be appropriate to envisage potential methods whereby the 
Model Law can be enhanced. As such, one obvious approach may be the establishment of 
a universal system of cross-filling/cross-priority so as to ensure equal treatment between 
III When the court of opening applies the provisions of the foreign law for the classification of creditors, it 
creates a certain atmosphere of trust and confidence in the proceedings. Thus, there is an important 
psychological effect that ensues from that method, even if in certain cases, the allocation of proceeds is not 
much enhanced to the benefits of foreign creditors. 
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domestic and foreign creditors. Although such an approach would present many 
advantages, several arguments discredit its feasibility, at least in the short or medium 
term. The second approach, which is an alternative to a universal cross-filling/cross- 
priority scheme, could be similar to the EU model and equally based on a conflict of law 
solution. The subsequent parts will explore the possibility to implement either approach 
under a revamped Model Law. 
1. Towards Universal Cross-Priort? 
As traditionally argued by scholars and academics, the idea of an international 
112 
order of priorities is appealing . 
Certainly, the creation of such a worldwide consensus 
would significantly improve the prospects for a coherent global cross-border insolvency 
regime, where the distinction between domestic and foreign creditors, along with the 
identification of the applicable law to govern priority claims would no longer be 
necessary. This would be the academic ideal to handle cross-border insolvency cases 
more equitably. 
However, in light of the current international legal infrastructure, one can only 
propose and reflect on a more modest and realistic approach, whereby cross-filing and 
cross-priority could find a broader scope of application among the different jurisdictions. 
Therefore, it is important to enquire how likely an international instrument, such as the 
Model Law, can provide for a global insolvency system based on the cross-filling and 
cross-priority of claims. 
As previously mentioned, most countries place the same categories of claimants at 
different rankings nonetheless, on the top of their priority list. These are mainly 
employees, tax authorities and those who have incurred administrative expenses in 
relation to the proceedings 113 . While each of these categories has an underlying rationale 
112 See Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 4, at 30. 
113 Stephen D. Hurd, Re-reading Reading: "Fairness to all persons" in the context of administrative expense 
priority for post-petition punitive fines in bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1459,1485 -1486 (1998); 
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justifying its privilege and priority of treatment, a number of other "country-specific" 
categories exist for which no objective reason, other than national and/or social 
considerations, justifies such a privilege 114 . As a consequence of these unique categories 
that exist in almost every jurisdiction, and despite the core similarities between countries 
regarding the main categories of privileged creditors, a system based on the cross-priority 
of claims and on a far off vision that would implicate "national treatment" of foreign 
creditors may seem hardly achievable 115 . 
Indeed, the first problem that may arise under such a system is that a special 
category of claimants in one jurisdiction may not be privileged pursuant to the laws of 
another forum, if at all recognized. In this case, national treatment would mean little to 
those privileged categories of foreign claimants because the forum of opening would treat 
them as general creditors who do not deserve any priority. 
Furthermore, as stated above, building a system on cross-priority requires that 
forums have the same categories of privileged creditors that enjoy the same priority 
ranking. Otherwise, the enforcement of cross-priority may spawn more discrimination 
among the various classes of creditors. Until today, no domestic insolvency regime has 
given priority to foreign creditors over its domestic creditors. For this reason, a global 
cross-priority approach, which would in fact result in the favouring of certain classes of 
foreign claimants over domestic creditors, would not garnish much support from policy 
makers and insolvency scholars. 
For instance, the European Union is a great example of the irreconcilable priority 
interest between nations. Even in the European insolvency system, where striking 
similarities exist between the various domestic insolvency laws regarding the main 
Barbara K. Morgan, Should the sovereign be paid first? A Comparative International Analysis of the 
Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 74 AM. BKR. L. J. 461-467 (2000). 
114 See Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 4, at 3 1. 
115 Id. at 37-3 8. 
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categories of privileged creditors 116 , no cross-priority regime could be created. The EU 
Regulation could only remedy this problem and foster cooperation through the exceptions 
to the application of the lex concursus and by ensuring that creditors have the right to 
lodge their claims in multiple forums. This constitutes a strong inference that a cross- 
priority system cannot be implemented globally, and that the potential advantages that 
may derive from such a system are only theoretical at this stage. 
In actuality, the Regulation sheds light on the implausibility of a cross-priority 
system because it only aims at increasing the level of cooperation between EU member 
states, rather than harmonizing domestic insolvency laws 117 . The drafters of the EU 
Regulation chose not to harmonize domestic insolvency laws because such a task - aside 
from being difficult - would have led most EU countries to reconsider their public and 
social policy choices that underlie their insolvency laws. The same process would apply 
to the international community, should an international cross-priority system be 
contemplated. 
In light of the above, a realistic improvement of the Model Law cannot entail the 
creation of a cross-priority system' 18 . Although such a system would, in theory, yield 
more advantages to the insolvent multinational's stakeholders than any other insolvency 
regime, its feasibility remains questionable at best' 19. For instance, the Regulation did not 
provide for cross-priority to foreign categories of claimants, and simply sought to 
establish mindful conflict of law rules; thereby striking an equitable balance between 
domestic public policies and the interests of foreign creditors. This has helped foster 
European integration, while faithfully realizing the objectives of the EEC treaty. 
116 See Balz, The European Union Convention, supra note 14, at 485. 117 Judge Samuel L. Bufford et al., international Conventions And Other Sources Of International 
Bankruptcy Law: European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, INTINSOLV IV. C (2001) 
118 See Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 44, at 35. 119 Although such a system might seem unrealistic today, the regional convergence and impact of global 
insolvency proceedings may prod the international community in that direction. As a good example of 
regional integration in the field of insolvency, see Am. L. Inst., Principles of Cooperation in Transnational 
Insolvency Cases among the Members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (2002). 
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Professor Westbrook's article entitled "Universal Priorities 12099 indirectly 
implicates the impossibility of creating a truly universal priority order. In his article, he 
stresses that a number of countries have the same categories of privileged creditors and 
explains how best the combination of cross-filing and cross-priority would serve the 
interests of these creditors 121 . Perhaps if nations could afford cross-filing, along with 
cross-priority to foreign claimants in the long run, it would significantly improve the 
prospects of creating an effective cross-border insolvency regime. In the meanwhile 
however, one should not disregard the EU alterative to a cross-priority system, namely an 
insolvency regime that contains elaborate conflict of law provisions. 
2. A Foreseeable Choice of Law Solution 
In essence, the UNCITRAL commission sought to obtain the commitment of the 
highest number of countries by drafting a flexible and non-binding Model Law. Such an 
objective was achievable so long as each forum can treat foreign creditors in the manner 
it sees fit. There are no obligations under the Model Law to treat domestic and foreign 
creditors of the same class equally and far less so, to grant foreign creditors their home 
country priority of claim. As a consequence, the Model Law fails to offer an acceptable 
degree of protection to foreign claimants, thereby foregoing stronger commitments on 
behalf of each enacting forum to cooperate when circumstances so require. As seen, the 
degree of cooperation under the Model Law always depends on the provisions of the lex 
concursus and the discretion of each forum to accommodate foreign claims. Because 
such a system has, over almost a decade, changed little of the primary territorial approach 
in resolving transnational insolvency cases, one should consider the alternative choice of 
law models, as adopted by the Regulation, and further enquire on its feasibility, 
practicality and the advantages that may ensue from its implementation under a revamped 
Model Law. 
1201t should be noted that the term "universal priorities" is misleading because a prospective global "cross- 
priority" system would not aim at harmonizing domestic insolvency laws. Domestic social policies need 
not be reviewed in order to create a global cross-priority model; adjudicating courts would simply 
recognize the status of foreign privileged creditors in the course of the proceedings. Their actual priority of 
payment however, would not be that of their home country; rather, the proceeds from liquidation would be 
distributed pursuant to the laws of the adjudicating forum. 
121 See Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 4, at 43. 
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A choice of law solution to overcome the problem of priority claims implies that 
the Model Law provides for certain exceptions to the application of the lex concursus. In 
other words, in certain instances, and with respect to pre-defined categories of foreign 
claimants, the enacting forum may be required to apply the provisions of a foreign law, 
including its classification of creditors and their priority rankings, notwithstanding any 
contrary disposition in its domestic law. As under the Regulation, this approach ensures 
that certain categories of creditors enjoy their home priority ranking, even before foreign 
courts. As noted by Professor Westbrook however, under a dominantly territorial system, 
the most internationalist policyrnaker would not apply a foreign law unless there is a 
compelling reason to do so 122 . Thus, the possibility to include elaborate choice of law 
provisions under an enhanced Model Law, where the enacting forum could occasionally 
apply a foreign law, would arise out of necessity rather than choice. 
Although achieving equitable and fair insolvency proceedings may theoretically 
seem a compelling reason for the application of a foreign law, concepts of equality and 
fairness arc seldom taken into consideration by the domestic policymakcr 123 . As 
discussed in the previous Chapters, potentially compelling reasons based on reciprocity, 
rough wash or prisoner dilemma arguments have not prodded forums to adopt a fairer 
approach to resolve cross-border insolvency cases, and far less so to apply a law other 
than their own to safeguard the rights of foreign claimants. Rather, what has proven 
effective in triggering the responsiveness of a given forum is the necessity to protect 
domestic creditors, especially the most fragile. 
As such, where a number of domestic social policies favour the same categories 
of claimants, it can be argued that each forum desires to ensure that such a protection is 
extended to these special categories of creditors, even before foreign courts. In the case of 
employees' privileges for instance, the domestic legislator will certainly want domestic 




employees to enjoy their home priority ranking before domestic courts, as much as they 
would before the courts of another country. Hence, the objective of protecting special 
categories of creditors is independent from the location of the court of opening. This is 
the premise upon which the Regulation was built, which presumes that countries share an 
equal interest in protecting their most fragile trenches of creditors and ideally ensure that 
such classes benefit from their home priority ranking throughout the EU community. 
Based on such an assumption, it could well be feasible to include special choice 
of law provisions in the Model Law, requiring the enacting forum to set aside the 
application of the lex concursus in favour of certain categories of foreign claimants. The 
latter may accept such progressive provisions not in the objective of protecting the 
interests of foreign creditors, rather to maintain the home priority of its own creditors 
when their claims are lodged in foreign jurisdictions where the debtor may possess more 
valuable assets. Such a rationale is similar to the rough wash argument presented by 
Professor Westbrook 124 , except that in the present situation, neither a stay nor a deference 
of proceedings would be required from the court of opening. Instead, the court of opening 
could be required to apply a law other than the lex concursus, in order to determine the 
ranking of a few categories of foreign claimants. 
Although a medium term solution to the issue of priority may lie within effective 
choice of law provisions, the identification of those special categories of creditors and 
claims may prove the most difficult at this stage. As noted in the various discussions 
leading to the final version of the Model Law, there exists a potential for at least certain 
categories of claimants to enjoy special treatment, irrespective of the domestic law in the 
forum of opening 125 . Perhaps, as highlighted by Westbrook, a case for choice of law 
rules, along with cross-filing and cross-priority, could be made as the "most urgent item 
on the international reform agenda ". 
124 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 457,464465 (1991). 




The above analysis of choice of law provisions under the Regulation illustrates 
how predictability and cooperation among forums may be improved, even without any 
deferral to foreign proceedings and/or transfer of local assets to foreign courts. While 
these provisions entail that the court of opening applies, in specific instances, a foreign 
law, thereby foregoing the simplicity of applying its own law, the rights of certain 
categories of domestic and foreign creditors would be better preserved with this method. 
For obvious reasons, the protection of foreign creditors, along with the issue of 
priority claims, was discussed at length by the UNCITRAL working group 126 . 
Various 
provisions of the Model Law reflect the correlation between the rights of foreign 
creditors and the extent to which each forum would be willing to cooperate. Nevertheless, 
a decade ago when the future of the UNCITRAL initiative was uncertain, neither cross- 
priority nor conflict of law rules could be contemplated by the working group so as to 
foster cooperation and to improve predictability. In this respect, the contribution of a 
fairly recent insolvency instrument, such as the Regulation, was to show that an effective 
cross-priority system requires significant harmonization among the various domestic 
insolvency laws, especially in relation to their priority ranking dispositions. Despite a 
number of international initiatives aimed at identifying best practices and principles in the 
area of cross-border insolvency, it is unlikely that a sufficient degree of harmonization is 
attainable in the near or medium term, so that a cross-priority system becomes feasible. 
As the advantages that may derive from cross-priority remain theoretical to this 
day, attention should be given to an alternative and more realistic system to overcome the 
problems related to the priority ranking of foreign claims. A system based on conflict 
law rules may provide for a medium term solution where each forum could ensure that its 
most fragile classes of creditors enjoy their home priority treatment, even in the course of 
126 See Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work of the Eighteenth Session, U. N. 
GAOR, 29th Sess., at 5, U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/419 (1995); Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law 
on the Work of the Nineteenth Session, U. N. GAOR, 30th Sess., at 5, U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/422 (1996); 
Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work of Its Twentieth Session, U. N. GAOR, 30th 
Sess., at 5, U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/433 (1996). 
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proceedings held before foreign jurisdictions. Perhaps the most difficult task in this 
respect is to identify which categories of claimants do the various domestic laws 
commonly favour the most, and how the Model Law can ensure that such categories 
enjoy special treatment before any enacting forum. 
Finally, it should be noted that potential improvements to the Model Law and its 
prospects of further maturing, depend on many factors. The first is the incentives and 
willingness of the UNCITRAL commission to refine the objectives of the Model Law, 
increase its effectiveness as regards the issues it already covers, and broaden its scope to 
unaddressed problems directly arising from the default of multinationals. Second, it is 
important to acknowledge the role of comparative studies in the area of cross-border 
insolvency and the useful lessons that may be drawn from other regional and/or 
international efforts and initiatives. This and the previous chapter have attempted to draw 
such lessons, while taking into consideration the policy underpinnings of the Model Law. 
And finally, the maturity of the Model Law also depends on finding complementary or 
alternative vehicles and/or institutions capable of channelling meaningful reforms in the 
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1. Introduction 
As developed throughout the previous chapters, the EU insolvency system is built 
substantively upon a series of measures and provisions that were debated for a long time 
among insolvency scholars and practitioners. Indeed, the long-known approach of 
allowing the opening of two sets of proceedings (main and secondary), and the 
application of adequate conflict of law rules are the key substantive approaches shaping 
the EU insolvency system. It has been suggested that various lessons might be learned 
from the EU substantive provisions in revising and enhancing the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. 
In parallel, it has been explained how the EU Regulation, through a rather 
pragmatic approach but within a special "quasi-constitutional" environment, fosters a 
substantial degree of cooperation among member states. Although the Regulation does 
not establish, nor seek harmonization among the various domestic insolvency laws, it 
creates a predictable set of rules to deal with the default of multinational debtors. Further, 
the Regulation can be implemented and enforced with certain ease, while ensuring the 
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protection of domestic and foreign creditors, which in turn has resulted in the first 
binding regional arrangement of its kind. The author recognizes that it is most improbable 
that the special "quasi-constitutional" framework and related legal instruments of the EU 
can be translated or transplanted into an international insolvency regime; but, the key 
point the author wishes to make is that regularized interstate judicial cooperation and 
cross-border enforcement needs to be pursued pragmatically under any revamped 
international insolvency structure through whatever existing internal instruments and 
vehicles that might possibly be available. In this latter context, this Chapter attempts "to 
stretch" in consider what these possible instruments and vehicles might be. The author 
does not believe this "stretch" is an unrealistic one in the medium-term as he will discuss 
further in this chapter the impact of globalization on economic markets may be bringing 
to the surface new instruments and vehicles that might be utilized in advancing an 
international insolvency regime. 
In order to capitalize on the possible lessons from the Regulation and to assess the 
potential of achieving similar or approximate results under a revamped Model Law, 
4owever, one may need to follow a deconstruction mechanism' so as to identify the steps 
that led to the success of the EU insolvency system. A first step might be to determine 
what legal notions, precepts and compromises are needed to accomplish what the 
Regulation has achieved. Previous chapters have attempted to fulfil this task and have 
highlighted these legal principles and have analysed their rationale, drafting and effect 
among EU member countries, along with the limitations of the Regulation. 
' Such a mechanism is believed vital because a mere analysis of the "black letter law" is insufficient to 
fully justify the results achieved under the Regulation. Indeed, previous tentative instruments - either 
regional or international - have failed to create such a degree of cooperation among courts located in 
different countries. It is ever more surprising that such previous legal undertakings contained similar 
provisions to those stipulated in the Regulation. In other words, the Regulation did not create new legal 
concepts; rather, it created a binding insolvency framework where forums are obliged to cooperate with one 
another. Even if one assumes the Regulation fashioned new legal precepts, such as original avoidance 
power rules and the manner whereby it avails an alternative to a cross-priority system, it remains uncertain 
why cross-border insolvency proceedings are most effectively handled within the EU and not elsewhere. 
This is why one should consider additional factors - other than the Regulation, its principles and drafting - 
that have contributed to the creation and effectiveness of the EU insolvency system. 
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A second step might consist of identifying what additional factors have 
contributed to the apparent viability of the Regulation and whether the international 
community possesses similar incentives and tools to address the shortcomings of the 
Model Law. This Chapter will undertake this task by positing that while the EU 
insolvency regime relies on the motivation of each individual state to realize the 
objectives of the EC Treaty and to establish an "internal market" conducive to liberalised 
investments, trade and corporate activities; the international community - nowadays 
pursuing those very objectives and pressured to face the rapid pace of globalisation and 
its demands - might be able to use the current international legal infrastructure to find the 
incentives, instrumental and institutional support to enhance the Model Law and to 
endow the latter with the necessary "binding" effect it currently lacks and otherwise to 
significantly generate the needed degree of interstate judicial cooperation on insolvency 
matters. 2. 
Differently said, the creation of a global insolvency regime, whether or not under 
the form of a revamped Model Law, may rest on the "de facto" international market 
resulting from globalisation and from the drive to create a more liberalised international 
environment that promotes trade and investment. Even without a legal instrument, 
comparable to the EC treaty, that creates an "internal market" on the global level, there 
still may exist alternative instrumental and institutional vehicles through which certain 
improvements to the provisions of and some form of "binding" component to the Model 
Law might be channelled 3. 
The first part of this Chapter will treat a shortfall of the Model Law, namely the 
Model Law's failure to provide for an automatic, or quasi-automatic, system for the 
2 Although this Chapter will not propose the definitive components of a binding insolvency treaty, it will 
envisage certain instruments and institutions that could, possibly through the Model Law, facilitate the 
enactment of more responsive cross-border insolvency principles or framework. 3 See Westbrook J. Lawrence, A Global Solution to Multinational Defaults, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,2328 
(2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, Global Solution] (arguing that "It is highly significant that the EU 
Regulation states that its adoption is necessitated by the integration of the internal market ... that is, as the market moves toward global dimensions, insolvency law must also become steadily more global. "). 
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recognition of foreign insolvency judgments4 - This stands in stark contrast with the 
Regulation, pursuant to which, insolvency judgments rendered by European courts are 
readily recognizable and enforceable in and by other European forums. 
The second Part will consider bilateral trade and investment treaties as possible 
conduits for the Model Law to further mature. Since the insolvency process of large 
multinationals can affect the objectives sought by such treaties5, it is suggested for further 
consideration that using these bilateral instruments to achieve meaningful reform in the 
area of cross-border insolvency might be feasible. To do so, this Part will highlight the 
correlation among insolvency, trade and investment, will seek common grounds for tying 
such areas together and will evaluate preliminarily the contributions of such a linkage on 
a bilateral (or regional) level. In turn and ideally, the Model Law could be enforced by 
and against sovereign states through such instruments, which would constitute a 
milestone in reducing the discretion of the enacting forum to recognize and to enforce 
foreign insolvency judgments. 
To maximize the benefits from an improved Model Law, without legal distortions 
and misapplications from one forum to the other, the EU experience appears (at this early 
stage in its active history) to demonstrate that a central judicial authority is desirable for 
preventing non-compliance and for ensuring uniformity of implementation. Under the 
European model, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is designed to fulfil this role. The 
extent of the ECJs powers has made most - if not all - legal undertakings within the 
European Union feasible 6. Therefore, the last Part of this Chapter will highlight the 
4 On the distinction between the recognition of foreign proceedings and the recognition of foreign 
insolvency judgments, see Chapters Two and Three. 
5 Insofar as BITs and FTAs aim respectively at easing market access to foreign investors and facilitating 
free trade, the insolvency of a multinational corporation can produce considerable ex-ante effects on the 
latter's decision to integrate a foreign market or to engage in trading activities beyond the borders of its 
home country. See Chapter One "the effects of insolvency laws on investment incentives". 6 It should be noted that compliance with EU regulations was not always ensured; the primacy of EU 
regulations over domestic laws was necessary. Therefore, the relationship between Community and 
domestic laws should not be disregarded. This will broaden the debate to the issue of compliance with 
international legal standards and how a global insolvency arrangement may fit within this complex 
mechanism. Indeed, the externalities created by the formation of an EU internal market have empowered 
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institutional channels that might contribute to the enhancement of the Model Law, with 
special emphasis on the role of a central judicial authority in promoting and supervising 
the implementation of sound cross-border insolvency principles. Also importantly, this 
Part enquires into whether an institution, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), might play some form of role in regards to this 
process. Primary attention will be drawn to the trend of adopting an "international public 
law" approach so as to find practical and medium-term solutions to Private international 
law issues. 
11. Recounition and Enforcement of Insolvencv Judaments 
The EU Regulation, although not flawless, seems to create a viable insolvency 
regime among EU member states. Though substantively sound, the functionality of this 
system, however, relies on the EU internal market and the legal instruments that 
contributed to its development, on a special mechanism for the automatic recognition and 
enforcement of judgments 7 and on a central judicial authority, such as the ECJ, to ensure 
that domestic courts duly implement the Regulation. Therefore, the first section of this 
Part II will highlight the peculiarities of the EU internal market along with its governing 
instruments. The second section will explain this automatic system of recognition, which 
ensures a uniform application of the Regulation throughout the EU Community. And the 
third section of this Part 11 will draw attention to the important role of the ECJ in 
supervising domestic judiciaries in regard to their implementation of Community laws 
and norms. Again, while the author does not envision the replication of this special EU 
framework on a global basis, he does suggest that lessons can still be learned as to how 
better to achieve enforcement mechanisms and greater interstate judicial cooperation 
the ECJ and assigned primacy to European Union laws over domestic laws. This might also explain the 
success of the Regulation, which requires minimal judicial supervision (infra). 7 See Bob Wessels, European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 20-NOV. AM. BANKR. INST. 
J. 24,31 (2001) [hereinafter Wessels, European Union Regulation]. See also Ian F. Fletcher, The European 
Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview and Comment, With U. S. Interest in Mind, 23 
BROOK. J. INTL L. 25,35 (1997) [hereinafter Fletcher, The European Union Convention] 
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A. The EU Internal Market and its Governing Instruments 
To understand the reasons underlying the success of the European insolvency 
regime, one cannot neglect the importance of the European internal market. Early 
European instruments refer to the creation of this market 8 and have since enunciated a 
number of principles to ensure its proper functioning 9. 
Alongside the measures taken to create this common area of free trade and 
services, European institutions, as much as member states, endeavoured to provide the 
most suitable legal and regulatory framework in support thereto. On the Community level 
for instance, an impressive number of regulations and directives were promulgated to 
address various issues pertaining to the economic and social impact resulting from this 
undertakinglo. On the domestic level, governments were required - pursuant to the EC 
treaty" - to prevent any conflicts that may arise between their individual interests and the 
objectives sought by the internal market. 
Although these ongoing concerns have been grappled with for over four decades, 
an effective, albeit late, agreement on cross-border insolvency proceedings could be 
reached within the Community recently. The very process of reconciling Community 
objectives with domestic legal traditions - also known as the integration process - has in 
turn permitted the adoption of an insolvency regulation acceptable to all participants. 
8 The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EC Treaty], art. 8a, para. 2, as amended by 
the 1987 Single European Act [SEA], defined the internal market as "an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty. " See Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Some Preliminary Observations on the 
intergovernmental Conferences: The Relations between the Concepts of a Common Market, a Monetary 
Union, an Economic Union, a Political Union and Sovereignty, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 291,293 
(1991). 
9 See Trevor C. Hartley,. Tbe Foundations of European Community Law 138 (3rd ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
Hartley, Foundations]. 
10 There are basically two approaches whereby European Institutions can ensure the construction of the 
European Union and its proper functioning. These are either harmonizing European domestic laws or by 
promoting cooperation among European countries. See Udo Di Fabio A European Charter: Towards a 
Constitution for the Union, 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 159,160 (2001); Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of Law in 
Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383,397 
(2003). 
11 See EC Treaty at art. 2. Available at http: //europa. eu. int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/ 
12002E. html (last visited March 2006). 
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This was possible to achieve because of the European legal system, which is 
formed by both primary and secondary sources of law 12 . Primary sources consist of all 
the constitutive treaties and their periodic amendments, which enjoy the highest 
hierarchic ranking and form the core of the European legal system. Secondary sources 
correspond to norms negotiated and agreed upon between European countries and are 
issued by European institutions. Subject to article 249 of the EC Treaty, they can either 
be of a binding or unbinding nature. For the purpose of this thesis however, only binding 
norms will be considered, as these norms gave structure to the European internal market 
and imposed fundamental rules on participating member states. 
Perhaps the most powerful instrument European institutions dispose of is the 
regulation. Indeed, a regulation is the most chief method to ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market, as a regulation presents a number of attractive characteristics that 
would compel all European countries to abide by its provisions. The regulation is not 
subject to any amendments and far less so to selective implementation. All the provisions 
it contains are obligatory and are directly applicable in all EU member states. This means 
that a regulation requires no act of transposition onto the domestic laws of European 
countries and individuals can directly enforce its provisions before their domestic courts. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the issue of insolvency was handled through the enactment 
of a regulation. The latter has deterred European countries from waving its most 
detrimental provisions to their domestic creditors. Because the regulation is the ultimate 
binding instrument with direct applicability, it could ensure that domestic courts in 
12 Even the classifications of authoritative sources show considerable variation. See Josse Mertens de 
Wilmars, The Case-Law of the Court of Justice in Relation to the Review of the Legality of Economic 
Policy in Mixed Economy Systems, 10 Legal Issues of European Integration 1 (1983); Josse Mertens de 
Wilmars, Reflections sur l'ordre juridico-6conomique de ]a Communautd europdenne [hereinafter Mertens 
de Wilmars, Reflections], in Interventions Publiques et Droit Communautaire (Jacqueline Dutheil de la 
Rochere & Jacques Vandamme eds., 1988); Pierre Pescatore, Les objectifs de ]a Communautd europdenne 
comme principes d'interprdtation dans ]a jurisprudence de ]a Cour de Justice, in Miscellanea Ganshof van 
der Meersch. Tome deuxieme (1972); John Temple Lang, Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: The Emergence of 
Constitutional Principles in the Case Law of the Court of Justice, 10 FORDIIAM INTL L. J. 503 (1987); 
John Temple Lang, The Constitutional Principles Governing Community Legislation, 40 Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 240 (1989). 
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member states would cooperate altogether so as to efficiently address the insolvency of 
large multinationals 13 . 
In contrast, the "Directive" - also a normative instrument proper to the European 
Union - targets specific countries, for which it sets an end result they must achieve. A 
directive however, does not define the means to be used in order to achieve the end result. 
Member states have a limited period of time to comply with the directive, upon expiry of 
which, non-compliant countries may be subject to a judgment in default, and possibly 
sanctions by the ECJ. A directive can also be enforced directly by individuals before their 
domestic courts. However, a directive must be transposed onto the domestic laws of 
member states. The act of transposition should be transparent and must provide for 
guarantees to individuals 14 . This is unlike a circular, which is of a purely administrative 
nature. 
Perhaps, the more remarkable aspect of Community law is its "primacy" over 
domestic laws. This means that community laws - whether primary or secondary- possess 
a higher hierarchic ranking than domestic laws. Needless to say, this was essential to 
ensure the survival of Community law; otherwise, member states could promulgate 
domestic laws and regulations that would hinder the creation, objectives and development 
of the internal market. 
Such a primacy ensures the uniform application of community norms and 
principles. It obliges domestic authorities, including courts, to wave domestic laws that 
run against Community principles". Furthermore, the primacy of Community law affects 
the interpretation of domestic laws in a substantial manner". Insofar as such an 
13 Nonetheless, it should be noted that a regulation is issued upon the consent of EU countries. Even though 
the issuing authority is the Council of Europe, one cannot forego the long negotiation process between 
European Countries to reach an agreement on insolvency matters. In other words, a consensus-based 
approach underlies each regulation and the compulsory nature of the latter is seldom used coercively to 
compel countries to adopt a certain course of action. 
14 See EC Treaty at art. 255-256. 
15 See 106/77 Simmenthal (1978) ECR 629 
16 See 14/68 Wait Wilhelm and others (1969) ECR 1. 
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interpretation should comply with Community principles, it would enable individuals to 
require the domestic judge to apply domestic laws accordingly. 
It should be mentioned that member states in breach of the principle of primacy 
are liable before the ECJ 17 . An individual can directly invoke such a breach before 
domestic courts and can claim damages against his own government for the latter's non- 
compliance with Community norms. For the award of damages in this case, there is a 
three-prong test that must be satisfied. First, the Community principle (or law) that was 
breached must confer subjective rights to the individual. Second, the breach must be so 
categorized by Community law. For instance, the failure of a state to transpose a directive 
from which derives a subjective right would often constitute a breach. Thirdly, there must 
be causation between the breach and the damage incurred. This being said, if the 
domestic law in force imposes less stringent conditions for the liability of the state, that 
domestic law would apply to determine whether or not the state has failed to comply with 
community law and whether the state will be held liable. In either case, the principle of 
procedural autonomy applies, whereby the adjudicating forum would always follow its 
own domestic procedures 18 . 
In fact, European legal instruments have tremendously contributed to the creation 
of the internal market. They have built the foundation of a system that revolves around 
the rule of law; without which, individual states may have been tempted to infringe 
Community laws and principles to their advantage. In addition, individuals, as much as 
corporations, operating within this internal market were afforded adequate protection in 
the course of their activities'9. In connection with these market regulatory efforts, the 
European Community was able to add the missing link that is, an apparently sound 
17 See Joined Cases C-6 Francovich and 9/90 Bonifaci (1991) ECR 1-5403. On the uniform application of 
EU Law, see C-393/92 Gerneente Almelo (1994) ECR 1-1477. 
18 In the Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer far das Saarland case of 
1976, the ECJ pointed out the principle of national procedural autonomy, according to which, "it is the 
national courts which are entrusted with ensuring the legal protection which citizens derive from the direct 
effect of the provisions of Community law". 
19 See Pall A. Davidsson, Legal Enforcement of Corporate Social Responsibility within the EU, 8 Colum. J. 
Eur. L. 529,545 -546 (2001); Joel R. Paul Free Trade, Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous 
Market Fallacy, I COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29,32 -33 (1995) 
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insolvency regime able to cope with the very nature of cross-border commercial 
activities. 
B. Automatic Recognition of Main and Secondary Proceedings 
Due to the direct applicability and effect of the Regulation as explained above, it 
is easier to understand how a domestic court in a member state is bound to 
unconditionally give full effect to the proceedings opened before and decided by other 
EU courts20. Such an automatic recognition also applies to other insolvency-related 
proceedings, namely those that derive from the insolvency of the debtor and are closely 
related thereto, even if adjudicated by other EU member state courts. Similarly, automatic 
recognition is also granted to preliminary relief and protective measures taken by 
ancillary courts after the opening of main proceedings. 
1. The Effect of Automatic Recognition 
Under the Regulation, the principle of automatic recognition has important 
consequences, especially when applied to the opening of main insolvency proceedings. 
Upon recognition, such proceedings would produce the same effect in all EU member 
states that they produce in the state of openingý'. Although these effects are subject to the 
provisions of articles 5 and 7 of the Regulation, and are similarly subject to the 
restrictions that apply when secondary proceedings have been initiated in other member 
states, the general principle is that the opening of main proceedings in one member state 
would divest the debtor of its assets. Importantly, automatic recognition would entail the 
issuance of a moratorium (or stay) against all creditors so as to prevent individual suits 
against the debtor and to ensure that creditors, irrespective of their location and ranking, 
20 See Regulation at art. 16. It should be noted however, that member states in which the debtor has an 
establishment may request a mandatory publicity of the commencement of proceedings from the liquidator, 
or from the competent authority in the sate of opening of main proceedings. 
21A recent application of this principle can be found in Re Probotec Ltd. (Tribunal de Luxembourg, 
27.05.2005 (11 No. 549/05)), where the court recognized and enforced an English judgment bearing on the 
insolvency of a Luxemburg subsidiary and its English parent company. 
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are treated equally with respect to the satisfaction of their claims 22 . In this regard, article 
20-1 of the Regulation provides that once main proceedings have been initiated against 
the debtor, "a creditor ... who obtains 
by any means total or partial satisfaction of his 
claim ... shall return what 
he has obtained to the liquidator". 
Other than the recognition of a court order to open main insolvency proceedings 
against the debtor, the recognition of the authority of the main liquidator is also ensured 
by the same principle. Indeed, a liquidator who has been duly appointed by the court of 
opening of main proceedings would automatically enjoy the same rights and prerogatives 
in all member states as those in the forum of opening. Hence, the liquidator would be able 
to seize the debtor's assets and to proceed with their liquidation in all member states, 
while respecting domestic enforcement Procedures. Likewise, an interim liquidator 
designated to take preservation measures and to ensure that the debtor's assets are not 
disseminated will be able to solicit all protective measures and preliminary relief 
necessary in all member states until the opening of main insolvency proceedings takes 
place. 
It should be noted that the powers of the main liquidator are restricted by a 
number of provisions. Aside from the situation where secondary proceedings have been 
initiated and preservation measures have been already undertaken by the secondary 
liquidator; the main liquidator cannot, by his actions, affect creditors' and/or third parties 
rights in rem or breach a reservation of title clause between the debtor and his creditors. 
Also, the liqui ator may not use "coercive measures or the right to rule on legal 
proceedings or disputes', 23 
Notwithstanding the breadth of the Regulation to enable automatic recognition 
and enforcement of insolvency proceedings and judgments among EU member states, 
there are means to challenge automatic recognition. Aside from the public policy 
22 See James H. M. Sprayregen et at, International Issues: Are You Ready for the New European Union 
Regulations?, 041802 ABI-CLE 287 (2002). 
23 See Regulation at art. 18-3. 
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exception previously discussed 24 , the recognizing forum may raise the incompetence of 
the adjudicating forum when the latter mistakenly asserts main jurisdiction over the 
entirety of the debtor's estate, and fails to accurately identify the debtor's centre of main 
interests. Furthermore, recognition may not be granted if the proof of designation of the 
liquidator does not satisfy the requirements of article 19, namely, the production of a 
"certified copy of the original decision appointing the liquidator". Lastly, courts may 
deny recognition and refuse to enforce an insolvency judgment issued by other EU 
member state courts if the recognition of such ajudgment would result in a"linlitation of 
personalfreedom or postal secrec)ý -)25 . 
2. Cross-Border Judicial Cooperation 
Two consequences result from the automatic recognition of judgments. The first 
relates to the obligation of the courts to cooperate with one another so as to ensure that 
main and secondary proceedings do not reach conflicting outcomes 26 . The second entails 
that creditors will be able to lodge their claims before multiple forums only if they did not 
already receive - from parallel insolvency proceedings or otherwise - more than what 
other creditors of the same ranking received 27 . 
Alongside the creation of sound model for the automatic recognition of 
insolvency judgments, the EU Regulation promotes coordination among EU courts in 
order to equally distribute the insolvency proceeds among creditors. The principle of 
equality among creditors is ensured through article 32 of the Regulation, which enables 
creditors to lodge their claims before the main and secondary proceedings 28. Furthermore, 
24 See Chapter Three on the restrictive definition of "public policy" under the Regulation. 
25 See Regulation at art. 25-3. 
26 See Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining 
Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 73 AM. BANKR. U. 385,433 (1999)[hereinafter 
Rammeskow, Predictability and Protection]. 
27 In order to ensure equal treatment of creditors, the distribution of proceeds between creditors in the main 
and secondary proceedings is co-coordinated by the statutory embodiment of the "hotchpot" rule. 
Accordingly, each creditor will be entitled to keep what he has received in the course of any insolvency 
proceedings but is entitled to participate in the distribution of total assets in other proceedings only if 
creditors of the same ranking have obtained satisfaction of the same portion of their claims. 28 See "Cross Filing and Cross Priority", Chapter Four. 
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if the proceeds from the liquidation in the secondary proceedings were sufficient to 
satisfy the claims of the creditors in such proceedings, the secondary liquidator must 
transfer any surplus to the liquidator of the main proceedings 29 . Lastly, article 20-2 of the 
Regulation stipulates, "A creditor ... who has obtained a dividend on his claim shall share 
in distributions made by other proceedings only where creditors of the same 
ranking ... obtained an equivalent dividend'. 
The Regulation goes even further in setting up a substantial degree of equality 
among creditors. For instance, in reference to foreign creditors, the Regulation does not 
mention the nationality of these creditors; rather it takes into account their residence in a 
forum other than the forum of opening. Its objective is to improve the situation of foreign 
creditors who face the difficulties pertaining to the territoriality of publicity measures, the 
distance, the foreign language used in the course of the proceedings and their 
unfamiliarity with such domestic proceedings. As a result, and in order to facilitate the 
flow of information to foreign creditors, the liquidator may demand that the court order to 
open main or secondary proceedings, and eventually, the court decision designating him 
as liquidator, be published in other EU member states pursuant to the formalities of 
article 21 of the Regulation. Furthermore, the liquidator may demand that the court order 
opening the proceedings be registered in a public register kept in other member states. 
Finally, each state in which the debtor possesses an establishment can compel the 
liquidator in the main proceedings to effect the publicity and/or registry mentioned 
above. The objective of this provision is to ensure that secondary proceedings are 
coordinated with the main proceedings. 
Foreign creditors that are known must be informed without delay, either by the 
court of opening, or by the liquidator. The Regulation provides for a mechanism of 
disseminating information, where a notification is sent to these creditors and indicates the 
time limits for foreign creditors to lodge their claims, the sanctions for not doing so in a 
29 See Regulation at art. 35. 
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timely manner and the authorities mandated to receive and distribute the proceeds 
resulting from the liquidation of the debtor's assets. This notification also includes the 
evidence secured creditors must produce before the court of opening 30. The Regulation 
also stipulates that foreign creditors include fiscal authorities and social security 
organizations in member states and that these categories of claimants are also invited to 
lodge their claims. 
In actuality, the Regulation encompasses a series of measures to ensure that 
foreign creditors, regardless of their status, are given a fair opportunity to participate in 
the insolvency proceedings of their debtor throughout the EU community. This was in 
part possible because of the existence of the ECJ and its important role of supervising the 
implementation of the Regulation by domestic courts. 
C. Central Judicial Authorit-v: the ECJ 
As previously mentioned, article 16 of the Regulation provides for a system built 
on automatic recognition of insolvency judgments rendered within the EU. Surprisingly, 
the Regulation contains only two relatively simple 31 articles regarding the recognition of 
insolvency judgments and their effects within the EU. Because this simple process 
retrieves the European practice of automatic recognition of judgments in commercial and 
civil matters, one may refer to the internal market so as to explain judicial cooperation 
within the Community. However, it could be misleading to confer all the merits of the 
European insolvency system (as well as other legal achievements) solely to the internal 
market. To a greater extent, the uniform implementation of EU law owes its success to 
30 This notification shall be written in the language of the sate of opening; however, in order to facilitate the 
task for foreign creditors, a standard format is used to that end, and includes the instructions and procedures 
to be followed in all official languages in the EU. 
3' By comparing the provisions of the Regulation on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
(art. 16 and 17) with other international agreement, one may come to the conclusion that these provisions 
are overly simplified and brief. The reliance of European countries on these provisions as regards the 
recognition and enforcement ofjudgments demonstrates a certain confidence in the European system. More 
importantly, it proves that member countries can rely on the ECJ to enforce Community law throughout the 




the ECJ. Indeed, the ECJ enjoys significant powers of interpretation and implementation 
of Community law pursuant to article 22032 of the EC Treaty, which confers sufficient 
prerogatives to the ECJ to ensure that member-states will comply with the acts of the 
Community. To achieve this, the ECJ has two duties to be used under specific procedural 
rules. These are: providing uniform interpretation of Community law and enforcing 
Community acts in member states. 
1. Preliminary Rulings 
The first task of the Court - that of interpretation and construction - finds its 
source in article 234 (ex 177) of the EC Treaty. According to this article, the ECJ has 
competence to give preliminary rulings - on the request of domestic courts or European 
institutions - on the meaning of community acts, either issued by the European Council or 
by the Commission. This role however is not limited to the interpretation of community 
acts insofar as the ECJ has also the power to detennine the validity of such acts. Such 
prerogatives are especially important within the European context, where European 
instruments often stipulate general principles that should be specifically and uniformly 
33 implemented 
in this regard, the ECJ has fashioned a number of precepts, values and policy 
objectives that are not expressly stipulated in the EC Treaty. Indeed, although such 
preliminary rulings were primarily conceived of as an optional recourse 34 when the 
application of community law is uncertain and a domestic court has to decide a case 
pending before it, the practice has developed a "duty" to refer to the ECJ when these 
uncertainties arise 35 . Most importantly, ECJ interpretations of Community law are 
32 Article 220 reads: "The court ofjustice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this 
treaty the law is observed. 
33 See Rasmussen Hjalte, European Court ofJustice, Gadjura, (1998), at 128; see also Mads Andenas (ed), 
article 177 References to the European Court - Policy and Practice, Buttcrworths, 1994. 34 Article 234 (ex 177) of the EC Treaty provides that domestic courts "against whose decisions there is no 
ýudicial remedy under national law", must bring the matter to the ECJ through a preliminary ruling. 5 See Blankenburg Erhard and Harm Schepel, Mobilizing the European Court of Justice, in The European 
court of justice, ed. Weiler J. J. and G. De Burca, Oxford University Press (2001), at 13 (the authors 
perceive the increasing number of preliminary rulings is a consequence of the mandatory character of the 
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binding on the domestic courts in each member state. In addition, individuals can rely on 
prior interpretations given by the ECJ with respect to the same community 
act/provisions 36 , thereby decreasing the number of abuses 
37 in the application of 
community law. 
Because various community instruments handle sensitive issues such as 
insolvency proceedings for instance and their effects throughout the Community, the 
existence of an interpretation mechanism is crucial. Indeed, previous parts of this thesis 
have demonstrated that the Regulation lacks precision with respect to some of its 
provisions. Its effective implementation is thus conditional on the uniform interpretation 
and application of its ambiguous elements. In virtue of article 234 of the EC Treaty, the 
ECJ can give its own interpretation of the Regulation so that the Regulation's elusive 
provisions do not affect its clarity. Within the European institutional setting, the ECJ will 
ensure that the Regulation is uniformly understood and duly implemented by domestic 
courts. 
2. Enforcement and Sanctions 
Relegation to the role of a mere interpretive body would be insignificant without 
enforcement tools. Thus the EC Treaty endows the ECJ with enforcement mechanisms 
through the infliction of sanctions against incompliant member states. Pursuant to the 
procedure set in articles 169-170 of the EC Treaty, the ECJ acts in concert with the EU 
Commission to ensure the implementation of its rulings. Without analysing the 
evolvement of the power of the ECJ in inflicting sanctions, it is noteworthy to mention 
procedure). See also the unconditional recourse to the ECJ and the theory of Act Clair in Rockfon A/S v 
Sýecialarbejderfbrbundet i Danmark, C-449/93 ECR (1995) 1429 1. 
3 3 See Paul Craig, The Jurisdiction of The Community Courts Reconsidered, 36 TEX. INTL L. J. 555,564 
(2001). 
" In this respect, it is important to mention that the primary procedure to control the infringement of 
community law is based on article 226 (ex 169) of the treaty. This article empowers the commission to 
pursue individual countries before the ECJ when infringements occur. However, the commission has 
seldom carried on the full procedure foreseen in this article. To avoid this complex and uncertain procedure 
however, an alternative recourse has often been made to article 234 of the EC Treaty, which is known to 
produce fewer constraints. On how progressively article 234 replaced article 226, see Debousse Renaud, 




that under previous versions of the EC Treaty, the court rarely used its coercive powers 38 . 
However, as the body of laws of the community grew in magnitude and 
complexity, the newly amended article 228 39 of the EC Treaty allows the ECJ to lay 
sanctions against infringing states. While the co-operative approach would be more 
preferable, especially when attempting to realize the common objectives of member 
states, the ECJ propensity to inflict sanctions increased as a result of a tighter agenda 
regarding the legal and economic integration of the Community. 
By analogy, the proper application of the Regulation by domestic courts can give 
rise to a number of infringements such as refusing the recognition of other insolvency 
proceedings, averseness to cooperate and to transfer assets when the latter are necessary 
for the reorganization of the debtor's business, or even expanding the scope of secondary 
proceedings beyond winding-up proceedings 40. Because all these practices constitute 
indirect infringements of states towards their legal and Community duties, the ECJ and 
the EU Commission can directly reprimand them. 
In light of the advanced stage of the Community in terms of judicial cooperation, 
it is not surprising that the EU insolvency regime stands more chances than any other 
system, whether regional or global, to function harmoniously. The interplay between the 
different European institutions has developed to ensure that the rule of law is effectively 
respected in the Community. Once a legal instrument is ratified by member states, the 
duties contained therein will be uniformly implemented and enforced by the ECJ. This 
" On the reluctance of the ECJ to inflict sanctions against member states despite infringement of EC law 
see Case 182/89, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, (1990) ECR I- 4337. 
Also on the non-compliance and suspension of sanctions, see case C-334/94 Commission of the European 
Communities v French Republic 1-01307. On the application and evolvement of the same provisions of the 
EC Treaty, see case T-334/94 Sarri6 SA v Commission of the European Communities, (1998) 11-01439 
39 Article 228 (ex 17 1) of the EC Treaty provides for a more stringent supervision on behalf of the ECJ and 
the Commission. There is a special procedure to inflict sanctions against incompliant states, See EC Treaty 
at art. 17-2. 
40 "The member states are bound to respect the verdicts of the ECJ, as they are responsible for the 
implementation of EU law, both directly and indirectly, and they can be sued for any failure in their 
country to enforce EU laW'. See Jan-Erik Lane, Substance of EU Law, available at www. spp. nus. edu. sgl 
docs/wp/wp22. pdf (last visited November 2005). 
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also explains why the process leading to the adoption of the Regulation was a long and 
arduous one. Member states needed to ensure their ability to comply with European 
insolvency arrangements. States' ability to comply resulted partly from the enactment of 
less intrusive insolvency rules and a series of special provisions for the protection of 
domestic creditors. While this special setting has facilitated the adoption of the 
Regulation, the binding character of the latter is the result of a sui generis legal system, 
only affordable among countries that have embraced a suPranational model of 
integration. Because achieving these exact same results on a global level would be, not 
only impossible, but unrealistic, the following parts will envisage the instruments and the 
channels through which meaningful insolvency reforms can take place without resorting 
to the EU supranational model of integration. 
111. Instrumental Channels to Improve Cooperation 
The following parts will respectively study Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) so as to ascertain whether or not these instruments 
are suitable to further cooperation between courts, or more generally, whether they can 
provide an adequate support to domestic insolvency reform efforts. 
Bilateral- Investment Treaties 
The last decade has witnessed a significant surge of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs), which aim at facilitating market access to foreign investors. These instruments, 
executed between the investor's home country and a host country, commonly protect the 
investor against potential unfriendly or illegal conduct from the host country, such as an 
irregular expropriation of the investors' assets or undue restrictions on capital transfers. 
The increasing use of BlTs during the last decade 41 demonstrates that the gap left by the 
absence of a multilateral investment instrument should be filled 42 . 
BlTs are primarily 
created to build an atmosphere of trust between host countries and foreign investors by 
defining the rights and duties of each party. More importantly, BlTs form the basis for 
41 See L. Eric Peterson, Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable Development, 




resolving investment disputes between the host country and foreign investors. In doing 
so, they create a binding obligation (more so for the host country) whose breach not only 
constitutes a breach of treaty with the investor's home country, but also a violation of 
international law, with the ensuing consequences and negative effects vis-a-vis the host 
country's reputation 43 . The subsequent sub-sections will attempt to determine whether or 
not BITs present sufficient ties to multinationals (and arguably to their insolvency 
processes) so as to serve as a potential vehicle capable of enhancing cooperation between 
courts involved in a cross-border insolvency case. 
1. Scope and Suitability 
By considering the most common BITs' definitions of an investment while taking 
into account BITs' core principles, the subsequent parts will test the aptness of BITs to 
serve as potential insolvency cooperation and/or insolvency refonn vehicles. 
a. Defining Investment 
In searching for the proper foundation that may justify a potential linkage between 
BITs and reform in the area of cross-border insolvency, one must stop at the definition of 
investment and ascertain whether a subsidiary of a multinational corporation constitutes 
an investment in light of BITs. Although the term "investment" can take various forms 
depending on its definition in each treaty, there are commonly five characteristics of an 
investmen t44. 
First, "an investment has certain duration "5. This first condition cxcludcs all 
business and trade exchanges that are temporary and/or transitory in nature and those that 
are not built upon a viable long-term infrastructure. In this respect, a subsidiary of a 
multinational corporation established in the host country fulfils this durational 
requirement. Even when a foreign multinational establishes a special purpose vehicle in 
13 Id. at 19. 
44 Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula 1. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct Investment through 





the host country so as to achieve its short term objectives, such a structure remains 
governed by the laws and regulations of the host country, enjoys a full-fledged legal 
personality and most significantly, could - in the course of its operations - cumulate debts 
and experience financial difficulties. 
Second, "an investment involves a certain regularity ofprofit and return PA6. In 
the case of a subsidiary, this second condition forms the very reason why a multinational 
would establish a separate legal entity in a host country. As the development of the 
international market is driven by competition, further market access and integration 47 , the 
subsidiaries of a multinational constitute the primary network to channel such integration 
and to realize profits from foreign markets. Hence, it is only a natural assumption to 
believe that the very reason for the existence of multinationals is to derive profits and 
revenues from the exploration of foreign markets. Absent such an incentive, corporations 
would simply limit their scope of activities to their home market, something that proved 
unfounded insofar as multinationals conduct their operations on an increasingly global 
level48. 
, 049 Third, "an investment typically involves an element of risk for both sides . 
While the risks associated with the establishment of a subsidiary may be obvious, such as 
the total loss of assets and/or capital, or a fierce domestic competition that would drive 
the foreign subsidiary outside the host's market, the risks for the host country are of a 
different nature. When the host country enacts pro-investment laws to encourage 
investment flows and allows a foreign corporation to establish a domestic subsidiary in 
its local market, several types of risks accrue. One type of risk is the potential threat to 
national corporations that are in the same line of business as the foreign subsidiary. 
Another type of risk is the financial default and liquidation of such a subsidiary resulting 
46 id. 
47 Kevin C. Kennedy, Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at the World Trade 
organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INTL L. REV. 585,587-589 (200 1). 
49 id. 
49 See generally Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1970); see also Cynthia Day Wallace, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal 
Control: Host State Sovereignty in an Era of Economic Globalization 1082 (2002). 
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in the abrupt unemployment of national employees. So long as the underlying rational to 
BITs is to satisfy the mutual interests of the foreign investor and of the host government, 
both players will bear a certain amount of risk throughout the investment period. 
50 Fourth, "an investment involves a substantial commitment or contribution" . 
When a multinational corporation decides to establish a subsidiary in a host country, 
thereby expanding its own network of subsidiaries and increasing its chances to realize 
more profits, it incurs substantial costs to that end. Indeed, the costs related to the study 
of a foreign market and the costs necessary for the creation of a separate legal entity in a 
foreign forum, such as capital requirements, assets and personnel, not only present a 
testimony to the contribution made by the multinational but also highlight a long term 
commitment to the host country and to its domestic market. As previously mentioned, the 
forbearance of these costs is justified by the profitability multinationals stand to realize 
by expanding their operations to foreign markets. 
Fifth, "an investment should be significantfor the host state's development "5 1. In 
this regard, it can be argued that the establishment of a subsidiary in any given market 
results in a number of gains for the host country. Among such gains one can mention the 
ability of the host country to attract the positive spillover of employment, to increase 
foreign capital flows, and more generally, to mobilize their internal and international 
resources to attract further foreign investments. Indeed, the latter is thought to be the 
dominant form of resource flows and the primary source of private capital for low- 
income countries52. It is therefore not surprising to consider the drastic legal and judicial 
reform programs developing countries undergo so as to be competitive in attracting 
foreign capital flows and to ensure of their non-volatility. Absent such measures, 
developing countries will be unable to foster their own development. Thus, the presence 
50 See supra note 27. 
51 Id. 
52 See Ewe-Ghee Lim, Determinants of, and the Relation Between, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: 
A Summary of the Recent Literature 12-15 (IMF, Working Paper No. 01/175,2001). 
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of a foreign subsidiary in the host country represents the idyllic fonn of investment able 
to create more job opportunities and to channel foreign capital flows into the domestic 
market. 
In many respects, the subsidiary of a multinational corporation fulfils the 
characteristics of an investment as commonly defined in BITs. Because the latter aim at 
easing market access for these foreign corporations, it would not be absurd to think that 
the insolvency regime the foreign subsidiary will be subject to may greatly impact on its 
level of integration and operations in the host's market. As mentioned in the previous 
chapters, domestic insolvency laws can produce non-negligible ex ante cffects on 
investment incentives, which may result in more or less efficient capital placements. 
Therefore, BITs may be used not only to ease market access and to ensure equal non- 
discriminatory treatment to foreign investors, but also to ensure that equality of treatment 
is extended to the insolvency liquidation and/or reorganization of the foreign subsidiary. 
This may further the cooperation between the host's courts and the home courts leading 
to a more equitable and predictable insolvency process. 
b. Furthering Cooperation through BITs Core Principles 
Aside from the above characteristics that may justify the inclusion of insolvency 
provisions in BlTs, the latter contain a number of principles capable of advocating a more 
equitable process for the resolution of cross-border insolvency cases. Most BITs provide 
for the right to national treatment, which entails that foreign investors enjoy the same 
rights and privileges as national investors. Should the national treatment principle be 
extended to and implemented in insolvency proceedings, this means that domestic 
corporations and foreign subsidiaries should be treated in the same manner. As such, it 
comes as no surprise that when a domestic corporation faces financial difficulties, it 
enjoys in practice a more favourable regime for its liquidation 53 and most significantly, it 
enjoys increased chances for its restructuring, whether through formal or informal 
53 Erin K. Healy, All's Fair in Love And Bankruptcy? Analysis of the Property Requirement for Section 
109 Eligibility and its Effect on Foreign Debtors Filing in U. S. Bankruptcy Courts, 12 AM. BANKR. 




reorganization plans . Indeed, a domestic corporation carrying the national 
flag and 
employing nationals of the host country will always garnish more support from either the 
legislator or from the judicial court system. 
In order to extend that same favourable treatment to a foreign subsidiary, and to 
provide the latter with equal chances to be rescued, coordination with the subsidiary's 
home forum may be necessary. Indeed, insofar as the assets of a multinational 
corporation are usually located in several forums and that an effective liquidation or 
reorganization of the financially distressed subsidiary may call for a complete evaluation 
of the subsidiary's estate and possibly, the repatriation of its assets located overseas, the 
host's courts would be well-advised to refer to foreign jurisdictions. In parallel, by taking 
into account the international nature of the foreign subsidiary, the hosts' court will be 
able to strike a more equitable balance between the interests of domestic and foreign 
creditors. 
From a different viewpoint, there are other commonly used principles in BITs that 
may justify a linkage between investment and insolvency. For instance, the fair and 
equitable treatment principle, which remains subject to ongoing controversies, may be 
used to support the rational of such a linkage. While an equal treatment principle aims 
primarily at achieving equality between foreign and domestic investors, it would not be 
far-fetched to consider that creditors and shareholders of both domestic and foreign 
investments should also be treated equally. This could be accomplished by extending the 
equal treatment principle to those parties whose rights vest in the operations of such 
investments entities, whether domestic or foreign. Needless to mention that a differential 
treatment between the creditors of domestic and foreign investors will in term increase 
the difficulty for foreign investors to find suitable business partners within the host's 
market. Insofar as this can render the ob ectives of BITs - namely easing the integration j 
and operations of the foreign investor in the host's market - more difficult to achieve, the 




principles can ensure that equal treatment is implemented in a way that would not place 
foreign investors at a disadvantage. 
2. LDCs' Efforts to Attract Foreign Investments 
The inclusion of insolvency standards and principles in BITs may seem ambitious 
in many respects. First, BITs signed between developed and developing countries have 
long been criticized as creating an unequal bargain to the advantage of developed 
countrieS55 . Thus, 
broadening the scope of BITs so as to include the insolvency processes 
of large multinationals is not a simple task at hand. Second, should such insolvency 
principles entail the deference to the proceedings held in the multinational's home 
country, an even greater reluctance from Least Developing Countries (LDCs) is to be 
expected. Indeed, as explained by the critics of the rough wash argument, LDCs will not 
reap the advantages of universality 56 as much as developed countries because LDCs are 
not the home country of as many multinationals as developed countries, and hence, they 
will more often defer to foreign insolvency proceedings rather than asking for the stay of 
foreign proceedings to their advantage. 
This being said, the use of BITs as potential reform vehicles is believed plausible. 
The subsequent parts will expose the incentives of LDCs to accept such a proposal with 
special emphasis on those incentives that result from the drive to compete and to attract 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Subsequently, it will be explained how the inclusion of 
insolvency standards in BITs can address the critics to the rough wash argument. 
a. Liberal Economy Theo[y: Competition 
Despite LDCs growing resistance to the enactment of a multilateral investment 
treaty, an exponentially growing number of BITs were signed between developed and 
55 See Inaamul Haque, DOHA Development Agenda: Recapturing the Momentum of Multilateralism and 
Developing Countries, 17 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 1097,1111 n. 60 (2002); see also Duncan E. Williams, 
Note, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in Emerging Nations: Lessons From the Asian 
Financial Crisis and a Look at the International Legal Regime, 70 FORDIJAM L. REV. 561,614 n. 446 
(2001). 
56 See Rammeskow, Predictability and Protection, supra note 16, at 426. 
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developing countries in the last decade. As such, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
LDCs is primary governed by BITs and the successful integration and performance of 
these foreign investments depend on the extent to which LDCs are able to create a 
favourable domestic environment rooted in transparency and respectful of the rule of 
IaW57. 
A number of theories were developed to explain LDCs reform efforts and most 
importantly, to elucidate LDCs' acquiescence of BITs despite the often unequal bargain 
the latter entail to their disadvantage5g. One of the most convincing theories to elucidate 
the widespread execution of BITs between the North and the South derives from 
liberalism. This theory argues that competition in attracting foreign capital flows 
constitutes the primary motivation for LDCs to sign BITs and to engage in far-reaching 
legal and judicial reform efforts". As FDI remains the main source of foreign capital 
flow into low-income countries, LDCs have become pre-disposed to making considerable 
concessions so as to appeal to foreign investors. 
In this regard, it could be argued that LDCs' legal reform efforts to capture a 
significant share of foreign capital flows would be more successful if such efforts 
included sound cross-border insolvency principles, resulting in more cooperation between 
the host's and parent's courts. Since multinationals are the main channels to foreign 
investments and BITs are nowadays the overriding instruments to regulate the treatment 
of these foreign entities within the host's market, the inclusion of insolvency principles in 
BiTs may be justified so as to resolve any potential dispute that may arise if and when 
these foreign experience financial difficulties. 
Doing so would result in more advantages to both investors and to the host 
country. For the former, the inclusion of insolvency principles in BITs may create further 
57 See Calvin, Trade and Investment, supra note 27, at 10- 11. 
58 Id. 
59 See Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on 




assurance as regards the commitment of the host country to create a suitable environment 
where the rule of law is respected not only throughout the life of the foreign entity, but 
also at the time of its eventual liquidation or reorganization. Hence, foreign investors will 
be more confident that the host's courts will extend them a fair treatment, thereby 
increasing the chances for the foreign subsidiary to either be rescued or more effectively 
liquidated. By the same token, the host country will be able to attract more foreign 
investments into its domestic market; and most importantly, it will gain a competitive 
edge over other LDCs that did not grant further assurance as regards the insolvency 
processes of foreign subsidiaries. 
Perhaps the most distinct advantage BITs offer so as to improve cooperation in 
cross-border insolvency cases is that LDCs are ready to make further concessions so as to 
attract FD160. In other words, by using LDCs motivational urge to attract FDI, BITs could 
be a suitable vehicle to enhance cooperation in transnational insolvency cases. 
Incidentally, this method would address the most common critics to Westbrook's "Rough 
Wash" argument. 
b. Defeating the "Rough Wash" Critics 
As mentioned in the previous Chapters, Westbrook is supportive of a cross-border 
insolvency regime based on universality, or on any lesser form thereof in the short term. 
This system would entail greater cooperation between several forums through deference 
to foreign proceedings and/or through the transfer of local assets from one jurisdiction to 
another. Because such deference and/or transfer of local assets are associated with greater 
risks to be born by the deferring forum 61 9 it has been argued that compliance with this 
potential transnational insolvency regime will be difficult to achieve. In this regard, 
Westbrook advanced the "rough wash" argument so as to defend the feasibility of such a 
framework of cooperation, which retrieves some essential characteristics of 
Universalism. Put in simple terms, the "rough wash" argument means that the risks and 
60 id. 
61 One such eminent risk for the deferring forum is to offer less protection to its domestic creditors if and 
when local assets are transferred overseas. 
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costs of deference and/or transfer of local assets by a given forum will "be evened out by 
foreign deference of local assets in other cases "6ý 
Although the "rough wash" argument may increase the incentives to cooperate 
among forums, it is built on the assumption that each country, whether developed or 
developing, is the home country of an equal number of multinationals. Because such an 
assumption is certainly not true, the rough wash argument has been criticized as being 
unfounded or incomplete at best 63 . Thus, deference and/or transfer of assets from one 
forum to the other will only take place if the deferring forum can draw certain advantages 
from cooperation or is compelled to do so, or both. By translating these parameters into 
the fora of bilateral investment relations, it becomes easier to contemplate the use of BITs 
as an effective medium to channel cross-border insolvency principles, thereby fostering 
cooperation especially between the North and the South. Doing so may address the 
shortfalls of the rough wash argument. Indeed, whether or not deferring forums stand an 
equal chance among each other to even out the risks and costs associated with deference 
and/or with the transfer of local assets in other cases, each forum will be bound to 
cooperate with the foreign subsidiary's home forum if and when that foreign subsidiary, 
recognized as a foreign investment, faces financial distress. Other than imposing a duty to 
cooperate on the court-to-court level, BITs may serve as a suitable insolvency reform 
vehicle insofar as they place the objectives of LDCs, namely enhancing their ability to 
attract further foreign capital flows, at the forefront of the debate. 
While this proposal may require a substantially different approach in negotiating 
and drafting BITs, and that the foreseeable opposition of LDCs to such an undertaking 
should not be taken lightly, it is believed that the linkage between foreign investment and 
multinationals' insolvency is a most plausible venture. This being said, in the face of 
globalisation and in the absence of a binding cross-border insolvency framework, the 
62 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 457,464-465 (1991) [hereinaller Westbrook, Theory and 
Pragmatism] 
63 See Rammeskow, Predictability and Protection, supra note 16, at 426. 
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foreign investment path may not be the sole conduit to achieve more cooperation between 
courts respectively located in the host's and in the investor's country. The pressures 
resulting from international trade and the ever-increasing number of Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) signed between countries should also be considered as a potential 
vehicle to improve cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases. 
B. Free Trade AP-reements 
As an alternative or parallel way to achieve meaningful reform in the area of 
cross-border insolvency, one should not disregard the trade path. Indeed, as the last 
decade could be accurately described as the era of trade and investment, responsible 
policyrnakers and academics have constantly attempted to create the most adequate legal 
environment to contain and to encourage the ever-increasing rate of trade and 
investment64. Within a bilateral context, the following parts will expose how sustained 
trade relations between two nations can significantly facilitate the issuance of insolvency 
guidelines and principles, thereby improving court-to-court cooperation. To do so, special 
attention will be drawn to the North American experience and how the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was an important medium to enhance cross-border 
insolvency cooperation between the United States, Canada and Mexico. 
Trade and Cross-Border Insolvengy 
As compared with BITs, using bilateral trade relations to address the lack of 
cooperation between courts in cross-border insolvency cases may be founded on a 
substantially different reasoning. Unlike FDI where there is a market presence of a 
foreign entity in the host country, trade does not necessitate market presence or 
integration. Nevertheless, the development of trade relations between two nations can 
create strong incentives for each one of them to avail a suitable legal environment, 
" See generally Aaron Judson Lodge, Globalization: Panacea for the World or Conquistador of 
International Law and Statehood?, 7 ORRIL 224 (2005). 
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including predictable and fair insolvency rules, so as to support their trade liberalization 
65 
efforts 
Insofar as multinational corporations are the primary traders on the global ICVC166 
and so long as continued and regular trade exchanges entail a signiricant number of 
debtors and creditors in several forums, the adjudication of insolvency cases would 
require a solid framework of cooperation between the various courts involved. For 
instance, as it was argued in the previous parts, the issuance of the Regulation was 
necessary to encourage and facilitate trade exchanges within the EU internal market, an 
objective clearly spelled out in the EC treaty. Similarly, NAFTA countries had to make 
considerable efforts in crafting a coherent insolvency regime able to facilitate the 
liquidation and/or reorganization of corporations having assets and operations in the 
United States, Canada and Mexico. 
By purporting such an analogy on the bilateral level and taking into account that 
each nation, whether developed or developing, stands to gain considerably from an 
increased rate of trade, it may be realistic to think that FTAs can lay the groundwork for a 
more rational cross-border insolvency framework. Because FTAs aim at promoting a free 
circulation of goods and services across the borders of two countries (or a group of 
countries), each and every aspect of these trade exchanges should be meticulously taken 
into account, including the financial distress of an entity engaged in trade transactions 
and cumulating debts and credits on each side of the borders. Within this trade context, it 
could be feasible to institute insolvency proceedings that are more universal in nature, 
where the interest of stakeholders (creditors and debtors), regardless of their location, will 
be equitably and fairly addressed. 
65 See Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreements"--An Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade Arca f The 
Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63,106 -107 (1997). 
66 See Daniel W. Schenck, Jurisdiction over the Foreign Multinational in the EEC: Lifting the Veil on the 
Economic Entity Theory, II UPAJIBL 495 (1989). 
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Perceiving the increase of trade and the surge of FTAs as a potential to 
promulgate sound cross-border insolvency principles resulting in more cooperation 
between forums is to acknowledge that the foundation of a free market economy, an 
objective pursued by most nations, can only be achieved through holistic reform efforts. 
Perhaps, because FTAs are rather specific to a limited number of countries and that their 
objectives are debated and agreed upon between their signatories, it is easier to advocate 
more cooperation thereunder on the court-to-court level. A prime example of this readily 
achievable objective between countries participating in free trade areas is the NAFTA 
model, from which certain lessons can be transmitted to policyrnakers, who are looking 
forward to furthering their insolvency reform efforts. 
2. The North-American Experience 
Although a potential linkage between trade and insolvency may be naturally 
conveyed in order to further insolvency reform efforts between nations involved in 
significant trade exchanges, the NAFTA experience gives a live illustration of the 
benefits, and also of the difficulties, that ensue from pursuing such a venture. The 
objectives set by NAFTA include, among other things, the elimination of trade barriers 
and the facilitation of cross-border movement of goods and services between NAFTA 
signatories 67 . Importantly, these trade liberalization efforts should take place in a system 
that implements national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and which is rooted 
68 in transparency 
Aware that these objectives can be more effectively reached with the enactment of 
guidelines to enhance cooperation between NAFTA courts in cross-border insolvency 
cases, the American Law Institute (ALI) launched in 1994, one year after the signature of 
NAFTA, its Transnational Insolvency Project (the ProjeCt)69. Short of harmonizing the 
insolvency laws in NAFTA countries, the Project aims at producing "a framework for 
67 See NAFTA at art. 102. Available at http: //www. nafta-sec-alena. org (last visited January 2006). 
69 id. 
69 See Am. L. Inst., Principles of Cooperation In Transnational Insolvency Cases Among The Members Of 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (2003), available at https: //www. aii. org/aii/trans-insolv. htm 
(last visited January 2006). 
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close cooperation, and some integration, in the management of insolvencies having 
effects in more than one of the NAFTA countries 00 . Although the Project has undergone 
a number of phases and has been the subject of numerous studies, it has not been adopted 
as the official instrument to resolve cross-border insolvency cases that arise between the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico. Despite its non-ratification, however, the Project has 
exerted a major influence on NAFTA participants to reconsider certain aspects of their 
bankruptcy laws 71 , resulting in more cooperation and coordination among NAFTA courts 
to overcome the problems that traditionally arise from transnational insolvency cases 72 . 
While several contributions may be drawn from the guidelines of cooperation 
contained in the Project, the most interesting aspect is how the Project could influence 
NAFTA countries to amend their bankruptcy laws despite the significant differences that 
exist between the United States, Canada and Mexico. Indeed, the difference between the 
legal systems of the NAFTA participants is sufficient to render any insolvency reform 
efforts rather difficult. First, there is the cleavage between common law and civil law 
jurisdictions that separates the United States and Canada from Mexico. As in a traditional 
civil law jurisdiction, the role of the judge in Mexico is more restricted compared to his 
counterpart in common law countries, such as the United States and Canada, where the 
judge enjoys greater flexibility to accommodate the demands of foreign creditors. 
Second, the bankruptcy regime in the United States and Mexico is more pro-debtor- 
oriented whereas the Canadian system is clearly in favour of creditors. These different 
orientations can have a major consequence on a court's decision whether to liquidate or 
to reorganize a financially distressed corporation. Third, the degree of specialization in 
bankruptcy is much higher in the United States and Canada than Mexico. For instance, in 
the United States, bankruptcy judges usually are originally bankruptcy lawyers who have 
cumulated extensive expertise on bankruptcy related issues and are able to advance 
flexible market-oriented solution to adjudicate insolvency cases submitted before them. 
70 Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law Institute NAFTA Insolvency Project, 23 
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7,7 (1997). 
71 E. Bruce Leonard and Jacob Ziegel, International Statement of Canadian Bankruptcy Law - ALI, Juris 




Further, and not surprisingly, the bankruptcy laws of NAFTA participants greatly differ 
from each other as regards the formalities of the proceedings, the substance of the law 
and most importantly the priority of claims. 
Notwithstanding these seemingly irreconcilable differences, important insolvency 
reform efforts have taken place in each of the NAFTA countries in the last decade. 
Differently said, the drive to create a free trade area between the participants was key to 
foster insolvency reform efforts and closer cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases. 
Hence, it could be. argued that a FTA between two nations can result, directly or 
indirectly, in insolvency reform efforts leading to greater cooperation, regardless of the 
legal disparities that may exist between the parties. This conclusion could be useful in 
considering whether trade and FTAs can be used as insolvency reform vehicles in the 
short or medium term. 
3. FTA Network and Regionalization 
Another significant advantage in resorting to FTAs to promote closer cooperation 
between courts is the widespread use of FTAs on a regional level. In fact, increased trade 
exchanges between neighbouring nations have encouraged the formation of free trade 
groups among which, the promulgation of cooperation guidelines in cross-border 
insolvency cases may be easier to achieve than on a global level. Undoubtedly, the most 
successful trading group so far is the European Union and this is one of the reasons why 
the study of the Regulation has been central throughout this thesis. This being said, 
without espousing the European insolvency model, which is built upon a real process of 
political, economic and legal integration among its members, sustained trade exchanges 
along with strong political will have also resulted in regional free trade coalitions. Aside 
from the NAFTA model, an overview of which was given above, one can cite the Andean 
Common Market (ANCOM)73, the Southern Cone Common Market 74 , the Association of 
73 Among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
74 Among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
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South-East Asian Nations 75 (ASEAN), and many other regional trade arrangements aimed 
at eliminating trade barriers and promoting the free circulation of goods and services 
across the borders of the participating nations. 
In light of the correlation between free trade and insolvency, the problems that 
arise from the liquidation or reorganization of a debtor presenting ties with more than 
forum have been, or soon will be, addressed by these regional efforts aiming at creating a 
free trade area among their constituencies. Thus, trade may not only serve as a potential 
vehicle for insolvency reform, but will also play an important role in increasing the 
awareness of cross-border insolvency matters and their incidence on effective trade 
liberalization. Not surprisingly, the most advanced regional models in advocating free 
trade, such as the EU and NAFTA, have already dedicated considerable time and 
resources to finding a viable solution to the cross-border insolvency dilemma. It is also 
believed that other free trade groups, in pursuing their trade liberalization efforts, will 
face the hurdles created by the insolvency of a multinational debtor. 
As the world becomes increasingly entangled in webs of FTAs and regional trade 
arrangements, several cross-border insolvency instruments, protocols, and court-to-court 
communication techniques are bound to surge, thereby enhancing cooperation. While 
such a projection may fulfil a short-term ideal in promoting sound regional insolvency 
practices, it advances little in a way of creating a uniform and truly global insolvency 
framework. Indeed, as explained above, governments are pre-disposed to make certain 
concessions only with their regular trading partners, from which foreseeable trade 
benefits may derive. Furthermore, due to the rather limited number of countries 
participating in a regional or bilateral free trade arrangement, a thorough consideration is 
given to the insolvency regime of each participant. For instance, in the phases leading to 
the issuance of the ALI Project, each of the United States, Canada and Mexico had the 




opportunity to present a detailed statement of their bankruptcy regime 76 . It is needless to 
mention that the process of building a global consensus on a cross-border insolvency 
framework may prove even more difficult if the peculiarities of each domestic insolvency 
system were taken into account. 
For the most part, bilateral and regional trade liberalization efforts, and naturally 
FTA networks, may provide for near-term and geographically limited improvements in 
cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases. Their propensity, however, to advance the 
creation of a global insolvency arrangement, in the form of an enhanced Model Law or 
otherwise, is believed uncertain. Here stands the distinction between the desirability of 
bilateral (or regional) reform vehicles and multilateral channels to improve cooperation. 
IV. Market Incentives and Institutional Channels 
A comprehensive overview of the channels that could be used to develop a better 
cross-border insolvency framework requires careful consideration of both bilateral and 
multilateral instruments. The latter have taken the form of multilateral trade agreements 
and have multiplied alongside the development of the international market. Thus, 
considering the current multilateral trading system as a potential conduit to create a more 
viable cross-border insolvency framework, whether or not under the form of an enhanced 
Model Law, will necessitate a thorough understanding of this international market, its 
dynamics and driving forces. By doing so, the following sections will demonstrate that 
the international market can provide strong incentives to innovatively address the cross- 
border insolvency dilemma through the multilateral trading system and its lead 
institution: the WTO. By furthering the contributions of the European experience 
pursuant to which, a central judicial authority such as the ECJ is necessary to oversee the 
implementation of a cross-border insolvency arrangement (supra), it will also be enquired 
76 See American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency Project: International Statement of United States 
Bankruptcy Law (Discussion Draft, Apr. 17,1996); American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency 
Project: International Statement of Canadian Bankruptcy Law (Council Draft No. 1, Nov. 26,1996); 
American Law institute, Transnational insolvency Project: international Statement of Mexican Bankruptcy 
Law (Preliminary Draft No. 1, Sept. 11,1996). 
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whether the WTO/DSB might fill some level of the international judicial gap and might 
extend more adequate institutional support to a more coherent transnational insolvency 
system. 
A. The International Market 
Alongside the development of the EU internal market, globalisation has created a 
"de facto" international market where the rule of law is expanding on a regional and 
international level. Globalisation encourages cross-border commercial activities and by 
the same token, limits the powers of sovereign states to scrutinize the operations of 
multinational corporations. The first part of this Section will examine the creation and 
development of the international market, where borders are ever more fluid and the 
participation of countries in the international market has expanded to include many LDCs 
that were initially excluded. Another important aspect of this international market is the 
presence of international institutions capable of regulating trade and non-trade issues 
effectively. Through harmonization, standard-setting mechanisms and assessment 
4 programs, the international community has witnessed a rapid expansion of the tools 
necessary to supervise commercial activities within this international market. A 
preliminary understanding of these tools is essential to ascertain whether the international 
market will, on the long term, follow a similar pattern of development as the EU internal 
market. More importantly, this might give an indication on whether a comparable viable 
cross-border insolvency arrangement may be created on the global level77. 
1. Globalization and Elapse of Borders 
Pundits often proclaim the dissolution of borders and the rapid advance of 
globalisation with all its cultural, economic and political implications for the nation-state. 
Similarly, within the legal sphere, globalisation has had a profound impact on 
'internationalising' the domestic legal systems of countries. Classical economists such as 
77 This will necessitate the examination of the development of the international market, the expanding 
participation of nation-states within that market and ascertain whether this international market shares the 
same developmental trends as the EU internal market. 
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Adam Smith and David Hume have long supported the necessity of a legal order to 
facilitate market transactions 78 . While their primary focus at that time was the importance 
of the domestic foundation of law, a mounting body of international law has since 
developed in response to the growing internationalisation of the world economy, such as 
the body of law regulating international commercial transactions. Nation states have seen 
the benefits of an international legal order governing trade in furthering their own trade 
liberalization efforts and upholding the framework for multilateral trade. The post war 
legal regime governing international trade has been guided by public international law, 
evolving from a loose agreement among nations embodied in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to an institution with binding contractual obligations and 
commitments, embodied in the WTO. While there are numerous reasons for the 
expansion of legalization in international trade, the focus of this section is on the 
existence of a de facto international market, which will be argued as an important driving 
force towards the liberalization of international trade and possibly for the promulgation of 
principles to deal with the insolvency of multinationals. 
One important critique however to this international market is the persistent 
exclusion of LDCs 79 from participating and reaping the benefits of globalisation on the 
same level as developed countries. The international market primarily included and 
benefited only the domestic markets of developed countries, creating not an international 
market, but a club of the privileged. Recently however, the status of developing countries 
in international trade has evolved from relative exclusion of legal obligations within the 
GATT, to one based on reciprocity and legal equality in the WTO. For instance, under 
the GATT system, LDCs sought special and differential treatment by demanding 
78 See generally, A. Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Methuen, 
London 1961 (1776). 
79 Some of such critics demonstrate how LDC's could not pursue their own economic interest within the 
international market. See for instance, Alexandre-Charles Kiss, Les resources naturelles et le droit 
international; Conclusions, 45-56 Annuairc de I'A. A. A. 263,271 (1984-86); Milan Bulajic, Principles of 
International Development Law, 236 (1986); Paul de Waart, The Right to Development: Utopian or Real?, 
in Restructuring the International Economic Order: The Role of Law and Lawyers, 99 (Pieter van Dijk et 




preferences from developed countries and exclusion from their basic legal obligations. 
Through their espousal and acceptance of a one sided legal status, developing countries 
hampered their effective participation and limited the benefits of international trade to 
those who accepted their limited legal obligations 80 , which were primarily developed 
countries. The mercantilist structure of the GATT reinforced the' legal inequality of 
developing countries, as the GATT was coloured by power politics and government 
discretion, where protectionism was often the status quo that could only be changed 
through negotiation and reciprocity. 
The nature of international trade law changed drastically with the establishment of 
the WTO, creating for the first time an international organization with binding legal 
obligations and an effective dispute settlement mechanism. LDCs also changed course 
dramatically in both the domestic and international sphere by implementing trade 
liberalizing reforms and accepting equal legal obligations under the WT081. While some 
remnants of special and differential treatment persist, there is no longer an imbalance of 
legal obligations between developed countries and LDCs. 
The legal equality of LDCs is of great benefit not only within their domestic 
political and economic sphere, but legal equality also serves to improve the relations of 
LDCs with other member states 82 . The international market is now truly international 
with the inclusion of both developed and developing countries. Thus the expanding 
international market is evidenced by the growing participation of all nation-states and the 
expanding body of internationally-agreed upon tools, enforced by a supra-riational 
authority such as the WTO 83 . There are stronger incentives to cooperate and greater 
so Id. 
a' Raj Bhala, Assessing The Modem Era of International Trade, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1647,1658 - 
1659 (1998). 
82 Kevin Watkins & Penny Fowler, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation, and the 
Fight against Poverty 235 (2002). 
83 See generally Alice Alexandra Kipel, Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, in 
The World Trade Organization: The Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Century and U. S. 
Implementing Legislation 617-94 (Terence P. Stewart ed., A. B. A., Section of Int'l Law & Practice 1996); 
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potential to resolve disputes between sovereigns in the international market, including 
those that arise from the insolvency process of large multinationals. This being said, a 
distinction should be made between the types of law that exist in the WTO and which 
may be of benefit in creating a predictable insolvency framework. 
2. Harmonization and Standard Settina 
One type of law that governs international trade is "negative" law, or law 
designed on the 'interface principle' 84 . This type of law restricts excessive government 
intervention and does not stipulate what governments must do; rather, it allows nations to 
retain their distinct regulatory structures, provided they do not contradict WTO law. For 
example, a member state can retaliate but must do so within the confines of the dispute 
settlement mechanism. Another type of law within the WTO is "harmonization" law, 
which seeks to establish obligatory standards among member stateS85, such as the Trade 
Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement that requires a minimum level of 
intellectual property protection 86 . Harmonization law tells governments what they must 
do and restricts regulatory differences among member states. 
Whether negative or harmonizing in nature, WTO rules are certainly a good 
example of hard-law making initiatives because nation-states are compelled to apply 
these rules and a risk of retaliation exists for those who deviate from such rules. On the 
other hand, soft-law making initiatives have gained increasing momentum in the last 
Bernard M. Hoekman & Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the 
WTO and Beyond 392-393 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001). 
94 See J. H. Jackson, Managing the trading system: the World Trade Organization and the post-Uruguay 
Round GATT agenda, Managing the world economy: fifty years after Bretton Woods; ed. P. B. Kenen. 
Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994, at 13 1. See also Hoekman, B., The WTO: 
functions and basic principles. Development, trade and the WTO: a handbook, ed. by B. Hoekman, A. 
Mattoo and P. English; Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2002, at 41-45. 8' "Harmonization has already become part and parcel of the existing GATT/WTO regime. But even more 
so, it seems to have become a central source of contention in the public debate surrounding the WTO's 
future agenda". See Arie Reich, The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. Pa J. Int7 Econ. L. 
321(2004). 
86 See Louis S. Sorell et al., Changes to U. S. Patent Law Under GATT: Summary and Practice 
Recommendations, 426 Practising L. Inst. 95 (1995). 
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decade 87 . These often come under the form of standard-setting efforts or through the 
identification of best international practices in a given domain. These tools altogether, 
whether hard or soft, create an arsenal of instruments that simultaneously develop and 
regulate the international market and can equally serve to fashion an effective cross- 
border insolvency arrangement. 
Though borders and controls surrounding sovereign states have not disappeared, 
the ongoing process of globalisation has encouraged the creation of internationally 
applicable regulations and standards and their associated enforcement mechanisms, 
buttressed by organizational bodies, such as the WTO. Nation-states have acknowledged 
that their domestic laws and domestic judiciary are unable to effectively supervise cross- 
border commercial activities; thus, nation-states hosting multinational corporations tend 
to embrace international standards. While the powers of the nation-state in watching over 
multinational's activities domestically have certainly not vanished altogether, states with 
obstructionist domestic policies that shun internationally accepted standards run the risk 
of corporate flight; as the very nature of the multinational corporation is to be 
internationally mobile and adaptable. Obstructionist, exclusionist or merely less 
favourable policies would surely hamper nation-states competitive quest to attract 
multinationals and all the economic benefits they may bring. 
Thus, with the continued pace of globalisation and the demands for a more 
flexible and dynamic market, international law-making initiatives, whether hard or soft, 
will continue to play a major role in regulating the international market, thereby affecting 
the operations of multinational corporations. National legal systems will increasingly be 
limited to control businesses that are primarily domestic in nature, while multinationals 
will expect, by virtue of their nature, to comply with international standards and 
regulations. 
97 See generally Professor Gunther F. Handl Et. Al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. SOCY lNrL L. 
PROC. 371 (1988). 
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Though a more in depth analysis of this issue is without the scope of this 
dissertation, based on the international market described above and its related sources of 
law, the potential appears to exist for the eventual creation of a "binding" cross-border 
insolvency regime. Indeed, from the European experience, the pre-requisites to create 
such a regime have been established generally and, importantly, the type of necessary 
legal instruments has been defined. This being said, the issue of what instruments should 
be used to create a cross-border insolvency system is still open for discussion. The EU, 
for instance, has clearly opted for an approach comparable to the "hard-law" models, 
which are compulsory in all their aspects and any infringement by member states would 
be sanctioned. However, due to the unique regional nature of the EU, this may not be 
possible on a global level, at least in the short-tenn or medium-term. 
Given the advancement of the international market and the availability of 
adequate regulatory instruments therein, the insolvency of multinational corporations can 
and should be addressed on an international scale. Despite that large multinationals today 
are the key players in the development of international trade, cross-border insolvency 
matters have not been on the WTO's agenda. This has frustrated the development of a 
full set of rules to contain and encourage international trade and investment in many 
ways. In other words, cross-border insolvency matters are seen today as the missing link 
in a long series of harmonization and standard-setting mechanisms launched by the 
international community, through the WTO or other international institutions, such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)88. 
B. Fillina the Judicial Gap 
Experience in the realm of international law has demonstrated that states do not 
abide by their commitments, unless rigid enforcement mechanisms - such as sanctions - 
8' On possible linkage schemes, see Gianvitti, F., Les rapports entre I'Organisation mondiale du commerce 
et le Fonds mondtaire international: La rdorganisation mondiale des &hanges (proWmesjuridiques). Paris: 
Pedone, 1996, at 75-86. See also B. Hindley, What subjects are suitable for WTO agreement? Political 
economy of international trade law: essays in honor of Robert E. Hudec / ed. by D. L. M. Kennedy and J. D. 
Southwick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, at 157-163. 
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are available. In addition, one may note that despite the development of tools to regulate 
the international market, there is still no international instrument that possesses the direct 
applicability feature of an EU regulation. Therefore, state' intervention is more frequently 
than not required for the transposition of international treaties onto the domestic level. 
For instance, under the WTO system, multilateral agreements, though ratified by a given 
state, usually call for the intervention of the executive and/or legislative authorities of that 
ratifying state to promulgate decrees and/or laws that would give effect to the provisions 
of these multilateral agreements on the domestic level. Limited by these constraints, a 
suitable international judicial entity to oversee the implementation of a potential 
insolvency arrangement must possess the power to compel states to abide by their 
commitments. This judicial entity should be empowered to oblige states to enact modem 
domestic insolvency laws that are able to cope with the very nature of multinationals. 
The issue of compliance with international law does not unfortunately depend 
solely on the ability of forcing sovereign states into adopting a given course of action. As 
seen under the EU insolvency system, the ECJ exercises tight control over domestic 
judiciary by way of interpretation. Replicating this model of supervision on the 
international level may seem particularly difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, it is one 
thing to ensure that sovereign states would give effect to a binding insolvency treaty onto 
their national level; and it is another issue to make sure that domestic courts in each 
country would effectively implement these now national insolvency principles and 
abstain from favouring domestic creditors. This problem however is not proper to the 
area of insolvency; rather, it translates the extent to which the rule of law is enforced 
within domestic legal systems. Tbus, it is important to understand what constraints a 
supranational judicial entity in the area of transnational insolvency is likely to face. 
As above discussed, such an entity should preferably have the ability to force 
states into complying with any potential insolvency arrangement, whether or not under 
the form of a revamped Model Law. Although examples of international judicial bodies 
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are nowadays abundant, very few might be able to successfully control or at least temper 
self-centered and egoistic states. Though numerous methods and theories of compliance 
have emerged from the disciplines of international relations and world diplomacy 89 , the 
most current and practical experience stems from the international trading system and the 
powers of the WTO/DSB to compel sovereign states into abiding by their WTO 
obligations, whether trade or non-trade related. This being said, bringing the WTO/DSB 
into the cross-border insolvency dilemma is advancing that a viable and justifiable 
linkage between trade and multinationals' insolvency exists 90 . 
The following sub-parts of this Section will reflect preliminarily upon the 
potential of involving the WTO/DSB in the process of reaching a more viable and/or 
binding cross-border insolvency framework that is rooted in the multilateral trading 
system. 
" See generally Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of 
the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 NYU J Intl L& Pol (1996); Frieder Roessler, Domestic 
Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the Past, 19 U PA J INTL ECON L 
(1998); Jeff-rey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 Geo 
Wash Intl L Rev (2001); John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem--Comments on Five Texts, 96 
AM J INTL L (2002); Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The "Trade and... " Conundrum-- A Commentary, 96 
AM J INTL L (2002). See also John H. Jackson, The Perils Of Globalization and the World Trading 
System, 24 FORDHAM INTL LJ (2000). 
90 In fact, using trade as a mechanism of compliance with international law is not a new trend. "Trade and' 
issues have existed for a long time in the international trading system. The issue of linkage could be traced 
back to the inception of the International Trade Organization (ITO), within the confines of which 
environmental issues and competition policies were included. Although an extensive empirical and 
academic work has been undertaken on the issue of linkage, none has considered cross-border insolvency 
matters as a potential area of linkage. Instead, most theories committed to explain and elucidate this 
phenomenon, whether in support or in rejection, tackled the very nature of the trading system as today 
managed by the WTO and raised questions of legitimacy, convenience and practicability. While such 
general studies constitute an important basis for the following parts, articulating a general view or a theory 
on the feasibility of linking trade and non-trade matters is beyond the scope of this work. Rather, the 
objective here is to highlight the arguments that may be used to advocate a specific linkage between trade 
sanctions and a potential cross-border insolvency arrangement, whether or not under the form of a 
revamped Model Law. See Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields 
over Swords, 13 MNJGT 305 (2004). 
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1. Insolvency and Trade: A Natural Linkage 
Pursuant to the "purposeful enterprise"91 theory to the linkage dilemma, one may 
see how a cross-border insolvency system may serve a number of objectives. First, such a 
system would considerably reduce the uncertainties that arise from international 
contracting. As previously explained, predictable cross-border insolvency rules would 
increase the transactional gain when a multinational corporation is conducting business 
on a global level. By decreasing pre-insolvency costs, a potential cross-border 
insolvency agreement fulfils a meaningful purpose by enabling more effective capital 
placements. Second, global insolvency proceedings produce some effects on the 
domestic social level. Insofar as a global insolvency regime renders the rescue option 
more feasible, it would thereby preserve jobs, which is an unlikely outcome when a 
multinational is simply liquidated. 
Although the purposeful enterprise approach would be suitable in justifying the 
linkage between insolvency and trade, other theories of linkage have developed in the 
course of the WTO negotiation process. Indeed, as argued by a number of scholars, the 
linkage issue reflects the ongoing bargaining process between developed and developing 
countrieS92. For instance, LDCs accepted a linkage between intellectual property and 
trade in exchange of cut-offs from developed countries with respect to textile quotaS93. 
Applying this strategic linkage approach to insolvency is to presume that LDCs would 
necessarily oppose the linkage between insolvency and trade; and developed countries 
would need - in order to achieve such a linkage - to make certain concessions in the 
course of future WTO negotiation rounds. However, it is believed that this projection 
may be unfounded in many respects. Previous WTO negotiation rounds have 
demonstrated that LDCs naturally reject topics that would burden, restrict and/or weaken 
their economic and social infrastructure. For instance strengthening labour rights and 
91 See Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration, in Jagdish 
Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds, Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol 2: 
Legal Analysis 21,36 (MIT 1996). 




imposing minimum labour standards would clearly affect developing countries' ability to 
94 
manufacture and export cheap products to the developed world . Similarly, an utmost 
protection of intellectual property would prevent developing countries from 
manufacturing generic medicines at affordable prices to their citizens. 
On that same level, one may ask what reasons might underlie LDCs' rejection of 
a linkage between insolvency and trade. As discussed earlier, an effective resolution of 
cross-border insolvency cases would result in more gains on the domestic level, whether 
social or economic. In addition, the application of fair and predictable insolvency rules on 
the domestic level would attract foreign direct investment? 5, which is a key objective of 
LDCs. Hence, the fact that most multinationals have their home country in the developed 
world, and accordingly, domestic courts in LDCs would most often defer to foreign 
insolvency proceedings, should not constitute a ground for rejecting such a linkage. So 
long as domestic and foreign creditors are treated equally through a global system of 
cross-priority; and insofar as secondary domestic proceedings may be initiated in order to 
protect the interests of domestic creditors, no apparent reasons for rejection exist under 
the current trading system. 
Perhaps, a more direct approach to advocate the linkage between insolvency and 
trade lies within the very nature of the WTO and the multilateral trading system itself. In 
fact, one may safely assert that the international trading system heavily relies on the 
96 active participation of multinational corporations . On the other hand, the scope of the 
WTO is not restricted to trade issues per se; rather this scope encompasses all matters that 
94 See Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U. S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, 
Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO's Future, 24 FORDHAM INTL LJ 608,64748 (2000). 
95 The area of investment finds a direct support from recent WTO negotiation rounds. Since the Singapore 
round, the WTO has set two separate working groups to explore the issues of competition and investment, 
and how the latter would relate to the promotion of free trade. 
96 "An indication of how closely trade is linked with investment is the fact that about one third of the $6.1 
trillion total for world trade in goods and services in 1995 was trade within companies - for example between subsidiaries in different countries or between a subsidiary and its headquarters. " See 
http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ (last visited July 2005). 
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may affect free trade 97 - As the insolvency of multinational corporations, which are 
important participants to the development of the multilateral trading system, produces 
considerable ex-ante and ex-post effects on the operations of such multinationals; the task 
of promoting global corporate insolvency rules should naturally be incumbent on the 
WTO. 
Linkages for less obvious reasons and relevancy to trade, such as intellectual 
property rights, could find a concrete implementation under the auspices of the WTO. 
Hence, it could be argued that multinationals' insolvency, a topic more related to trade 
than intellectual property rights, ought to be linked with trade under the supervision of 
the WTO. This would represent the most practical solution because of a number of 
reasons. First, the rule-making process under the WTO will favour a consensus-based 
approach on cross-border insolvency, with expected, yet useful, North/South debates on 
the issue. These debates will shed lights on the concerns of each country to abide by a 
global insolvency arrangement and to defer to foreign insolvency courts when doing so 
would result in a fairer liquidation or reorganization process. Although an eventual 
consensus on these matters may take long to concretise, significant advantages will result 
from the inclusion of cross-border insolvency matters into a readily functional and 
effective structure such as the WTO. Second, the WTO could use its own dispute 
settlement mechanisms so as to ensure that the consensus reached among the participants 
is duly enforced. By analogy, though analogies are often incomplete, the WTO and its 
DSB would respectively fulfil the same role as the Counsel of Europe and the ECJ. 
2. Prospects and Advantages under the WTO/DSB 
Undoubtedly, the primary advantage of linking insolvency to trade is to benefit 
from the WTO/DSB and its ability to compel nation states to respect their WTO 
97 See Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law, 35 J. 
World Trade 167 (2001); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT`L 
ECON. L. 19 (2000); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign 
Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20 MICH J. INTL L. 1 (1998); Neil Walker, The EU and the 
WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Aspects 
(Grainne De Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001). 
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commitments. Theoretically, the previous parts have attempted to find a plausible 
justification of how and why the insolvency of multinational corporations and the rules 
pursuant to which these entities are liquidated or restructured may hamper trade 
liberalization efforts as advocated by the WTO. This part will envisage, to the extent 
possible, the prospects of linking insolvency to trade, and most importantly, the prospects 
of resorting to the WTO/DSB to ensure that WTO member states enact an instrument 
such as an enhanced Model Law, thereby boosting cooperation trends between forums in 
resolving cross-border insolvency cases. 
To date, the international community has made no proposal or efforts to include 
cross-border insolvency into the WTO agenda. This lack of initiative may seem even 
more surprising when one considers that the WTO aims at regulating all aspects affecting 
the liberalization of trade, in relation to which, multinationals are the key players. It is 
more probable, however, that the area of insolvency did not attract much attention in the 
course of the WTO negotiation rounds because the implications of cross-border 
insolvency have traditionally been thought of as investment rather than trade-related. In 
light of the absence of a multilateral investment treaty, it can be understood why so little 
attention has been given to create or resort to a supranational entity, which objective is to 
enforce a more viable insolvency framework and/or standards. As such and despite the 
various justifications to link insolvency with trade, and notwithstanding the advantages 
that are likely to result from such a process, the prospects of transposing the Model Law, 
or any similar instrument, onto the form of a multilateral agreement on trade-related 
aspects of cross-border insolvency seem rather bleak. Insofar a multilateral investment 
treaty is now and remains under consideration at the WTO level and so long as a vivid 
opposition between the North and the South exists and will continue to delay the 
advancement of this projec ? 8' it is realistic to acknowledge that the cross-border 
insolvency dilemma stands little of a chance to be resolved through the WTO, at least in 
the short-term. 
9' See Paul Civello, The Trims Agreement: A Failed Attempt at Investment Liberalization, 8 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 97,97-100 (1999). 
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This being said, in today's global economy, the distinction between trade and 
investment is increasingly loose and even convergent". Rules affecting and regulating 
international trade affect investment, and vice versa, investment agreements between 
nations affect their WTO free trade commitments'00. Hence, it is foreseeable that the 
scope of the WTO will ultimately be broadened so as to cover investment related issues 
and ideally this will take the form of a binding multilateral investment treaty benefiting 
from the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. Perhaps, at that stage and within this 
investment context, the promulgation and ratification of cross-bordcr insolvency 
principles may become more easily achievable under the auspices of the WTO. Until 
then, the international community may have valuable years ahead to refine the Model 
Law and to address its shortcomings, thereby improving its chances to serve as the 
instrument of reference for a more rational, viable and perhaps "binding" cross-border 
insolvency regime. 
V. Conclusion 
The debate over the policy underpinnings for an effective cross-border insolvency 
framework has unfortunately occupied much of the literature in this area. Although 
achieving a meaningful advancement in this domain requires a complete and thorough 
understanding of such an extensive literature, it is believed that the cross-border 
insolvency dilemma is yearning for a more pragmatic and incremental (phased) solution, 
one that can reconcile conflicting theories while fully utilizing and benefiting from the 
international legal order. Undoubtedly, the Model Law marks the first step in the way of 
this pragmatic solution, but regrettably, it remains too weak to change the stalus quo of 
territoriality; not to mention its lack of binding effect. Accordingly, this last Chapter has 
attempted to browse and sift through the range of instruments and institutions, which by 
virtue of their nature and powers, are thought capable of achieving and channelling 
significant'insolvency reform and binding principles, on both bilateral and multilateral 
level. While the prospects of using such channels have been discussed, this Chapter does 
not aim at proposing the definitive components of an international insolvency treaty. 




Rather, it has attempted to broaden the debate on cross-border insolvency so as to involve 
potential reform vehicles not previously contemplated. Perhaps, more difficult than 
finding a viable solution to the cross-border insolvency dilemma is shifting the focus 
from theory to practice and to acknowledge that the international market is now 
sufficiently developed and mature to embrace global insolvency standards and/or 
framework. 
Admittedly the modest, interim and incremental (phased) approach ("Modiried 
Universalism") suggested by this thesis does not address satisfactorily, in the short and 
medium term, a number of the lingering international corporate insolvency issues and 
probably only a True/Pure Universalist framework would, but as pointed out in Chapter 
One and reaffirmed here in conclusion, "there needs to be a 'practical' start-point that can 
be incrementally enhanced and perfected over time, while exiting from the unproductive 
theoretical deadlock between Universality and Territoriality and unrealistic visions of 




1. Primary Sources 
A. Statutes & Regulations 
Commission's Draft Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, submitted to Council 
Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, OJ 1990 L 225/6. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ 
2000 L 160/1. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Joint 
Children, OJ 2000 L 160/19. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the statute for a European 
Company, OJ 2001 L 294/1. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement ofjudgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2001 L 12/1. 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (195 1), available at 
http: //europa. eu. int/ eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/treaties-founding. htm 
B. Official and Other Related Documents 
American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency Project: International Statement of 
Mexican Bankruptcy Law (Preliminary Draft No. 1, Sept. 11,1996). 
American Law Institute. Transnational Insolvency Project, International Statement of 
Canadian Bankruptcy Law: Tentative Draft. Philadelphia, PA: American Law Institute, 
(1997). 
American Law Institute. Transnational Insolvency Project: Interim Report (April 15,1999). 
Philadelphia, Pa.: American Law Institute, (1999). 
American Law Institute. Transnational Insolvency Project: International Statement of 
Mexican Bankruptcy Law: Tentative Drall. Philadelphia, PA (4025 Chestnut St., 
Philadelphia 19104-3099): Executive Office, American Law Institute, (1998). 
271 
Bibliography. 
American Law Institute. Transnational Insolvency Project: International Statement of United 
States Bankruptcy Law: Tentative Draft. Philadelphia: American Law Institute, (1997). 
Explanatory Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (Authors: Virgos, Miguel, 
Spain and Schmidt, Etienne, Luxemburg), Council's document 6500/l/96, dated 8 July 1996. 
Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and tile EC 
Treaty. 
Protocol on the position of United Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty on European 
Union and the EC Treaty. 
Report by Mr. P. Jenard on the Conventions of 27 September 1968 on the recognition and 
enforcement ofjudgments in civil and commercial matters, 1979 O. J. (C59). 
Report of the Committee's on Citizens" Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs 
opinion on 28 January 2000, AS-0039/2000. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, U. N. Commission on 
International Trade Law, U. N. Doc. A/52/17 (1997). Available at: 
www. uncitral. org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/insolvency/1 997model. html 
C. Treaties and Bindine Resolutions 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), available at http: //w%vw. nafta-sec. 
alena. org (last visited January 2006). 
The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, concluded on 27 September 1968. OJ 1998 C 27/1. 
The Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters, dated 28 May 1998, OJ 1998 C 221/1. 
The Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in 
Rome on 19 June 1980, for a consolidated text; see OJ 1998 C27/36. 
The Nordic Bankruptcy Convention, concluded at Copenhagen on 7h Novcmber 1933. 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (195 1), available at: 
http: //europa. eu. int/ eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/trcatics_founding. htm 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,1957,298 U. N. T. S. 11, 
1973 Gr. Brit. T. S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-11). 
272 
Bibliography. 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIP's) Agreement available at 
http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/tripsý_e/trips-e. htm 
A International Aaencies Report 
Ian F. Fletcher (Ed. ), Cross-Border Insolvency: National and Comparative Studies (Reports 
delivered at the XIII International Congress of Comparative Law, Montreal 1990) (1992). 
IMF publication "Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures" (1999). 
Report of the UNCITRAL Assembly General, U. N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Possible Future 
Work: Cross-border insolvency, A/CN. 9/378/Add. 4 (1993). 
Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work of Its Twentieth Session, 
U. N. GAOR, 30th Sess., at 5, U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/433 (1996). 
Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work of the Eighteenth Session, 
U. N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 5, U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/419 (1995). 
Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work of the Nineteenth Session, 
U. N. GAOR, 30th Sess., at 5, U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/422 (1996). 
The World Bank's report entitled Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights Systems, available at www. worldbank. org/gild 
U. N. COMMN ON INTI TRADE LAW, 30th Sess., U. N. Doc. A/CN. 9/442 (1997), U. N. 
Pub. Sales No. E. 99. V. 3, available at: 
http: //www. uncitral. org/English/texts/insolven/insolvency 
U. N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, U. N. Doc. A/52/17 (1977). 
E. Cases 
Case 106/77 Amministrazione della Finanze v. Simmenthal, (1978). ECR 629 
Case 14/68 Wait Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellarnt [1969] ECR 1. 
American Bell Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F2d 879,886 (3d Cir. 1984). 




Arret du 18 septembre 1992, Asia Motor France e. a. / Commission (T-28/90, Rec. -P. _Il- 2285) (cf. al. 36-37) available at http: //www. curia. cu. int/common/recdoc/rcpcrtoirc_ 
jurisp/bull-cee/data/index-B- I 9-03_00. htm 
Case C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo and others v. EnergiebedryflJsselniij, [1994] E. C. R. I- 
1477. 
Case 182/89, Commission of the European Communities v French Rcpubl ic, (1990) ECR 1 
-4337. 
Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Ondememing van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, (1963) ECR 1. 
Case C-334/94 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic (1996) 1- 
01307. 
Case T-334/94 Sarri6 SA v Commission of the European Communities, (1998) 11-01439. 
Cases 28/62 and 30/62 Da Costa en Schaake N. V. and Others v. Ncderlandsc 
Belastingadministratie, (1963) ECR 3 1. 
City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474,485 (S. D. N. Y. 1990) 
Compagnie Europeene des Petrolles S. A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V. (Netherland s) (I lol Ian 
d), 22 Int'l Legal Materials 66 (1983). 
Dow Jones & Co. v. Attorney General of Canada, 122 D. L. R. 3d 731 (Fed. Ct. A pp. 1981), 
affg, 113 D. L. R. 3d 395 (Fed. Ct. 1980). 
Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy (France), 5 Intl Legal Materials 476 (1966). 
In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 B. R. 597 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1988). 
In re Hourani, 180 B. R. 59 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1995). 
In re Maruko Inc., 160 B. R. 633 (Bankr. S. D. Cal. 1993). 
In re Maxwell Communication Corp. p1c, 170 BR 800 (Bankr. SDNY 1994) 
In re Olympia & York Dev. Ltd., [1993] 12 O. R. 3d 500 (Ont. Gen. Div. ). 
In re Papeleras Reunidas, S. A., 92 B. R. 584,590 (Bankr. E. D. N. Y. 1988). 
274 
Bibliography. 
In re Sefel Geophysical Ltd., 62 Alta. L. R. 2d 193,70 C. Bankr. (N. S. ) 97 (Q. B. 1988). 
In re The Singer Company N. V., No. 99-10578 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y., filed Scpt. 13,1999). 
In re Toga and Liverpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of the MN Venture Star, 102 B. R. 
373(D. N. J. 1988). 
Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich, Danila Bonifaci and Others v Italy, 
ECJ 19 November 1991, ECR [1991] 1-5357. 
Joslyn MfG. Co. v. TL James & Co. 893 F 2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990). 
Lubbe v Cape plc [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 139 (CA), UK Court of Appeal. 
Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Socidtd Gdnerale (In rc Maxwell Communication 
Corp. ), 93 F. 3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
Re ISA Daisytek SAS (France: Court of Appeal, Versailles - September 4,2003), available 
at http: //www. iiiglobal. org/country/european_union. html 
Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtscliaftskammcr fuer 
das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989. 
Case 449/93 Rockfon A/S v Specialarbej derforbundet i Danmark, ECR (1995) 1429 1. 
RSR Corporation v. Avanti Development, Inc., 2000 WL 1448705 (S. D. Ind., 2000). 
Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1981). 
Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F2d 215,221 (1 st Cir. 198 1). 
United States v. Kayser-Roth Co., 910 F2d 24 (1 st Cir. 1990). 
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (ED Pa. 1989). 
275 
Bibliography. 
11. Secondary Sources 
A. Books 
Andenas, Mads (ed). Article 177 References to the European Court. Policy and Practicc, 
Butterworths (1994). 
Baird, D. and T. Jackson. Cases, Problems, and Materials on Bankruptcy. Boston: Littlc, 
Brown and Company (1995). 
Baird, 11. The Elements of Bankruptcy. New York: Foundation Press (1992). 
Baker & McKenzie and Euromoney Publications p1c. Insolvency: A Legal Guide. 
[London]: Euromoney Publications p1c. (1999). 
Balleisen, Edward J. Navigating Failure: Bankruptcy and Commercial Society. In 
Antebellum America 28 (N. Carolina Press 2001). 
Barrett, John A. International Bar Association. Committee J Creditoes Rights Insolvency 
Liquidation and Reorganisations, and International Bar Association. Section on Business 
Law. Environmental Issues in Insolvency Proceedings. International Bar Association 
Series. London; Boston: Kluwer Law International and International Bar Association 
(1998). 
Basedow, Rurgen and Toshiyuki Kono. Legal Aspects of Globalisation: Conflict of Laws, 
Internet, Capital Markets and Insolvency in a Global Economy. The Hague; Boston: 
Kluwer Law International (2000). 
Belcher, Alice. Corporate Rescue: A Conceptual Approach to Insolvency Law. Modem 
Legal Studies. London: Sweet & Maxwell (1997). 
Bennett, Frank and Canada Bennett on Bankruptcy. 6th ed. Ontario: CCII Canadian 
(2000). 
Bennett, Frank. Bennett on Bankruptcy. 3rd ed. North York, Ont. Rivenvood, Ill.: CCIJ 
Canada; CCH, Inc. (1993). 
Berti, Stephen. Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law: English Translation of flic 
Amended Federal Statute on Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy (Schkg). Z6urich: 
Schulthess Polygraphischer (1997). 
Blankenburg, Erhard. Mobilizing the European Court of Justice, in The European court of 
justice, ed. Weiler J. J. and G. De Burca, Oxford University Press (200 1). 
276 
Bibliography. 
Blum, Walter J. Materials on Insolvency and Reorganization. 1960 ed. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press (1960). 
Brewer, Thomas L. and Stephen Young. The Multilateral Investment System and 
Multinational Enterprises. Oxford University Press 45 (1998). 
Bridge, M. G. and Robert Stevens. Cross-Border Security and Insolvcncy. Oxford 
[England]; New York: Oxford University Press (2001). 
Bridge, Michael. Cross-Border Insolvency and Security. Oxford University Press (2001). 
Butcher, Bruce S. Directors' Duties: A New Millennium, a New Approach?. Studies in 
Comparative Corporate and Financial Law; V. 7. The Hague; Boston: Klu%%, cr Law 
International (2000). 
Charlesworth, John, et al. Company Law. 16th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell (1999). 
Chaudhary, War Hussain. Manual of Insolvency Laws. Lahore: National Times 
Publications (1995). 
Clarke, Alison. Current Issues in Insolvency Law. Current Legal Problems. London: 
Stevens (199 1). 
Dalhuisen, J. H. Dalhuisen on International Insolvency and Bankruptcy. New York: M. 
Bender (19 8 0). 
Dalhuisen, Jan. Dalhuisen on International Insolvency and Bankruptcy. 127 (6th ed. 1986). 
Dalhuisen, Jan. Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial and Trade Law, Second 
edition, Hart Publishing Oxford (2004). 
De Waart, Paul. The Right to Development: Utopian or Real?. In Restructuring the 
International Economic Order: The Role of Law and Lawyers, Pietcr van Dijk et al. eds. 
(1987). 
Debousse, Renaud. The European Court of Justice: the politics of judicial integration. st. 
Martin's Press New York (1998). 
Dennis, Campbell. International Corporate Insolvency Law. Butterworth (1992). 
Derharn, S. R. Set-off. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press (1996). 
277 
Bibliography. 
Duns, John. Insolvency: Law and Policy. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 
(2002). 
Finch, Vanessa. Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles. Cambridge; Ncw 
York: Cambridge University Press (2002). 
Fletcher, Ian F. and Letitia Crabb. The Law of Insolvency. 2nd ed. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell (1996). 
Fletcher, Ian F. and Letitia Crabb. The Law of Insolvency. Sweet & Maxwell's Insolvency 
Library. 3rd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell (2002). 
Fletcher, Ian F. and United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law. Cross. 
Border Insolvency: Comparative Dimensions: The Aberystwyth Insolvency Papers: United 
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law (1989). 
Fletcher, Ian F. Insolvency in Private International Law: National and International 
Approaches. Oxford Monographs in Private International Law. Oxford: Clarcndon Prcss 
(1999). 
Fletcher, Ian F. The Law of Insolvency. London: Sweet & Maxwell (1990). 
Fletcher, lan. Insolvency in Private International Law: National and International 
Approaches. Oxford University Press (1999). 
Forde, Michael. The Law of Company Insolvency. Blackrock, Co. Dublin: Round Hall 
Press (1993). 
Franks, Julian R. and Oren Sussman. Empirical investigation of U. S. firms in 
reorganization, in Corporate Bankruptcy and Distressed Restructuring. S. Altman, cd. 
(2000). 
Gen-nany and Charles E. Stewart. Insolvency Code, Act Introducing tile Insolvency Code: 
Gerrnan-English Edition with an Introduction to the German Law. Frankfurt am Main: F. 
Knapp (1997). 
Gianvitti, F. Les rapports entre I'Organisation mondiale du commerce et le Fonds 
mondtaire international: La reorganisation. mondiale des dchanges (probl6mesjuridiques). 
Paris: Pedone (1996). 
Goode, R. M. Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law. 2nd ed: Sweet & Maxwell (2003). 
Goode, R. M. Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell: Centre for Commercial Law Studies (1985). 
278 
Bibliography. 
Goswarni, Omkar. Corporate Bankruptcy in India: A Comparative Perspective. Paris, 
France: Development Centre, OECD (1996). 
Hartley, Trevor C. The Foundations of EuroPean Community Law. 138-3'd cd. (1994). 
Hilliard, Francis. A Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy and Insolvency. 2nd cd. Clark, 
N. J.: Lawbook Exchange (2003). 
Hindley. B. What Subjects are Suitable for WTO Agreement? Political economy of 
international trade law: essays in honor of Robert E. Hudec / ed. by D. L. M. Kennedy and 
J. D. Southwick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2002). 
Hoekman, B. The WTO: functions and basic Principles. Development, trade and the WTO: 
a handbook, ed. by B. Hoekman, A. Mattoo and P. English; Washington, D. C.: World 
Bank (2002). 
Hoogvelt, Ankie M. M. Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: 17he New Political 
Economy of Development (1997). 
Jackson, J. H. Managing the trading system: the World Trade Organization and the post- 
Uruguay Round GATT agenda, Managing the world economy: fifty years after Bretton 
Woods/ ed P. R Kenen. Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics (1994) 
Jackson, T. The Logic and Limits to Bankruptcy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company 
(1986). 
Juenger, Friedrich K. and Patrick J. Borchers. International Conflict of Laws for tile I'llird 
Millennium. Essays in Honor of Friedrich K. Juenger. Ardsicy, NY: Transnational 
Publishers (2001). 
Keay, Andrew R. Insolvency: Personal and Corporate Law and Practice. 3rd ed. Sydney, 
NSW, Australia: J. Libbey (1998). 
Kilpi, Jukka. The Ethics of Bankruptcy. Professional Ethics. London; New York: 
Routledge (1998). 
Kipel, Alice Alexandra. Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, in 
The World Trade Organization: The Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Century 
and U. S. Implementing Legislation (Terence P. Stewart cd., A. B. A., Section of Int'l Law & 
Practice (1996). 
Kiss, Alexandre-Charles. Les resources naturelles ct le droit international: Conclusions. 
45-56 Annuaire de PA. A. A. (1984-86). 
Krugcr, Lewis and Practising Law Institute. Creditor Representation in Bankruptcy and 
279 
Bibliography. 
Insolvency Proceedings. Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series. No. 122. 
New York: Practising Law Institute (1974). 
Laziac, Vesna. Insolvency Proceedings and Commercial Arbitration. International 
Arbitration Law Library. The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, (1998). 
Leonard, E. Bruce and Christopher W. Besant. Current Issues in Cross-Bordcr Insolvency 
and Reorganisations. International Bar Association Series. London ; Boston, Klu%vcr 
Academic Publishers Group, (1994). 
Leonard, E. B. and C. W. Besant (Editors) Current Issues in Cross-Border Insolvency and 
reorganizations (1994). 
Lester, V. Markham. Victorian Insolvency: Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt, and 
Company Winding-up in Nineteenth-Century England. Oxford Historical Monographs. 
Oxford University Press, (1995). 
L6uer, Hans-Jochem. The Insolvency Laws of Germany. Yonkers, NY Juris Publishing 
(2000). 
Lightman, Gavin. The Law of Receivers and Administrators of Companies. 3rd cd. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell (2000). 
Mann, Bruce H. Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of Amcrican Indcpcndcncc. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (2002). 
Mathews, Barbara Allen. "Forgive Us Our Debts" Bankruptcy and Insolvency in America. 
1763-1841. Microform: (1994). 
Meeran, R. The Unveiling of Transnational Cotporations: A Dircct Approach. Kluwcr Law 
International (1999). 
Miller, Frederick H. and Alvin C. Harrell. The ABCs of the UCC. Related Insolvency 
Law. Chicago, Ill.: American Bar Association (2002). 
Moss, Gabriel S. The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: A Commentary and 
Annotated Guide. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press (2002). 
Muchlinski, Peter. Multinational Enterprises and the Law. Oxford, Cambridge MA: 
Blackwell Publishers (1995). 
N. Cooper, R. Jarvis and S. Abeyratne. Recognition and Enforcement of Cross-Border Insolvency (1996). 
280 
Bibliography. 
Palmiter, Alan R. and Lewis D. Solomon. Corporations: Examples and Explanations. The 
Examples & Explanations Series. 4th ed. New York: Aspen Publishers (2003). 
Peltzer, Martin. German Insolvency Laws: A Synoptical Translation of the Bankruptcy 
Act, the Court Composition Act and Act on Contestation. K6oln: 0. Schmidt (1975). 
Pescatore, Pierre. Les objectifs de la Communautd curopdcnne commc principes 
d'interpretation dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice. in Miscellanea Ganshof van 
der Meersch. Tome deuxieme (1972). 
Prior, Michael & Nabarro Nathanson. Bankruptcy Treaties Past, Present and Future, Their 
Failures and Successes, in Insolvency Law. Theory and Practice 229 (Harry Rajak cd., 
1993). 
Rajak, Harry and Joe Bannister (eds). European Corporate Insolvency: A Practical Guide. 
2d ed. New York: Wiley (1995). 
Rasmussen, Hjalte. European Court of Justice, Gadjura (1998). 
Sarra, Janis Pearl. Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent 
Corporations. Toronto [Canada]; Buffalo [N. Y. ]: University of Toronto Press (2003). 
Smart, Philip. Cross-Border Insolvency, Butterworth (1988). 
Smith, A. An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Methuen, 
London 1961 (1776). 
Snaith, Ian and Fiona Cownie. The Law of Corporate Insolvcncy. Ist cd. London: 
Waterlow (1990). 
Sorensen, Anker. Directors' Liabilities in Case of Insolvency. The I lague; Boston: Kluwer 
Law International (1999). 
Tabalujan, Benny S. and Indonesia. Indonesian Insolvency Law. Singapore: Wordjoy, 
Business Law Asia Division (1998). 
Tomasic, Roman & Peter Little. Insolvency Law and Practice in Asia. Hong Kong: FT 
Law & Tax Asia Pacific (1997). 
Tomasic, Roman and Peter Little. Insolvency Law & Practice in Asia. I st cd. I long Kong: 
FT Law & Tax Asia Pacific (1997). 
Virg5os Soriano, Miguel. The 1995 European Community Convention on Insolvency 




Walker, Neil. The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in The EU and the 
WTO: Legal and Constitutional Aspects. Grainne De Burca & Joanne Scott cds. (2001). 
Wallace, Cynthia Day. The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: I lost State 
Sovereignty in an Era of Economic Globalisation 1082 (2002). 
Watkins, Kevin and Penny Fowler. Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, 
Globalisation, and the Fight against Poverty. 235 Oxfarn Campaign Reports (2002). 
Weiss, L. A. Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (1998). 
White, Kenneth. Trading Claims in Bankruptcy; Trends, Issues and lnvcstmcnt 
Opportunities. 366 PLI Real Estate L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 9, (Jan. - 
Mar. 1991). 
Wood, Philip, Peter Totty and Allen & Overy (Fin-n). Buttcnvorths International 
Insolvency Laws. London Carlsbad, Butterworth Legal Publishers (1994). 
Wood, Philip. Principles of International Insolvency. Law and Practice of International 
Finance. London: Sweet & Maxwell (1995). 
B. Articles 
Adams, C., "An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganization", 20 Horstra L. Rev. 117 
(1991). 
Adler, Barry, "Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules", 67 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. (1994). 
Adler, Barry and Ayres, I., "A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in Bankruptcy", 
III Yale L. Journal (200 1). 
Adler, Barry, "A Re-Examination of Near Bankruptcy Investment Incentives", 62 U. Chi. L 
Rev. (1995). 
Adler, Barry, "Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation", 77 Comell L. Review (1992). 




Aghion, Philippe, Et al., "The Economics of Insolvency Reform", 8 Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization (1992). 
Alix, J., Et. al., "Financial Handbook for Bankruptcy Professionals", FlNBKRPROF § 3.5 
(2003). 
Altman, E., "A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question", Journal of 
Finance, 39 (1984). 
Alwang, Melissa K. S., "Steering the Most Appropriate Course Between Admiralty and 
Insolvency: Why an International Insolvency Treaty Should Recognize the Primacy of 
Admiralty Law Over Maritime Assets", Fordham Law Review 64, no. 6 (1996). 
Andrew, J., and Kelly, J., IOSCO Deal to Reduce Securities Risk (Fin. Times, May 28,1998). 
Annstrong, P., "The Chaos of International Insolvency--Achieving Reciprocal Universality 
Under Section 304", 6 Transnational Law R. (1993). 
Baird, D., and Morrison, E., "Bankruptcy Decision Making", 17 J. L. Econ. & Organization 
(2001). 
Baird, D., Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 107 Yale L. Journal (1999). 
Baird, D., The initiation problem in bankruptcy, International Review of Law and Economics 
11(1991). 
Baird, D., The uneasy case for corporate reorganizations, Journal of Lcgal Studies (1986). 
Baldwin, C., and Mason, S., "The Resolution of Claims in Financial Distress: The Case of 
Massey Ferguson", Journal of Finance, 38, (1983). 
Balz, M., "The European Union Convention on Insolvency Procecdings", 70 Am. Bankr. L. J. 
(1996). 
Barrett A., Jr., "Mexican Insolvency Law", Pace International Law Review 7 (1995). 
Barrctt, J., and Barrctt, A., Jr., "Cross Bordcr Aspccts of Mcxican Insolvcncy Law", Annual 
Survcy of Bankruptcy Law (1995-1996). 




Bebchuk, A., "A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations", 101 IIARV. L. REV. 775 
(1988). 
Bebchuk, A., "The Options Approach to Corporate Reorganization", rnimco, Harvard 
University (2001). 
Bebchuk, A., "Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy", European Economic 
Review 44, (2000). 
Bebchuk, A., and Chang, H., "Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate 
Reorganization", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 8, (1992). 
Bebchuk, A., and Fried. J., "The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy", 105 Yale L. J. (1996). 
Bebchuk, A., and Fried. J., "The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Insolvency: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics", 82 Cornell L. Rev. (1997). 
Bebchuk, A., and Gusman, A., "An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcics", 42 J. 
Law & Econ. (1999). 
Belinfante Freres, La Codification du Droit International de ]a Faillitc, La Ilaye (1895). 
Berends, A., "The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-bordcr Insolvency: A Comprehensivc 
Overview", 6 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. (1998). 
Berends, A., "The UNICITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive 
Overview", 6 Tul. J. Int & Comp. Law (1998). 
Berger, M., "Currency Issues in Multinational Business Reorganizatione', Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 20, no. I (1995). 
Berkovitch, E., and Israel, R., "An Optimal Insolvency Law and Firm-Spccific Investments", 
European Economic Review 41, (1997). 
Berkovitch, E., and Israel, R., "Optimal Insolvency Law Across Different Economic Systems", 
The Review of Financial Studies 12, No-2, (1999). 
Berkovitch, E., and Israel, R., "The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations", 
European Finance Review 2, (1998). 
Bhala, R., "Assessing The Modem Era of International Trade", 21 Fordharn Int'l L. J. (1998). 
284 
BibliographY. 
Bland, S., "Insolvency in Farming and Agribusiness", 73 Ky. L. J. (1994). 
Block-Lieb, S., "Bankruptcy Fraud: Book Review: A Humanistic Vision of Bankruptcy Law: 
Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (Yale University 
Press 1997)", 6 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. (1998). 
Block-Lieb, S., "Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied 
to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case", 42 Am. U. L. Rev. (1993). 
Blum, B., "The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small Businesses in Bankruptcy", 4 The 
Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law (1995). 
Blumberg, P. I., "The Multinational Challenge to Corporate LaNV', OUP 25 (1993). 
Blumberg, P., "The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems in the Bankruptcy or reorganization 
of Parent Subsidiary corporations", (1987) §§ 17.09.2,17.16,17.23.4). 
Booth, C., "Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the Inconsistent 
Approaches of United States Courts", 66 Am. Bankr. L. J. (1992)., 
Borchers, P., "Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests and Other Liens in International 
Bankruptcies", 46 Am. J. Comp. L. (1998). 
Bradley, M., and Rosenzweig, M., "The Untenable Case for Chapter 11" , Yale Law Review, 
101(1992). 
Brozman, T., "A Perspective from a US Judge", International Insolvency Review 4 (Supp) 
(1995). 
Brubaker, R., "Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of 
Non-Debtor Releases In Chapter II Reorganizations", 1997 U. 111. L. Rev. (1997). 
Buckley, F. H., "The Termination Decision", 61 UMKC L. Rev. 243,244 (1992). 
Burman, Harold S., "Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law: A United States 
Perspective", Fordham Law Review 64, no. 6 (1996). 
Butler, R. and Gilpatric, S., "A Re-examination of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy", 
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 269 (1994). 
Buxbaum, H., "Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-Law 
Rules and Theory", 36 Stan. J. Int'l L. 23 (2000). 
285 
Bibliography. 
Buxharn H. L., "Rethinking International Insolvency: the Neglected Role of Choice of Law 
Rules and Theory", 36 Stan, J. Int. 'I L. (2000). 
Cameron, D., "EMU AFTER 1999: The Implications and Dilemmas of the Third Stage", 4 
CLMJEURL 425 (1998). 
Chittenden, C., "After the Fall of Maxwell Communications: Is the Time Right for a 
Multinational Insolvency Treaty? ", 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 161,179 (1993). 
Civello, P., "The Trims Agreement: A Failed Attempt at Investment Liberal ization", 8 Minn. 
J. Global Trade (1999). 
Coffee, J., Jr., "The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control", III Yale Law Journal (2001). 
Cohen, N., "Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next Frontier", 33 Tcx. 
Int'l L. J. (1998). 
Coogan, P., Et al., "Panel Discussion: The Problems of the Sinking Ship"', 31 BUS. LAW. 
(1976). 
Cook, David C., "Prospects for a North American Bankruptcy Agreement; Lcs Prospects pour 
une Convention de la Faillite en Amerique du Nord; Los Prospectos Para un Convcnio dc 
Quiebra de Norte America", Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 2 
(1995). 
Cooper, N., "International Initiatives: INSOL. ", 6 International Insolvency Review 85 (1997). 
Craig, P., "The Jurisdiction of The Community Courts Reconsidered", 36 Tex. Intl L. J. 
(2001). 
Cremades, Bernardo M., "International Financial and Secured Transactions", International 
Lawyer 3 1, no. 2 (1997). 
Dallmeyer, G., "The United States- Japan Semiconductor Accord of 1986: The Shortcomings 
of High-Tech Protectionism", 13 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade (1989). 
Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonization and The Virtues of Shields over Swords, 
13 Mnjgt 305 (2004). 
Davidsson, P., "Legal Enforcement Of Corporate Social Responsibility within the EU", 8 
Colum. J. Eur. L. (2001). 
Davis, L., Et al., "Corporate Reorganization in the 1990's: Guiding Directors of Troubled 
Corporations Through Uncertain Territory", 47 Bus. Law I (199 1). 
286 
Bibliography. 
Dennis, F., "Stock Repurchase Agreements in Bankruptcy: A Tale of State Law Rights 
Discarded", 12 Banks. Dev. J. (1996). 
DevIing, B., "The Continuing Vitality of the Territorial Approach to Cross-Bordcr 
Insolvency", 70 UMKC L. Rev. (2001). 
Di Fabio, U., "A European Charter: Towards a Constitution for the Union"', 7 Colum. J. Eur. 
L. 159,160 (2001). 
Drake, W. Jr., and Strickland, C., "Chapter 2. Systems of Debtor Relier', CII II REORG § 2: 7 
(2003). 
Drobnig, U., "Secured Credit in international Insolvency Proceedings", 33 Tex. Intl L. J. 
(1998). 
Dunne, G., "Transnational Insolvency: Centrality versus Territoriality", 112 Banking Law 
Journal, No. 3 (1995). 
Dunne, Gerald T., "Transnational Insolvency--Centrality Versus Territorality", The Banking 
Law Journal 112, no. 3 (1995). 
Dunne, Gerald T., "Wanted: An International Insolvency Act", The Banking Law Journal 12, 
no. 2 (1995). 
Eberhart, A., "Absolute priority rule violations and risk incentives for financially distrcsscd 
firms", Financial Management (1993). 
Eberhart, A., "Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy 
Proceedings", Journal of Finance, 45 (1990). 
Enock, R., and London, N., "The Company Market and Insolvency: Schemes of Arrangement; 
Section 304; The Policyholders Protection Board", Practising Law Institute Commercial Law 
and Practice Course Handbook Series, 735 (1996). 
Felsenfeld, Carl, "A Comment About a Separate Bankruptcy System", Fordham Law Review 
138(1999). 
Flaschen, E., and Plank, L., "The Foreign Representative: A New Approach to Coordinating 
the Bankruptcy of a Multinational Enterprise", 10 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. (2002). 
Flaschen, E., and Silverman, R., "Cross- Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocole', 33 Tex. 
Int'l. L. J. (1998). 
Flaschen, E., and Watkins, B., "Section 304 and Related Provisions-. United States Treatment 
of Foreign Insolvencies", Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law (1996-1997). 
287 
Bibliography. 
Fletcher, I., "Cross-Border Cooperation in Cases of International Insolvency: Some Recent 
Trends Compared", 6-7 Tul. Civ. L. F. (1992). 
Fletcher, I., "The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An overview 
Comment", with U. S. interest in Mind, 23 Brook. J. Int'l L. 25, (1997). 
Fletcher, I., "The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choicc-of-Law 
Provisions", 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. (1998). 
Flics, M., and Ireland, M., "Bankruptcy and the Problems of Multi-Jurisdictional Workouts", 
592 PLI/Comm 415, (199 1). 
Flynn, E., "A Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, mimeo, Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts", Washington D. C. (1999) 
Franks, Julian R., "A comparison of U. S., U. K., and Gcrman insolvcncy codcs", Financial 
Managcmcnt 25 (1996). 
Franks, Julian R., and Torous, N., "An empirical investigation of U. S. firms in 
reorganization", Journal of Finance 44 (1989). 
Friman, R., "Rocks, Hard Places, and the New Protectionism: Textile Trade Policy Choices in 
the United States and Japan", 42 INTI ORG. 689 (1988). 
Gaa, T., and Garzon, P., "International Creditors' Rights and Bankruptcy", 31 International 
Lawyer no. 2, (1997). 
Gaa, T., "International Creditors' Rights and Bankruptcy", International Lawyer 31, no. 2 
(1997). 
Gaillard, E., and Westbrook J., "Four Models for International Bankruptcy", Am. J. Cornp. L. 
(1993). 
Garcia, F., "Americas Agreements"--An Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade Area f 11c 
Americas, 35 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. (1997). 
Gary, P., "The Turnover of Assets Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code", 12 Fordharn 
Inter. L. J. (1989). 
Gersten, "The doctrine of lis pendens: The need for balance", Fla. B. J. 83 (1995). 
Gertner, Robert and Scharfstcin, D., "A theory of workouts and the effects of reorganization 
law", Journal of Finance 46 (1991). 
288 
Bibliography. 
Giammarino, Ronald M., "The Resolution of Financial Distress", Review of Financial Studies 
2, (1989). 
Gilreath, M., "Overview and Analysis of How the United Nations Model Law on Insolvency 
Would Affect United States Corporations Doing Business Abroad", 16 Bank. Dev. J. (2000). 
Gilson, R., "Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function", 49 
American Journal of Comparative Law (2001). 
Gilson, S., "Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Block Holdcrs", Journal of Financial Economics, 
27(1990). 
Gilson, S., "Management Turnover and Financial Distress", Joumal of Financial Economics, 
25, (1989). 
Gilson, S., "Managing Default: Some Evidence on How Firms Choose Betwcen Workouts and 
Chapter 11", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 4 (199 1). 
Gilson, S., "Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially 
Distressed Firms", 52 J. of Finance (1997). 
Gilson, S., and Kose, J., "Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study Private 
Reorganization of Firms in Default", Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1990). 
Glosband, D., and Katucki, T., "Current Developments in International lnsolvcncy Law and 
Practice", 45 Bus. Law. (1990). 
Glosband, D., and Katucki, T., Symposium, Transnational Insolvency: A Multinational View 
of Bankruptcy "Claims and Priorities in Ancillary Proceedings under Section 304", 17 Brook. 
J. Int'l L. (1991). 
Golick, S., "What, How, Where, and When to File: Considerations and Implications in Cross. 
Border Insolvency Proceedings in Canada", 12 JBKRLP 5 ART. 2 (2003). 
Gomide, L., Et. al., "Commercial Financing And Insolvency Law in Brazil"', 2 Sw. J. L. & 
Trade Am. 123 (1995). 
Goode, R., "Security in Cross-Border Transactione', 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. (1998). 
Goodman, Henry and Friedman, P., "Use of the United States Bankruptcy Law in 
Multinational Insolvencics: Tile Axona Litigation-Issucs, Tactics, and Implications for the 
Future", 9 Bank. Dev. J. 19, (1992). 
Green, Richard C., "Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrant", Journal of Financial 
289 
Bibliography. 
Economics 13 (1984). 
Grimes, D., "Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veit", 13 NO. 5 Bankr. Strategist (1996). 
Grossman, A., "Conflict of Laws in the Discharge of Debts in Bankruptcy", International 
Insolvency Review 5, no. I (1996). 
Gunther, F., Et. Al., "A Hard Look at Soft LaNV', 82 Am. Soc'y Ind L. Proc. (1988). 
Guzman, A., "In Defence of Universalism", 98 Mich. L. Rev. (2000) 
Guzman, A., "International Law: A Compliance Based Theory", UC (1997). 
Hamilton, C., and Rochwerger, P., "Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct Investment through 
Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties", 18 N. Y. Int'l L. Rev. (2005). 
Hansmann, H., and Kraakman, R., "Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts", 100 Yale L. J. (199 1). 
Haque, I., "DOHA Development Agenda: Recapturing the Momentum of Multilatcralism and 
Developing Countries", 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. (2002). 
Harrison, L., Et al., "Dealing with Secured Claims & Structured Financial Products in 
Bankruptcy Cases", 853 PLI/Comm (2003). 
Harrison, S., "The Extraterritoriality of the Bankruptcy Code: Will the Borders Contain tile 
Code? ", Bankruptcy Developments Journal 12, no. 3 (1996). 
Haysom D., and Damiani, A., "Practitioner's Guide to International Bankruptcy", New York 
State Bar Journal 68, no. I (1996). 
Healy, E., "All's Fair In Love And Bankruptcy? Analysis of the Property Rcquiremcnt for 
Section 109 Eligibility and its Effect on Foreign Debtors Filing in U. S. Bankruptcy Courts", 
12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. (2004). 
fleidt, K., "Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy", BKRENVOB § 10: 32 (2004). 
Heinkel, R., and Zechner, J., "Financial Distress and Optimal Capital Structure Adjustments", 
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 2, No. 4 (1993). 
Helen, V., and Yoffie, B., "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and 
a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands", 43 INTL ORG. 239 (1989). 
Hindley, "What subjects are suitable for WTO agreement? ", Political economy of international 
trade law: essays in honor of Robert E. Hudec: / cd. by D. L. M. Kennedy and J. D. Southwick. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2002). 
290 
Bibliography. 
Hoffmann, L., "Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective", 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2507 
(1996). 
Hurd, S., "Re-reading Reading: "Fairness to all persons" in the context of administrative 
expense priority for postpetition punitive fincs in bankruptcy", 51 Vand. L. Rev. (1998). 
Isham, S., "UNCITRAL's Model Law on Cross- Border Insolvency: A Workable Protection 
for Transnational Investment at Last"', 26 BROOK. J. INTL. L. 1177 (2001). 
Jackson, J. H., "Afterword: The Linkage Problem--Commcnts on Five Texts", 96 Am J Intl L 
(2002). 
Jackson, J. H., "Managing the trading system: the World Trade Organization and tile post- 
Uruguay Round GATT agenda, Managing the world economy: fifly years aftcr Brctton 
Woods", (ed. P. B. Kenen. Washington, D. C. ), Institute for International Economics, (1994). 
Jackson, J. H., "The Perils Of Globalisation and the World Trading System", 24 Fordham Intl 
LJ (2000). 
Jackson, T., and Scott, R., "On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing 
and The Creditor's Bargain", 75 Va. L. Rev. (1999). 
Jeremy, V., "How Well Does the U. S. Bankruptcy Code Support the Emerging Standards of 
Comity in Cross-Border Insolvcncies", Am. Bankr. Inst. J. (1997). 
Johnston, J., "The Bankruptcy Bargain", 65 Am. Bankr. L. J. (199 1). 
Joseph, S., and Friedman, B., "Multinational Insolvcncies", Practising Law Institute 
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 752 (1997). 
Kalevitch, L., "Setoff and Bankruptcy", 41 Clcv. St. L. Rev. 599, (1993). 
Karnlah, K., "The New German Insolvency Act: Insolvcnzordnung", 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 
417(1996). 
Keech, E., "Problems in the Liquidation and Reorganization of International Steamship 
Companies in Bankruptcy", 59 Tul. L. Rev. (1985). 
Kelakos, G., et al., "A Report on the International Insolvency Colloquium", 041901 ABI-CLE 
689(2001). 
Kennedy, K., "Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at the World Trade 
Organization", 33 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. (2001). 
Kerkman, J., "The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 
291 
Bibliography. 
Marquette Law Review", 70 Brooklyn J. Int. L. (1987). 
Kershman, Stanley J., "The Canadian Experience--The Bankruptcy & Insolvency Advisory 
Committee", American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 14 (1996). 
Klee, K., "Cram Down 11", 64 Am. Bankr. L. J. (1990). 
Klein, M., "Multinational Insolvencies: Implementing International Bankruptcy Cooperation", 
12 NO. 6 Bankr. Strategist (1995). 
Koral, R., and Sordino, M. C., "The New Bankruptcy Reorganization Law in France: Ten 
Years Later", 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. (1996). 
Korobkin, D., "Employee Interests in Bankruptcy", 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. (1996). 
Korobkin, D., "Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy", 91 Colum. L. Rev. 
717(1991). 
Koutrakos, P., "Constitutional Idiosyncrasies and Political Realities: The Emerging Security 
and Defense Policy of the European Union", 10 Colum. J. Eur. L. (2003). 
Kraft, T., and Aranson, A., "Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond", Columbia 
Bus. L. R. (1993). 
Krajewski, M., "Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law', 35 J. 
World Trade 167 (2001). 
Krause, Stuart A., and Janovsky, P., "Relief Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: 
Clarifying the PriniciPal Role of Comity in Transnational Insolvencies", Fordharn Law 
Review 64, no. 6 (1996). 
Larry, L., and Stulz, R., "Contagion and Competitive Intra-Industry Effects of Bankruptcy 
Announcements", Journal of Financial Economics (1992). 
Leal-Arcas, R., "Unitary Character of EC External Trade Relations", 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 
(2001). 
Lee, P., "Ancillary Proceedings under Section 304 and Proposed Chapter IS of the Bankruptcy 
Code", 76 Am. Bankr. L. J. (2002). 
Leonard, B., "The International Year in RevieNV', 22-JAN Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 22, (2004). 
Leonard, B., "The Way Ahead: Protocols in international Insolvency Cases", 17-JAN Am. 
Bankr. Inst. J. 12, (1999). 
292 
Bibliography. 
Leonard, B., and Marantz, G., "International Bankruptcies: Developing Practical Strategies", 
628 PLI/Comm (1991). 
Leonard, B., and Zwaig, M., "Development and Trends in United States/Canada Cross-border 
Reorganizations", 9 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. (2000). 
Leonard, E. Bruce, "International Initiatives: IBA Committee P, International Insolvency 
Review 6, no. I (1997). 
Leonard, E. Bruce, "The International Scene: Canada's New Cross-border Insolvency 
Legislation", American Bankruptcy Institute Journal (September 1997). 
Levy, "Lis pendens and Procedural Due Process: A Closer Look after Connecticut v. Doehr", 
51 Md. L. Rev. 1054, (1992). 
Lieb, R., "Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations", 
(University of Toronto press 2003, Book Review), II Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 551 (2003). 
Lim, Ewe-Ghee, "Determinants of, and the Relation Between, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Growth: A Summary of the Recent Literature", 12-15 (IMF, Working Paper No. 01/175, 
(2001). 
Lin, L., "Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty 
to Creditors", 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1993). 
Lodge, Aaron, "Globalisation: Panacea for the World or Conquistador of International Law 
and Statehood? ", 7 ORRIL 224 (2005). 
Londot, John K, "Handling Priority Rules Conflicts in International Bankruptcy: Assessing the 
International Bar Associations's Concordat", Bankruptcy Developments Journal 13, No. 1 
(1996). 
LoPucki, L. & W. Whitford, "Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly-Held Companies", mimeo, University of Wisconsin (1992). 
Lopucki, L., "Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Schwartz Alan", 109 Yale L. Journal (1999). 
Lopucki, L., "Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach", 84 
Cornell L. Rev. (1999). 
LoPucki, L., "The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy", 98 Mich. 
L. Rev. (2000). 
Lopucki, L., "The Death of Liability", 106 Yale L. J. 1 (1996). 
293 
Bibliography. 
LoPucki, L., "The Debtor in Full Control -- Systems Failure Under Chapter II of the 
Bankruptcy Code? ", American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 57 (1983). 
Lowell, John, "Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments of Creditors", I HARV. L. REV. 
(1988). 
Maizel, S., "Setoff and Recoupment in Bankruptcy", 820 PLI/Comm 279,281(200 1). 
Malloy, M., "Note, Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a Changing World", 62 Fordham. 
L. Rev. (1994). 
Maloney, M., "Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation", 37 XECON 
(1994). 
Manne, H., "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control", 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965). 
Markell, B., "A View from the Field: Some Observations on the Effect of International 
Commercial Law Reform on the Rule of Law", 6 Ind. J. Global Leg. S. (1999). 
Markell, B., "Changes in Attitudes, Changes in Platitudes: A Short Examination of Non- 
Uniform Approaches to Business Insolvency", 6 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 35,37 (1998). 
Marsh, G., "The Many Faces of Directors' Fiduciary Duties", 22-SEP Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 
(2003). 
Mayer, J., Et. al., "Recharacterization from Debt to Equity: Lenders Beware", ABI JNL. 
LEXIS 205 (2003). 
McConnell, J. and Servaes, H., "The Economics of Pre-Packaged Bankruptcy", Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 4. (1991). 
McDonnell, S., "Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors' Burden 
Fonn Shareholders to Creditors", 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177 (1994). 
McGeorge, R., "An Introduction and Commentary: Revisiting the Role of Liberal Trade Policy 
in Promoting Idealistic Objectives of The International Legal Order", 14 N. 111. U. L. Rev. 
(1994). 
Mie, F., "Japan's New Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency 
Proceedings", ABI Journal, (July/August 2001). 
Miguens, H. J., "Liability of a Parent Corporation for the Obligations of an Insolvent 




Miles, L. Jr., Et. al., "Choosing a Liquidator and Negotiating the Fees", 16-SEP Am. Bankr. 
Inst. J. (1997). 
Miller, Sandra, "Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European 
Community and in the US: A Comparative Analysis of US, German, and UK Veil Piercing 
Approaches", 36 Am. Bus. L. J. (1998). 
Mitchell, J., "The Economics of Insolvency in Reforming Socialist Economies", 84 Columbia 
Law Review (1990). 
Montfort, R., and Pelletier, L., "European Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies: Status of French 
Practice after the E. U. Regulation", 23-APR Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 28 (2004). 
Morgan, B., "Should the sovereign be paid first? A Comparative International Analysis of the 
Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy", 74 Am. Bkr. LJ (2000). 
Mosoti, V., "Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on 
Investment at the World Trade Organization: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between? ", 26 
NWJILB (2005). 
Muchlinski P., "Corporations in International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the 
United Kingdom Asbestos Cases"', 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1,6 
(2001). 
Murphy, P., "Why Won't The Leaders Lead? The Need for National Governments To Replace 
Academics and Practitioners In The Effort To Reform The Muddled World of International 
Insolvency", 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 121 (2002). 
Nadelmann, Kurt, "Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News from the Common Market and a Reflection 
for Home Consumption7,56 Am. Bankr. L. J. (1982). 
Nadelmann, Kurt, "International Bankruptcy Law: Its Present Status", 5 U. TORONTO L. J. 
324,351 (1944). 
Nichols, P., "Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of the World 
Trade Organizations Authority", 28 NYU J Intl L& Pol (1996). 
Nielsen, A., and Sigal, M., "The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate 
the Resolution of International Insolvencies", 70 Am. Bankr. L. J. (1996). 
Nielsen, Anne and Sigal, M., "The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate 




Nogueras, D., Et. Al., "Human Rights Conditionality in the External Trade of the European 
Union: Legal And Legitimacy Problems", 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. (2001). 
Norton, W. Jr., "Chapter 152. International Insolvencies: Fundamental Principles of Cross- 
Border Insolvencies in the United States", NRTN-BLP § 152: 1(2003). 
Norton, W. Jr., "Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat", NRTN-BLP § 152: 66 (1994). 
Omar, P., "International Insolvency Co-Operation: The UNCITRAL Model Law", (May 25, 
2000), available at http: //www. mlj. com. my/articles/P. Omarl. htm. 
Paulus, G., "The New Genman Insolvency Code", 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 1 (1998). 
Perez, A., "The International Recognition of Judgments: The Debate Between Private and 
Public Law Solutions", 19 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 44, (200 1). 
Perkins, L., "A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border", Corporate Insolvencies, 32 
N. Y. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. (2000). 
Peters, A., "Overview of International Securities Regulation the International Securities 
Market: Issues of Regulation and Taxation", 6 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 229, (1988). 
Petermann, Emst-Ulrich, "How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for 
the Benefit of Civil Society? ", 20 Mich J. Int'l L. 1 (1998). 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, "The WTO Constitution and 'Human Rights", 3 J. Int'l Econ. L. 19 
(2000). 
Peterson, L., "Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable 
Development", International Institute for Sustainable Development (2003). 
Pickholz, Marvin G., "Civil Disclosure and Freezing Orders: Recovering Property From 
Overseas", Dickinson Journal of International Law 13, no. 3 (1995). 
Plank, T., "The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy", 63 Tenn. L. Rev. (1996). 
Povel, P., "Optimal Soft and Tough Bankruptcy Procedures", 15 J. Law, Econ. & Organization 
(1999). 
Pulvino, Todd, "Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Assets Sales", 52 J. Finance & 
Economics (1999). 
Quittner, A., "Cross-Border Insolvencies-Ancillary and Full Cases: The Concurrent Japanese 
and United States Cases of Maruko Inc. ", 4 INTL INSOLVENCY REV. 171 (1995). 
296 
Bibliography. 
Quittner, A., Maxwell Communications and Cross-Border Insolvency Issues, 752 PLI/Comm 
647, (1997). 
Quittner, Arnold M., "Maxwell Communications and Cross-border Insolvency Issues", 
Practising Law Institute Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 752 (1997). 
Rajak, H., "Rescue Versus Liquidation in Central And Eastern Europe", 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 157 
(1998). 
Raj ak, R., "The harmonization of insolvency proceedings in the European Union", Company 
Financial and Insolvency Law Review, N' 2,180-196 (2002). 
Rammeskow, U., "Asset Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability 
and Protection of Local Interests", 73 Am. Bankr. L. J. (1999). 
Rasmussen, Robert K., "A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies", 19 Mich. J. Inter. L 
(1997). 
Rasmussen, Robert K., "Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy", Texas 
L. Review. (1992). 
Rasmussen, Robert K., "The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment 
Incentives", 72 Wash. U. L. Q. (1994). 
Rasmussen, Robert K., and Skeel, D., "The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy", 3 
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. (1995). 
Ray, E., "Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff 
Barriers", 8 NW. J. INTI L. & BUS. 285 (1987). 
Reed, A., "A New Model Of Jurisdictional Propriety For Anglo-American Foreign Judgment 
Recognition And Enforcement: Something Old, Something Borrowed, Something New? ", 25 
Loy. L. A. Int'l. & Comp. L. Rev. (2003). 
Reich, A., "The WTO As a Law-Harmonizing Institution", 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 321 
(2004). 
Reilly, M., "The Latent Efficiency of Fraudulent Transfer Law", 57 La. L. Rev. (1997). 
Reilly, R., Et. al., "How to Value Assets and Liabilities When Determining Insolvency Under 
the IRC", ABI JNL. LEXIS 112, (200 1). 
Resnick, Alan N., "Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort 
Liability"), 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. Review 64, No. 6 (1996). 
297 
Bibliography. 
Richard, G., and Flaschen, E., "The International Void in the Law of Multinational 
Bankruptcies", 42 Business Law R. (1987). 
Roe, J., "Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy, Priority, and 
Economics", 75 VA. L. REV. 219 (1989). 
Roe, M., "Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganizations, Columbia Law 
Review", 83 (1993). 
Roe, M., Commentary on "The Nature of Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics", 
75 Va. L. Rev. (1989). 
Roessler, F., "Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration", in Jagdish 
Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds, Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free 
Trade? Vol 2: Legal Analysis 21,36 (MIT 1996). 
Roessler, F., "Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the 
Past", 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L (1998). 
Rowat, Malcolm, and Astigarraga, J., "Latin American Insolvency Systems: 
A Comparative Assessment", World Bank Technical Paper, No. 433. Washington, D. C.: 
World Bank, (1999). 
Sandez, Christine, "The Extension of Comity to Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings: 
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S. A. ", North Carolina Journal of 
International Law & Commercial Regulation 20, No. 3 (1995). 
Sargent, P., "Bankruptcy Remote Finance Subsidiaries: The Substantive Consolidation Issue", 
44 Bus. Law. (1989). 
Sawyer, Sylvia Renee, "Upstream, Overseas, and Underwater: When a Foreign 
Subsidiary Files Bankruptcy in the United States, Which Legal Standards Control the 
Treatment of an Upstream Guaranty? ", Loyola of Los Angeles International & 
Comparative Law Journal 17, No. 2 (1995). 
Schenck, W., "Jurisdiction over the Foreign Multinational in The EEC: Lifting the Veil on the 
Economic Entity Theory", II UPAJIBL 495 (1989). 
Schollmeyer, E., "The New European Convention on International Insolvency", 13 Bankr. 
Dev. J. (1997). 
Schwartz, A., "A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy", Yale L. Journal (1998). 
Schwartz, A., "Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed", 109 Yale L. Journal (1999). 
298 
Bibliography. 
Schwartz, A., "Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts", 6 J. Law & Econ (1993). 
Schwartz, A., "Contracting About Bankruptcy", 13 J. Law, Econ. & Organization (1997). 
Scott, R., "Sharing the Risks of Bankruptcy: Timbers, Ahlers, and Beyond", 1989 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. (1989). 
Segal, N., "The Choice of Law Provisions in The European Union Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings", 17 Bankr. Dev. J. (1997). 
Serrano, MR, "International Arbitration and Insolvency Proceedings", Arbitration 
International 11, No. I (1995). 
Shaffer, G., "WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U. S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, 
Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO's Future", 24 Fordham, Intl LJ 608,647-48 (2000). 
Shandro, S., "Italian Law Reform", 24-OCT Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 18,18 (2005). 
Shinichiro, Abe, "Recent Developments of Insolvency Laws and Cross-Border Practices in 
The United States and Japan", 10 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 47, (2002). 
Silverman, R., "International Law Weekend Proceedings: Advances in Cross-Border 
Insolvency Cooperation: The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency", 6 ILSA 
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265 (2000). 
Silverman, R., Et al., "Second Circuit Explores Parameters of Ancillary Jurisdiction", ABI 
JNL. LEXIS 87, (2001). 
Skeel, A., Jr., "An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy", 51 
Vand. L. Rev. (1998). 
Skeel, A., Jr., "Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory", Wis. L. 
Rev. (1993). 
Sorell, L., Et al., "Changes to U. S. Patent Law Under GATT: Summary and Practice 
Recommendations", 426 Practising L. Inst. 95 (1995). 
Sprayregen, J., Et al., "International Issues: Are You Ready for the New European Union 
Regulations? ", 041802 ABI-CLE 287 (2002). 
Steger, D., "Afterword: The "Trade and Conundrum- A Commentary", 96 Am J Intl L 
(2002). 
Tagashira, S., "Intra-teffitorial Effects of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings: An Analysis of 
299 
Bibliography. 
"Ancillary" Proceedings in the United States and Japan", Tex. Int'l L. J. 1, (1994). 
Tay, D., "Insolvencies without Frontiers: The Emergence of the Cross-Border Protocol", 
Insolvency institute of Canada (1999), available at: 
http: //www. globalinsolvency. com/insol/lýntinsolvencies/overview. html 
Tene, 0., "Revisiting the Creditor's Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concem Surplus in 
Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations", 19 Bankr. Dev. J. (2003). 
Trautman, D. T., "Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings", HARV. Inter. L. J. 
(1989). 
Trost, J., "Roger G. Schwartz & Sidley & Austin, Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Insolvent 
Corporations", SD24 ALI-ABA 87 (1998). 
Tung, Frederick, "Fear of commitment in International Bankruptcy: The Political 
Implausibility of Universalism", 33 Geo. Wash. Int'L L. Rev. (2001). 
Tung, Frederick, "Is International Bankruptcy Possible", 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. (2001). 
Tung, Frederick, "Skepticism about Universalism: International Bankruptcy and International 
Relations", 127 Harvard Law Review (200 1). 
Unt, Lore, "International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: Liberalism, 
Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue", Law and Policy and International 
Business vol. 28 (1997). 
Vagts, D., "The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law", 83 Ham 
L. Rev. 739 (1970). 
Vagts, Detlev F., "The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 
Harvard Law Review", 83, (1970). 
Van Themaat, P., "Some Preliminary Observations on the Intergovernmental Conferences: 
The Relations between the Concepts of a Common Market, a Monetary Union, an Economic 
Union, a Political Union and Sovereignty", 28 Common Mkt. L. Rev. (199 1). 
Van Themaat, P., "The Changing Structure of international Economic LaNv', 2 Minn. J. Global 
Trade (1999). 
Vukowich, W., "Civil Remedies in Bankruptcy for Corporate Fraud", 6 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. 
Rev. 439 (1998). 
Warner, Jerold B., "Bankruptcy costs: Some evidence", Journal of Finance 32 (1997). 
300 
Bibliography. 
Warren, E., "Bankruptcy Policy", 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1987). 
Warren, E., and Westbrook, J., "Financial Characteristics of Business in Insolvency", 73 Am. 
Bankr. L. J. 499,524 tbl. 2A (1999). 
Warren, Elizabeth and Westbrook, J., "Financial Characteristics of Business in Bankruptcy", 
73 Am. Bankr. L. J. (1999). 
Watt, H., "Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political 
Economy", 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. (2003). 
Weinberg, J., "What Are U. S. Creditors' Rights? ", 20 No. 7 BKRST 3 (2003). 
Weiss, L., "Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims", 27 J. 
Finan. Eco. (1990). 
Wessels, B., "European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings", 20-Nov. Am. Bankr. 
Inst. J. 24, (200 1). 
Wessels, B., "Primer on the New European Insolvency Framework", 17-AUG Am. Bankr. 
Inst. J. 12 (1998). 
Wessels, B., "Principles of European Insolvency LaNV', 22-SEP Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 28 (2003). 
Westbrook, J., "A Global Solution to Multinational Default", 98 Mich. L. Rev. (2000). 
Westbrook, J., "Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies", 65 Am. Bankr. L. J. (1991). 
Westbrook, J., "Creating International Insolvency LaNV', 70 AMBKRLJ 563 (1996). 
Westbrook, J., "International Bankruptcy Approaches Chapter 15", N. Y. L. J. (2005) 
Westbrook, J., "Japan's New Cross-Border Insolvency Law", 1112 Kinyu Shoji (2001). 
Westbrook, J., "Modeling International Bankruptcy", Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law 
(1998). 
Westbrook, J., "Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The Ali Principles, 
and The EU Insolvency Regulation", 76 Am. Bankr. L. J. 1 (2002). 
Westbrook, J., "The American Law Institute NAFTA Insolvency Project", . 23 




Westbrook, J., "The Globalisation of Insolvency Reform", New Zealand L. Rev. (2000). 
Westbrook, J., "The Lessons of Maxwell Communications", Fordham L. Rev. (1996). 
Westbrook, J., "The Transnational Insolvency Project of the American Law Institute", 17 
Conn. J. Int. L. (2001). 
Westbrook, J., "Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum", 65 Am. Br. L. J. (1991). 
Westbrook, J., "Universal Priorities", 33 Tex. Ind L. J. (1998). 
Westbrook, J., and Trautman, T., "Conflict of Laws Issues in International Insolvencies", in 
Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (1994). 
Westbrook, J., and Ziegel, J., "The American Law Institute NAFTA Insolvency Project", 23 
BROOKLYN J. INTL L. 7,12 (1997). 
White, M., "Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code", Journal of Finance. 38 (1983). 
White, M., "Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules", II Bell J. 
Econ. 550 (1980). 
White, M., "The corporate bankruptcy decision", Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (1989). 
William, Tetley, "Conflicts of Law Between the Bankruptcy Courts in Admiralty: Canada, 
United Kingdom", United States, and France, Tulane Maritime Law Journal 20, No. 2 (1996). 
Williams, J., "Application of the Cash Collateral Paradigm to the Preservation of the Right to 
Setoff in Bankruptcy", 7 Bankr. Dev. J. 27 (1990). 
Wolfgang, Lueke, "The New European Law on International Insolvencies: A German 
Perspective", 17 Bankr. Dev. J. 369 (2001). 
Wruck, K., "Financial Distress, Reorganization, and Organizational Efficiency", Journal of 
Financial Economics, 27 (1990). 
Yannopoulos, G., "World Shipping: Between Liberalism and Protectionism", 14 N. C. J. Intl L. 
& Com. Reg. 45 (1989). 
Yard, A., "Insolvency Law in the International COntexf', Metro. Corp. Counsel (1996). 
Zinman, R., Et. al., "Fraudulent Transfers According To Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of 
302 
Bibliography. 
Two Circuits", 39 Bus. Law. (1984). 
Zwaig, M., "Developments and Trends in United States/Canada Cross-Border 
Reorganizations", 9j. Bankr. L. & Prac. (2001). 
303 
